Over the last twenty-five years, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff have developed a groundbreaking interpretation of Marxian theory generally and of Marxian economics in particular. This book brings together their key contributions and underscores their different interpretations. In facing and trying to resolve contradictions and lapses within Marxism, the authors have confronted the basic incompatibilities among the dominant modern versions of Marxian theory, and the fact that Marxism seemed cut off from the criticisms of determinist modes of thought (...) offered by post-structuralism and post-modernism and even by some of Marxisms greatest theorists. (shrink)

This article assesses the relevance today of two different kinds of Marxism : traditional, “classical” or determinist Marxism and non-traditional or overdeterminist Marxism. These two Marxisms are compared and contrasted to show how and why they yield different notions of socialism and communism, class, the place of economics in Marxism, causation, and epistemology. The authors explain why the overdeterminist version is preferred to the determinist and what this choice suggests about a new Marxian politics for the 21st century. The latter (...) aims to yield a society with a new kind of economic freedom for workers : one in they collectively receive and distribute the gross profits they produce. (shrink)

The existence and unity of a discipline called economics reside in the eye and mind of the beholder. The perception of economics's unity and disciplinarity itself arises in some, but not all, of the different schools of thought that we would loosely categorize as economic. Indeed, as we hope to show, the presumption of unity and disciplinarity—the idea that there is a center or “core” of propositions, procedures, and conclusions or a shared historical “object” of theory and practice—is suggested in (...) the concepts and methods of some schools of economic thought, but is opposed by others. Further, we argue that the portrayal of economics as a discipline with distinct boundaries is often a discursive strategy by one school or another to hegemonize the field of economic discourse. In this way, the issue of the existence of an economics discipline and its principles of unity or dispersion is in part a political question. Its effects are felt in the hiring and firing of economics professors and practitioners, the determination of what comprises an economics curriculum, the determination of what is a legitimate economic argument and what is not, the dispensation of public and private grant monies, and the differential entry into or exclusion from ideological, political, and economic centers of power and decision making.Our view is that no discipline of economics exists. Or, rather, no unified discipline exists. The “discipline” of economics is actually an agonistic and shifting field of fundamentally different and often conflicting discourses. The dispersion and divisions that exist between the schools of thought we discuss here as “economic” may have some regularities. But we do not see closer contiguity of these economic schools when placed on a horizontal scale than, to take just one example, among all of the many different "disciplinary" forms of Marxian thought. That is, in our view, Marxian economic thought shares more concepts, approaches, and methods—may have more discursive regularity—with Marxian literary theory than do Marxian economic thought and neoclassical economic theory. Jack Amariglio is associate professor of economics at Merrimack College and the editor of Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture, and Society. He is working on a book entitled Modernism and Postmodernism in Economics with Arjo Klamer. Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff are professors of economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Their recent coauthored books are Knowledge and Class: A Marxian Critique of Political Economy and Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical. (shrink)

What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...) construction of a minimal theory of mind. Minimal theory of mind is rich enough to explain systematic success on tasks held to be acid tests for theory of mind cognition including many false belief tasks. Yet minimal theory of mind does not require representing propositional attitudes, or any other kind of representation, as such. Minimal theory of mind may be what enables those with limited cognitive resources or little conceptual sophistication, such as infants, chimpanzees, scrub-jays and human adults under load, to track others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs. (shrink)

The unique discourse of Confucian ritual practice encompasses a powerful and sophisticated way of talking about individual fulfillment within the context of more substantive or universal conceptions of the good life. To make this case, I will consider both the text of the "Analects" and the influential readings of the "Analects" offered by Fingarette in "Confucius: The Secular as Sacred" and by Hall and Ames in "Thinking through Confucius". Though the two interpretive works are helpful in articulating the classical Confucian (...) contribution to the problem of balancing conformity and individuality, I will argue that an alternative reading is required to appreciate fully how values thought to embody and express the fullest humanity might be inculcated in ethical agents without undoing their individuality. Such an alternative is developed here. (shrink)

What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...) construction of a minimal theory of mind. Minimal theory of mind is rich enough to explain systematic success on tasks held to be acid tests for theory of mind cognition including many false belief tasks. Yet minimal theory of mind does not require representing propositional attitudes, or any other kind of representation, as such. Minimal theory of mind may be what enables those with limited cognitive resources or little conceptual sophistication, such as infants, chimpanzees, scrub‐jays and human adults under load, to track others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs. (shrink)

Scientific peer reviewers play an integral role in the grant selection process, yet very little has been reported on the levels of participation or the motivations of scientists to take part in peer review. The American Institute of Biological Sciences developed a comprehensive peer review survey that examined the motivations and levels of participation of grant reviewers. The survey was disseminated to 13,091 scientists in AIBS’s proprietary database. Of the 874 respondents, 76% indicated they had reviewed grant applications in the (...) last 3 years; however, the number of reviews was unevenly distributed across this sample. Higher review loads were associated with respondents who had submitted more grant proposals over this time period, some of whom were likely to be study section members for large funding agencies. The most prevalent reason to participate in a review was to give back to the scientific community and the most common reason to decline an invitation to review was lack of time. Interestingly, few suggested that expectation from the funding agency was a motivation to review. Most felt that review participation positively influenced their careers through improving grantsmanship and exposure to new scientific ideas. Of those who reviewed, respondents reported dedicating 2–5% of their total annual work time to grant review and, based on their self-reported maximum review loads, it is estimated they are participating at 56–87% of their capacity, which may have important implications regarding the sustainability of the system. Overall, it is clear that participation in peer review is uneven and in some cases near capacity, and more needs to be done to create new motivations and incentives to increase the future pool of reviewers. (shrink)

Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others. Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman 1992), lifting.

Traces the rise and fall of successive international systems from medieval times to the present, showing how international order is created, how it is maintained, and why it breaks down.

Sensitivity to others’ actions is essential for social animals like humans and a fundamental requirement for any kind of social cognition. Unsurprisingly, it is present in humans from early in the first year of life. But what processes underpin infants’ sensitivity to others’ actions? Any attempt to answer this question must solve twin puzzles about the development of goal tracking. Why does some, but not all, of infants’ goal tracking appear to be limited by their abilities to represent the observed (...) action motorically at the time it occurs? And why does their sensitivity to action sometimes manifest itself differently in dishabituation, pupil dilation and anticipatory looking? Solving these twin puzzles is critical for understanding humans’ earliest sensitivity to others’ actions. After introducing the puzzles, this paper argues that solving them may require identifying multiple, distinct processes for tracking the targets and goals of actions. (shrink)

SummaryThe Admonition Controversy, largely between Thomas Cartwright and John Whitgift has proven fecund ground for intellectual historians analysing the religious dimension to early-modern political ideas. This paper argues that the religious dimension of Cartwright's mixed constitutionalism needs better explanation, rather than just noting that his ecclesiastical mixed constitutionalism mirrors his political mixed constitutionalism. This paper tracks Cartwright's progressive, dialogical unfolding of his mixed constitutionalism in response to Whitgift's attempt to derive episcopacy from the fact of English monarchy, effectively discrediting the (...) Admonition to Parliament. Furthermore, the essay outlines how the Cartwright–Whitgift debate led Cartwright to emphasise a parliamentarist mixed constitution when most of his contemporaries, especially the more famous mixed constitutionalist, Thomas Smith, portrayed the English parliament leaning noticeably towards the monarch. This analysis accepts that religious polemic was a major driving force in the normalisation of parliamentarism, yet seeks to show exactly how this worked out in one of the most important church–state disputes in Elizabethan England. (shrink)

What is Christian about Christian bioethics? And is an authentically Christian bioethics a practical possibility in the world in which we find ourselves? In my essay I argue that personhood and the personal are so fundamental to the Christian understanding of our humanity that body, soul, and spirit are probably best understood as the components of a triune (as opposed to dual) aspect theory of personhood. To confess to a Christian bioethics is to admit that Christians cannot pretend fully to (...) understand either cures or their meaning. However effective and “knowledge-based” contemporary medical interventions are, a Christian must humbly and honestly confess a lack of complete knowledge on both levels. At the same time, a Christian bioethicist must express a total personal commitment to Christian Faith. (shrink)

In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.

The development of children’s minds raises fundamental psychological and scientific questions, from how we are able to know about and describe basic aspects of the world such as words, numbers and colours to how we come to grasp causes, actions and intentions. This is the first book to properly introduce and examine philosophical questions concerning children’s cognitive development and considers the implications of scientific breakthroughs for the philosophy of developmental psychology. Each chapter explores a central topic in developmental psychology from (...) a philosophical perspective: social interaction and the developing mind children's awareness of objects and the question of 'object permanence' knowledge of numbers children and the acquisition of knowledge of colour language acquisition and the 'mapping problem' children's knowledge of the relation between actions and goals belief acquisition and the developing mind. Throughout the book Stephen Butterfill draws on several important case studies, including experiments with children on memory, ‘false belief tasks’, and the process by which children come to see other people, not just themselves, as capable of experience. He shows how these questions can illuminate some fundamental debates in philosophy of mind, such as the mind’s possession of concepts, rationality and the mind, the possibility of objective thought, and the nature of perceptual experience. Additional features, such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary provide helpful tools for those coming to the subject for the first time. (shrink)

Pompey does not accept defeat at Pharsalus. Rather, in an effort to gain support from powers beyond Rome, he makes for Egypt and, unbeknownst to him, his decapitation. As narrated in Lucan'sBellum ciuile, after deliberating in Cilicia with his senatorial advisers (8.259–455), Pompey stops at the island of Cyprus (8.456–9):tum Cilicum liquere solum Cyproque citatasimmisere rates, nullas cui praetulit arasundae diua memor Paphiae, si numina nascicredimus aut quemquam fas est coepisse deorum.Then they left the Cilician soil and steered their vessels (...) in haste for Cyprus—Cyprus which the goddess, mindful of Paphian waves, prefers to any of her shrines (if we believe that deities have birth, or if it is lawful to hold that any of the gods had a beginning).In Lucan, Pompey's trip to Cyprus is brief and includes a somewhat curious reference to Venus (diua), her origins (undae … Paphiae) and the birth of the gods. Other authors also record Pompey's visit to Cyprus, although the details vary. Some, including Julius Caesar, set his deliberations not in Cilicia but on Cyprus itself (Caes.BCiu.3.102.3.1–8.1; cf. Plut.Vit. Pomp. 77.1.1–2.1). Others, it seems, provide few if any details of Pompey at the island, for example the scanty evidence from Livy,Per. 112.1–10. (shrink)

Morain and colleagues (Morain et al. 2019) propose two conditions for avoiding role conflicts: if “(A) research participation would not substantially disadvantage the patient as compared with usual...

Presents close analysis of eight of Francis Bacon's texts in order to investigate the relation of his religious views to his instauration. Attempts to correct the persistent misconception of Bacon as a secular modern who dismissed religion in order to promote the human advancement of knowledge"--Provided by publisher.

Clearchus of Soloi, a junior colleague of Aristotle's, devoted a work in at least two books to the topic of eros. Like most of what survives from his once substantial corpus, the remains of this work display wide learning, especially in history and literature, and a moralizing orientation. The work did not circulate widely; all that survives is a handful of passages in Athenaeus (frs. 21-35 Wehrli), most very brief. That is far too little to permit any reconstruction of its (...) overall structure or scope. But some of its interests and themes can be recovered. Clearchus discussed love, especially between the sexes, with more sympathy and subtlety than previous scholarship has recognized. His work on eros also appears to have been largely in tune with trends in early Hellenistic poetry. (shrink)

The argument of this paper develops in four stages. In the first I expose two fundamental and at the same time highly problematical questions which serve as points of departure for Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. In the second stage I set forth an answer which serves to unite the two questions and reveal their interpenetration. This answer assumes the form of an explication of the fundamental structure of experience. The third stage serves as a justification of this procedure by (...) showing why the answer takes the form it does. This is accomplished by uncovering the basic ontological dimension presupposed in the answer and elaborating its development. The fourth and final stage is a repetition of the initial question in the light of this uncovering, and is done with a view toward recasting the answer in a more fundamental way. I think this outline will become clear in its intent, and will be seen to be in a peculiar way inevitable as the argument proceeds. (shrink)

The argument of this paper develops in four stages. In the first I expose two fundamental and at the same time highly problematical questions which serve as points of departure for Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. In the second stage I set forth an answer which serves to unite the two questions and reveal their interpenetration. This answer assumes the form of an explication of the fundamental structure of experience. The third stage serves as a justification of this procedure by (...) showing why the answer takes the form it does. This is accomplished by uncovering the basic ontological dimension presupposed in the answer and elaborating its development. The fourth and final stage is a repetition of the initial question in the light of this uncovering, and is done with a view toward recasting the answer in a more fundamental way. I think this outline will become clear in its intent, and will be seen to be in a peculiar way inevitable as the argument proceeds. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 293 graphies, which put the individual thinkers and their works into their proper doctrinal context, are very welcome. Noack tries to be, and is, fair. We saw that he even tries to find a common ground between phenomenological and analytical philosophy. He does not reject the latter at the outset. He is objective within the limits of his philosophical upbringing and his historical background. MAx RIESZR New (...) YorIc City Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics. An Introduction to His Thought. By George Joseph Seidel, O. S. B. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964. Pp. x + 169.) Seidel's book, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Soeratics, is a carefully documented explication of Heidegger's interpretations of Parnmnides and Heraclitus. Beyond this it attempts and in large measure succeeds in giving an account of tteidegger's understanding of the western philosophical tradition as originated and at the same time fatefully misled by the Greeks. Seidel intends his study to be an introduction to Heidegger's thought. For purposes of evaluation I will divide my remarks into three major categories: (1) Seidel's work as an introduction to Heidegger's philosophy, (2) Seidel's work as an account of Heidegger's philosophy, and (3) the value of the work to the historian of philosophy and to the philosopher. Seidel's rejections of various al~rnative approaches to Heidegger's thought are somewhat contrived and not terribly convincing, which brings into question the author's claim tt~at Heidegger is approached least prejudicially through his interpretations of the presocratics. There are I think even more compelling reasons for rejecting Seidel's claim. In fact, there are strong reasons for rejecting his approach. I shall deal with them shortly. The author rejects an approach to Heidegger through Heidegger's Kantbuch (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysilc) because of the difficulty involved in disentangling Kant's views, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's views, and Heidegger's own views as revealed in these interpretations. The same difficulty, however, pertains with respect to YIeidegger's interpretations of Parmenides and Heraclitus, though I suspect classical scholars will react with no small degree of indignation to the suggestion that Heidegger's interpretations of these thinkers are not easily distinguishable from what they actually said. To give but one more example, Seidel rejects an approach to tIeidegger through Hegel on the grounds that the similarities holding between the two thinkers tends to blind one to their essential differences. Now if this were truly the case, and I seriously doubt that it is, it is a very sad commentary on the capacities of historians and scholars of German philosophy. Leaving aside the fact that the reasons offered for the purpose of eliminating various alternative approaches to tteidegger are dubious, let us consider Seidel's own approach. There are at least two strong reasons for rejecting it. To begin with, it is indispensable to an understanding of Heidegger's "conversations" with past thinkers that his views on the nature of the history of philosophy be grasped. This in turn involves a commentator in that nest. of problems which center in and around I]eidegger's understanding of the nature of history. This leads one back ultimately to a discussion of Heidegger's conception of time and of temporality, for it is temporality that grounds and makes intelligible historicity and with it those sets of happenings which come to be understood as historical. Heidegger makes clear in Sein und Zeit that a proper understanding of time is necessary not only for the articulation of Being, but that it is the indespensable horizon in terms of which a phenomenological destruction--and, one might add, understanding--of the history of ontology is possible. Now Seidel is by no means unaware of this, but nonetheless he fails to give us any more than a sketchy account of Heidegger's understanding of time and temporality, and he gives us little more information with respect to history and historicity. The information he does give--at least in the case of history--is accurate enough, but it lacks that amplification and care for detail that would permit us a comprehension of the nature and significance of Heidegger... (shrink)