Research on the neurobiology and psychosocial features of Major Depressive Disorder has the ability to extend our understanding of affiliative behavior. In depression, decreased hedonic capacity and hypoactivity in dopaminergic and prefrontal circuitries may decrease the ability to experience affiliative relationships as rewarding. We suggest that neurobiological research on depression can provide a test case for theoretical models of affiliation.

By emphasizing nonlinear dynamics between appraisal and emotions, Lewis's model provides a valuable platform for integrating psychological and neural perspectives on the emotion-cognition interface. In this commentary, I discuss the role of neuroscience in shaping new conceptualizations of emotion and the putative role of theta oscillation within frontocingulate pathways in depression, a syndrome in which emotion-cognition relations are dysfunctional.

Research on emotion and emotion regulation is expected to improve our understanding of psychopathology. However, achieving this understanding requires overcoming several obstacles, including the paucity of objective markers of specific emotions or psychiatric diagnoses, and the fact that emotion regulation is a concept that can be difficult to operationalize. We review affective neuroscience research that has addressed these issues by focusing on psychological and neural mechanisms implicated in approach and avoidance behaviors, as revealed by studies of fear, anxiety, and reward (...) processing. Dysfunction in these mechanisms may serve as risk markers for psychopathology, while emotion regulation research demonstrates that some of them are susceptible to volitional control. The conclusion acknowledges limitations of affective neuroscience and highlights goals for future work. (shrink)

Through the explorations of excellent scholars, this book provides a new understanding of Plato's _Theaetetus_, an absolute masterpiece which contains fundamental insights – about the nature of human cognition, perception, rationality – which are still at the centre of the contemporary debate.

The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true (...) of w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A” as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. (shrink)

The stability of the perfect screw dislocation in silicon has been investigated using both classical potentials and first-principles calculations. Although a recent study by Koizumi et al . stated that the stable screw dislocation was located in both the 'shuffle' and the 'glide' sets of {111} planes, it is shown that this result depends on the classical potential used, and that the most stable configuration belongs to the 'shuffle' set only, in the centre of one hexagon. We also investigated the (...) stability of an sp 2 hybridization in the core of the dislocation, obtained for one metastable configuration in the 'glide' set. The core structures are characterized in several ways, with a description of the three-dimensional structure, differential displacement maps and derivatives of the disregistry. (shrink)

O inconsciente, a grande descoberta freudiana, foi o responsável por toda a composição da teoria psicanalítica. Como toda teoria, passou por adaptações de acordo com as descobertas de Freud, que se via na necessidade de reestabelecer as regras e os meios de funcionamento do aparelho psíquico. Através das antinomias pulsionais, das topologias relativas ao inconsciente e, em particular, da melancolia como pivô entre tópicas, mostraremos como Freud possibilita pensar não só as consequências da perda objetal, mas como esta influencia na (...) composição do Eu. Elegendo-a como fundamental à instauração da segunda tópica, advogaremos que é a partir da melancolia que Freud nos permite compreender o Eu como descentrado e despossuído por uma “cena outra” que o coloca numa situação perpetuamente deficitária. Do advento da segunda tópica, defenderemos que Freud foi capaz de desvelar um Eu que é, também, inconsciente. (shrink)

Dos estudos que Merleau-Ponty dedica à noção de corpo, este projeto versará sobre os modos como a relação entre sexualidade e existência pode ser compreendida à luz de uma reinterpretação ontológica e fenomenológica da psicanálise freudiana. Com efeito, a partir de Três Ensaios sobre e Teoria da Sexualidade, veremos, num primeiro instante, como os atos humanos não são determinados apenas por um inconsciente falho e involuntário; dado que as produções do inconsciente do outro influem sobre as fontes do inconsciente subjetivo (...) (e vice-versa), em Freud o teor destes atos possuiriam antes uma significação pulsional de ordem sexual e conflitiva que se estenderia da infância (onde é predominantemente polimorfa, perversa e autoerótica) à vida adulta (onde coloca-se à serviço da função reprodutora, sob o primado da zona genital) e que, objetiva e causal, deveria ser medida e direcionada para mantermos, em termos de economia libidinal, o controle de nossa vida sexual frente a ordem social. No entanto, haveria, aí, algo censurável, pois, se o analista – ao refletir sobre sua pratica – serve-se de uma teoria formulada em terceira pessoa e se distancia do discurso produzido em primeira pessoa pelo consulente, a sexualidade seria antes uma força biológica que, distante, determinaria as ações humanas. Assim, se desejamos devolver a vida mental ao mundo da vida sem, contudo, perder o aspecto essencialmente sexual de nossos desejos e paixões, será em Maurice Merleau-Ponty onde estes atos não serão mais objetos de contemplação, e sim vivências que, em carne e osso, expressam a maneira pela qual co-pertencemos a um mundo inter-humano. Para este, o corpo – nem puramente objetivista, nem puramente subjetivista – remete à nossa forma ampla de inserção no mundo da vida: na junção entre natureza e liberdade, é potência exploratória e é por ele que o ser vai ao mundo. E se assim o for, a partir de obras como A Estrututra do Comportamento, Fenomenologia da Percepção, O Visível e o Invisível, etc., o mesmo só pode ser compreendido a partir da relação que mantem com outras realidades sensíveis, para além de uma experiência para mim. Será preciso, portanto, considerar a afetividade e a sexualidade como modos de ser que evidenciam nossa relação com as coisas (partes constituintes do nosso trato com o mundo), sem apresentar-se independente da infraestrutura existencial humana. Partindo da própria estrutura psicanalítica, a obra de Merleau-Ponty revelará, na sexualidade, uma atmosfera que não é nem transcendência da vida humana, nem imagem de representações conscientes ou inconscientes, mas coextensiva à vida. Evitando certos pressupostos segundo os quais a sexualidade – seguindo uma causalidade própria – determinaria as demais esferas da vida, veremos que grande parte dos problemas descritos pela psicanalise não remetem necessariamente à uma estrutura sexual, mas estão antes ligados à atitude geral de ser no mundo, que envolve sempre o campo sexual. Posta de bases fenomenológicas, veremos, portanto, que a reinterpretação de Merleau-Ponty acerca da sexualidade não apenas devolve o ser a sua vivência de mundo, como dissolve a ideia de uma identidade estática e objetiva, pois esta, sendo corpo no mundo em relação com a alteridade, será sempre implícita e misteriosa. (shrink)

This article analyzes the notion of malaise resulting from the tension impulses between individuals and cultures, according to the results achieved by Freud's psychoanalytic reflexes. Despite certain moments in his work, it is possible to envision a certain possibility of emancipation of the individual through reflection or clinical analysis itself, or the psychoanalyst does not fail to notice a certain entropy present not only in the human being, but in the whole being alive. It is a movement within the organism (...) itself that leads to its exhaustion, meeting its demand in decline. (shrink)

Dos estudos que Maurice Merleau-Ponty dedica à noção de corpo, este artigo versa sobre os modos como a questão da sexualidade pode ser compreendida. Com efeito, dentro desta perspectiva, o corpo não se confunde com aquilo que se pode pensar dela a partir de uma perspectiva tanto objetivista quanto subjetivista, mas diz respeito à nossa forma ampla de inserção no mundo da vida. Na junção entre natureza e liberdade, o corpo não é da ordem do “eu penso”, mas do “eu (...) posso” – é potência exploratória. Assim, ser corpo é estar amarrado a certo mundo; é só por ele que o ser vai ao mundo. Todavia, se assim o for, o mesmo só pode ser compreendido a partir da relação que mantem com outras realidades sensíveis, para além de uma experiência para mim. Deste modo, será, pois, preciso passar a considerar a afetividade e a sexualidade como partes constituintes do nosso trato com o mundo. Enquanto modo de ser que evidencia nossa relação com as coisas, sem apresentar-se, contudo, independente da infraestrutura existencial humana, revisitaremos, portanto, O Corpo como Ser Sexuado presente na Fenomenologia da Percepção e veremos como este a) nos abre para o outro, b) revela o nosso estilo de ser e c) nos mostra a promiscuidade entre existência e vida sexual. (shrink)

The discussions of these past twenty years have significantly improved our knowledge about the foundation of bioethics and the meaning of the four bioethical principles with concern to at least three different points: that they are organised hierarchically, and therefore not “prima facie” of the same level; that they have exceptions, and consequently lack of absolute character; and that they are neither strictly deontological nor purely teleological. The only absolute principle of moral life can be the abstract and unconcrete respect (...) of human beings. But when determining the material content of this respect, principles become contingent and relative. Therefore, moral reasoning must have necessarily no less than three moments, one absolute but merely formal, namely respect for all human beings, and the other two relative and material. The first material moment is comprised of the four bioethical principles, divided into two levels, one private, including the principles of autonomy and beneficence, and the other one public, including those of nonmaleficence and justice. The second material moment deals with specific cases, and requires analysis of their context, including their circumstances and consequences. Only when following these steps, and therefore balancing principlism and contextualism, can moral reasoning be correct and complete. (shrink)

South Africa shared with the world the warning of a new strain of SARS-CoV2, Omicron, in November 2021. As a result, many high-income countries (HICs) instituted complete travel bans on persons leaving South Africa and other neighbouring countries. These bans were unnecessary from a scientific standpoint, and they ran counter to the International Health Regulations. In short, South Africa was penalized for sharing data. Data sharing during pandemics is commonly justified by appeals to solidarity. In this paper, we argue that (...) solidarity is, at best, an aspirational ideal to work toward but that it cannot ground an obligation to share data. Instead, low-and-middle income countries (LIMCs) should be guided by the principle of reciprocity, which states that we ought to return good for good received. Reciprocity is necessarily a conditional principle. LMICs, we argue, should only share data during future pandemics on the condition that HICs provide enforceable assurances that the benefits of data sharing will be equitably distributed and that LMICs won’t be penalized for sharing information. (shrink)

En este paper ofrezco una lectura global de _De Anima _III 4 de Aristóteles, en la que pretendo develar la rigu­rosa estructura argumentativa del capítulo. Así, mues­tro que el capítulo exhibe el típico patrón aristotélico de investigación filosófica: el estableci­mien­to de los pro­blemas básicos que han de ser resueltos, el camino dia­léctico para la postulación de una hipótesis, la deri­va­ción, a partir de ella, de las características indivi­dua­li­zantes relevantes del objeto (algunas de las cuales son ya manifiestas y explicadas _como_ (...) derivables de la hipó­tesis), y la emergencia de _aporiai_ que _prima_ _facie_ pare­cen invalidar la hipótesis pero que finalmente po­si­bili­tan una comprensión más profunda de ella. Pro­curo cla­rificar la progresión especulativa del capí­tu­lo al consi­derar incialmente el _Principio de Actuali­dad_ como sub­yacente a su _Modelo de Asimilación_ de la cog­nición (S conoce F _si y solo si_ el principio cognitivo de S deviene F debido a un objeto conocido O que es F en acto). Aristóteles, además, deriva la no-mezcla a partir de la carencia de límites (_Asunción de Ilimita__­ción_), que es una carac­terística manifiesta del _nous_. De la no-mezcla deriva la _Separabilidad_ (estas im­plica­cio­nes se clarifican en la primera _aporia_), de la Se­pa­rabi­li­dad deriva la _Espontaneidad_ y de la Esponta­neidad la _Autointelección_ del _nous_ (clarificada en la segunda _aporia_). Aunque examino el capítulo completo, me en­foco específicamente en el valor teórico y meto­doló­gico de la introducción y discusión de las dos _aporiai_. (shrink)

Some authors have called into question the normativity of logic, using as an argument that the bridge principles for logical normativity (MacFarlane, In what sense (in any) is logic normative for thought, 2004 )? are just by-products of general epistemic principles for belief. In this paper, I discuss that suggestion from a formal point of view. I show that some important bridge principles can be derived from usual norms for belief. I also describe some possible ways to block this derivation (...) by modifying the epistemic norms or weakening the bridge principles. Finally, I discuss different philosophical interpretations of these results. (shrink)

Current biological sciences standardly ascribe proper functions to biological parts, traits and mechanisms. In addition, realism about proper functions has an important space within the ongoing debate in philosophy of biology. Functional ascriptions are often conceived of as tracking objective, observer-independent higher-level features of the inquired object, rather than merely depending on a methodological, descriptive or epistemic attitude. In this paper, I argue for a realist account of proper bio-functions based on standard causal explanations of an organism’s behaviour: such explanations (...) are most intelligible if the autonomy of special sciences rests on the ontological and causal autonomy of their respective objects. I take into consideration the Aristotelian theoretical framework on teleological causation and reconstruct his arguments against his reductionist rivals. Finally, I consider the recent revival of Emergentism and try to establish to what extent the Neo-emergentist framework fits with the Aristotelian model, which I show to be partially valid also within an evolutionist view. (shrink)

According to methodological anti-exceptionalism, logic follows a scientific methodology. There has been some discussion about which methodology logic has. Authors such as Priest, Hjortland and Williamson have argued that logic can be characterized by an abductive methodology. We choose the logical theory that behaves better under a set of epistemic criteria. In this paper, I analyze some important discussions in the philosophy of logic, and I show that they presuppose different methodologies, involving different notions of evidence and different epistemic values. (...) I argue that, rather than having a specific methodology such as abductivism, logic can be characterized by methodological pluralism. This position can also be seen as the application of scientific pluralism to the realm of logic. (shrink)

Suppose that a team of neurosurgeons and bioengineers were able to remove your brain from your body, suspend it in a life-sustaining vat of liquid nutrients, and connect its neurons and nerve terminals by wires to a supercomputer that would stimulate it with electrical impulses exactly like those it normally receives when embodied. According to this brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, your envatted brain and your embodied brain would have subjectively indistinguishable mental lives. For all you know—so one argument goes—you could be (...) such a brain in a vat right now.1 Daniel Dennett calls this sort of philosophical thought experiment an “intuition pump” (Dennett 1995). An intuition pump is designed to elicit certain intuitive convictions, but is not itself a proper argument: “intuition pumps are fine if they’re used correctly, but they can also be misused. They’re not arguments, they’re stories. Instead of having a conclusion, they pump an intuition. They get you to say ‘Aha! Oh, I get it!’ (Dennett 1995, p. 182). Philosophers have used the brain-in-a-vat story mainly to raise the problem of radical skepticism and to elicit various intuitions about meaning and knowledge (Putnam 1981). The basic intuition the story tries to pump is that the envatted brain, though fully conscious, has systematically false beliefs about the world, including itself. Some philosophers reject this intuition. They propose that the envatted brain’s beliefs are really about its artificial environment or that it.. (shrink)

Using matrix iterations of ccc posets, we prove the consistency with ZFC of some cases where the cardinals on the right hand side of Cichon’s diagram take two or three arbitrary values (two regular values, the third one with uncountable cofinality). Also, mixing this with the techniques in J Symb Log 56(3):795–810, 1991, we can prove that it is consistent with ZFC to assign, at the same time, several arbitrary regular values on the left hand side of Cichon’s diagram.

The present article proposes to study Condillac’s analysis of Spinoza’s Ethics, against the background of the more general criticism that the French abbot makes of the seventeenth-century logique de système. From the Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines to the Traité des systèmes to the later texts, Condillac’s theory and critique of systems are crossed by two components: on the one hand, the search for the sensory origin of ideas, that Condillac radicalizes in his Traité des sensations into a theory (...) of knowledge as a ‘transformed sensation’. On the other hand, an operative logic of signs, which from the Essai to the works subsequent to the Traité des sensations translates sensibility into a knowledge, or a ‘well-made language’, whose logic is calculation. My objective is to clarify how the new ‘systematic spirit’, repeatedly invoked by the abbot, departs from the ‘bad metaphysics’ that he claims to liquidate. The comparison with the Spinozist system will be illuminating: in his treatise on the metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century Condillac proposes a critical analysis of the ‘geometrical spirit’; in his latest work, La langue des calculs, he proposes a new logic to which he assigns the task of bringing together the abstract and the concrete, beyond the ruins of classical metaphysics. The ‘systematic spirit’ and ‘spirit of system’ will be revealed, in spite of Condillac’s efforts, as being much closer to what it appears at first sight. (shrink)

This paper explores the notion of reciprocity in the context of active pulmonary and laryngeal tuberculosis treatment and related control policies and practices. We seek to do three things: First, we sketch the background to contemporary global TB care and suggest that poverty is a key feature when considering the treatment of TB patients. We use two examples from TB care to explore the role of reciprocity: isolation and the use of novel TB drugs. Second, we explore alternative means of (...) justifying the use of reciprocity through appeal to different moral and political theoretical traditions. We suggest that each theory can be used to provide reasons to take reciprocity seriously as an independent moral concept, despite any other differences. Third, we explore general meanings and uses of the concept of reciprocity, with the primary intention of demonstrating that it cannot be simply reduced to other more frequently invoked moral concepts such as beneficence or justice. We argue that reciprocity can function as a mid-level principle in public health, and generally, captures a core social obligation arising once an individual or group is burdened as a result of acting for the benefit of others. We conclude that while more needs to be explored in relation to the theoretical justification and application of reciprocity, sufficient arguments can be made for it to be taken more seriously as a key principle within public health ethics and bioethics more generally. (shrink)

El sistema agro-industrial-alimentario de Argentina, en el actual contexto de globalización económica, está signado desde algunas décadas ya, por el despliegue de un patrón de acumulación capitalista denominado como agronegocios . Se trata de un proceso, de transformación multidimensional y multiescalar, que presenta rupturas y continuidades con la expansión del anterior modelo de la agroindustria orientado al mercado interno a partir de regulaciones estatales. Según nuestras investigaciones desde la Comunidad de Estudios Campesinos (CEC) pudimos identificar cinco dispositivos según los cuales (...) el agronegocio se territorializa: económico-financiero, jurídico-normativo y de políticas públicas, legitimación ideológica, formación y desarrollo tecnológico, coercitivo (CEC, 2009). Nos interesa abonar a la caracterización del despliegue del último de los dispositivos del agronegocio: el de la violencia. En esta oportunidad presentamos un análisis del conjunto de los asesinatos o muertes de campesinos e indígenas en conflictos de tierra en Argentina, desde la desregulación económica hasta la actualidad. En este sentido nos proponemos indagar el significado de la violencia sobre los cuerpos de campesinos/as e indígenas que registramos desde 1991. Nuestra hipótesis se orienta a explicar la vinculación entre la violencia rural y la desterritorialización de la emergente intencionalidad campesina. (shrink)

Externalism about artifactual words requires that (a) members of an artifactual word’s extension share a common nature, i.e. a set of necessary features, and (b) that possession of such features determines the word’s extension independently of whether the linguistic community is aware of them (ignorance) or can accurately describe them (error). However, many common artifactual words appear to be so used that features that are universally shared among members of their extensions are hard to come by, and even fewer can (...) be plausibly regarded as necessary; morevoer, it is highly doubtful that a speaker could manage to refer to kind A while being utterly ignorant of the role the As play in the A-producing community, and it is no less doubtful that an artifactual word that was used to refer to certain objects would keep referring to them (and be regarded as having referred to them) once it has been shown that the associated description is utterly false of such objects, the reason being that we could easily make things that do fit the associated description. Against generalized externalism, it is suggested that artifactual words come in (at least) three different semantic varieties: a few have an externalist semantics, others have an internalist semantics, still others have neither but rather behave as “family names” in Wittgenstein’s sense. (shrink)

Este artigo busca encontrar na teoria crítica da racionalidade moderna de Jürgen Habermas (1929-) elementos de uma paideia. O primeiro tópico lança o substrato epistemológico sobre a existência das racionalidades estratégica e comunicativa. O segundo, afirma que o desengate entre o sistema e o mundo da vida, e a colonização deste por aquele, causam as patologias modernas e colaboram para a formulação de pedagogias coordenadas pela ação estratégica. O terceiro, propõe que o reacoplamento do sistema ao mundo vivido proporciona que (...) todas as dimensões da existência humana sejam orientadas pela ação comunicativa, na qual se encontram os traços de uma paideia emancipadora e revolucionária. (shrink)

In May 2021, when the Delta variant of SARS-CoV2 was wreaking havoc in India, the Australian Federal Government banned its citizens and residents who were there from coming back to Australia for 14 days on penalty of fines or imprisonment. These measures were justified on the grounds of protecting the broader Australian public from potentially importing the Delta strain, which officials feared would then seed a local outbreak. Those Australians stranded in India, and their families and communities back home, claimed (...) that they were abandoned by Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s government. This case—along with other barriers used as part of border control measures in the name of public health—raises the following question: is it ever morally permissible for a state to ban its citizens and residents from entering their own country during a pandemic? I conclude that it’s impermissible. I argue that persons have a right of entry that should be understood as a security right. This security right should be non-derogable because it’s a foundational good that is necessary for life-planning purposes. Moreover, it is a right that people should be able to rely upon absolutely, even during pandemics. At the very least, should someone believe that there are rare exceptions to the right of entry on public health grounds, governments have a duty—grounded in the principle of reciprocity—to support those who are temporarily denied entry. In the case of Australians stranded in India, I will argue that the Australian Federal Government failed on all accounts. (shrink)

cal basis of consciousness. We continue by discussing the relation between spatiotem- One of the outstanding problems in the cog- poral patterns of brain activity and con- nitive sciences is to understand how ongo- sciousness, with particular attention to pro- ing conscious experience is related to the cesses in the gamma frequency band. We workings of the brain and nervous system. then adopt a critical perspective and high-.

The goal of education is the promotion of the intellectual, moral and human skills as well as the character of human beings. In Kantian terms, it is to foster their autonomy. This is a quite strange activity, given most of the influences the environment exerts on human beings are pursuing the exact opposite: compel us to do what they want us to, that is, to act heteronomously. Ethics is quite the only academic discipline whose direct aim is to empower people (...) to do what they should; hence its enormous importance, comparable to its complexity. But all throughout Western history, ethics has also fallen into the habit of promoting heteronomy over autonomy. Such practice claims for immediate correction in such a troubled moment as the initial steps of the 21st century. (shrink)

The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, to examine what beliefs, if any, underlie (a) the Pyrrhonist’s desire for ataraxia and his account of how this state may be attained, and (b) his philanthropic therapy, which seeks to induce, by argument, ejpochv and ataraxia in the Dogmatists. Second, to determine whether the Pyrrhonist’s philanthropy and his search for and attainment of ataraxia are, as scholars have generally believed, essential aspects of his stance.

In this paper, I will argue that Logics of Formal Inconsistency $$ can be used as very sophisticated and powerful methods of classical recapture. I will compare $LFIs$ with the well-known non-monotonic logics by Batens and Priest and the ‘shrieking’ rules of Beall. I will show that these proposals can be represented in $LFIs$ and that $LFIs$ give room to more complex and varied recapturing strategies.