Pejović verkörpert in seiner Person das ursprüngliche philosophische Ethos und die Gelehrsamkeit. Die Stärke seines Denkens spiegelt sich in der verfeinerten Analyse des Themas wider. Sein literarisches Talent ist klar und er fühlt sich wie ein Virtuose und ein Künstler von Worten und Stil, der stellenweise poetisch ist. Er spricht leicht über die schwierigsten Themen der Philosophie. Er besitzt einen klaren, lehrreichen und enthusiastisch angemessenen, verfeinerten und raffinierten Ausdruck, der über alle unsere philosophischen Autoren hinausgeht. Dies wird bereits in den (...) Titeln seiner Bücher, Studien, Aufsätze und Artikel sichtbar, die die Tiefe seiner Bedeutung angeben, und als würde die Bedeutung des gesamten Textes in ihnen selbst liegen. Obwohl nicht der Einzige, zeigte Pejović, dass es möglich war, anders zu denken, neue Perspektiven zu öffnen, sich der Zukunft zu öffnen, indem man aus dem marxistischen Regenmantel herauskommt, in den wir fast alle gehüllt waren. Professor Pejović demonstriert, wie sich die Evolution entwickeln kann, um auf Kommendes, Neues und Andersartiges zu treffen. Natürlich ist das Neue und Andersartige allein dadurch nicht schon hier, aber um neue Horizonte zu eröffnen, müssen wir gegen die Strömung vorgehen. Das Opus von Professor Pejović sollte als eine Richtung verstanden werden, die uns auffordert, mit uns selbst umzugehen, uns vorzustellen, wie es mit uns war, wie es ist und wie es sein sollte. Seine Reflexion über das Thema des kroatischen Nationalschicksals, betrachtet durch die Reflexion über unser Erbe, unsere Kultur, unsere Geschichte und unsere Gesellschaft und Politik, hat der Fromme auf einer beneidenswerten Denkstufe eines engagierten Philosophen geschaffen, mit dem bei uns wenige zu vergleichen sind. Genau heute verdanken wir es ihm und geben ihm die Ehre, sich diesem thematischen Kreis geöffnet zu haben. Seine Gedanken sind für uns unvermeidlich und verbindlich. Wir denken, dass gerade jetzt der richtige Moment ist, um sein Werk im Allgemeinen und diesen Aspekt im Besonderen zu lesen. Mit diesem kurzen Überblick möchten wir nur auf seinen Beitrag zu unserer Philosophie und Kultur hinweisen. Er bleibt extrem aktuell und anregend. Wir hoffen, dass diese Arbeit dies ausreichend begründet hat. Wenn dieser Text unsere jungen Philosophen und Philosophinnen dazu anregt, seine Werke zu studieren, dann würde diese Arbeit seinen Zweck erfüllen. Mögen seine Worte sie erreichen, die Worte des Denklehrers, laut denen das „Denken nur auf jene Weise lebt, indem es in der Suche und in der Frage bestehen bleibt“. (shrink)

In gegenwärtigem sozialen Protest lässt sich, mit Eva von Redecker, eine „Revolution für das Leben“ ausmachen: eine neue Protestform, die sich durch einen Bezug auf bedrohtes Leben auszeichnet und die Vulnerabilität politisiert. Im vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich mit John Dewey ein Verständnis von Politisierung durch sozialen Protest entwickeln und dieses in Bezug auf die „Revolution für das Leben“ erläutern. Dazu schlage ich vor, Politisierung als Problematisierung auf drei Ebenen zu begreifen. Sozialer Protest artikuliert, erstens, ausgehend von Erfahrungen, Sachverhalte als Probleme (...) von öffentlicher Bedeutung, die einer Lösung bzw. Bearbeitung bedürfen. Zweitens thematisiert er diese zugleich als Probleme zweiter Ordnung, d.i. als Probleme sozialer Institutionen und gesellschaftlicher (Selbst-) Gestaltung. Und schließlich stellt sozialer Protest die Grenzen politischer Gemeinschaft zur Disposition, indem er zugleich Probleme dritter Ordnung, d.i. politischer Teilhabe adressiert. In diesem Sinne ist auch die „Revolution für das Leben“ zu verstehen: sie artikuliert Vulnerabilität nicht nur als sachliches Problem des Schutzes von akut bedrohten Leben, sondern auch als soziales Problem gestaltbarer Praktiken der Sorge um verletzliche Leben sowie als politisches Problem des Ausschlusses aus der Gemeinschaft derjenigen, deren Leben als der Sorge und des Schutzes wert und würdig anerkannt werden. (shrink)

Since Aristotle there are two main approaches in the explanation of begging the question (petitio): a dialectical mistake (an improper move in an argumentative dialogue) and an epistemic mistake. According to the latter begging the question is committed when the premises of an argument cannot be known independently of knowing the conclusion of the argument. Dialectical approaches use the notion of a commitment (acceptance, standpoint) and rules of dialogue as their basis. I propose a hybrid model, inspired by Jackson: the (...) rationale for introducing commitments and rules is epistemic. (shrink)

This book shows that at the beginning of modern thought the revival of ancient skepticism challenged the powers of the intellect in making knowledge possible, opening the way to the consideration of language as an alternative to mental representation, thus leading to an early linguistic turn.

The debate on compatibility of fate with human responsibility lasted for five hundred years of the Stoic school and it is still with us in terms of contemporary discussions of the compatibility of determinism and free will. Chrysippus was confronted with the standard objection: It would be unjust to punish criminals “if human beings do not do evils voluntarily but are dragged by fate.” Chrysippus uses the famous illustration of the cylinder and cone, which cannot start moving without being pushed. (...) However, when this has happened, from then on the cylinder rolls and the cone spins by their own nature. I explore the cylinder analogy and its modern relevance from the perspective of thought experiments. I argue that it helps us isolate the main causal factor (the locus of responsibility and agency) and insulate this factor from the rest of the causal history and causal background. The cylinder/cone analogy is a compatibilistic tool, a kind of “mental distillation” in which we separate in imagination those aspects (causal factors) which are relevant for moral responsibility from those which are not. I suggest, somehow anachronistically, but in line both with contemporary compatibilism and Chrysippian views on causal structure of agency that the actions of an agent are “fated” from the theoretical point of view, but they are up to her from the practical point of view. (shrink)

The article aims to revisit the relationship between inequality and education, a theme that accompanies education in modern societies. Despite access to data on inequality in society and education, as well as many analyzes of the origins and trends that provoke real social apartheids one has the impression that the metaphor of the labyrinth, common in Latin American literature, applies to education. The article is divided in two parts. The first seeks to situate the theme of inequality as a problem (...) of education and for education, with a brief reference to classic works and the identification of some pedagogical places that can serve to perpetuate inequality or resist it. The second part, based on thoughts from the beginning of the second half of the last century, revolves around the question of whether we are facing yet another unfinished revolution in Latin America. Two themes are discussed: updating the notion of awareness and the pedagogical nuances of concepts such as liberation, social exclusion and coloniality. In the conclusion, Paulo Freire’s centrality is emphasized to understand the relationship between inequality and education, and to create untested feasibilities in education and through education to promote a less unequal and more just society. Keywords: Inequality. Democracy. Awareness. Liberation. coloniality. (shrink)

How to accommodate the possibility of lucky true beliefs in necessary (or armchair) truths within contemporary modal epistemology? According to safety accounts luck consists in the modal proximity of a false belief, but a belief in a true mathematical proposition could not easily be false because a proposition believed could never be false. According to Miščević modal stability of a true belief under small changes in the world is not enough, stability under small changes in the cognizer should also (and (...) primarily) be considered. I argue for a more traditional modal reliabilism based on the critical question: how easy is it for a belief to be false, given the way it was formed? A belief (a priori or a posteriori) is then agent-lucky when based on a specific method which might easily lead to a false belief in the target proposition. Miščević suggests a unifying approach in terms of virtue epistemology. It seems to me that this approach, if successful, will undermine the project that he started with: formulate an anti-luck condition in the frame of a modal theory of luck. (shrink)

A obra aborda dois específicos temas - a ética e a utopia em sua relação com a educação. Os textos aqui apresentados sinalizam temas novos a serem explorados e outros nem tão novos a serem revisitados para que possa haver novos avanços, para além de Paulo Freire.

Il libro scava nel profondo dell' umanitā per mostrare la pericolositā della paura, i notevoli rischi e le sofferenze che la paura individuale e la paura collettiva comportano, senza dimenticare il rapporto fra potere e paura.

Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. The goal of this paper is to discuss the assumptions of these arguments, including the measure of epistemic value. I have designed AI agents based (...) on the Bayesian model and a nonmonotonic framework and tested how they achieve practical and epistemic value in conditions in which an alternative set of assumptions holds. In one of the tested conditions, the nonmonotonic agent, which is not opinionated and fulfills neither probabilism nor conditionalization, outperforms the Bayesian in the measure of epistemic value that I argue for in the paper (α-value). I discuss the consequences of these results for the epistemology of rationality. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the recurring concepts emerging in a transnational social-media arena focusing on Brexit in the period immediately after the June 2016 referendum. It mainly focuse...

El artículo analiza la noción de amor en la filosofía de Spinoza a través del Tratado de la reforma del entendimiento, el Tratado breve y la Ética. El amor en Spinoza debe contextualizarse en su fenomenología crítica de los afectos y su teoría del conocimiento. Así es posible mostrar que, para Spinoza, cómo se ama —activa o pasiva-mente— es más importante que una distinción normativa entre objetos de amor correctos o incorrectos. Esta interpretación sobre el amor en Spinoza es coherente (...) con las premisas éticas y el monismo ontológico de su filosofía, y con su afirmación de que el amor es también una actividad de la Sustancia. (shrink)

This paper aims to elucidate the emphatic demand of the Listening Pastoral inside the Catholic Church. The Supreme Pontiff, Pope Francis, dreams with a clergy with a greater capacity to handle the Christian community in its most relevant urgencies, such as youth accompaniment, specially an active listening made with attentive ears. From this base the article proposes a new method for accompaniment: a pastoral of listening according to the Humanistic Integrative Counseling model. However, the Listening Pastoral doesn’t have agents with (...) the required formation, therefore, beyond the technique, it is important the attitudes of the professional, who welcomes the marginalized and weakened. At the end of the article a list of attitudes will be presented having in mind a pastoral accompaniment. (shrink)

Nuestra tradición filosófica ha funcionando como un mito de la racionalidady no como un desarrollo de la racionalidad misma. Esta tradición muestratodas las características típicas de los sistemas mítico–mágicos. Sólo uncambio de condiciones sociales podría permitir el surgimiento de unaracionalidad genuina. De manera inversa, sólo el surgimiento de unaracionalidad genuina, podría producir el surgimiento de las condicionessociales apropiadas en las que la racionalidad pueda prosperar. No puedehaber un desarrollo filosófico genuino al margen de las condiciones socialesapropiadas. Se intenta aquí hacer (...) un bosquejo de esta situación. (shrink)

Al hablar sobre los actos de habla lo que Austin hacía o debía estar haciendo era tratando de articular una teoría de la eficacia de los actos de habla: ¿Cómo es que, por ejemplo, cuando digo a alguien en las circunstancias socialmente apropiadas ‘Lo nombro...’ la persona a quien me refiero queda nombrada? Esto es pura magia. Mis palabras funcionan como un hechizo. Constituyen un hechizo. Mis palabras son lo que son por el efecto social que producen. Oficiando como un (...) mago de su propia tribu filosófica, él es incapaz de romper el hechizo que lo mantiene cautivo. Su teoría de los actos de habla se encuentra condicionada por fuerzas sociales que él desconoce. Como resultado sus actos de habla sobre los actos de habla resultan fallidos. Este escrito es un intento de articular una perspectiva desde la que la situación social en la que Austin se encuentra, y la manera como ésta incide en la producción de su teoría pueda ser valorada. (shrink)

I raise some questions about differentiations between methods, checking methods, and appropriate methods in terms of their modal profiles. Melchior argues that there can be sensitive checking methods which are not safe. I try to show that such methods are epistemically deficient. I introduce restricted sensitivity (RS) and investigate its checking profile. RS with respect to a proposition _p_ requires that we consider more non-p worlds (not just the closest ones) but not those which are irrelevant (outside a sphere of (...) seriously possible worlds). Restrictedly sensitive methods (vacuously sensitive and strongly safe) based on the appropriate type of Bayesian reasoning might be sufficient for some kind of “modest” checking. Melchior defends a uniform account of checking based on insensitivity even in the case of necessary true propositions and he introduces the apparatus of impossible worlds. I argue that an unsatisfactory method for checking a necessary true proposition is a way of reaching a belief in the target proposition (different from the original one) which might easily not have delivered a true one. I also indicate some limitations of the idea that checking (and knowing) is essentially modal in character. (shrink)

Com o objetivo de responder à questão sobre quais são as condições para que aconteça um filosófico ensino de filosofia, busca-se o diálogo com a obra _O ensino de filosofia como problema filosófico_, de Alejandro Cerletti. Critica-se o que ele denomina “pergunta filosófica” e valoriza-se sua proposta de ensino de filosofia como ensino da repetição criativa. Para construir esta proposta de um filosófico ensino de filosofia faz-se também a apropriação do conceito camusiano de embarcamento, utilizado por Albert Camus para descrever (...) o compromisso do artista com sua criação. É a partir do embarcamento que se pensa o compromisso docente com seu filosofar e com o filosofar de seus alunos. Enfim, defende-se que o filosofar deve ser compreendido como repetição criativa, como uma crítica à tradição filosófica, e, desse modo, o ensino de filosofia, acima de desafios pedagógicos ou uma questão de método, deve ser compreendido como uma problemática que deve ser tratada filosoficamente a partir do diálogo crítico e criativo com a história do pensamento filosófico, ou seja, a partir da noção de repetição criativa. (shrink)

This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another). These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic maximality, (...) where a reasoner fulfills all the alethic norms and could be used as a standard of rationality (as they are, in fact, used in some of these approaches). I propose a function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as inputand returns a numeric alethic value. Then I use this function to define a notion of alethic maximality that is satisfiable by finite reasoners (reasoners with cognitive limitations) and does not present problems with blindspots. Function α may also be used in alethic norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to finite reasoners and do not present problems with blindspots. A result of this investigation isthat the project of providing purely alethic norms is defective. The use of function α also sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the lottery and the preface paradoxes, and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection. (shrink)

God's character remains one of the big mysteries in Supernatural. We certainly see God's impact on the world, and occasionally, we're told he has miraculously interceded on behalf of the Winchesters or Castiel. Spinoza said, ”The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.“ But after concluding that God exists, Spinoza concludes that evil does not. Ironically, while many thought of Spinoza as the Devil, he denied the Devil's existence. As Supernatural illustrates, loving relationships don't need to be mutually beneficial; one (...) person may even risk his life to save another person he loves. Often philosophical, the ending scene may hold the key to understanding God in Supernatural. The Philosopher John Locke argued that the idea of redemption could be arrived at in principle by the same sort of reasoning that arrives at the idea of God. (shrink)

Este artigo objetiva pensar como o ensino da filosofia pode produzir processos de transformação nos modos de vida ocasionando experiências de pensamento que ultrapassam o bom senso e o senso comum e problematizam o próprio pensamento no sentido de abri-lo à criação de outros modos de pensar e de agir. A partir da experiência do pensamento deflagrada pelo encontro da filosofia com a educação se desprende um movimento do pensar que afeta a vida de seus ensinantes e aprendentes abrindo-lhes possibilidades (...) de mudanças em seus modos habituais de compreender e se relacionar com a diversidade do mundo, tornando a filosofia um vetor de mutação e uma prática de resistência não apenas dentro, mas também fora da escola. (shrink)

Nesse artigo articulamos um diálogo entre E. Levinas e A. Badiou em torno da possibilidade de uma ética na conjuntura pandêmica global. Apresentamos as propostas levinasianas de uma ética do rosto e uma ética do acolhimento analisando sua impossibilidade diante da necessidade de máscaras e do isolamento. Em seguida, verificamos a hipótese de Badiou acerca de uma ética das verdades, argumentando como, diante do acontecimento coronavírus, ela se desenvolve em uma ética do recolhimento. Assim, a ética do recolhimento se torna (...) adequada para a situação de pandemia porque mantém a fidelidade à verdade do acontecimento e possibilita a acessibilidade posterior ao rosto e ao acolhimento. (shrink)

Two issues in synapsid brain evolution are discussed: the presumed structure and function of the brain of the Synapsida/Diapsida common ancestral, and the enlargement of dorsal telencephalon. Ecological niches possibly occupied by some Carboniferous tetrapods are considered in order to speculate about evolution of major telencephalic sectors. An alternative interpretation of isocortical origins, based on differences in Pax-6 expression, is suggested for discussion.