Ce livre repose sur un projet ambitieux : proposer une anthropologie historique de cette catégorie d’individus que le langage quotidien et les médias aussi bien qu’un large faisceau de sciences humaines et sociales nomment les « victimes ». En bref, les victimes sont à la mode, associées à toutes les commémorations, parce qu’elles offrent un regard renouvelé sur toutes les affaires du monde ; elles permettent de construire une histoire ou une sociologie « d’en bas », from below. Les grands (...) fl... (shrink)

Sur un sujet fort peu abordé, la thèse implicite prévaut que les femmes sont exclues des armées des cités, parce que la fonction combattante n’est pas de leur ressort. Leur exclusion proviendrait de ce qu’elles ne sont pas citoyennes et participerait de ce déni du féminin, fondateur du politique en Grèce ancienne. Cette perspective est permise, à condition de s’en tenir à une définition restreinte de la citoyenneté et, par là, de circonscrire étroitement les limites de ce qu’il faut entendre (...) par l’armée de la cité. Or l’armée de la polis n’a jamais été confinée à une cour de caserne, y compris pour les hommes, ni son déploiement ramené au champ ouvert des seules batailles hoplitiques. La notion de fonction ou de sphère combattante permet, par ailleurs, de revenir sur la définition de la cité en armes et de ce qu’il faut entendre, en bien des contextes, défensifs en particulier, par une armée civique où les femmes ont leur place. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Anabases. Traditions et réceptions de l'Antiquité, n° 20, 2014. Nous remercions Pascal Payen, la revue Anabases et Juliette Lormier de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Cet article propose d'analyser deux entreprises de traduction en hexamètres français : celle des Travaux et des Jours d'Hésiode par Jean-Antoine de Baïf dans ses Étrénes de poézie fransoeze an vers mezurés, et celle de l'Iliade d'Homère par Philippe Brunet. Il s'agit de resituer (...) ces - Poétique et Études littéraires – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Since its origin, bioethics has attracted the collaboration of few social scientists, and social scientific methods of gathering empirical data have remained unfamiliar to ethicists. Recently, however, the clouded relations between the empirical and normative perspectives on bioethics appear to be changing. Three reasons explain why there was no easy and consistent input of empirical evidence into bioethics. Firstly, interdisciplinary dialogue runs the risk of communication problems and divergent objectives. Secondly, the social sciences were absent partners since the beginning of (...) bioethics. Thirdly, the meta‐ethical distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ created a ‘natural’ border between the disciplines. Now, bioethics tends to accommodate more empirical research. Three hypotheses explain this emergence. Firstly, dissatisfaction with a foundationalist interpretation of applied ethics created a stimulus to incorporate empirical research in bioethics. Secondly, clinical ethicists became engaged in empirical research due to their strong integration in the medical setting. Thirdly, the rise of the evidence‐based paradigm had an influence on the practice of bioethics. However, a problematic relationship cannot simply and easily evolve into a perfect interaction. A new and positive climate for empirical approaches has arisen, but the original difficulties have not disappeared. (shrink)

In this critical introduction to contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth Pascal Engel provides clear and authoritative exposition of recent and current ideas while providing original perspectives that advances discussion of the key issues. This book begins with a presentation of the classical conceptions of truth - the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and verificationist and pragmatist accounts - before examining so-called minimalist and deflationist conceptions that deny truth can be anything more than a thin concept holding (...) no metaphysical weight. The debates between those who favour substantive conceptions of the classical kind and those who advocate minimalist and deflationist conceptions are explored. Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking as some upholders of radical deflationist views have claimed. Questions about truth and realism are examined and the author shows how the realism/anti-realism debate remains a genuine, meaningful issue for a theory of truth and has not been undermined by deflationist views. Even if a metaphysical substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, Engel concludes, truth can keep a central role within our thinking, as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices, in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics. (shrink)

I argue that the normative dimension in mental content does not figure in the content as a direct feature of this content. But I do not take is as an extrinsic feature due to the properties of our ascriptions either. I suggest that the normativity has to do with the possibility of self attribution of mental states. The views of Robert Brandom are examined in this respect.

The field of bioethics is increasingly coming into contact with empirical research findings. In this article, we ask what role empirical research can play in the process of ethical clarification and decision-making. Ethical reflection almost always proceeds in three steps: the description of the moral question,the assessment of the moral question and the evaluation of the decision-making. Empirical research can contribute to each step of this process. In the description of the moral object, first of all, empirical research has a (...) role to play in the description of morally relevant facts. It plays a role in answering the “reality-revealing questions” (what, why,how, who, where and when), in assessing the consequences and in proposing alternative courses of action. Secondly, empirical research plays a role in assessing the moral question. It must be acknowledged that research possesses “the normative power of the factual,” which can also become normative by suppressing other norms. However, inductive normativity should always be balanced out by a deductive form of normativity. Thirdly, empirical research also has a role to play in evaluating the decision-making process. It can rule out certain moral choices by pointing out the occurrence of certain unexpected consequences or effects. It can also be useful, however, as a sociology of bioethics in which the discipline of bioethics itself becomes an object of research. (shrink)

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirelyad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of (...) two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers,” “that is not mine.” This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free ofad hocstipulations. (shrink)

The book introduces Ramsey's main doctrines and assesses their contemporary significance. In particular, Jérôme Dokic and Pascal Engel are interested in Ramsey's thoughts on truth and belief, and his pragmatic thesis that the truth of one's beliefs guarantees the success of one's actions. From this, it is a short step to what may be called "Ramsey's principle": the content of a belief is constituted by the success of one's actions. This principle finds its current expression in the work of (...) philosophers who offer evolutionary conceptions of mental states, according to which the success conditions of a belief are constituted by its biological functions. (publisher, edited). (shrink)

This paper analyses Davidson's conception of the norms of rationality which govern, according to him, the interpretation of mind and action. While I accept Davidson's thesis that there are norms of the mental, I disagree with him on their scope. It is argued that there are much more specific norms for concepts, and that belief in partiuclar is governed by a norm of truth.

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

Découvert en 1981 près de l'angle Nord-Est du palais de Malia, un triton en chlorite porte une décoration et une représentation sculptées en relief. On y voit deux génies léonins à carapace dressés face à face sur un piédestal : l'un tient une cruche à double bec et semble en présenter le contenu à l'autre qui porte ses antérieurs à sa gueule. L'analyse de l'objet, des éléments du décor et de la représentation conduisent à reconnaître dans ce triton une réalisation (...) égéenne datant du MR I A. Il paraît plus vraisemblable de l'interpréter comme rhyton que comme une trompette. Une annexe présente les autres coquillages en pierre, en terre cuite et en faïence trouvés dans le monde égéen. (shrink)

This paper considers the UN efforts to introduce a legally binding Treaty on corporate accountability for human rights impacts in the context of other proposed legislation at country level, on the one hand, and existing voluntary initiatives like the UN Guiding Principles (2011), on the other. What we are interested in is whether the proposed Treaty signals a transition from voluntary initiatives (based on moral commitments) to law (that is, a focus on compliance), and the extent to which it might (...) stimulate or hinder links between judicial and non-judicial initiatives. The scholars who have explicitly addressed these two divides are – Michael Sandel, on theory v. practice; and Amartya Sen, on law v. morality. We engage with their views, in sections II and III respectively, seeking to build an integrated approach to help us overcome these dualisms. We further consider John Ruggie’s “principled pragmatism”, a strategy that he uses to build the Protect, Respect and Remedy (henceforth, PRR) Framework; and we invoke arguments from casuistry as well as a practice-focused deontology (Thomas Donaldson’s) in favour of an ethics ‘beyond cognition’, which we consider better suited than either utilitarian or principle-based theories to guide the debate on human rights. This is because it allows us to take non-rational factors into account (such as emotions and personal affiliations), when judging the kind of common good we consider worth pursuing. In the last section of the paper, we investigate whether and how might the Treaty illustrate the two divides, trying to (a) distinguish between purely legal elements and those of a wider nature, to do with morality; and (b) understand what might help bridge the gap between theoretical commitments to the universality of human rights and various practical challenges. Our aim is not to evaluate the Treaty, from a legal viewpoint, or suggest improvements to it (lawyers are better placed to do that); rather, we seek to investigate the way in which the proposed Treaty – which is the first attempt to address the challenge of transnational business and human rights in international law – combines moral and legal aspects, and what this tells us about the world we live in. (shrink)

The increasing implementation of next-generation sequencing technologies in the clinical context and the expanding commercial offer of genetic tests directly-toconsumers has increased the availability of previously inaccessible genetic information. A particular concern in both situations is how the volume of novel information will affect the processing of genetic and genomic information from minors. For minors, it is argued that in the provision of genetic testing, their “right not to know” should be respected as much as possible. Testing a minor early (...) in life eliminates the possibility for the minor to make use of his or her “right not to know.” The article discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the right not know, analyzes reasons why various direct-to-consumer companies process samples from minors, and discusses the right not to know in relation to common complex disorders in a pediatric population. (shrink)

Au travers du cas clinique d’un adolescent placé dans les services de l’Aide sociale à l’enfance souffrant d’une problématique honteuse et d’un délabrement du lien maternel, l’auteur de cet article étudie en quoi l’écoute familiale modifie l’écoute individuelle à l’aide du concept de scénario généalogique porte-la-honte développé par Pierre Benghozi. À la suite de cet auteur, il propose un nécessaire décalage de l’écoute intrapsychique dans les thérapies familiales vers le transpsychique car une honte intrapsychique exprimée peut aussi être le rappel (...) d’une honte transpsychique indicible, non élaborée. (shrink)

One of the main difficulties with contemporary materialism is the risk of epiphenomenalism: if mental properties systematically depend on physical properties, how can they have causal efficiency? Davidson's anomalous monism' only solves this problem through a "feeble" understanding of the individuation of events and with relative imprecision as to the pertinence of causal explanations formulated in psychological terms. Nor do other conceptions of the individuation of events and the causal power of mental states, as that of Kim and of Jackson (...) and Pettit, solve the problem. It will not then be solved by modifying the theory of the individuation of events. (shrink)

The paper surveys the main issues raised by doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief in contemporary epistemology. It argues that the deontological theory of justification fails.