IBERTARIANS hold that we have such duties as: not to directly and significantly harm others or their property, to keep agreements, to refrain from lying and certain other sorts of deception, and to compensate those whom we wrong. They also hold that we have a duty not to interfere with the liberty of others as long as they are fulfilling these duties. This duty of non-interference, they have thought, has protected the privacy of the home, and hence parental autonomy, for (...) it insures that others have no authority over or responsibility for (except in extreme circumstances) how parents raise or treat their children. (Why parental autonomy has been held to be protected by this duty of non—in_terference should be clear enough: for if (as is surely plausible) the main effect of that duty is to secure for adults the liberty (within limits) to live their private lives as they choose, then, on the natural assumption that the matter of how to raise one`s children falls within the domain of the private lives of adults, intervention by others, and in particular by the state, for the purpose of ensuring that children get raised in one way rather than another, would be impermissible.) More specifically to our purposes now, libertarians have supposed that the duty of non-interference leaves intact parents` perogative to decide if, and in what way, their children are to be educated. That this is crucial both to the degree and to the point of parental autonomy is clear enough. For it goes both to the matter of keeping out of the private home those who would provide education for children (if such is the wish of the parents), and to the matter of parents` entitlement to instill in their children the values that they (the parents) wish their children to have. Libertarians, however, have not had very much specific to say about the moral status of children. Are children owned by their parents? Do they have all the rights and duties that normal adults have'? Or is their status somewhere in between these extremes? Given that libertarians haven't said, there are different possible ways of extending traditional libertarian theory so as to cover children.. (shrink)

These original essays offer new perspectives for science educators, curriculum theorists, and cultural critics on science education, French post-structural thought, and the science debates. Included in this book are chapters on the work of Bruno Latour, Michel Serres, and Jean Baudrillard, plus chapters on postmodern approaches to science education and critiques of modern scientific assumptions in curriculum development.

This article presents a critique of two arguments made by S.P. Morris in his recent piece ‘The Trouble with Mascots’. The first argument is that the wrong of mascots is rooted in the falsity of the stereotyping generalizations that they create and perpetuate. The second is that when the group provides the name to itself, it is, in light of that fact, no less morally objectionable. These two arguments are related, for the second would be correct if falsity were in (...) fact the issue. As I argue, however, if we take a different view of the problem that generalizations present, the moral relevance of who does the naming becomes clear. (shrink)

This provocative, engaging and important book marks the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Peter Winch's seminal The Idea of a Social Science . The authors – the first two philosophers, the third a sociologist – have worked together in various permutations before. No-one familiar with their previous publications will be surprised that the dominant voice throughout is Wittgenstein's – that is, Wittgenstein as read ‘resolutely’ by ‘new Wittgensteinians’. They have three principal aims: first, to read Winch's own work (...) in an equally ‘resolute’ way; hence to read ISS as prophylactic and therapeutic in intention, and not as heralding a wonderful or not-so-wonderful new social theory; secondly, to defend Winch against certain persistent charges; and thirdly, to persuade social theorists and philosophers of ‘social science’ that Winch's therapeutic lessons have not yet been assimilated, with the possible exception of a handful of ethnographers and ethnomethodologists.Following a substantial introductory section, Chapters 1 and 2 – respectively, entitled ‘Beyond pluralism, monism, relativism, realism etc.: reassessing Peter Winch’ and ‘Winch and linguistic idealism’ – argue that Winch cannot be seen as an advocate of linguistic idealism or “any of the other ‘isms’ that have been reactively bandied about …. (shrink)

The benefit-fairness theory of punishment, which is one of the most prominent retributive justifications of punishment, appeals to some benefits received by an offender in explaining why it is fair to impose punitive burdens on him. However, many see the two traditional versions of the theory, found in the works by writers such as Herbert Morris, Jeffrie Murphy, and George Sher, as being susceptible to fatal objections. In a recent paper, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and Punishment,” Zachary Hoskins offers a new (...) version of the benefit-fairness theory of punishment. I will highlight his original contribution by showing how his version of the benefit-fairness theory of punishment is different from the traditional versions in such a way that the main objections applying to the traditional versions do not apply to his account. Nonetheless, despite its many virtues, I will argue that Hoskins’s theory fails because it would entail disproportionate punishment. (shrink)

An essential addition to the Stone Reader series, Question Everything is a groundbreaking collection of philosophical essays from some of our foremost thinkers and storytellers. When The Stone Reader-a landmark collection of 133 essays from the New York Times' award-winning philosophy column-first published, in 2015, the world urgently needed insight and wisdom, and for many, the book served as a bulwark of reason against the rising tide of post-fact rhetoric. Now, as disinformation continues to run rampant and our rights are (...) increasingly called into question, editors Peter Catapano and Simon Critchley contend that philosophy in the public sphere is more crucial than ever. Like The Stone Reader and its sequel, Modern Ethics in 77 Arguments, Question Everything delivers the contrarian views, sound arguments, and creative approaches to traditional opinion-writing that loyal readers of the series have come to expect. Its essays, however, are not organized by traditional categories like ethics or epistemology, but thematically by question, thirteen of them in all-the first twelve like the hours of a clock, ticking us through the tumultuous time in which these pieces were written, from late 2015 to 2021, with the last speculating into an uncertain future. The volume begins with the most fundamental of questions: What does it mean to be human? There, contemporary thinkers from Martha Nussbaum to Bernard-Henri Lévy explore the essence of who we are as a species. The next question-Is democracy possible?-interrogates our social and political ideals. While Malka Older calls into question the viability of our institutions, philosophers Gary Gutting and Alex Rosenberg reassess the meaning of patriotism. And onward, with more timeless struggles: What is happiness? Does life have meaning? Finally, it asks, Is this the end of the world as we know it? Now what? While its foundation and core consists of the work of professional scholars and philosophers, Question Everything also features a number of prominent artists and thinkers who may never appear on a philosophy syllabus, including, among others, novelist Elena Ferrante, actor Cate Blanchett, filmmaker Errol Morris, musician Sonny Rollins, and artist Ai Weiwei, all of whom offer insights shaped by decades of devotion to and practice of their crafts. Designed both for immediate gratification and long-term use, Question Everything, with an introduction by Catapano, is not only an essential addition to a much-loved series, but an act of resistance, "a product," as Catapano writes, "of the spirit of agitation and inquiry that has been integral to the human enterprise from the beginning of recorded history.". (shrink)

No two images of socialism or utopia were more influential a century ago than those of Marx and Bellamy. Marx and Engels famously denied the utopian dimension of their own project; Bellamy celebrated it. In this essay I sketch out some clues for revisiting images of utopia in Marx and in Bellamy. My claim is that Marx failed to develop a systematic utopia or image of socialism. We are left with a series of hints towards five different images of utopia (...) across the path of his life and work. Bellamy's image of utopia is more consistent, but contrary to common understanding, it reflects the unresolved tensions of nineteenth century American modernity expressed through the prism of New England small town radicalism. Bellamy's utopia is connected to the later image of the machine in the garden; contrary to William Morris's assertion, he was not an unmixed modern, and this is one quality at least that he shared with Marx, where the impress of romanticism remains profound. (shrink)

In this chapter, the author's unplanned venture into public philosophy began in the mid‐to‐late 1980s, just as Ronald Reagan was insisting that a certain famous wall be torn down. Various European thinkers and political philosophers in America, along with a few people working in the author's own tradition, like Robert Nozick and Peter Singer, had already begun to work in the nascent movement of “applied philosophy,” and in a public way. The author's early work in philosophy had been solidly (...) within the analytical tradition, with a special interest in religion, focused mainly on metaphysics and, secondarily, epistemological issues. Public philosophy can be rekindled in our time by any number of means and across a wide variety of topics. Many of the philosophers who had the biggest public impact in their own time and into our own have been good storytellers, and some have used the power of humor well. (shrink)

Imperialism is thought to be wrong by virtually everyone today. The consensus may be correct. However, there may be a few good things to be said for empire. More importantly for political philosophy, empires are not harder to justify or legitimate than states, or so I argue. The bad press that empires receive seems due to a methodological suspect comparison of nasty empires to nice states. When nice empires are considered they do not fare much worse than (nice) states. I (...) suggest that empires can have the same weak kind of legitimacy that states have and that both lack fuller or stronger legitimacy. a Footnotesa An earlier version of this essay was presented at James Madison University and discussed at a workshop of the Committee for Politics, Philosophy, and Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. I am grateful to members of both audiences for critical questions and comments, in particular to John Brown, Farid Dhanji, Douglas Grob, Peter Levine, Jerry Segal, and Karol Soltan (others are thanked in the notes). Gratitude is also owed to Jose Idler-Acosta, David Lefkowitz, and Ellen Paul for helpful written comments. (shrink)

Andocidis Orationes edidit Iustus Hermann Lipsius; pp. xxxii, 67. B. Tauchnitz, Leipzig, 1888. M. 1. 20. Andocidis de Mysteriis et de Reditu; edited by E. C. Marchant, B.A., late scholar of Peter house, Cambridge; Assistant Master at St. Paul's School. Rivingtons, London, 1889. 5s.

I contend that influential, computational theories have failed to relate the subjective and information processing dimensions of imagery. Hampson and Morris′s account of the phenomenology of imagery is evaluated, and I reject the proposal that the sensuous quality of images is reducible to the specificity of corresponding representations. A selective literature review suggests necessary information processing conditions for sensuous objects-for-awareness to emerge, and these conditions inform development of a theory explicating conscious perception and sensuous imagery in terms of a self-regulating (...) cognitive system employing a verification procedure to control resource allocation. Functions of sensuous imagery are discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Demystifying the Mystery of Alzheimer's as Late, No Longer Mild Cognitive ImpairmentPeter J. Whitehouse (bio)Keywordsaging, Alzheimer’s disease, deconstruction, mild cognitive impairmentProfessor Tom Kirkwood and Michael Bavidge's comments are welcome additions to our discourse as both emphasize the importance of considering mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD) in relationship to the normal biological and cultural processes of aging. Whereas I agree with my colleague and co-author, Atwood Gaines' (...) response, I wish to add my own commentary to update the reader concerning the dynamic political processes at work in the social construction and deconstruction of MCI and AD. I have referred to MCI as autodeconstructing AD because whatever we come to think of the MCI label on the spectrum of cognitive aging should alter our beliefs about the ultimate utility of the concept of AD. Tensions in the field of study of MCI have increased since the project reported in this journal began. The social science and philosophical contributions toward understanding MCI need to inform our debate now; otherwise, we will be less effective at influencing a critical debate for society about its relationships to medicine, science, and modern capitalism.This past year, Ron Petersen, the major proponent of the concept of MCI was awarded the prestigious Potamkin Prize for research in Alzheimer's disease by the American Academy of Neurology. The National Institute on Aging (NIA) placed the discovery of MCI as first on the list of contributions during twenty years of research funded through hundreds of millions of dollars poured into the NIA Alzheimer's Research Centers. Some have even suggested that we relabel MCI of the amnestic type, Petersen syndrome. Yet, John Morris, who was co-awarded the Potamkin Prize, has continued to write that MCI is early AD and most recently has suggested (Morris 2006) that we should revise our diagnostic criteria. He joins me and a growing list of other so-called thought leaders who believe (but do not always state publicly) that the term MCI is not useful clinically. Lon Schneider (2005) has recently joined the camp of critics publicly by suggesting that MCI is [End Page 87] not only confusing clinically but is now possibly retarding research.The proliferation of different kinds of MCI indicates that we are studying heterogeneous processes of brain aging. Whereas, John Morris suggests that we relabel MCI as early AD, I have suggested the converse. For example, in a grand rounds lecture at Johns Hopkins in March 2004, I used the lecture title "LNLMCI (late no longer MCI)" as a synonym for AD.Kirkwood is right to compare the quest for biological therapy for AD to the search to treat aging processes in other organs. He has been an outspoken critic of anti-aging medicine quackery that claims that aging itself is a disease that can be reversed today. But, if AD is brain aging, are we not in fact creating a "disease" category that raises false hopes and expectations?Kirkwood also points out that aging is a lifespan process. To prevent dementia in older individuals, we should prevent damage to neurons in younger individuals. Recently, it has been claimed, for example, that exposure to lead in young animals makes these animals more at risk for amyloid deposition in later life (Basha et al. 2005). Whether or not lead directly affects the pathogenesis of AD, it seems eminently reasonable to try to prevent damage to neurons in young children so that they may have maximum cognitive capacity throughout their lifespan.Almost ten years ago, when I stepped down as the editor of the Alzheimer's Disease and Associated Disorders Journal and as John Morris took over this responsibility, I wrote an editorial calling for the end of AD (Whitehouse 2001). In other words, I argued that thinking through the invention of the term mild cognitive impairment reveals that we are attempting to assign medical categories to what are a heterogeneous set of processes that affect our brains as we age. At the hundredth anniversary of the first case of what we have come to call Alzheimer's disease, perhaps it is time to reflect on the individual and social... (shrink)

Morris Grossman, the author of this captivating collection of essays Art and Morality: Essays in the Spirit of Santayana, was fond of quoting Santayana as saying, “when Peter tells you something about Paul you learn more about Peter than you do Paul.” This aphorism appears several times in this volume, and its emphatic repetition should clue us into Grossman’s approach to expository writing. While the book is ostensibly about figures from the history of philosophy and art in individual (...) essays, its real charm comes from getting a sense for Grossman’s intellectual temperament across the whole volume. One aspect of Grossman’s intellectual character which is favorably displayed portrayed in this book is his... (shrink)

The history of contractarian moral theory is long and varied. It includes the classic social contract theories of Hobbes (1651), Hume (1739/1740), and Kant (1785) as well as modern versions of these theories, such as those of Gauthier (1986), Scanlon (1998), Darwall (2006), and Southwood (2010). In Minimal Morality: A Multilevel Social Contract Theory (2018), I continue this tradition by developing a ‘multilevel social contract theory’ that combines Humean, Hobbesian, and Kantian moral features. In this article, I reply to comments (...) by Fred D’Agostino, John Thrasher, Christopher W. Morris, and Peter Vanderschraaf. I am deeply grateful for these commentators’ constructive and engaging comments that, in their own way, shed light on core assumptions and features of the theory. Due to space restrictions, I focus on what I consider to be the main criticisms and have organized my responses thematically. I hope that doing so will also help readers who are less familiar with my work to understand the relevance of multilevel social contract theory for morally diverse societies. (shrink)

Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and his philosophical importance redeemed.

A text that would find a place for the realistic formalism of Aristotle, the scientific penetration of Peirce, the pedagogical soundness of Dewey, and the ...

_Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory_, a book written by Donald Green and Ian Shapiro and published in 1994, excited much controversy among political scientists and promoted a dialogue among them that was printed in a double issue of the journal Critical Review in 1995. This new book reproduces thirteen essays from the journal written by senior scholars in the field, along with an introduction by the editor of the journal, Jeffrey Friedman, and a rejoinder to the essays by Green and (...) Shapiro. The scholars—who include John Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, Stanley Kelley, Jr., Robert E. Lane, Peter C. Ordeshook, Norman Schofield, and Kenneth A. Shepsle—criticize, agree with, or build on the issues raised by Green and Shapiros critique. Together the essays provide an interesting and accessible way of focusing on competing approaches to the study of politics and the social sciences. (shrink)

This article describes three utopian attempts to ameliorate the negative effects of income inequality that are less revolutionary than those of More and Bellamy. Rather than dispensing with money or gold, these three utopias modify existing institutions with the aim of lopping off the extremes of both wealth and poverty without upending the entire social and economic structure. Discussion includes Theodor Hertzka’s _Freeland_ (1891), Theodor Herzl’s _Altneuland: The Old New Land_ (1902), and H. G. Wells’s _A Modern Utopia_ (1905). The (...) three utopias provide potential solutions by undercutting causes of poverty and intergenerational wealth accumulation rather than by economic leveling, and by stressing a fresh start for each generation. The primary tools in this effort are education, universal healthcare, a safety net of basic income, fiscal transparency, confiscatory estate taxes, and common ownership of land. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to develop a conception of death with dignity and to examine whether it is vulnerable to the sort of criticisms that have been made of other conceptions. In this conception “death” is taken to apply to the process of dying; “dignity” is taken to be something that attaches to people because of their personal qualities. In particular, someone lives with dignity if they live well (in accordance with reason, as Aristotle would see it). It (...) follows that health care professionals cannot confer on patients either dignity or death with dignity. They can, however, attempt to ensure that the patient dies without indignity. Indignities are affronts to human dignity, and include such things as serious pain and the exclusion of patients from involvement in decisions about their lives and deaths. This fairly modest conception of death with dignity avoids the traps of being overly subjective or of viewing the sick and helpless as “undignified”. (shrink)

[1] The rise of modern paganism.--v. 2. The science of freedom.

The historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) is most often treated by historians of philosophy as part of the story of political philosophy in the Islamic world. While this is perfectly legitimate, it may be misleading when it comes to the question of the method he proposes for the historian. This paper argues that that method is in fact based on a different branch of (Aristotelian) science: natural philosophy. After rendering this proposition initially plausible by noting frequent references to "nature" in (...) the _Muqaddima_, the paper discusses a number of parallels between natural philosophy and history as Ibn Khaldūn conceives it. Ultimately it is suggested that this method is legitimated insofar as history is for Ibn Khaldūn a study of human nature. (shrink)