O propósito geral deste artigo consiste em mostrar, a partir de hipóteses globais de interpretação da natureza e da arte, o lugar da pintura na filosofia de F. W. J. v. Schelling. Submetendo a obra pictórica a condições teórico-especulativas inovadoras, a ponderação schellinguiana impele-nos, não raro, a um tratamento diferenciado do visível. Por isso, a título de exercício de reflexão, espera-se igualmente indicar que tal caracterização da pintura ecoa e antecipa, ao longe, questões levantadas pela filosofia contemporânea – em especial, (...) pela fenomenologia – a respeito da imagem. (shrink)

O presente artigo conta investigar o processo de constituição da estética musical a partir da teoria da arte elaborada por F. W. J. von Schelling. Para tanto, espera-se mostrar a maneira pela qual o filósofo alemão procura redimensionar as bases que davam sustentação à chamada estética sistemática para, a partir de uma ponderação extremamente inovadora, caracterizar a música como um objeto original de saber.

The subject of this paper are the implications of Lyotard's critique of the intellectual as a public actor. It is shown that Lyotard's critique of politics results in a rejection of political theory, real politics and political involvement of the intellectual. In place of that, Lyotard develops his concept of "philosophical politics", i.e. "reflexive writing" as a specific form of political disengagement. The author argues that Lyotard's critique of the political involvement of the intellectual is acceptable, but that Lyotard's concept (...) of "philosophical politics" cannot compensate for the lack of an acceptable real politics and an appropriate political theory. It can be viewed only as an individual-existential posture of resistance to the dominant political patterns which, as preconditions of its own possibility, must presuppose the existence of an acceptable real politics and appropriate political doctrine. Osnovni predmet ovog rada predstavljaju implikacije Liotarove kritike intelektualca kao politickog delatnika. Autor najpre pokazuje da Liotarova kritika politike rezultira odbacivanjem politicke teorije, realne politike i politickog angazmana intelektualca. Umesto toga, Liotar razvija koncept "filozofske politike", tj. "refleksivnog pisanja", kao specifican oblik politickog dezangazmana. Za autora je Liotarova kritika politickog angazmana intelektualca prihvatljiva, ali naglasava da Liotarov koncept "filozofske politike "ne moze nadoknaditi nedostatak prihvatljive realne politike i odgovarajuce politicke teorije. Naime, ona moze da se shvati samo kao jedan individualno-egzistencijalni stav otpora prema vladajucim politickim obrascima, koji mora da pretpostavi postojanje prihvatljive realne politike i odgovarajuce politicke doktrine kao uslov sopstvene mogucnosti. (shrink)

In elite sport, the advantages demonstrated by expert performers over novices are sometimes due in part to their superior physical fitness or to their greater technical precision in executing specialist motor skills. However at the very highest levels, all competitors typically share extraordinary physical capacities and have supremely well-honed techniques. Among the extra factors which can differentiate between the best performers, psychological skills are paramount. These range from the capacities to cope under pressure and to bounce back from setbacks, to (...) the knowledge of themselves, opponents, and the domain, which experts access and apply in performance. In the companion chapter on breadth and depth of knowledge in expert sport (see Chapter 11), we discussed the forms or kinds of knowledge deployed by elite athletes, and described some lines of research which seek to tap and study such expert knowledge (McPherson & MacMahon, 2008; McRobert, Ward, Eccles & Williams, 2011). In this chapter we focus more directly on questions about methods for measuring or more accurately assessing expert knowledge, in particular addressing a wider range of methods to help us understand what experts know. Suggesting that sport researchers can productively adopt and adapt existing qualitative methodologies for integration with more standard quantitative methods, we introduce and survey a number of areas of qualitative research in psychology. (shrink)

In this paper thecanonicalmodal logics, a kind of complete modal logics introduced in K. Fine [4] and R. I. Goldblatt [5], will be characterized semantically using the concept of anultrafilter extension, an operation on frames inspired by the algebraic theory of modal logic. Theorem 8 of R. I. Goldblatt and S. K. Thomason [6] characterizing the modally definable Σ⊿-elementary classes of frames will follow as a corollary. A second corollary is Theorem 2 of [4] which states that any complete modal (...) logic defining a Σ⊿-elementary class of frames is canonical.The main tool in obtaining these results is the duality between modal algebras and general frames developed in R. I. Goldblatt [5]. The relevant notions and results from this theory will be stated in §2. The concept of a canonical modal logic is introduced and motivated in §3, which also contains the above-mentioned theorems. In §4, a kind of appendix to the preceding discussion, preservation of first-order sentences under ultrafilter extensions is discussed.The modal language to be considered here has an infinite supply of proposition letters, a propositional constant ⊥, the usual Boolean operators ¬, ∨, ∨, →, and ↔ —with ¬ and ∨ regarded as primitives—and the two unary modal operators ◇ and □ — ◇ being regarded as primitive. Modal formulas will be denoted by lower case Greek letters, sets of formulas by Greek capitals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MACINTYRE'S REPUBLIC J. K. SWINDLER Westminster College Fulton, Missouri CONTRARY TO HIS own evident intentions and perceptions, in After Virtue A'lasdair Macinty!l.·e is much more of a Ptlatonist 1than the A1 ristotelian he aims to be. I hase this judgment both on the positive evidence that Macintyre and Plato (in the Republic) m1gue for and against the same crucial theses and on the negative evidence that Plato has read (...) answers to the very issues which Macintyre finds 1 intractable from an AristoteHan point of viiew. My thesis can be made out in terms of a half dozen issues which Maclntyire takes as crucial to his case: (1) Can there he a science of government? (2) Is there an answer to the sophist's chaillenge to morality? (3) How oan the fragmentation of the modern self he theoretically overcome? (4) What are the hi1stocical and social determinants of morality? (5) Is there a unity of virtue in addition to individual virtues? (6) Can we reconcile ourselves to teleofogy, the absence of the polis, and the tragedy of human 1:ife? I will consider each of these in turn. I. Wisdom Plato defines wisdom as knowledge of how to rule, and Aristotle (in the Nichomachean Ethics) distinguishes between theoretical and practical wisdom, 1suggesting thereby an interesting ambiguity in Plato's view, an ambiguity of which Macintyre makes a great deal. One may rule eithecr hy law or by judgment. In his attack on the Enlightenment, MacIntyre showis quite clearly tha;t the idea of a social science that would p11ovide laws of human behavior, which could in 343 344 J. K. SWINDLER turn be used by il"ulers and managers to predict and therefore manipulate!human action, was an invention of the eighteenth century. He offers an extensive 1oritique o.f this conception of socirul science, grounded primarily in the claim that human.behavior is essentially unlawful, at least if we judge it by the standards of the physical sciences. There is in human affairs a farge 1and uneliminwble element of fortiuna which makes it impossrible rto.formulate laws of human nature or behavior that would he exceptionless and therefore underwrite predictions of behavior. For there is nothing to be done about the unpredictability of innovations or, from one's own point of view, of one's own future actions; nor can the uncertainties of gametheoretie decisions and 1 the general contingency of the outcomes of ruction,be remedied. There is therefore no possibility of a social science in the sense in which Hume tried to imitate Newton. So much for Marx and Weber and the horde of modern.social scientists. This is not to say that life is completely uncertain; on the contrary, there are genuine and general regularities in society, some natural, some social, ·some statistical, some causal, wihich make life bearable. But these provide a,ground for the Aristotelian idea, endorsed by MacIntyre, that the principles of conduct, such as they might be, hold only for the most part and not universa1ly. There is therefore in Maclntyre's view no justification for 1a mora;l oode in the modern sense, nor ev;en of moral principles of the kind we are used to from Kant ·and Mill, Rawls and Nozick, which purport to istand as a sufficient criterion of right in all cases. But, importantly, we do not find any such rules or codes in Pla.to either. For Plato, too, insists on the mixed reign of chaos and logos in the materia;l world and in our Jives and concludes that judgment is essential to· determining right conduct. He tellrs us that wise rule comes only &om good oharructer and good institutions, that legislating in such detaii1 as to eliminate judgment is "cut:ting off the heads of a hy:dra." One cannot help hut think that tMs (essentially Hemclitean) point is something Aristotle ~earned at his MACINTYRE'S REPUBLIC 345 master's knee. And both aspects of Plato's :point ~e ipresent in Aristotle, viz., that s~nce the:ve is chance in nature, there is luck (good 'and had) in life, and since no rule can capture the particularity of conorete situations right... (shrink)

This article looks at the Indian canonical sources for Mādhyamika Buddhist refusals to personally endorse truth claims, even about customary matters. These sources, on a natural reading, seem to suggest that customary truth is only widespread error and that the Buddhist should do little more than duplicate, or acquiesce in, what the common man recognizes about it. The combination of those Indian canonical themes probably contributed to frequent Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka positions on truth, i.e., that the customary is no more than (...) surface level truth, mere consensus amongst the mistaken, or, similarly, that there can be no right answers or truth claims to endorse about customary matters, as there are no sources of knowledge that have them as objects. Tsong kha pa and the dGe lugs pa, by contrast, adopted what I consider to be a philosophically more promising stance, one that recognized the need for a robust normativity: things customary are not just reduced to accepted errors; there are right answers about them that should be endorsed and may well defy current consensus of opinion. Not surprisingly, however, they needed a quite different and even strained exegesis of that same Indian textual legacy. (shrink)

This article explores atheist meaning-making by employing a multidimensional model of meaning operationalized by the Sources of Meaning and Meaning in Life Questionnaire. When compared to a representative sample of “religionists” and “nones”, atheists show lower degrees of meaningfulness, but they do not suffer from crises of meaning more frequently. However, subsequent cluster analysis reveals that heterogeneity within atheism has to be taken into account. Three types of atheists are identified. ‘Low-commitment’ atheists are characterised by generally low commitment; they report (...) very low meaningfulness and a high frequency of crises of meaning. ‘Broad-commitment’ atheists exhibit considerably higher levels of meaningfulness and rare crises of meaning. They evidence, in particular, high scores on the dimension of well-being and relatedness. The third type, primarily committed to “selfactualization,” exhibits moderate levels of meaningfulness, with crises of meaning being literally absent. Common to most atheists is a particular commitment to self-knowledge, freedom, knowledge, individualism, and comfort. In comparing male and female atheists, gendered patterns of commitment are discovered. (shrink)

The paper looks at how Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub, and Go rams pa understood the third and fourth lemmas in the tetralemma, “both A and B” and “neither A nor B,” respectively.

The temporal behaviour of the nonlinear compartmental model we have developed for rat calcium metabolism is discussed with respect to the theoretical properties of the self-oscillating autocatalytic subunit around which the model is constructed. Depending on the approximations made, this subunit is described by a minimal two-variable model, SU2, or by a three-variable one, SU3. The diversity of the theoretical dynamic behaviours possible with SU2 is greatly increased with SU3. But the identification of SU3 parameter values in three different experimental (...) situations reveals that biological constraints efficiently preserve a simple circadian rhythm for bone metabolism. This analysis indicates the significant contribution of the available bone crystal pool to the dynamic organization of this tissue, and hence to extracellular calcium homeostasis. (shrink)

Critical notice of Tom Sorell's Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science.

The first solid bit of argumentation you get in Plato's Phaedo goes something like this: Whatever comes to be, comes to be from its opposite. If at a certain time t a given thing a begins to be F, before that time t it must have been non-F. Wherever a pair of predicates, F and G, are genuine contradictories; where, that is, they stand to each other in the same relation as F stands in to non-F; it is necessarily true (...) that if a began to be F at t before then a was G. The only trouble comes from the difficulty of finding substitutes for F and G that people will allow to be genuine contradictories. It the butter began to be soft at four o'clock, we may suggest, before four it was hard. A tiresome opponent will retort that there is a state in which butter cannot properly be called either hard or soft. We try again: If Ann began to be asleep at eight, before eight she was awake; if my shirt became dirty on Tuesday, before Tuesday it was clean; if Bonzo died last week, before last week he was alive. And when the advocate of the borderline state reminds us of the various twilight areas of consciousness or cleanliness, we are reduced to legislation: “asleep” shall henceforth apply to every mental state short of complete wakefulness, “alive” to every condition of the body before the onset of putrefaction, “clean” to every shirt incapable of producing a certain measurable discoloration in the water in which it is washed. “Let F and G be contradictories”, we still guardedly maintain: “then if a comes to be F at time t, before time t a was G”. (shrink)

This article looks at the Indian canonical sources for Mādhyamika Buddhist refusals to personally endorse truth claims, even about customary matters. These sources, on a natural reading, seem to suggest that customary truth is only widespread error and that the Buddhist should do little more than duplicate, or acquiesce in, what the common man recognizes about it. The combination of those Indian canonical themes probably contributed to frequent Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka positions on truth, i.e., that the customary is no more than (...) surface level truth, mere consensus amongst the mistaken, or, similarly, that there can be no right answers or truth claims to endorse about customary matters, as there are no sources of knowledge that have them as objects. Tsong kha pa and the dGe lugs pa, by contrast, adopted what I consider to be a philosophically more promising stance, one that recognized the need for a robust normativity: things customary are not just reduced to accepted errors; there are right answers about them that should be endorsed and may well defy current consensus of opinion. Not surprisingly, however, they needed a quite different and even strained exegesis of that same Indian textual legacy. (shrink)

In this paper, we give an example of a complete computable infinitary theory T with countable models ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ , where ${\mathcal{N}}$ is a proper computable infinitary extension of ${\mathcal{M}}$ and T has no uncountable model. In fact, ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ are (up to isomorphism) the only models of T. Moreover, for all computable ordinals α, the computable ${\Sigma_\alpha}$ part of T is hyperarithmetical. It follows from a theorem of Gregory (JSL 38:460–470, 1972; Not Am Math Soc 17:967–968, 1970) (...) that if T is a Π 1 1 set of computable infinitary sentences and T has a pair of models ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ , where ${\mathcal{N}}$ is a proper computable infinitary extension of ${\mathcal{M}}$ , then T would have an uncountable model. (shrink)

This article summarily describes the arrival and establishment of Analytic Philosophy [= AP] in Spain. It first expounds the role played in that process by philosophers such José Ferrater Mora, exiled alter the Spanish Civil War, and by Manuel Garrido, Jesús Mosterín, Javier Muguerza, Josep Blasco y José Hierro, the proper introducers of AP in the Spanish university. Secondly, the article refers to the work developed by the introducers’ former students and disciples, and holds that this second wave of (...) AP in Spain largely helped to its consolidation. Finally, the current situation–a third wave of analytic philosophers in action–is reviewed. Its most actives centres are identified, the main changes in the national scientific policy, its profound effects on academic activities for the last twenty years, and the high degree of internationalization reached by Spanish AP from the 1990s, after the founding of the Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica (S.E.F.A.), are concisely pointed out. (shrink)

In this paper the authors argue that ethical considerations are relevant for evaluating animal production systems and that in consequence agrologists should seriously consider the arguments of animal welfare supporters. Furthermore, the authors point out the ethical basis for some (though not all) of the conclusions proposed by supporters of animal welfare. In consequence it is necessary to determine the nature of animal welfare and methods of evaluating the welfare of animals and to recognize when production systems fail to satisfy (...) the needs of animals. (shrink)