Book reviewed in this article: Health Policies, Health Politics: The British and American Experience, 1911–1965. By Daniel M. Fox.

This article traces John Rawls’s debt to Frank Knight’s critique of the ‘just deserts’ rationale for laissez-faire in order to defend justice as fairness against some prominent contemporary criticisms, but also to argue that desert can find a place within a Rawlsian theory of justice when desert is grounded in reciprocity. The first lesson Rawls took from Knight was that inheritance of talent and wealth are on a moral par. Knight highlighted the inconsistency of objecting to the inheritance of (...) wealth while taking for granted the legitimacy of unequal reward based on differential productive capacity. Rawls agreed that there was an inconsistency, but claimed that it should be resolved by rejecting both kinds of inequality, except to the extent they benefitted the worst off. The second lesson Rawls learned from Knight was that the size of one’s marginal product depends on supply and demand, which depend on institutional decisions that cannot themselves be made on the basis of the principle of rewarding marginal productivity. The article claims that this argument about background justice overstates its conclusion, because the dependence of contribution on institutional setup is not total. Proposals for an unconditional basic income may therefore have a strike against them, as far as a reciprocity-based conception of desert is concerned. If we follow Knight’s analysis of the competitive system, however, so too does the alternative of leaving determination of income up to the market. (shrink)

This is a review of the book by John Corvino and Maggie Gallagher, _Debating Same-Sex Marriage_.

The Conservative Manifesto has to be scoured for policies which might improve the lives of women as a sex. There is a section on animal welfare but nothing on the welfare of women. Little attention is paid to women's special problems either at work or as carers in the home. Yet much Conservative social policy depends on women as unpaid carers. (St-John Brooks, 1987).

This paper is a short commentary on Michelle Dempsey's contribution to a symposium on the work of John Finnis which took place at Villanova Law School in the fall of 2011. It focuses on Finnis's claim that there is a presumptive obligation to obey the law and some worries that Dempsey raises against this claim. It is forthcoming, along with several other papers from the symposium, in the Villanova Law Review.

Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace control into the Difference Principle’s index of advantage. The thesis of this paper is (...) that even based on income alone, the Difference Principle is not as hostile to property-owning democracy as it may seem, because the Difference Principle should not be interpreted to require maximizing long run income growth. The main idea is that it is unfair to make the present worst off accept inequality that doesn’t benefit them, for the sake of benefitting the future worst off, if the future worst off will be better off than they are anyway. (shrink)

One source of controversy surrounding John Rawls's later work — a source of both criticism and praise — has been the impression that he abandoned the philosophical project of figuring out what is truly just, in favour of the political project of working out a feasible consensus for people from a particular political tradition. One aspect of this controversy is the question of whether Rawls could advance his theory as being worthy of endorsement on the basis of good reasons (...) without also claiming it to be true. In preferring to claim reasonableness rather than truth, Rawls's main concern seems to have been to distinguish the ‘whole truth’ as represented by a particular comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine, from the truth about politics given that reasonable people will inevitably disagree about the whole truth. (shrink)

One source of controversy surrounding John Rawls's later work — a source of both criticism and praise — has been the impression that he abandoned the philosophical project of figuring out what is truly just, in favour of the political project of working out a feasible consensus for people from a particular political tradition. One aspect of this controversy is the question of whether Rawls could advance his theory as being worthy of endorsement on the basis of good reasons (...) without also claiming it to be true. In preferring to claim reasonableness rather than truth, Rawls's main concern seems to have been to distinguish the ‘whole truth’ as represented by a particular comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine, from the truth about politics given that reasonable people will inevitably disagree about the whole truth. (shrink)

The idea of “promoting democracy” is one that goes in and out of favor. With the advent of the so-called “Arab Spring”, the idea of promoting democracy abroad has come up for discussion once again. Yet an important recent line of thinking about human rights, starting with John Rawls’s book The Law of Peoples, has held that there is no human right to democracy, and that nondemocratic states that respect human rights should be “beyond reproach” in the realm of (...) international relations. This is, for obvious reasons, a controversial view, especially given the powerful and important arguments purporting to show that democracies do significantly better than nondemocracies in promoting internal peace and equality, and in engaging in peaceful international cooperation. Both proponents and opponents of the Rawlsian view of human rights have argued that the view implies that democracies may not “promote democracy” in nondemocratic societies. But, given that all parties to this dispute agree that democracy is necessary for justice, and given the important instrumental goods provided by democracy, the Rawlsian view has seemed deeply implausible to many. -/- In this paper I blunt this challenge to the Rawlsian view by showing how, even if there is no human right to democracy, we may still rightfully promote democracy in a number of ways and cases. Showing this requires investigation of what it means to “promote democracy”, and a more careful inspection of when various methods of promoting democracy are appropriate than has been done by most political theorists working on human rights. When we look carefully, we can see that in some instances acceptable forms of promoting democracy are compatible with the Rawlsian view of human rights, and that this view is therefore not vulnerable to the “instrumentalist” challenge. We also see how, if political philosophy is to be useful, it must be less abstract and look closely at actual cases. -/- This paper posted by permission of the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. For information visit the Stanford University website. (shrink)

On June 10, 1480, William Caxton issued his edition of the Chronicles of England, based on the Middle English prose Brut. On August 18 of the same year he issued the Description of Britain, a short work adapted from John Trevisa's translation of Ranulph Higden's Polychronicon. Two years later, at some point between July 2 and November 20, 1482, Caxton published his full edition of Trevisa's Polychronicon, and on October 8 of the same year he issued a second edition (...) of the Chronicles of England. (shrink)

The great biologist Louis Pasteur suppressed 'awkward' data because it didn't support the case he was making. John Snow, the 'first epidemiologist' was doing nothing others had not done before. Gregor Mendel, the supposed 'founder of genetics' never grasped the fundamental principles of 'Mendelian' genetics. Joseph Lister's famously clean hospital wards were actually notorious dirty. And Einstein's general relativity was only 'confirmed' in 1919 because an eminent British scientist cooked his figures. These are just some of the revelations (...) explored in this book. Drawing on current history of science scholarship, Fabulous Science shows that many of our greatest heroes of science were less than honest about their experimental data and not above using friends in high places to help get their ideas accepted. It also reveals that the alleged revolutionaries of the history of science were often nothing of the sort. Prodigiously able they may have been, but the epithet of the 'man before his time' usually obscures vital contributions made their unsung contemporaries and the intrinsic merits of ideas they overturned. These distortions of the historical record mostly arise from our tendency to read the present back into the past. But in many cases, scientists owe their immortality to a combination of astonishing effrontery and their skills as self-promoters. (shrink)

Public reason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is public reason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that public reason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the public reason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their own requirements. My discussion has several important (...) implications for the debate on public reason. (shrink)

Moral Absolutes sets forth a vigorous but careful critique of much recent work in moral theology. It is illustrated with examples from the most controversial aspects of Christian moral doctrine, and a frank account is given of the roots of the upheaval in Roman Catholic moral theology in and after the 1960s.

This volume brings together a group of researchers from different European countries and disciplines who are involved in Clinical Ethics Consultation. The work provides a discussion on the theories and methods underlying CEC and on the issues of implementation and evaluation.

Prompting this book is the paradox of belonging. What pushes the author to write are art's questions. Rather than take the route of writing, artists in academia could opt for the studio, teaching students, and occasionally indulge in conferences and symposia. However, beyond such rituals, writing art's questions remains akin to art's acts of belonging. In these lessons of belonging this is done through art's paradox. Belonging is a matter of art because art belongs to the aporia that writes it.

PovertyPoverty is a serious threat for human beings and their well-beingWell-being. People are simply unable to live a good life when they are faced with severe problems, e.g., bad education, poor housing, poor sanitationSanitation, poor hygiene, or malnourishment. However, one of the most urgent problems with regard to poverty is badHealth/ healthcare, right toaccess access to primary health careGlobal healthcare and the allocation of health care resources for millions of people around the world. These people are deprived of human flourishing, (...) and life is for them, in general, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” In this chapter, I present an ethical argument that shows that people have a moral right to primary health carePrimary health care, and that wealthy developed countries are morally obligated to help the needy. Primary health care, and hence access to it is, as I will argue, a global public goodGlobal public good that is protected by human dignity and the human rightHuman rights of protection from unwarranted bodily harmHarm. (shrink)

Livro de memórias escrito num tom ensaístico, que refle sobre a vida do autor em relação direta com os temas transversais ao seu trabalho: filosofia, ética, educação e política.

Translation of On liberty, Utilitarianism, selections from Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social philosophy and The utility of religion.

Epistemic justifi cation is necessary for deliberative democracy, yet there is a question about what we mean by the concept of epistemic values of public deliberation. According to one reading, the epistemic value of public deliberation implies a procedure’s ability to achieve a correct outcome, as judged by a procedure-independent standard of correctness. As I shall show in this paper, however, there is another reading of the "epistemic" value of public deliberation extant in the literature: Epistemic values are constitutive of (...) a deliberative process as an exchange of reasons. If the distinction between two concepts of epistemic values of public deliberation holds, then we can re-conceptualize the relationship between procedural fairness, epistemic values, and legitimacy. Thus, a concept of legitimacy that combines procedural fairness and a procedure-independent standard of correctness on the one hand, versus one that combines procedural fairness and the constitutive epistemic value of deliberation on the other hand. (shrink)

Things that don't exist -- Fictional object nominalism -- Fictional object realism -- Meinongianism -- God's existence and nonexistence -- Contingency and nonexistence -- Perfection and divine existence -- Nonexistence and creatures -- Ex nihilo and nonexistence -- Infinite existence and countless nonexistents -- Providence and freedom -- Nonexistents and middle knowledge -- Evil as nonexistence.

"A Handbook of Traditional Living" consists of two texts originally published by the Italian cultural organization Raido, translated here for the first time: "The World of Tradition," a comprehensive summary of the principle ideas of Julius Evola; and "The Front of Tradition," a more practical guide for living as a traditionalist.

Among Thomists the standard practice is to show the openness of human nature to beatitude from the speculative side. The intellectual desire to know the richness of the notion of being, the ratio entis, becomes the desire to know the creator who as esse subsistens embodies the intelligible heart of being. I want to try the same strategy but from the practical side. I believe that more people experience a desire to love than a desire to know. Few have noticed (...) that Aquinas’s first practical principle “Good ought to be done” is, as I will explain, a call to be respectful and solicitous of ourselves and others as intellectors of being. Hence, fidelity to this principle illustrates a connection between being and love so that the greater is the concentration of being, then the greater is the concentration of love. A subsistent instance of being should be a subsistent instance of love. In his metaphysics Aquinas attains the creator as subsistent being. Hence, contact with that instance would strengthen in an unparalleled way the human’s fidelity to the first practical principle. Does this contact in fact occur? That philosophical question raises the religious possibility. In its parade of saints, Christianity provides tantalizing evidence that that contact is realized. (shrink)

Job: the soul's pathfinder.--Plato: intimations of immortality.--Kant: a protest against materialism.--Hegel: theistic evolution.--Persistence of ideas: the spirit in the trend of thought.--Robert Browning: the subtle assertor of the soul.

This book argues that the sin of the devil compels a view of moral responsibility that undermines concerns about luck. It surveys the biblical account of the primal sin, its major interpretation in the tradition, and navigates that interpretation through objections from the perspective of moral luck.

Robin Barrow has been one of the leading philosophers of education for more than forty years. This book is a critical but appreciative examination of his work by some of the leading philosophers of education at work today, with responses from Professor Barrow. It will focus on his work on curriculum, the analytic tradition in philosophy, education and schooling, and his use of Greek philosophy to enrich current debates in the subject. This work will be of interest to all those (...) who have been influenced by his contributions to educational and philosophical debate. (shrink)

Clear focus on its application of formal logic to ordinary English is the most distinctive feature of this textbook for the introductory course in deductive logic. Great care is taken with the appropriate translation into logical languages of ordinary English sentences. Evaluation of these translations promotes a more effective use of ordinary language. The Principles of Deductive Logic presents symbolic logic in a fuller and more leisurely fashion than other introductory textbooks. Early chapters cover informal material, including definition and informal (...) fallacies. The remainder of the text is devoted to the treatment of four distinct artificial languages. The Categorical language is the language of syllogistic logic. The Extended Categorical language enriches this first language with the symbolic connectives for conjunction and negation. The Propositional Connective language and the First-Order language are the two basic languages of modern logic. Each language is accompanied by a deductive system, and is used as an instrument for exploring ordinary language, including ordinary arguments The book contains a large number of exercises whose answers are supplied in the back of the book, and many more that can be assigned as homework. A solution’s manual is available to instructors upon their request. The request must be written on college or university letterhead. (shrink)