Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by Ian T. Ramsey.Evil and the God of Love. By John Hick.Blondel et Teilhard de Chardin, Correspondance Commentée. By Henri de Lubac.The Structure of Behaviour. By Maurice Merleau-Ponty.New Testament Essays. By Raymond E. Brown, S.S.Ideologies. By Patrick Corbett.Worship in Israel. By Hans-Joachim Kraus. Translated by Geoffrey Boswell.The Theology of St John. By Joseph Crehan, S.J.Jesus and the Kingdom. By George Eldon Ladd.Finding the Historical. By James Peter.The Shape of Christology By John Mcntyre.Christology. By Dietrich (...) Bonhoeffer. Translated by John Bowden, with an introduction by Edwin H. Robertson.Theology of the English Reformers. By Philip Edgcumbe Hughes.The Execution of Justice in England: A True, Sincere, and Modest Defense of English Catholics. By William Cecil and William Allen. Edited by Robert M. Kingdon.The Revolution of the Saints. By Michael Walzer.L'Église au temps du Grand Schisme et de la crise conciliaire. By E. Delaruelle, E.-R. Labande and P. Ourliac.John Hus at the Council of Constance. Translated and introduced by M. Spinka.Mission to France 1944–1953, Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, Pope John XXIII. Edited by Don Loris Capovilla. Translated by Dorothy White.The Vatican Council and Christian Unity. A commentary on the Decree on Ecumenism of the Second Vatican Council. By Bernard Leeming, S.J.The Documents of Vatican II. Edited by Walter M. Abbott, S.J. Translations edited by Mgr Joseph Gallagher. (shrink)

The way in which the term "activity" is understood determines foundations for the logical theory of activity. Activity understood as performance of changes or forbearance of performing a change is an object of G. H. von Wright's logic of actions based on the logic of changes. Generalization of such treatment of activity is T. Kubiński's concept according to which it consists in adopting a specific attitude towards a change; an object of nth logic of actions is description of n attitudes (...) to changes. The distinction made between two main attitudes, out of which one expresses itself in activity and the other in its forbearance makes it necessary to specify more exactly the concept of forbearance. Analysis of this concept brings out strongly its ambiguity, it emphasizes the difference between non-activity and forbearance. Defining forbearance as non-activity in the situation, in which a possibility of activity did exist involves application of one of the modal concepts. The concepts in which forbearance is not taken into account constitute an argument justifying an assertion that forbearance cannot be expressed by the negation function. Attempts at formalization of intuitions connected with the term "forbearance of activity" show how deeply entangled it is in modal contexts, and even in deontic concepts if it is interpreted as "forbearance of activity". (shrink)

In this book, T. L. Short corrects widespread misconceptions of Peirce's theory of signs and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary analytic philosophy of language, mind and science. Peirce's theory of mind, naturalistic but nonreductive, bears on debates of Fodor and Millikan, among others. His theory of inquiry avoids foundationalism and subjectivism, while his account of reference anticipated views of Kripke and Putnam. Peirce's realism falls between 'internal' and 'metaphysical' realism and is more satisfactory than either. His pragmatism is not verificationism; (...) rather, it identifies meaning with potential growth of knowledge. Short distinguishes Peirce's mature theory of signs from his better-known but paradoxical early theory. He develops the mature theory systematically on the basis of Peirce's phenomenological categories and concept of final causation. The latter is distinguished from recent and similar views, such as Brandon's, and is shown to be grounded in forms of explanation adopted in modern science. (shrink)

Controversy over providing financial incentives to research participants has a long history and remains an issue of contention in both current discussions about research ethics and for institutional review bodies/human research ethics committees which are charged with the responsibility of deciding whether such incentives fall within ethical guidelines. The arguments both for and against financial incentives have been well aired in the literature. A point of agreement for many is that inducement in the form of financial incentive is permissible when (...) the risk of harm to the individual is negligible in terms of degree and probability of occurrence. In the absence of harm to the individual, encouraging more people to participate in research would appear to be a good thing in so far as it will lead to statistically more robust research outcomes, which can then be translated into better healthcare and other practice. Whilst, on the face of it, this position seems highly defensible, I will explore the possibility that it is counterproductive – that is, providing individuals with financial incentives to become research participants may have the unintended outcome of reducing participation rates in some areas of research. In exploring this idea I will draw on empirical findings from the literature on crowding-out – the hypothesis that providing monetary incentives to people can backfire by overall reducing intrinsic motivation, in this instance intrinsic motivation to behave altruistically or undertake civic duties. (shrink)

Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527-Criticism and interpretation ; Political science-Translating.

Logic; Islamic philosophy; Islam--doctrines.

Byzantine Empire; economic and social conditions; history.

There have been many discussions on problems of logic over the past several years. While the problem of the nature of the law of contradiction, one of the laws of formal logic, has received particular attention by everyone, the question has not been posed very precisely in the arguments. Actually, the question is not whether the movement, change, and development of things can be reflected in consciousness by use of the methods of formal logic, or in distinguishing the effectiveness of (...) the law of contradiction in disputation, proofs, or theoretical systems from its effectiveness in the general process of cognition, when applied to phenomena. If the development of reality cannot at all be reflected by the use of the logical tools of formal logic, what use do they have? No one denies that formal logic does not suffice as a method of cognition. If, in disputations and proofs, or in the establishment of theoretical systems, one relies only on the logical tools of formal logic, this is also not enough. The scope of applicability of the laws of formal logic, as laws that are studied by a concrete science, is necessarily limited. It is impossible for them to be all-powerful; it is of course impossible, relying on the law of contradiction, to know and grasp the contradictions in reality — the unity and conflict of opposites. All disputations and proofs, and the establishment of theoretical systems, are, in fact, efforts to know real objects, efforts of the subjective to grasp the objective. In principle, the use of formal logic in disputations and proofs and in the establishment of theoretical systems, and its use in knowing an object, should be no different. What, then, is the question? The question should be posed as follows: can thought contravene the law of contradiction? (shrink)

On inquiring into the nature of the Charites one may be astonished at the disagreement of their compounding elements. On the one hand, they appear as the very representatives and even personification of gracefulness and charm, brightness, and joy; their name itself seems to testify this, closely allied as it is with the verb χαρειν besides the particular names of the most renowned Hesiodic trinity—Aglaia, Euphrosyne, and Thalia—that is to say, brilliancy, mirth, and florescence. Hence arose the Roman conception of (...) the Gratiae decentes; hence also the widespread neo-humanistic idea, clothed by Goethe in the well-known verse of the Classical Walpurgis Night: ‘Grace we are bringing into life ….’ But, on the other hand, we discover the incontestable kinship of Charis with Charon, the ugly and sullen ferryman of the lower world, the still more amazing relation between Eurynome, the mother of the Hesiodic trinity, and Eurynomos, the horrid demon of decay, the vulture-skinned devourer of putrefying corpses in the Delphic Nekyia of Polygnotos. (shrink)

To compare a novel to a work of philosophy is, admittedly, a risky exercise in analogy. When the novelist is Lawrence and the philosophical text is the ponderous and dialectical Being and Nothingness, such a comparison may seem willfully perverse and peculiarly open, insofar as it deals with Lawrence's great theme of sexuality, to his anathema of "sex in the head." Furthermore, modern criticism, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has tended to be wary of critical approaches that lean on notions (...) that are not derived from literature itself - a tendency that is being reinforced these days by the structuralist insistence on the "literariness" of the Text. Now, despite its metaphorical statement as a form of dramatic "gesture," Sartre's book is very definitely not a work of literature. T.H. Adamowski, associate professor of English at Erindale College, the University of Toronto, has written articles on English, American, and French literature. This essay is part of a larger study on progress on Lawrence's "sexual poetics.". (shrink)