In The Art Instinct, Denis Dutton promoted a theoretical framework that “has more validity, more power, and more possibilities than the hermetic discourse that deadens so much of the humanities.”1 This framework is Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural and sexual selection. Dutton proposed to seek “human universals that underlie the vast cacophony of cultural differences and across the globe” (AI, p. 39), based on a shared, evolved human nature.This contrasts with the relativistic presumptions of those falling under the (...) shadow of Margaret Mead and Clifford Geertz, or “the dogmas of Freud, the speculations of Jung, the sterile formulations of behaviorism, all variously empty or misleading” (p. 37). Also .. (shrink)

This chapter highlighted some salient trends in pediatric ethicsEthics, pediatric from different parts of the globe. It is interesting to note that although diverse, there are many similarities between ethical challenges in pediatrics in different parts of the world.

Dans ce texte, Gerhard Krüger cherche à déterminer la nature du problème philosophique de l’histoire et/ou de l’historicité. L’histoire est-elle devenue – comme beaucoup de contemporains de Krüger le prétendent, s’affligeant de leur propre impuissance à surmonter une crise de l’historicisme qui met selon eux en danger l’être-homme de la manière la plus radicale – notre problème philosophique le plus urgent, le plus compréhensif et le plus difficile? Et si, comme le suspecte Krüger, le problème de l’histoire n’est pas aussi (...) urgent, compréhensif et obscur qu’on le croit, qu’est-ce qui a conduit la philosophie contemporaine à lui accorder ce statut? (shrink)

Gerhard Krüger s’interroge sur la genèse, le sens – tout autant philosophique qu’historique – et les résultats de la philosophie romantique. Il s’efforce de démontrer que le romantisme est une réaction à une décision antérieure qui avait fondé l’ Aufklärung : le retrait de la pensée dans le for intérieur de la conscience réflexive, la séparation entre le Selbst pensant et le corps propre, la communauté politique et Dieu. Le romantisme part du constat d’une douloureuse absence de contenu dans l’existence (...) moderne. L’intention qui anime la philosophie romantique dans son ensemble – chez Fichte, Schelling et Hegel est de soulager cette douleur en rendant par divers moyens à l’homme moderne ce dont la fondation de l’ Aufklärung avait exigé qu’il se sépare. (shrink)

Gerhard Krüger s’interroge sur la genèse, le sens – tout autant philosophique qu’historique – et les résultats de la philosophie romantique. Il s’efforce de démontrer que le romantisme est une réaction à une décision antérieure qui avait fondé l’ Aufklärung : le retrait de la pensée dans le for intérieur de la conscience réflexive, la séparation entre le Selbst pensant et le corps propre, la communauté politique et Dieu. Le romantisme part du constat d’une douloureuse absence de contenu dans l’existence (...) moderne. L’intention qui anime la philosophie romantique dans son ensemble – chez Fichte, Schelling et Hegel est de soulager cette douleur en rendant par divers moyens à l’homme moderne ce dont la fondation de l’ Aufklärung avait exigé qu’il se sépare. (shrink)

Gerhard Krüger aborde le conflit entre la pensée scientifique moderne et la foi chrétienne. Il cherche à répondre aux questions suivantes : comment et pour quelles raisons ce conflit a-t-il vu le jour? À quoi tient-il essentiellement? La compréhension de l’advenir temporel qui sert de fondement à la pensée scientifique moderne n’offusque-t-elle que la foi chrétienne, ou l’homme en tant qu’être agissant est-il lui aussi concerné par le conflit qui les oppose? Et quelle réforme ou concession une résolution satisfaisante dudit (...) conflit exige-t-elle de la pensée moderne? (shrink)

Dans cet article originalement publié en 1934, Gerhard Krüger présente une version condensée de l’interprétation de la philosophie de Kant qu’il avait proposée trois années plus tôt dans un ouvrage intitulé Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen Kritik. Par l’entremise d’une réflexion portant sur la nature des rapports entre critique et métaphysique dans le système de Kant, Gerhard Krüger entend mettre à jour l’intention existentielle ou morale qui est selon lui au fondement du projet philosophique kantien. Dans cette perspective, son (...) interprétation de Kant est à la fois tributaire et critique de celle de son professeur de Marbourg Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

The question whether τυγχνω can be used forτυγχνω ν in Attic Prose has been differently answered by different scholars. Phrynichus held that it could not, and Porson followed him. The generality of modern scholars, however, have taken the other view—so, e.g., Locella, Heindorf, Lobeck, Ast, Schneider, Madvig, Stallbaum, Krüger, W. H. Thompson, Rutherford, Jebb, Adam, Kühner-Gerth. The object of the present note is to show that the ‘modern’ view, if it is to be maintained, must be based on other evidence (...) than that hitherto given for it. (shrink)

The question whether τυγχνω can be used forτυγχνω ν in Attic Prose has been differently answered by different scholars. Phrynichus held that it could not, and Porson followed him. The generality of modern scholars, however, have taken the other view—so, e.g., Locella, Heindorf, Lobeck, Ast, Schneider, Madvig, Stallbaum, Krüger, W. H. Thompson, Rutherford, Jebb, Adam, Kühner-Gerth. The object of the present note is to show that the ‘modern’ view, if it is to be maintained, must be based on other evidence (...) than that hitherto given for it. (shrink)

D’abord formé par Nicolai Hartman et Rudolf Bultmann, Gerhard Krüger (1902- 1972) fut l’un des élèves les plus doués de Heidegger. Il a suivi d’un œil critique et avisé les soubresauts de sa pensée. S’il fut séduit par la résurrection de la question de l’être et celle de la métaphysique chez Heidegger, comme par sa critique du sujet moderne, c’est une tout autre conception de l’être, de la métaphysique et de l’existence humaine qu’il lui opposait. Il le fit notamment dans (...) ses livres remarquables sur Kant (1931) et sur Platon (1939) que l’on peut lire comme des contestations rigoureuses de la conception heideggérienne de l’histoire de la métaphysique, mais aussi de sa vision de la philosophie. (shrink)

In this article the public-theological motives in the film As it is in heaven is analised to demonstrate the film producer Kay Pollack's ideal to communicate through the film that people should live their lives here and now authentically without seeking excuses for being happy. In this article the principles of narratology is applied in the analysis of the film's plot, characterisation, plotted time and narrated spaces. It is also argued that the protagonist in the film can be regarded as (...) a 'Christ-figure' and that the film conveys a 'Christ narrative' in a secularised context. Societal issues such as emotional abuse and violence against children, women, people with disability and animals constitute building blocks of the narrative. Ecclesiastical hypocrisy and outdated sexual values endorsed by the institutional church are replaced by a choir consisting of common people which leads a whole world to sing in harmony. (shrink)

For Bernard Stiegler ‘the question of philosophy is first of all that of action’ (p.7). By extending this statement to philosophy of education, I consider the possibilities of action in education in responding to the conditions of the contemporary. These conditions, which have come to be discussed and dissected with reference to such terms as Anthropocene (Stoermer, Crutzen), Capitalocene (Moore), Plantationocene (Haraway), hold unprecedented and mostly devastating consequences for all life. To consider possibilities for action within the field of education (...) to the conditions of the contemporary, I read Walter Mignolo’s concept of the colonial wound together with Gilles Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the wound. Based on this reading, I argue for the conditions of the contemporary to be understood as a wound in both Mignolo’s and Deleuze’s sense. Conceptualising it as such in turn allows me to ask how we might counter-actualise the wounds of the contemporary. In other words, how might we be worthy of the wound-event and respond in an affirmative yet critical manner to it within the field of education, and in so doing generate new possibilities of (educational) life. To consider what one such possibility of counter-actualisation might entail, I propose that education be informed by the notion of incompleteness, as expressed in the concept of conviviality. I conclude by reflecting on implications of counter-actualising the wound of the contemporary in relation to education if we were to activate the concepts of incompleteness and conviviality and pursue a different aesthetics of (educational) life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 17-21 [Access article in PDF] Self-Injury:Symbolic Sacrifice/Self-Assertion Renders Clinicians Helpless Christa Krüger Keywords feminism, iconic communication, moral conflict, oppression, psychiatrist/psychologist roles, societal norms. POTTER'S PAPER CONSIDERS self-injury in women diagnosed with borderline person ality disorder (BPD) to be a form of body modification where the body is used to communicate meaning. She touches on symbolism as a possible explanatory theory for this sort (...) of self-injury. She also refers to the culture of body commodification as underlying self-injury. She then argues that clinicians have a duty to give uptake to the patient's own interpretations about the meaning of the self-injury. Giving uptake is a virtuous approach for ethical interactions with people diagnosed with BPD who self-injure, and it aims to preserve the communicator's integrity, along with other benefits. Potter offers five maxims for giving uptake properly. However, I shall argue that giving uptake can be very difficult for clinicians, and that an appreciation of this difficulty depends on an expansion and linkage of some of the theories that she touched on. Self-injury is revisited experimentally as a double-edged sword of symbolic sacrifice and iconic-symbolic self-assertion. This revisiting aims to illustrate how clinicians might be caught in a double bind, where giving uptake properly might be very difficult if not more or less doomed to fail.Potter's paper starts by situating self-injury in a broader discourse of body modifications. In this discourse the body is being used as a text, a tool to communicate meaning. The meaning that is communicated might be difficult or impossible to articulate otherwise (by using words, for example). The meaning of the communication is embedded in a context of social, cultural, religious, political, and other norms. Potter explores possible interpretations of the meaning of self-injury in women with BPD, including an interpretation of self-injury as symbolic sacrifice. She suggests that a cultural understanding/nonunderstanding of the meaning of a particular instance of self-injury is an important determinant of whether such self-injury is considered pathological/nonpathological. She then shifts the focus to the present-day culture in which women's bodies are commodified and objectified, and where women become alienated from their bodies. Self-injury might then be interpreted as an attempt to re-own one's body as a part of oneself. This re-owning is a socially transgressive act that violates repressive norms for the bodies of women. [End Page 17]Notwithstanding these possible significations of self-injury, Potter then argues that clinicians have a duty to give uptake to the patient's own interpretations, instead of jumping to conclusions (my oversimplification) about the meaning of the self-injury. Giving uptake, then, constitutes a framework for ethical interactions with people diagnosed with BPD who self-injure, and it aims to preserve the communicator's integrity. Potter offers five maxims for giving uptake properly.At the risk of losing their essence, I translate the five maxims for practicing psychiatrists as involving the following: critical self-reflection about one's own conceptual framework and cultural context; being receptive to the patient's conceptual framework and cultural context; giving the patient the benefit of the doubt; being open to the emergence of new meanings of self-injury; and keeping a range of possible interpretative options open, rather than insisting on having the final word. We should try to understand what the world looks like from the patient's position. All of this requires some moral effort.Potter describes a number of benefits that result from giving uptake. Giving uptake is a crucial corrective to the human tendencies of becoming overly committed to prevailing societal norms and conceptual schemes (stuck in our ways), of imposing our views on others, and of silencing or distorting the communications of our patients. Giving uptake allows clinicians to be dialogically responsive and to treat patients with respect and dignity. Giving uptake fosters trust in a therapeutic relationship where clinicians do not exploit their patients' vulnerabilities. Giving... (shrink)

The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope (...) for in the justifi cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously. (shrink)

This target article presents a theory of human cultural learning. Cultural learning is identified with those instances of social learning in which intersubjectivity or perspective-taking plays a vital role, both in the original learning process and in the resulting cognitive product. Cultural learning manifests itself in three forms during human ontogeny: imitative learning, instructed learning, and collaborative learning – in that order. Evidence is provided that this progression arises from the developmental ordering of the underlying social-cognitive concepts and processes involved. (...) Imitative learning relies on a concept of intentional agent and involves simple perspective-taking. Instructed learning relies on a concept of mental agent and involves alternating/coordinated perspective-taking (intersubjectivity). Collaborative learning relies on a concept of reflective agent and involves integrated perspective-taking (reflective intersubjectivity). A comparison of normal children, autistic children and wild and enculturated chimpanzees provides further evidence for these correlations between social cognition and cultural learning. Cultural learning is a uniquely human form of social learning that allows for a fidelity of transmission of behaviors and information among conspecifics not possible in other forms of social learning, thereby providing the psychological basis for cultural evolution. (shrink)

Abstract John McDowell argues for minimal empiricism via using the notion of second nature of human beings. I should like to invite him to discuss Helmuth Plessner's Philosophical Anthropology in order to elaborate a more substantial conception of second nature. McDowell seems to think that it is adequate for his more epistemological aim to remind us of second nature as though it were to be taken for granted. But I think, following Plessner, that this right reminder needs a therapeutic elaboration (...) in Kant's sense of propaedeutics. What had been called our second nature found itself being questioned in order to limit the range of ways of treating the self we can authorize. (shrink)

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

We cooperate with other people despite the risk of being exploited or hurt. If future artificial intelligence (AI) systems are benevolent and cooperative toward us, what will we do in return? Here we show that our cooperative dispositions are weaker when we interact with AI. In nine experiments, humans interacted with either another human or an AI agent in four classic social dilemma economic games and a newly designed game of Reciprocity that we introduce here. Contrary to the hypothesis that (...) people mistrust algorithms, participants trusted their AI partners to be as cooperative as humans. However, they did not return AI's benevolence as much and exploited the AI more than humans. These findings warn that future self-driving cars or co-working robots, whose success depends on humans' returning their cooperativeness, run the risk of being exploited. This vulnerability calls not just for smarter machines but also better human-centered policies. (shrink)

Neurobiological and cognitive models of unconscious information processing suggest that subconscious threat detection can lead to cognitive misinterpretations and false alarms, while conscious processing is assumed to be perceptually and conceptually accurate and unambiguous. Furthermore, clinical theories suggest that pathological anxiety results from a crude preattentive warning system predominating over more sophisticated and controlled modes of processing. We investigated the hypothesis that subconscious detection of threat in a cognitive task is reflected by enhanced ''false signal'' detection rather than by selectively (...) enhanced discrimination of threat items in 30 patients with panic disorder and 30 healthy controls. We presented a tachistoscopic word-nonword discrimination task and a subsequent recognition task and analyzed the data by means of process-dissociation procedures. In line with our expectations, subjects of both groups showed more false signal detection to threat than to neutral stimuli as indicated by an enhanced response bias, whereas indices of discriminative sensitivity did not show this effect. In addition, patients with panic disorder showed a generally enhanced response bias in comparison to healthy controls. They also seemed to have processed the stimuli less elaborately and less differentially. Results are consistent with the assumption that subconscious threat detection can lead to misrepresentations of stimulus significance and that pathological anxiety is characterized by a hyperactive preattentive alarm system that is insufficiently controlled by higher cognitive processes. (shrink)