François Duchesneau. cité de construire un jeu d'expressions symboliques s' emboîtant par paliers et répondant à une norme analogiquement combinatoire. Au sommet de la construction et en assurant l'intégration, figurent des expressions ...

Les notions relatives au vivant jouent un role central dans l'economie interne du systeme de la nature selon Leibniz. Elles ont aussi influe sur les theories qui ont ponctue le developpement des sciences de la vie. Le dessein de cet ouvrage est de traiter de ce double objet. Comment Leibniz dessine-t-il le profil d'une science des vivants suivant un modele en partie inspire de Malpighi? Comment la theorie leibnizienne de la substance influe-t-elle sur la determination du concept de vivant comme (...) machine de la nature? Quel role charniere la dynamique joue-t-elle dans la conception leibnizienne de l' organisme, concept scientifique nouveau en son temps? Echangeant avec des figures majeures de la science et de la medecine de cette epoque, Hartsoeker, Stahl, Hoffmann, Johann Bernoulli, Michelotti et d'autres, comment Leibniz developpe-t-il la vision d'une physique speciale dont le vivant serait l'objet specifique? De quelle maniere le modele leibnizien s'integre-t-il d'emblee dans des theories sur la generation que developpent Conti et Vallisneri, puis Bourguet? Ainsi une exploitation multiforme d'idees leibniziennes sur le vivant pourra-t-elle s'amorcer au siecle des Lumieres. (shrink)

Par-delà le règne, puis l'éclipse, du paradigme newtonien, l'oeuvre philosophique et scientifique de ce penseur qui inventa le calcul infinitésimal, la dynamique et de nouveaux modèles pour la théorie de l'organisme, fournit un point d'ancrage privilégié à l'analyse épistémologique.

_The first unabridged English translation of the correspondence between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Georg Ernst Stahl detailing their opposing philosophies_ The correspondence between the eighteenth-century mathematician and philosopher G. W. Leibniz and G. E. Stahl, a chemist and physician at the court of King Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia, known as the Leibniz-Stahl Controversy, is one of the most important intellectual contributions on theoretical issues concerning pre-biological thinking. Editors François Duchesneau and Justin E. H. Smith offer readers the first fully (...) annotated English translation of this fascinating exchange of philosophical views on divine action, the order of nature, causality and teleology, and the soul-body relationship. (shrink)

Les considérations physiologiques sont étrangères, en tant que telles, au projet de l'Ethique, et sans doute, à l'ensemble des préoccupations philosophiques de Spinoza. Au début de Ia seconde partie de l'Ethique, Spinoza précise clairement: “j'expliquerai seulement ce qui peut nous conduire comme par la main à la connaissance de l’ Arne humaine et de sa béatitude suprême”. Pourtant, le livre ne laisse pas de contenir une révision intéressante du modèle mécaniste que Descartes appliquait à l'explication du corps humain; il contient (...) surtout une hypothèse sur Ia structure organique, qui, nous le croyons, a joué un rôle de modèle pour un certain type de théorie de l'être vivant. Ce type de conception se trouve d'abord dans l'iatromécanisme de Boerhaave et de ses disciples au XVIIIe siècle, mais les séquelles en sont identifiables jusque dans Ia philosophie biologique contemporaine. (shrink)

The theory of living beings as machines of nature and the conception of composite substances endowed with conjoined souls, entelechies, or monads, as well as that of organic bodies, were solidified over the course of the transformations of Leibniz's thought that issued in the New System of Nature. On this basis, the monadological versions of a system of nature centered upon the integrated organization ad infinitum of living beings were gradually articulated. Leibniz aimed to spell out a science, or physiology (...) of vital processes, that would be, as much as possible, in agreement with the epistemological exigencies of the complex metaphysical model that he had elaborated. On the one hand, Leibniz offers a critical evaluation of the methodological options that divide the allegiances of the physicians and naturalists who are his contemporaries; what is more, he determines the profile of the analyses and explications that are to be promoted. For This double preoccupation translates into the scientific exchanges and correspondences that accompany the construction of the theory of organic bodies as constituents of machines of nature. The author focuses on the particular case of the propositions concerning the science of the living that stem from his reaction to the work of Georg Ernst Stahl. (shrink)

. G. W. Leibniz did not contribute directly to scientific discoveries in the life sciences, but he provided several relevant analyses on methods of investigation applicable to complex, and in particular organic, phenomena. Leibniz's theory of organic bodies and his methodological model had deep and broad implications for the development of physiology at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This paper focuses on a methodological issue which divided natural philosophers and physiologists during the early Enlightenment—about which Leibniz supported (...) original viewpoints which have kept a certain relevance, mutatis mutandis, in later contexts. The issue in question concerns the relation between the surface organization of phenomena and the deeper organization of underlying micro-structures and micro-processes. In a search for the sufficient reason for phenomena, hypothetical models are called upon to provide determining reasons for surface effects. These reasons represent processes involving micro-mechanisms combined so as to account for the emerging organization. (shrink)

Both Stahl and Leibniz worked out conceptions of the organism that diverged significantly from the mechanistic models involved in the Cartesian dualism of soul and body. In the polemics which developed in 1709-1710 concerning Stahl's Theoria medica vera , Leibniz focused his attacks on what he considered a paralogistic theory of the soul; he wondered in particular how such an abstruse metaphysics could be reconciled with the scientific analysis of vital phenomena. Contrary to Stahl, Leibniz would defend the view that (...) the sufficient reason of organisms at the phenomenal level depends on an integrative combination of specific mechanisms; but the soul conceived as an entelechy needs to be called upon to account for the functional integration of the whole at the substantive level. Thus, the psychic and the somatic would involve a joint rationality unfolding in analogical and expressive relationships. However, both domains would require the use of separate analytic methodologies in any attempt at explaining those relationships. (shrink)

L'une des tâches séculaires de la philosophie est de surmonter ce que Locke nommait l'abus des mots; le dictionnaire des ntions s'efforce de l'accomplir en présentant une technologie des réseaux sémantiques.

David Raynor aborde une pluralité de thèmes chez Berkeley, qui se rapportent soit à la signification ambiguë de l'immatérialisme par rapport à la philosophie spontanée des gens ordinaires, soit au dosage savant de réalisme et d'idéalisme dans une philosophie qui élabore une critique radicale de la doctrine de l'idée-représentation. Il est intéressant de noter que Raynor ne s'en laisse pas raconter par certains interprètes classiques de la pensée berkeleyenne et qu'il sait tirer avantageusement parti d'une confrontation de Berkeley avec des (...) rationalistes tels Male-branche ou Leibniz, mais tout aussi bien d'une mise en perspective à l'intérieur du courant empiriste à partir des réflexions de Hume et de Maupertuis. (shrink)

The text compares Leibniz’s architectonic principles with Wolff’s uses of teleological explanations. Among other points of divergence, it appears that in Wolff “the living being qua ‘natural machine’ has been dispossessed of its character of entailing ‘organism’ to infinity, and deprived of a sufficient reason for its operations equated with the finalized sequences of perceptions of the dominant monad”. As a consequence, while the Leibnizian machines of nature differ from any man-made mechanism, the living being, according to Wolff, is a (...) natural machine whose composition may be legitimately represented as a set of mechanist models. (shrink)

Leibniz differs from Descartes insofar as he submits the search for mechanical explanations to regulatory norms. This is the case, for instance, in dioptrics: provided the law of sines is shown to conform to a sufficient reason of functionality, a relevant mechanical hypothesis is found acceptable. Explaining by means of hypotheses implies a twofold process of connections between an analytic model defining such an order of the elements as may fit the norm of a mathesis, and a presupposed mechanical disposition (...) of the elements such as may produce the constant effects revealed through experience. (shrink)

Jean Gayon can be defined a philosopher of biology with a historical approach to epistemic issues. Evidence for this statement may come from reconsidering his Darwinism’sDarwinismStruggle for Survival (Gayon, Darwinism’s struggle for survival: Heredity and the hypothesis of natural selection, Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1992]), which he presented as “a scenario of rational reconstructionRational reconstruction.” He was essentially interested in developmental perspectives on concepts, theories and analytic procedures, but the reconstructions he considered had to undergo the test of fitting with (...) a historical analysis of the antagonistic theories that developed and succeeded that of DarwinDarwin, Charles. The rigorous and successful methodology Gayon applied in this major work and several others may account for the lasting value of his reconstitution of the transformation phases that the Darwinian hypothesisHypothesis of evolution by natural selectionSelection underwent up to the advent of the evolutionary synthesis. (shrink)

To paraphrase Locke (Essay, 9-10), Leibniz may be counted among the master-builders of modern science, but also among the philosophical under-labourers who helped clear the ground for scientific knowledge. In the area of natural philosophy, he contributed directly to the advancement of science, but his achievements, for instance the invention of the infinitesimal calculus and the foundation of the dynamics, bore the mark of a philosophical mind and were systematically exploited in furthering significant epistemological objectives. The scope of Leibniz's scientific (...) interest and contributions was broad. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 416-417 [Access article in PDF] Jean-Baptiste Rauzy. La Doctrine leibnizienne de la vérité. Aspects logiques et ontologiques. Paris: Vrin, 2001. Pp. vii + 353. Paper, FF 170,55.This important book provides a reappraisal of Leibniz's philosophy of logic and epistemology based on a close scrutiny of the recently edited manuscripts in the Akademie-Ausgabe, and a reconstitution of Leibniz's sequential investigations. The author (...) displays an exceptional knowledge of the Leibnizian corpus, the ancient and medieval sources for the various doctrines he analyzes, and the contemporary issues underpinning Leibniz's investigations. He aims at rectifying misconceptions that stemmed originally in Couturat's La Logique de Leibniz (1901) and have since affected several studies. Three methodological statements set the ground for Rauzy's analysis: (1) Leibniz's notion of truth concerns in unified fashion all the elements of discourse: terms, concepts, and propositions. (2) Leibniz did not restrict his doctrine of truth to consistency relations, but yielded a complex, well-articulated conception of truth as correspondence, as evidenced in New Essays on Human Understanding, IV, v, sect. 11; yet, at the same time, his doctrine focused on conceptual relations which specify an order of reasons deserving to be analyzed for their own sake: "Dans la doctrine leibnizienne de la vérité, l'adaequatio rei constitue encore le cadre général en dehors duquel le prédicat de vérité n'a pas de sens. Mais les concepts et les liaisons conceptuelles donnent désormais la raison pour laquelle telle phrase particulière est vraie..." (47). And (3) one should resist attributing to Leibniz a purely syntactic conception of truth since the semantic dimension of his logical analyses deserves to be reconstituted and due consideration should be given to the evolution of his thoughts on central philosophical issues, which occasioned significant variations in the elements and formulas of his calculus rationis.It is merely possible to render the rich contents of the book by mentioning some of its more striking features. In Chapter 1, the inesse principle (Praedicatum inestsubjecto) is shown to serve grammatical, logical, and conceptual functions. The doctrine of expression is finely analyzed: expression is shown to provide the major translation tool between characters and thoughts and to condition the combinatorial treatment of rational discourse. In Chapter 2, the distinction between concept and object is shown to involve some relativity, even if the understanding of complete notions is supposed to entail real knowledge of the corresponding realities. Leibniz is thus justified to represent the manifold of ontological relations, including the requisites of actual existence, in a tentatively unified logical way: "Que [End Page 416] l'existence soit une propriété relationnelle complexe, conçue tantôt par la relation de compatibilité, tantôt par une relation à l'esprit en général—et éventuellement [...] par un mixte des deux—n'interdit nullement de maintenir que la vérité de toutes les propositions dépend de relations conceptuelles" (124-5). In Chapter 3, the project of a calculus based on concepts is shown to entail a special relation, hardly dealt with in the literature, between intension and extension (cf. for instance New Essays, IV, xvii, sect. 8). Rauzy reassesses in particular Leibniz's critical revision of nominalism and of inductive procedures as these require universal propositions to ground rational presumptions. The extensional notion of class is considered an abstraction: a class presupposes therefore the extension of a concept in order to become an object of thought. The principle of conceptual inherence requires to be interpreted as stating the equipollence between the requisites of subject and predicate; if such an equipollence may be reached a priori in exceptional cases, most of the time it will require various kinds of additions and derivations to yield sufficient congruence between the related terms. Chapter 4 is devoted to substitutions, more precisely to the theory of definition and the context, at once logical and discursive, from which a potential Leibnizian theory of communication might be derived. Rauzy notes that substitutive equivalences... (shrink)

Maupertuis conflates Leibnizian arguments with a form of empiricism which Locke and Newton had inspired. In physics, he applies an optimum principle in order to generate a « system » ; and his teleology of the maximum saving is meant to counterbalance apparent discontinuities within empirical properties and laws. In physiology, the Leibnizian model is put to a different use. The Vénus physique suggests that the elementary organic parts are so adapted as to combine and reproduce a living organism ; (...) and the Système de la nature fosters the analogy of the physiological « monad » as a theoretical notion. The epistemological unity of Maupertuis's theory of science depends upon the regulatory constraints he imposes on the empiricist methodology. (shrink)