Resumo: O presente artigo pretende trazer à luz a convergência entre dois modos divergentes de superação do paradigma por excelência da filosofia moderna, qual seja, o da interioridade do sujeito, como pedra de toque epistemológica. Mais precisamente, pretende-se evidenciar o rito de passagem de um filosofar moderno para o contemporâneo, segundo a vertente que se convencionou chamar de “filosofia continental”, a aqui ser visitada com Nietzsche - equacionada a uma hermenêutica -, e a “filosofia analítica” ou “anglo-saxônica”, a aqui ser (...) visitada com o Wittgenstein dos §§ 143-178 das Investigações filosóficas -, equacionada a uma filosofia da linguagem. Em um e outro caso, cada qual à sua maneira, vai se pôr em questão o que até então se tinha como consciência pensante, transparente a si mesma e com acesso a seus próprios fundamentos e conteúdos, ou, então, uma interioridade, a qual, por um viés o mais das vezes mentalista, associa significado a entidades ou processos mentais. Desse modo, sujeito e pensamento, em vez de tomados por núcleos duros, passam a ser desvelados como funções das condições que os suscitam - de sobrevivência, no caso de Nietzsche, de condições práticas, ou seja, do uso, no caso de Wittgenstein.: The purpose of this article is bringing to light the convergence between two diverging modes of overcoming the very paradigm of modern philosophy, namely, the interiority of the subject as an epistemological milestone, and thus emphasizing the rite of passage from a modern philosophizing to a contemporary one. This process will be addressed according to the strand known as “continental philosophy”, with Nietzsche, equated with a hermeneutics, and to the “analytical philosophy” or anglo-saxon philosophy, with Wittgenstein, equated with a philosophy of language. In both cases we will put into question the conditions underlying the thinking consciousness, transparent to himself and with access to his own grounds and contents, and an interiority approached most of times by a mentalistic bias, that relates meaning to entities or mental processes. In this way, subject and act of thinking, instead of being taken as a core, are unveiled as functions of their very conditions - condition of survey, for Nietzsche, conditions of practical experience, for Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Resumo: Para além da triangulação Nietzsche-Kuno Fischer-Spinoza, a proposta do texto é perscrutar as peculiaridades da relação entre Nietzsche e Spinoza, partindo não de uma conexão biunívoca e restrita a Nietzsche e Spinoza, mas de menções compartilhadas, em que outros filósofos e pensadores são mencionados. A partir daí se pretende evidenciar traços de uma relação que é de admiração pelo “profundo ocultador”, mas também de crítica pelas instâncias que tal ocultador mascarou e que acabaram por consumi-lo.: Beyond the triangulation Nietzsche-Kuno (...) Fischer-Spinoza, the purpose of the article is to investigate the peculiarities of the relation between Nietzsche and Spinoza, stemming not from the biunivocal relationship restricted to Nietzsche and Spinoza, but from the references shared with other philosophers and thinkers mentioned by the German philosopher. Thenceforth, we intend to emphasize traits of a relationship based on admiration for the “deep hidden”, but also on critics related to spheres that this very hidden disguised and that after all consumed him. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é fazer ver de que modo o caráter de Janus – do mito de Janus – da filosofia de Schopenhauer pautou a relação que com ela entabulou a filosofia de Nietzsche –, aspecto este um tanto relegado pela pesquisa Nietzsche, talvez justamente por se tomar a relação entre ambos como exaurida em binômios do tipo “adesão e ruptura”, “encantamento e distanciamento crítico", “pessimismo e afirmação da vida”. Assim sendo, num primeiro momento preliminar procederemos a analisar a (...) face dual da filosofia de Schopenhauer, cujo olhar se volta simultaneamente ao passado e ao futuro. Num segundo momento preliminar visitaremos a ousadia de Schopenhauer ao converter as ambições malogradas da filosofia no princípio inconsciente da vontade. A partir daí passaremos à compreensão de Schopenhauer por Nietzsche ao modo de um filósofo que, vitimado por sua segunda natureza, alemã, esquiva-se de protagonizar a filosofia trágica, que chegou a tangenciar, em função do esquadrinhamento metafísico de sua arrojada descoberta – o inconsciente na espécie humana. (shrink)

It is shown that the postulation of a minimum length for the horizons of a black hole leads to lower bounds for the electric charges and magnetic moments of elementary particles. If the minimum length has the order of the Planck scale, these bounds are given, respectively, by the electronic charge and by \. The latter implies that the masses of fundamental particles are bounded above by the Planck mass, and that the smallest non-zero neutrino mass is \eV. A precise (...) estimation in agreement to the area quantisation of Loop Quantum Gravity predicts a mass for the lightest massive state in concordance with flavor oscillation measurements, and a Barbero–Immirzi parameter in accordance to horizon entropy estimations. (shrink)

A partir do estudo sobre o processo histórico de ressignificação da relação entre subjetividade e verdade, realizado por Michel Foucault no curso “A Hermenêutica do Sujeito”, o presente artigo analisa as possíveis implicações dessa ressignificação no processo de institucionalização da filosofia, problematizando, por conseguinte, a temática do ensino de Filosofia na Educação Básica.

Interessa ao educador científico contemporâneo compreender as relações entre ciência e religião, particularmente investigando como elas se dão entre seus estudantes e na realidade por eles vivenciada, posto que essa bagagem cultural está presente na sala de aula. Neste sentido, o presente trabalho objetiva identificar e analisar as principais características e tendências de investigações sobre as relações entre ensino de ciências e a religião, a fim de fornecer subsídios atualizados para quem o desejar ou necessitar. Para tanto, uma revisão de (...) referenciais teóricos sobre a relação ciência-religião é apresentada e, em sequência, reúnem-se e analisam-se produções científicas publicadas entre 2004 e 2020 com foco nas relações entre ensino de ciências e a religião. Entre os resultados observados destaca-se que as relações entre religião e ciência não são homogêneas dentro da escola (nem fora dela): diferentes estudantes, bem como diferentes professores, têm diferentes opiniões, atitudes, e visões de mundo sobre o tema. Além disso, os pesquisadores sugerem atuações pedagógicas frente às relações entre religião e ciência: os conhecimentos sobre a história da ciência bem como conhecimentos sobre a história das relações entre a ciência e a religião são relatados como ferramentas importantes e há unanimidade quanto à importância de combater a noção de conflito entre ciência e religião. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é dar relevo à presença da argumentação histórica e antropológica nas obras publicadas por John Locke entre 1689 e 1695. Essa orientação defende a existência de uma diversidade de povos e costumes ao redor do mundo, tomando como base as comunidades longínquas descritas nos relatos de viagens. Entre os tipos de povos considerados por Locke, existem sociedades ateias, idólatras, de moral filosófica e, poder-se-ia dizer, culmina com a defesa do cristianismo como a religião mais apropriada para (...) educar os trabalhadores das sociedades de apropriação ampliada. (shrink)

In "De l’Allemagne", Mme de Staël develops a sophisticated philosophical psychology that centers not on reason, but imagination. She does this by bringing French Enlightenment philosophy, particularly Rousseau and Diderot, into dialogue with German thinkers, including Kant and Herder. For Mme de Staël, imagination transcends the epistemic limits of sensibility and reason by incorporating sentiment.

This book reassesses the seminal work of Wilhelm Wundt by discussing the history and philosophy of psychology. It traces the pioneering theorist's intellectual development and the evolution of psychology throughout his career. The author draws on little-known sources to situate psychological concepts in Wundt's philosophical thought and address common myths and misconceptions relating to Wundt's ideas. The ideas presented in this book show why Wundt's work remains relevant in this era of ongoing mind/brain debate and interest continues in the links (...) between psychology and philosophy. Featured topics include: Theoretical and philosophical foundations of Wundt's early work in scientific psychology. Wundt's conception of scientific philosophy in relation to his theory of knowledge. The epistemological dimensions of Wundt's final project in scientific psychology. Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology is a valuable resource for researchers, professors, and graduate students in cognitive and related psychology and philosophy disciplines. ----- "Saulo Araujo raises Wundt scholarship to a new level. This book is the splendid result of intensive studies of the entire Wundt oeuvre." Horst Gundlach Heidelberg, Germany "Saulo Araujo, in his study of Wundt's philosophy and psychology, is as remarkable for the breadth and depth of his scholarship as he is for the clarity of his writing." Rand B. Evans Emeritus Professor of Psychology, East Carolina University "A milestone, this book serves to establish an advanced level in Wundt studies. Araujo presents a reconstruction of Wundt's epistemology and philosophy of psychology and corrects misunderstandings in the reception of Wundt's essential thoughts." Jochen Fahrenberg Emeritus Professor of Psychology, University of Freiburg, Germany. (shrink)

Founding psychologist William James famously called for pluralism, valuing psychology's range of theoretical and philosophical foundations, methods and perspectives. In this book, Araujo and Osbeck investigate the meanings of pluralism across James's writings, connecting them to psychological research and theory today.

This book presents, for the first time in English, a comprehensive anthology of essays on Christian Wolff's psychology written by leading international scholars. Christian Wolff is one of the towering figures in 18th-century Western thought. In the last decades, the publication of Wolff's Gesammelte Werke by Jean École and collaborators has aroused new interest in his ideas, but the meaning, scope, and impact of his psychological program have remained open to close and comprehensive analysis and discussion. That is what this (...) volume aims to do. This is the first volume in English completely devoted to Wolff's efforts to systematize empirical and rational psychology, against the background of his understanding of scientific method in metaphysics. Wolff thereby paved the way to the very idea of a scientific psychology. The book is divided into two parts. The first one covers the theoretical and historical meaning and scope of Wolff's psychology, both in its internal structure and in its relation to other parts of his philosophical system, such as logic, cosmology, aesthetics, or practical philosophy. The second part deals with the reception and impact of Wolff's psychology, starting with early reactions from his disciples and opponents, and moving on to Kant, Hegel, and Wundt. The Force of an Idea: New Essays on Christian Wolff's Psychology shows not only that Wolff's psychological ideas have been misinterpreted, but also that they are historically more significant than traditional wisdom has it. The book, therefore, will be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, historians of philosophy and psychology, as well as to philosophers and psychologists interested in understanding the roots of scientific psychology in 18th and 19th century German philosophy. (shrink)

Neste artigo, traremos a distinção entre vontade própria e liberdade, para designar como a relação do homem não é a de domínio com as coisas, tampouco de si mesmo, e sim um desprendimento que une a alma com a dimensão plena e livre de Deus em si mesmo. As noções de sujeição e obediência se mostram aí em sentido ontológico, nas quais o homem mantém uma ligação de dependência no ser com o transbordamento de tal dimensão maior. Ao se retirar (...) da posição de apego consigo próprio e com um entendimento de ser enquanto materialidade definitiva, o homem muda a relação com o mundo e passa a ver e a ter Deus em todas as coisas, na sua soltura e desprendimento de categorização e pré-determinação. (shrink)

As substâncias imateriais não são compostas de matéria sensível, não partem dos entes; são diretamente inteligíveis. O conhecimento assim precisa de outra via para apreendê-las. Tomás, ainda no artigo 7 da questão 84, parece ver esta via a partir do pensador Dionísio Areopagita que, ao cogitar nomes para Deus, em seu tratado Nomes Divinos, enumerou quais as possibilidades de conhecimento para o intelecto humano ante a substância primeira. São três: o conhecimento por causa, por via de eminência, ultrapassamento ou por (...) negação ou remoção. Em Dionísio, conhecer negativamente Deus significa dizer que tudo o que se pode afirmar a respeito de sua natureza é aquilo que Ele não é. Tomás amplia o princípio para as substâncias imateriais em geral e há a possibilidade de se transpor o modo teológico do Areopagita para um modo gnosiológico, em que as substâncias imateriais, entendendo-as como toda aquela imune a qualquer mudança e movimento da matéria, assumem um possível caráter apofático e ainda assim possam ser afirmadas enquanto noções do entendimento. (shrink)

Apesar do crescente interesse despertado pela figura de Christian Wolff nas últimas décadas, a compreensão de seu pensamento ainda enfrenta obstáculos e desafios. De um lado, na história da filosofia, não é raro encontrarmos um Wolff compreendido a partir de Kant. De outro, na história da psicologia, pode-se falar de uma estranha negligência do papel exercido por Wolff no desenvolvimento de uma ciência psicológica autônoma, especialmente na tradição alemã, que vai culminar na separação radical entre filosofia e psicologia a partir (...) do século XX. O objetivo deste artigo é situar historicamente o projeto wolffiano de uma ciência da alma, mostrando não só o seu sentido específico, mas também suas principais contribuições e algumas de suas consequências para o posterior desenvolvimento da psicologia alemã nos séculos XVIII e XIX. Finalmente, vamos indicar alguns desafios e possíveis caminhos para investigações futuras. (shrink)

_Abstract_: The recent proliferation of the term “_Psychological Humanities_” (PH) raises many questions, not least of which is the wide variety of ways in which the term is employed. After noting some of this variety, we focus on a related question that has been insufficiently discussed: the extent to which PH represents a genuinely new contribution and approach, and to what extent it represents a renaming. To address this question, we examine examples of past efforts to theorize the relation between (...) psychology and the humanities. We explore Dilthey’s argument in favor of “two sciences” and C.S. Snow’s description of “two cultures”, which offer somewhat different models of the relations between science and the humanities. We then discuss the application of these models to the discipline of psychology, first by Dilthey himself and later by Sigmund Koch, noting similarities to descriptions of the project for PH as currently described. We question the need for a renaming of the project and call attention to the risk of PH exhibiting its own form of presentism while critiquing the presentism of (in) “mainstream” psychological science. _Keywords_: Psychological Humanities; Wilhelm Dilthey; C.P. Snow; Sigmund Koch; Philosophical and Theoretical Psychology _Cosa c’è in un nome? Le Psychological Humanities e la logica del presentismo_ _Riassunto_: L’uso crescente del lemma _Psychological Humanities_ solleva diversi problemi, non ultimo l’ampia varietà di modi in cui questo è impiegato. Dopo aver portato l’attenzione su alcuni usi di questo lemma, ci concentreremo su una questione collegata, fin qui trattata in maniera insoddisfacente: fino a che punto le _Psychological Humanities_ rappresentano un contributo e un approccio davvero innovativo e in che misura sono solo una nuova denominazione. Per affrontare questo problema, prenderemo in esame alcuni tentativi compiuti in passato per trattare il rapporto tra psicologia e discipline umanistiche. Prenderemo in considerazione l’argomento di Dilthey in favore delle “due scienze” e la posizione di C.S. Snow circa l’esistenza delle “due culture”, che offrono modelli leggermente diversi rispetto alla relazione tra scienza e discipline umanistiche. Discuteremo poi l’applicazione di questi modelli alla psicologia, seguendo dapprima lo stesso Dilthey per poi considerare il modello di Sigmund Koch, mettendo in risalto le loro affinità con le descrizioni correnti del progetto delle _Psychological Humanities_. Discuteremo poi la necessità di una nuova denominazione per questo progetto per richiamare l’attenzione sul rischio che le _Psychological Humanities_ possano esibire una propria forma di presentismo mentre criticano il presentismo della scienza psicologica “mainstream”. _Parole chiave_: Psychological Humanities; Wilhelm Dilthey; C.P. Snow; Sigmund Koch; Psicologia filosofica e teoretica. (shrink)

_Abstract_: We imagine the future of cognitive science by first considering its past, which shows remarkable transformation from a field that, although interdisciplinary, was initially marked by a narrow set of assumptions concerning its subject matter. In the last decades, multiple alternative frameworks with radically different ontological and epistemic commitments (e.g., situated cognition, embodied cognition, extended mind) found broad support. We address the question of how to understand these changes, noting as logical alternatives that (1) newer approaches are not properly (...) _cognitive_; (2) that newer approaches are cognitive but not _science_; and (3) that cognitive science has become pluralistic. We endorse the third position and venture to guess that the future of cognitive science is also pluralistic. We are left, however, with the question of what this _means. _After noting the polysemous nature of the term “pluralism”, we attempt to add clarity by distinguishing three forms: ontological, epistemic, and ethical. We then consider what each form might imply for the future of cognitive science. _Keywords_: Cognitive Science; Pluralism; Relativism; History of Science; Philosophy of Science _Il futuro della scienza cognitiva è pluralista, ma che vuol dire?_ _Riassunto_: Pensiamo al futuro della scienza cognitiva in primo luogo considerando il suo passato, il quale è notevolmente cambiato rispetto al presente. Per quanto si proponesse come un campo di studi interdisciplinari, la scienza cognitiva delle origini era caratterizzata da un insieme ristretto di assunzioni riguardanti il proprio oggetto. Negli ultimi decenni hanno trovato supporto diverse cornici teoriche in reciproca competizione e con impegni ontologici ed epistemologici radicalmente differenti (si pensi, per esempio, alla cognizione situata, alla cognizione incarnata, alla mente estesa). Proveremo a dare risposta alla domanda su come intendere questi cambiamenti, prendendo atto che ci troviamo di fronte a una serie di posizioni che sono logicamente alternative fra loro: (1) gli approcci più recenti non sono propriamente _cognitivi_; (2) oppure che gli approcci più recenti sono cognitivi, ma non _scientifici_; (3) la scienza cognitiva è diventata pluralista. Noi crediamo che la terza posizione sia corretta e scommettiamo su un futuro della scienza cognitiva che sia anche pluralista. Resta aperto, tuttavia, il problema di cosa questo _significhi_. Dopo aver preso atto della natura polisemica del termine “pluralismo”, cercheremo di far chiarezza distinguendo tre forme di pluralismo: ontologico, epistemico, ed etico. Considereremo quindi ciò che ciascuna può comportare per il futuro della scienza cognitiva. _Parole chiave_: Scienza cognitiva; Pluralismo; Relativismo; Storia della scienza; Filosofia della scienza. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop a comparative analysis of the place of emotion from Indian and Western philosophical perspectives. Both Eastern and Indian philosophy consider three mental states as being involved with the arousal of emotions, i.e., cognitive (epistemic), conative (desire), and affective. In Indian philosophy, there is no such single term or specific equivalent definition to the Western term ‘emotion.’ Further, there is no clear dichotomy (cognitive & non-cognitive) between reason and emotion in Indian culture. In Indian scriptures, there (...) are various, at times intermingled conceptions of emotion. From a religious standpoint, emotion can be an expression of religious devotion (bhakti), and often emotions are viewed as barriers to having true knowledge and are considered a cause of attachment and an obstacle to liberation. After comparing a large amount of discussion on emotion following Western and Indian conceptions, and analyzing some real-life experiences where emotion plays various roles (intellectual, personal, and spiritual) within each philosophical tradition this paper concludes that it is critical to engage in a comparative, collaborative study of emotion. (shrink)

O estudo investigou a experiência de transição para a aposentadoria na perspectiva subjetiva dos sujeitos que a vivenciaram. Foram entrevistados 20 trabalhadores aposentados no período de até 18 meses após o desligamento de suas atividades laborais. As entrevistas seguiram roteiro semi-estruturado e..

Relatively new and now ubiquitous, smartphones and tablet computers are changing our lives by asking us to rethink the ways that we conduct business, form and maintain relationships, and read books and magazines. In the same capacity, mobile devices are redefining how health care is administered, monitored, and delivered through specialized technologies called medical apps (applications). In general, apps are pieces of software that can be installed and run on a variety of hardware platforms, including smartphones, tablets, laptops, and desktop (...) computers. Medical apps, in particular, refer to a wide variety of software that focuses on health care (loosely defined). Whether these apps target the health-care .. (shrink)

Withdrawal involves emotional pain that motivates much addictive behavior. In this paper, I argue that the emotional pain of withdrawal compels much addictive behavior. Researchers have noticed this possibility but it is widely underappreciated. Among philosophers, only Hanna Pickard has discussed emotional compulsion in addiction, and the emotional aspect of withdrawal has been almost completely neglected. Accounts of emotional compulsion in the philosophical literature (from Tappolet, Elster, and Furrow) probably do not capture how the distress of withdrawal compels, so I (...) propose a more suitable account of “pathodoxastic” compulsion in addiction. On this account, the emotional pain of withdrawal compels when it undermines the ability to believe that one can continue to endure it, and therefore the ability to intend abstinence. (shrink)

This book is not a critique of digital ethics but rather a hack. It follows the method of hacking by developing an exploit kit on the basis of state-of-the-art social theory, which it uses to breach the insecure legacy system upon which the discourse of digital ethics is running. This legacy system is made up of four interdependent components: the philosophical mythology of humanism, social science critique, media scandalization, and the activities of many civil society organisations lobbying for various forms (...) of regulation. The hack exposes the bugs, the sloppy programming, and the false promises of current digital ethics, and, because it is an ethical hack, redesigns digital ethics so that it can address the problems of the global network society. The main idea of the book is that the social world of meaning is based on information, which, because of its relational nature, must be understood more as a common good than as private property. A digital ethics that relies upon humanistic individualism cannot address the issues arising from the global network society based upon information. This demands a complete revision of the philosophical foundations of current digital ethics by means of a redesign of ethics as a theory of governance by design. (shrink)

I am troubled by the temper of E. H. Gombrich’s response, “Representation and Misrepresentation” , to my “Ambiguities of Representation and Illusion: An E. H. Gombrich Retrospective” and by his preferring not to sense the profound admiration—indeed, the homage—intended by my essay, both for his contributions to recent theory and for their influence upon its recent developments. But I am more troubled by the confusions his remarks may cause in the interpretation of his own work as well as in the (...) judgment of mine. There are important issues at stake, I feel, especially as regards the relation between scientific and aesthetic inquiry.The very irritated tone of his reaction helps make what I see as my major point: his work has contained a conflict between two Gombrichs—one, the skeptical humanist and, the other, the positive scientist—and with the passing years the second has increasingly sought to obliterate signs of the first, becoming increasingly impatient with any attempt to revive those signs or remind us of their existence. On the other side, since the line of literary criticism with which I associate myself has drawn strength from the first Gombrich, this development in his work and in his attitudes has caused some disappointment. Murray Krieger is University Professor of English at the University of California. He is the author of many works, including The Tragic Vision, The Classic Vision, Theory of Criticism: A Tradition and its System, Poetic Presence and Illusion: Essays in Critical History and Theory, and Arts on the Level. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “Fiction, History, and Empirical Reality” , “Poetic Presence and Illusion: Renaissance Theory and the Duplicity of Metaphor” , and “The Ambiguities of Representation and Illusion: An E. H. Gombrich Retrospective”. (shrink)

L’existentialisme pose à l’histoire des problèmes aussi bien subjectifs qu’objectifs. En tant que sujets, les existentialistes épousent des positions qui sont souvent antithétiques par rapport à la dimension historique ; en tant qu’objets, ils ont donné à voir des idées et des activités qui sont souvent difficilement accessibles à la connaissance historique. Chez Sartre se..

Using the later works of Wittgenstein, this paper investigates the intricate ways in which the will is related to mental imagery. It examines how "seeing" is subject to the will in a different way from "forming an image". Although it is unwise to posit a model of images which maintains that images are directly willed inner objects - just like outer objects, only located in our heads - this model is often incorrectly embraced by philosophers and psychologists. A proper understanding (...) of the relationship between seeing and imaging will also help solve the dilemma posed by a visual mental image that can be both intentional (i.e., subject to the will) and yet unintentional (i.e., forced upon one). (shrink)

Using the later works of Wittgenstein, this paper investigates the intricate ways in which the will is related to mental imagery. It examines how "seeing" is subject to the will in a different way from "forming an image". Although it is unwise to posit a model of images which maintains that images are directly willed inner objects - just like outer objects, only located in our heads - this model is often incorrectly embraced by philosophers and psychologists. A proper understanding (...) of the relationship between seeing and imaging will also help solve the dilemma posed by a visual mental image that can be both intentional (i.e., subject to the will) and yet unintentional (i.e., forced upon one). (shrink)