This book is a discussion of a wide range of topics that bear on the existence of God. For each topic, there is a chapter by one (or more) theists, and a chapter by one (or more) atheists. Topics: (1) Definition; (2) Method; (3) Logic; (4) Doxastic Foundations; (5) Religious Experience; (6) Faith and Revelation; (7) Miracles; (8) Religious Diversity; (9) Causation and Sufficient Reason; (10) A Priori; (11) Our Universe; (12) Human History; (13) Human Beings; (14) Ethics; (15) Meaning; (...) (16) Evil and Suffering; (17) Science; (18) Theories of Religion; (19) Prudential / Pragmatic Arguments; (20) Final Reckonings. (shrink)

Stemming from two conferences, held in 1994, and 1996, Prophecy and Diplomacy: The Moral Doctrine of John Paul II explores the general orientations and the specific applications of the moral teaching of Pope John Paul II. The first part of the book places the Pope's moral theory within a broader theological framework, attempting to identify the overarching philosophical and theological attitudes that shape the Pope's fundamental moral perspective. In part two, the work studies the Pope's teaching in the areas of (...) applied ethics. Both the major lecturers and the respondents focus upon those areas of applied ethics that have provoked the greatest tension between the magisterium and the academy and between the Church and the state in the West. The volume concludes by presenting a homily that places the ethics of John Paul II within a spiritual framework of repentance and redemption. The Pope's moral teaching is not an academic survey of ethical themes. Nor is it a Pelagian call to human self-regeneration. The ultimate truth concerning human conduct and moral judgement emerges only with the proclamation of God's grace. (shrink)

Articles contained in fifteen volumes describe issues relating to and affecting the Catholic Church, in areas such as history, ethics, spirituality, and social sciences. Annual supplements update the original volumes and also include new entries.

First, there are some striking similarities in the history of reception of Fleck’s and Neurath’s ideas. Due to the style of their writings they were not or often not well welcome in their national philosophical communities, i.e., the Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. This is especially true in the case of Fleck. On the other hand, some prominent logical positivists, like Hempel, are to some extent guilty of making of Neurath a clumsy thinker whose ideas needed to be clear (...) by a more mature philosopher, i.e. Carnap. So their work was often considered as non-scientific. With a lack of response their theories were forgotten for many years, and even if not forgotten they were habitually ridiculed by critics. After a long period of seven thin years they have their renaissance. They are even quite popular. In the last 20 years a number of excellent books and papers on Neurath and Fleck have apperared. But one can hardly find a line of comparison. One might say that this is not surprising at all, as there is nothing to compare there. Neurath was a radical positivist while Fleck’s writing were aimed only against neopositivism. Accordingly, these are poles, and all we can say is that they are completely different. But even if Neurath was a follower of radical neopositivism that Fleck was fighting with, there are some common points in their programmes and I will try to show that even if they are in opposition, their paths intersected at certain points. (shrink)

Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936) was immediately regarded as a clear and faithful presentation of the views of the Vienna Circle to English-speaking readers. Since Ayer wrote this book after his visit to Vienna, where he participated in the meetings of the Circle, one may often hear to this day that he brought logical positivism to England. However, while Ayer’s conception was a form of logical positivism, it significantly differed from its Viennese counterpart(s). The key discrepancies are related to (...) verificationism: this article aims to analyse these discrepancies. It will be claimed that upon his return from Vienna Ayer assumed positions that were no longer, or had never been, held in the Circle: regarding the verification principle, test-statements, phenomenalist reductionism and analyticity. (shrink)

Boethius’s famous definition of “person” as naturae rationabilis individua substantia (an individual substance of a rational nature) is frequently cited without reference to the specific theological purpose of his formulation (an attempt to provide some clarification about the mysteries of Christ and the Trinity). This article elucidates some of the theological issues that required philosophical progress on the nature of “personhood.” It also considers some of the residual difficulties with the application of this definition to divine persons that have been (...) raised by subsequent theologians such as Thomas Aquinas who are otherwise sympathetic to Boethius’s definition of person when applied to human beings. (shrink)

ConclusionTo avoid pitfalls, Juhos rejected the idea that some processes are timeless, so the act of “obtaining K” must take time; it’s clear then that one can utter or write down any K — they are not designed as pre-linguistic entities. Because they have many features of ordinary hypotheses — they are intersubjectively testable , they are accepted on empirical grounds — there is still one question pending: how it is possible that one cannot revise them?Juhos thought that they cannot (...) be subject to correction, and this thesis is the last link with Schlick’s doctrine. In the end he repeats what we already know from his mentor: Konstatierungen do not appear as the effect of mistakes, so there is nothing to correct in them. They are incorrigible because of their nature. Then we have again the old question about the possibility of such sentences. Having thus gone in a big circle — just to avoid pitfalls — Juhos came back to the point of departure. That is why we may say that it seems Juhos was not successful in rescuing Konstatierungen as descriptions of reality that are absolutely certain. (shrink)

This volume makes good on a promise that the author made in his Ancient Menippean Satire , namely, to use that tradition to offer an interpretation of Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy. Building on a trend in recent scholarship to reclaim the Consolation as a Christian work, on his own well-received translation of the Consolation , and on the literary criticism associated with Northrop Frye and Mikhail Bakhtin, Relihan argues that attentiveness to the ironies typical of Menippean satire can help to (...) resolve the problem that is presented by the lack of any explicit testimony to Boethius's Christian faith within the Consolation. Had Boethius somehow found his religion insufficient for coping with his prison experience and reverted to philosophy for comfort in the face of imminent death? Going beyond the stance that the Consolation has merely some latent religious convictions, Relihan argues that Boethius is using the resources of Menippean satire to show the limits of pagan philosophy and the need to turn to prayer instead. (shrink)

By exploring the philosophical character of some of the greatest medieval thinkers, __An Introduction to Medieval Philosophy__ provides a rich overview of philosophy in the world of Latin Christianity. Explores the deeply philosophical character of such medieval thinkers as Augustine, Boethius, Eriugena, Anselm, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham Reviews the central features of the epistemological and metaphysical problem of universals Shows how medieval authors adapted philosophical ideas from antiquity to apply to their religious commitments Takes a broad philosophical approach of (...) the medieval era by,taking account of classical metaphysics, general culture, and religious themes. (shrink)

Dans les « Deux dogmes», Quine voulait démontrer que le positivisme logique n’était possible qu’en raison d’hypothèses injustifiées. L’intention de Quine était de montrer qu’il n’est possible de sauver l’empirisme que si l’on accepte une autre approche, holistique. Toutefois, l’article de Quine était anachronique dès le moment de sa publication. Le but de cet article est double. Tout d’abord, on esquissera l’argument de Quine et on le confrontera aux positions de Carnap et Dubislav. On montrera que la critique de Quine (...) était en retard d’au moins 15 ans. En deuxième lieu, on examinera le postulat de Quine de l’empirisme sans dogmes et on comparera brièvement à la théorie de Poznański et Wundheiler. On soutiendra que ce postulat avait été réalisé déjà dans les années 1930. (shrink)

‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ has quickly become a classic of analytical philosophy and has invoked the since lasting discussion about possibility of analytic/synthetic distinction. It has been also considered a nail to the coffin of logical positivism. Accordingly, Quine tried to show that logical positivism was possible solely due to assumptions taken without justification in terms of standards preached by neopositivism itself. Quine aimed to point out that since they functioned as dogmas, the rescuing of empiricism was possible only if (...) another approach was accepted, the one characterized as holism. (shrink)