Most non-human animals live in the wild and it is probable that suffering predominates in their lives due to natural events. Humans may at some point be able to engage in paradise engineering, or the modification of nature and animal organisms themselves, to improve the well-being of wild animals. We may, in other words, make nature 'red in tooth and claw' no more. We argue that this creates a tension between environmental ethics and animal ethics which is likely insurmountable. First, (...) we argue that concern for the environment can be compatible with helping individual wild animals but should see redesigning nature as morally impermissible. Second, we argue that if we are concerned with animal well-being, we may reject that we have a duty to help wild animals even to the point of redesigning nature, but we must nevertheless concede that it is permissible to do so under certain circumstances. We show how this permissibility can be derived from three animal rights views: Tom Regan's, a novel account inspired by Thomas Pogge and a libertarian approach to animal rights. (shrink)

In her Pharmaceutical Freedom, Jessica Flanigan argues that antibiotics can be regulated consistent with her otherwise largely deregulatory view with respect to pharmaceuticals and recreational drugs. I contend in this essay that the reasons for justifying antibiotic regulation are reasons that can be offered to justify the regulation of many other drugs, both pharmaceutical and recreational. After laying out the specifics of Flanigan’s view, I suggest that it is amenable to the regulation of drugs like varenicline. Though such drugs can (...) legitimately improve the quality of a patient’s life by helping them quit smoking, they could be permissibly regulated if they expose others to impermissible risks. I then argue that recreational drugs like alcohol could be regulated using the same reasoning. In the penultimate section of this essay, I anticipate objections that one might have to my extension of arguments favoring antibiotic regulation to drugs correlated with aggression. Flanigan might find my extrapolation of her view as entirely plausible and accept that her view is relatively friendly to these regulations, or she might reconsider her antibiotic caveat if these regulations are overly paternalistic on her understanding. I conclude by briefly considering the benefits and drawbacks of adopting each view. (shrink)

The defection thesis holds that members of marginalized social groups are obligated not to express views important to others in the group that are regarded by the others as substantively wrong. In this essay, I evaluate arguments that seek to vindicate the defection thesis and conclude they all fail. Then, I argue that we have reason to believe sanctioning defectors in certain ways is wrongful and that the expression of their contentious ideas is good for members of marginalized groups. We (...) are left to conclude both that members of marginalized groups have no obligation to suppress certain heterodox views and that it is likely wrong to sanction them for expressing these views even if it were wrong for them to do so. (shrink)

I argue that factory farming should be abolished consistent with the principles of classical liberalism. To make my case, I first argue that anti-cruelty is a commitment of classical liberalism. In Section 3, I explain how the commitments of classical liberalism, including a commitment to anti-cruelty, give us weighty reasons to abolish factory farming. Then, I consider and respond to the objection that the property rights of factory farmers override the strength of reasons for the abolition of factory farming. Finally, (...) I conclude by flagging some other possible implications of taking seriously a liberal commitment to anti-cruelty. (shrink)

Strong comic immoralism maintains that every time a humorous demonstration (for example, a joke) involves a moral defect, it is enhanced aesthetically in virtue of having this moral defect. I want to show that strong comic immoralism is a coherent position, that it is possible to defend, and that there is, in fact, some reason to defend it. By doing this, my hope is that, moving forward, those who are interested in questions about the relationship between immorality and the aesthetic (...) value of jokes will take more seriously the objections that may be presented against their views by the strong comic immoralist, rather than claiming that “no one on this side of Satan” would be one. (shrink)

I first argue that forms of regulated parenting are presumptively justified whereas private parenting is not. Then, I argue that the reasons we have to believe that regulated parenting is justified give us reasons to believe that individuals who are objectionably intolerant—that is, they subscribe to prejudicial dogmas such as racism, sexism, and homophobia to such an extent that their ability to direct caring attitudes toward, for example, Black people, women, and/or gay people is significantly impaired—ought not to rear children. (...) Finally, I argue that if these people ought not to rear children, we have special reason to institute a scheme of parental licensing to ensure they do not. (shrink)

It is important for members of marginalized groups to express political views relevant to how members of their respective groups should be treated. Recently, however, it has been argued that there are some contexts––that is, contexts in which members of marginalized groups are tokenized and have considerable power to influence political outcomes that would affect their other group members––in which certain marginalized group members ought not express certain political views relevant to how members of their respective groups should be treated. (...) In this essay, I examine two arguments defending this conclusion (the proportional representation and unjust enrichment arguments) and conclude that both fail. Then, I argue that recognizing that members of marginalized groups are permitted to speak their minds, even in these contexts, favorably affirms their broad political speech rights. (shrink)

In their forthcoming article, ‘What makes a medical intervention invasive?’ De Marco, Simons, and colleagues explore the meaning and usage of the term ‘invasive’ in medical contexts. They describe a ‘Standard Account’, drawn from dictionary definitions, which defines invasiveness as ‘incision of the skin or insertion of an object into the body’. They then highlight cases wherein invasiveness is employed in a manner that is inconsistent with this account (eg, in describing psychotherapy) to argue that the term invasiveness is often (...) used to explicitly or implicitly reference interventions that do not fall under the standard account. The authors offer an alternative ‘schematic’ definition of invasiveness, whereby medical interventions entail an underlying context-independent property of ‘basic invasiveness’ and may be understood both relative to each other and to a context-specific threshold of what is ‘invasive’.1 We propose that the meaning of terms such as ‘invasiveness’ is necessarily heterogeneous, and that what is implied by its usage will certainly depend on context, particularly in medical settings. Hence, the creation of a unifying definition is less critical than clarification of the implied and intended meanings of each instance of the term’s use. We further argue that interpreting the use of terms like ‘invasiveness’ in medical practice is complicated by the embedding of each use of this term in a different ‘language game’, whereby words and their meanings are understood by an in-group familiar with …. (shrink)

In what follows, I shall presuppose the ecumenical core of the causal powers metaphysics. The argument of this paper concerns what may appear at first to be a wholly unrelated matter, the metaphysics of free will. However, an adequate account of freedom requires, in my judgment, a notion of a distinctive variety of causal power, one which tradition dubs ‘agent-causal power’. I will first develop this notion and clarify its relationship to other notions. I will then respond to a number (...) of objections either to the possibility of a power so explicated or to its sufficiency for grounding an adequate account of human freedom. (shrink)

I Introduction The question of this paper is, what would it be to act with freedom of the will? What kind of control is inchoately in view when we speak, pretheoretically, of being ‘self- determining’ beings, of ‘freely making choices in view of consciously considered reasons’ (pro and con) - of its being ‘up to us’ how we shall act? My question here is not whether we have (or have any reason to think we have) such freedom, or what is (...) the most robust account of our freedom compatible with late twentieth-century science. Many contemporary philosophers are all too ready to settle for a deflationary account of freedom and declare victory, with some brief remarks reminding us that we were created a little lower than the angels. I am not so sanguine about the ability of such accounts to leave reasonably intact our judgments about human autonomy, dignity, and responsibility. But, as I’ve said, that’s not my concern here. Instead, I want to revisit the question of what exactly ‘self-determination’, on our ordinary conception, comes to. (shrink)

Many societies have norms of equity – that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this article, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much (...) more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break symmetry between actors in determining both contribution and reward in joint projects. (shrink)

Recent studies within neuroscience and cognitive psychology have explored the place of conscious willing in the generation of purposive action. Some have argued that certain findings indicate that the commonsensical view that we control many of our actions through conscious willing is largely or wholly illusory. I rebut such arguments, contending that they typically rest on a conflation of distinct phenomena. Nevertheless, I also suggest that traditional philosophical accounts of the will need to be revised: a raft of studies indicate (...) that control over one’s own will among human beings is limited, fragile, and – insofar as control depends to an extent on conscious knowledge – admitting of degrees. I briefly sketch several dimensions along which freedom of the will may vary over time and across agents. (shrink)

The hypothetical scenarios generally known as trolley problems have become widespread in recent moral philosophy. They invariably require an agent to choose one of a strictly limited number of options, all of them bad. Although they don’t always involve trolleys / trams, and are used to make a wide variety of points, what makes it justified to speak of a distinctive “trolley method” is the characteristic assumption that the intuitive reactions that all these artificial situations elicit constitute an appropriate guide (...) to real-life moral reasoning. I dispute this assumption by arguing that trolley cases inevitably constrain the supposed rescuers into behaving in ways that clearly deviate from psychologically healthy, and morally defensible, human behavior. Through this focus on a generally overlooked aspect of trolley theorizing – namely, the highly impoverished role invariably allotted to the would-be rescuer in these scenarios – I aim to challenge the complacent twin assumptions of advocates of the trolley method that this approach to moral reasoning has practical value, and is in any case innocuous. Neither assumption is true. (shrink)

What makes ethical accounts natural law ethical is, I argue, commonly misrepresented in teaching within much of the philosophical academy. Yet those immersed in the field of natural law and ethics rarely give definitions/brief characterisations of what makes ethical accounts natural law ethical. I suggest theoretical reasons for the lack. I argue that bringing natural law into ethics is best understood as leading to theoretically unitary accounts, not simply collections of positions detachable from each other: an overlooked and significant point (...) when defending natural law ethical accounts. My arguments throughout rely on the metaethical/normative ethical distinction, which is relatively little used in the natural law literature. I argue that the distinction helps clarify what is distinctive of natural law ethical accounts in general, especially to the secular contemporary philosophical academy, where appreciation of natural law ethical accounts is commonly appreciably lower than in philosophical contexts with a religious ethos. (shrink)

I Introduction This essay will canvass recent philosophical accounts of human agency that deploy a notion of 'self' (or 'agent') causation. Some of these accounts try to explicate this notion, whereas others only hint at its nature by way of contrast with the causality exhibited by impersonal physical systems. In these latter theories, the authors' main argumentative burden is that the apparent fundamental differences between personal and impersonal causal activity strongly suggest mind-body dualism. I begin by noting two distinct, yet (...) not commonly distinguished, philosophical motivations for pursuing an agent-causal account of human agency. In the course of discussing the accounts that some philosophers have developed in response to these considerations, I reconsider both the linkage of agent causation with mind-body dualism and its sharp cleavage from impersonal (or 'event') causation. (shrink)

New Zealand fisheries management reforms are being conducted in terms of 'balancing' of interests and reconciliation of conflicting claims over ownership and use. Fisheries legislation seeks efficient levels of fishing effort, while establishing 'environmental bottom lines' for stock conservation; resource management law requires, alongside efficiency of resource use, consideration for species diversity and 'the intrinsic values of ecosystems' ; and the Treaty of Waitangi safeguards customary practices and life-support requirements for the Maori people. This paper analyses these antinomies in terms (...) of contrasting ethical positions – utilitarian rationality, versus an ethic of reciprocal hospitality – and shows how fisheries management policies can be formulated on this basis. (shrink)

Philosophy and Kafka is a collection of original essays interrogating the relationship of literature and philosophy. The essays either discuss specific philosophical commentaries on Kafka’s work, consider the possible relevance of certain philosophical outlooks for examining Kafka’s writings, or examine Kafka’s writings in terms of a specific philosophical theme, such as communication and subjectivity, language and meaning, knowledge and truth, the human/animal divide, justice, and freedom.

A Companion to the Philosophy of Action offers a comprehensive overview of the issues and problems central to the philosophy of action. -/- * The first volume to survey the entire field of philosophy of action (the central issues and processes relating to human actions) * Brings together specially commissioned chapters from international experts * Discusses a range of ideas and doctrines, including rationality, free will and determinism, virtuous action, criminal responsibility, Attribution Theory, and rational agency in evolutionary perspective * (...) Individual chapters also cover prominent historic figures from Plato to Ricoeur * Can be approached as a complete narrative, but also serves as a work of reference * Offers rich insights into an area of philosophical thought that has attracted thinkers since the time of the ancient Greeks. (shrink)

A review of Zygmunt Bauman, _Culture in a Liquid Modern World_.

The concepts of responsibility and causation are entangled at various points. Different considerations arise depending on whether one focuses on responsibility for one’s very actions, or on the consequences of one’s actions which are partly the result of many factors outside one’s control.

John Dewey argued that democracy is a way of life. Over the course of a professional career which lasted nearly seven decades, Dewey developed a comprehensive social philosophy which had as its central purpose to engage in the project of realizing democracy as a way of life. This dissertation examines John Dewey's democratic theory as found in his four major political works and myriad occasional addresses during the period between the world wars. Dewey argued that capitalism, and particularly the pecuniary (...) culture of capitalism, represented a challenge to realizing democracy in America. The context of industrial capitalism during the depression era represented a challenge to liberalism, both in thought and practice. This dissertation examines Dewey's call for a reconstruction of liberalism in order to realize democracy. I argue that his mature political writings are best understood as an attempt to reconcile this fourfold matrix which included the material context of industrial capitalism, the institutional context of liberal political institutions, the intellectual context of liberal political thought, and the normative vision of realizing democracy as a way of life. (shrink)

Kaur (2012) raises the question, how can education be more inclusive and representative when catering to diverse groups and students? Does our entitlement to human kindness cease once incarcerated, and are we to be forever banished to the outskirts of society? The majority of offender education research assesses success or failure through mechanistic, objective and calculated criteria. Statistically, offenders repeatedly underachieve in primary and secondary education; offenders who partake in some form of adult and post-release learning continue this pattern, and (...) face other non-learning barriers that impact on participation and accreditation outcomes (Prison Education Trust, 2018). Departing from conventional modes and methods of teaching, this article examines the transformative journeys of former offenders, and considers the role of education in supporting them to lead more productive and meaningful lives. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: God Evil The Problem of God and Evil Design Faith and Reason Our Two Investigations Suggested Reading.

This chapter explores the notion of necessary being and defends its explanatory significance. Even if we were to accept the traditional answer involving necessary being to the existence question, its wider significance may be challenged. While it is often incorporated into what has come to be known as the ‘cosmological argument from contingency’ for the existence of God, the bare idea of ‘necessary being’ seems quite thin. The chapter shows how the causal efficacy of a necessary being could figure into (...) an explanation of a contingent universe that affirms the universe's contingency that is an inevitable emanation of the necessary being without thereby conceding an ultimate explanatory surd. It enables one comfortably to steer clear of their necessitarian excesses even while retaining Schopenhauer's cab as a permanent mode of transportation on the way to a philosopher's paradise. (shrink)

Summary Classical Greek armies and navies moving through the territory of friendly, allied, and neutral city-states provisioned themselves through markets organized and controlled by those city-states. No scholar has ever explained why this was so. By placing this practice within a comparative framework, this article demonstrates that the protocol of the provision of markets by poleis to passing armies developed in the way it did in the late Archaic and early Classical Greek world because Greek states in this period lacked (...) the logistical structures to exert sustained coercive power against other states. Once the protocol was established, however, it continued in use throughout the Classical period even after fifth-century Athenian navies gained the logistical capacity to apply prolonged strategic pressure on coastal and island poleis. Use of the protocol continued because traditions of autonomy as well as long-standing customs governing relations between states restrained even the Aegean-dominating Athenians from using more forceful means of acquisition than markets to acquire their food from other poleis. (shrink)

The overdose epidemic continues to accelerate, with deaths from overdose increasing from approximately 78,000 pre-pandemic to nearly 100,000 presently. While much of the focus in mainstream media has been on overdoses from opioids, women are overdosing on a variety of drugs. The gendered dimensions of the overdose epidemic have been largely ignored even though this crisis has been building for decades. From 1997 to 2017, the overall death rate for women ages 30–64 from overdoses has increased 260 percent. The largest (...) increases in this group were women between the ages of 55 and 64. Factors such as the sexual division of labor, greater financial insecurity, intimate partner violence, and significant burdens from... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Two Investigations The Veil of Ignorance Suggested Reading.