It has always been the ideal of science to discover laws of nature on which we can all agree. Agreement requires evidence independent of individual judgment, i.e., objective evidence. We apply the term objective to such unbiased scientific evidence because we associate it with an external world of objects that we conceive to be the origin of our information. This external world is instinctively invented by each of us as a means of dealing with invariant patterns in his private world (...) of experience. The invention is validated and elaborated as a consequence of the fact that it turns out to be sharable. In fact the common content of all our invented external worlds is so unambiguous and independent of individual bias that it can form the universally accepted basis for communication and action in an organized society. The consistency of the patterns of experience associated with the external world is such that we are under severe psychological compulsion to assign to this world an existence independent of our experience and a reality superior to that of any small part of our experience. Physical science is devoted to the study of the “laws” of the external physical universe, i.e., to the behaviour of the objects in it. Hence there is a strong tendency to project into the external world the information gathered by scientifically objective methods and even the theoretical concepts in terms of which the information is interpreted. Whatever is so projected is objective in a second sense of the term, i.e., assigned by us to the external world of objects. (shrink)

The writer of this paper is not an expert on probability from either the mathematical or the philosophical side, but a theoretical physicist forced by the exigencies of work in his own field to make his peace with the concept of probability. The present contribution is a sequel to remarks on two different types of probability in a recent paper on the relation between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics.

This introduction to physical science combines a rigorous discussion of scientific principles with sufficient historical background and philosophic interpretation to add a new dimension of interest to the accounts given in more conventional textbooks. It brings out the twofold character of physical science as an expanding body of verifiable knowledge and as an organized human activity whose goals and values are major factors in the revolutionary changes sweeping over the world today.Professor Kemble insists that to understand science one must (...) understand not only what the scientists have discovered, but how the discoveries were made, why the growth of scientific knowledge had to begin slowly, and what it has done to our habits of thought. He has written neither a history of science nor an introduction to the philosophy of science but an introduction to scientific concepts and principles that supplies as much of their historical and philosophical context as limits of space permit.The volume takes up in turn the story of the astronomy of ancient Greece, the Copernican revolution, the idea of the expanding sidereal universe, the rise of Newton's classical mechanics with its many astronomical applications, the concept of energy and its relation to heat, to steam engines, and to thermodynamics. The volume ends with an account of the successes and failures of classical kinetic-molecular theory of heat. (shrink)

When it is seen that those who speak for the new society also establish it wherever they are, then the ranks of oppression and inequity break and straggle; when it is seen that those who speak for the new society are less regardful of the comfort and rights of others than are the best in the old society, then the ranks of oppression and inequity re-aline [sic] and advance anew to battle. He that cries against externally-enforced order carries complete conviction (...) only when he ceases to create disorder by discourtesy, tumult, and greater invasions. I can have little faith in the professed love of liberty of one who denies to me the opportunity to hear what he or she does not care to hear, just as I can have little faith in the professions of the Censor who denies to me the opportunity to read what he does not care to read. “We learn to do by doing.”. (shrink)

Abstract: How can the decisions of “autonomous” individuals provide a rationale for freedom and self-governance if a mechanical and causal sense of the self leads us to question the foundational nature of the individual? If most of our decisions originate in brain function below the level of consciousness, we live in a virtual world produced by mechanisms outside our control, arising from transparent self-models of which we are not aware. “Opacity,” the gift of not perceiving directly, of not automatically believing (...) what we are experiencing, is precisely what makes it possible for us to question our first-person perspectives. While we do not have direct access to the mechanisms that give rise to our sense of ourselves, our investigation can make it possible for us to analyze and understand those very mechanisms consciously. The deployment of that knowledge in the act of decision making and the infinite regress of interacting conscious individuals underlies our existential freedom. (shrink)

This article responds to Stanley J. Grenz's Templeton Lecture, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?” published in the June 2000 issue of Zygon (Grenz 2000). In the first part I outline my reasons for finding the kind of theological reflections in which Grenz engages worthy of attention by noting my disagreement with the view that a sufficient response to theological issues can be formulated on the basis of an examination of our biological nature. I assert, in that connection, the (...) autonomy of reason as a way of investigating and understanding the world. In the second part I respond directly to Grenz by explaining my disagreement with the postmodern critique of science upon which he relies and his adherence to Christian eschatology as an answer to the conundrums into which, he posits, we are drawn as a result of that critique. I note that I agree with Grenz, however, that the activity of valuing is necessarily a forward‐looking Godlike endeavor that is not derivable from science. In the third part I suggest that we must be open to the investigation of the possible existence of an objective realm of value and that, in any case, rejection of the postmodern critique of science in many cases pro‐vides a sound basis for the disciplined resolution of factual questions that frequently lie at the base of disagreements about values. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, the author discusses the origin and obligation of the medical profession and argues that the duty of fidelity in the context of a patient–professional relationship (PPR) is the central obligation of medical professionals. The duty of fidelity entails seeking the patient’s best interests even at the expense of the professional’s own, and refusing to treat a risk-patient infected by SARS is a breach of fidelity because the medical professional is involved in a situation (...) of conflict of interests and places his/her own health interests ahead of the patient. The author attributes the failure to the fact that professional ethical codes are not legally enforceable, and this failure at the microethical level damages the integrity of the profession at the macroethical level. The author argues that professional autonomy must be subordinated to professional fidelity for the medical profession to survive as a social institution. In the second part of the paper, the author shows that the PPR has most of the important attributes of a fiduciary relationship, and analyzes several important court cases in some common law jurisdictions to illustrate the increasing importance of fiduciary law in adjudicating disputes between patients and medical professionals, and appeals to law courts and legislatures to apply more stringent fiduciary principles on the medical profession to ensure that the professional duty of fidelity is enforced and the goal of medicine fulfilled for the interests of members of the community who has established the medical profession in the first place. (shrink)

Out of 288 Hong Kong cancer patients, 92.3% include themselves in decision-making, 71% prefer joint decision-making: with family, with doctor, with doctor plus family, with family minus doctor, and with doctor minus family. <5% want decision-making by “doctor-alone” and <1% desire decision-making by “family-alone”. Harmony, communication and responsibility are reasons for family participation. Most patients prefer “specialist” for information, followed by “family”, “friends”, and “GP”. Trust in doctors and prospects for controlling/curing disease are important factors in decision-making. Patients want to (...) participate and be listened to rather than make decisions. Doctors should not disclose information to family without patients’ permission, nor withhold information from patient [End Page 109] on family’s request. Only 25% of patients have discussed post-competent treatment with others and 7% have heard of Advance Directive ; 24% refuse to discuss it. After AD has been explained to them, 66% remain reluctant to sign one, preferring to leave oral instructions or appoint family as proxy decision-makers. The family’s decision-making role increases when patients become incompetent. The top reason for signing AD is to receive preferred post-competent treatments, and for not signing it, difficulty with making a prospective decision. The implications of these findings will be discussed. (shrink)

This study elucidates and defends philosophical realism. The version I propose includes a realist understanding of the nature of reality, and a twofold realist view of truth. I hold that reality is cognition-independent. This means that the conceptual scheme of inquiry into a given subject matter does not constitute its nature. Using a different set of concepts to investigate a certain phenomenon will not change what it is. This is realism about reality: Reality is not contingent upon the concepts we (...) use in our attempts to understand it. ;I embrace, as well, a realist conception of truth, according to which, truth consists in agreement with reality. In addition, truth is not characterized as any sort of justification. What we say is true if, and only if, what we are talking about is as we claim it to be. Furthermore, the conditions under which a statement is true are not to be identified with the conditions which would make anyone justified in believing the statement: Truth conditions and justification conditions of statements are not identical. ;There are two major ways in which I defend realism. First, I specify exactly what the doctrine should be. This involves so characterizing realism that it is not committed to a number of undesirable theses; for example, foundationalism, physicalism, scientism, skepticism, and moral relativism. The realism I embrace allows for ontological and epistemological pluralism, according to which there are many kinds of things in the world, and many ways to describe them. Secondly, I respond to two of the most important recent attacks on realism, those of Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. I examine their alternatives to realism, and find them lacking in merit. I formulate their strongest arguments against realism, and then respond on the realist's behalf. Realism emerges as a plausible, interrelated conception of the nature of knowledge, truth, and reality which stands up well against the attacks of its most prominent contemporary critics. (shrink)

The main objective of the study was to survey health-care practitioners' (HCPs) perception of health-care practices that are of medical–ethical importance in Hong Kong public hospitals, and to identify the moral issues that concern them most. A total of 2718 doctors, nurses, allied health and administrative workers from 14 hospitals participated. HCPs considered that communication/conflict between patients/families and HCPs was the most important issue, followed by issues concerning patients' rights and values. The ‘ethics climate’ in Hong Kong public hospitals was (...) found to be largely determined by two negative factors (inadequate communication and conflict issues) and two positive factors (high regard for patients' rights and the decline in family interference). Chinese cultural conventions were inferred to exert strong influence on the behaviours of HCPs and patients/families. Significant differences in perceptions between different categories of HCPs were also detected. The study was the first of its kind ever done in Hong Kong and signalled the need for institutional reorganization and medical–ethical education. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion of C. I. Lewis’s theory of meaning in his book, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946) and his pragmatic theory of analyticity and necessity. I bring this theories together with some remarks that he makes in an appendix to the second edition of Symbolic Logic to construct an algebraic semantics for his logics S2 and S3. These logics and their semantics are compared and evaluated with regard to how well they implement Lewis’s theories (...) of meaning and analyticity. (shrink)

As the expansion of the Internet and the digital formatting of all kinds of creative works move us further into the information age, intellectual property issues have become paramount. Computer programs costing thousands of research dollars are now copied in an instant. People who would recoil at the thought of stealing cars, computers, or VCRs regularly steal software or copy their favorite music from a friend's CD. Since the Web has no national boundaries, these issues are international concerns. The contributors-philosophers, (...) legal theorists, and business scholars, among others-address questions such as: Can abstract ideas be owned? How does the violation of intellectual property rights compare to the violation of physical property rights? Can computer software and other digital information be protected? And how should legal systems accommodate the ownership of intellectual property in an information age? Intellectual Property is a lively examination of these and other issues, and an invaluable resource for librarians, lawyers, businesspeople, and scholars. (shrink)

This paper sets out a semantics for C.I. Lewis's logic S2 based on the ontology of his 1923 paper ‘Facts, Systems, and the Unity of the World’. In that article, worlds are taken to be maximal consistent systems. A system, moreover, is a collection of facts that is closed under logical entailment and conjunction. In this paper, instead of defining systems in terms of logical entailment, I use certain ideas in Lewis's epistemology and philosophy of logic to define a class (...) of models in which systems are taken to be primitive elements but bear certain relations to one another. I prove soundness and completeness for S2 over this class of models and argue that this semantics makes sense of at least a substantial fragment of Lewis's logical theory. (shrink)

This paper starts with an intuitive notion of representational spaces, which is intended to provide an improved version of Kuhn's concept of paradigms. It then proceeds to study the following topics in terms of this new notion: incommensurability, paradigm change, explanation of anomalies, explanation of regularities, explanation of irregularities, and physical necessity. In the course of the investigation, "representational space" gets clarified and defined. It is envisaged that this new concept should throw light on many issues in the philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

In scientific explanations, the explanans theory is sometimes incommensurable with the explanandum empirical data. How is this possible, especially when the explanation is deductive in nature? This paper attempts to solve the puzzle without relying on any particular theory of reference. For us, it is rather obvious that the geometric idea of projection plays a key role in Keplers explanation of Tycho Brahes empirical data. We discover that a similar mechanism operates in theoretic explanations in general. In short, all theoretic (...) explanations are projective explanations. If so, there should be no logical reason why explanans theories cannot be incommensurable with explanandum data. For illustration, we analyse Einsteins explanation of the results of the Michelson–Morley experiment in some detail. (shrink)

Part I distinguishes epistemic and choice democracy, attributing the first to the Rawls of A Theory of Justice but arguing that the second is more justifiable. Part II argues that in comparison with the difference principle, three principles — equal participation in choice democracy, no subordinating purpose, and a just wants guarantee — constitute a more rational choice in the original position; and that they better provide all the benefits claimed for the difference principle in its comparison with either average (...) utilitarianism or restricted average utilitarianism (the mixed conception). Part III, despite noting that my conclusions in Part II can all be reached within the Rawlsian framework, suggests that finding the basis of equality in the presuppositions of communicative action rather than in the existence of the two basic moral powers is more conducive to the affirmative conclusions of Parts I and II. It argues that Rawls' conclusions represented in part his not fully carrying out the break with Kant that he identified himself as making. (shrink)

My thesis is simple. The right of informational privacy, the great modern achievement often attributed to the classic Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis article, “The Right to Privacy” , asserts an individual's right not to have private personal information circulated. Warren and Brandeis claimed that individual dignity in a modern society requires that people be able to keep their private lives to themselves and proposed that the common law should be understood to protect this dignity by making dissemination of private (...) information a tort. As broadly stated, this right not to have private information distributed directly conflicts with a broadly conceived freedom of speech and of the press. My claim is that, in cases of conflict, the law should reject the Warren and Brandeis innovation. Speech and press freedom should prevail; the privacy tort should be ignored. This conclusion requires a normative argument concerning the appropriate basis and status of speech freedom that this essay will not really provide but for which I have argued elsewhere. Here, instead, I will describe that theory of speech freedom, explore its implications for informational privacy, and finally suggest some reasons to think that rejection of the privacy tort should not be so troubling and is, in fact, pragmatically desirable. (shrink)

This paper critiques the reduction of the significance of human moral action to mere social construction and suggests two perspectives that resist this theoretical maneuver. It is argued that any school of thought within psychology that cannot provide an adequate account of ethics and moral action ultimately fails as a psychology. This paper examines the social constructionist claims of Kenneth Gergen and others, arguing that, because it undermines the possibility of a meaningful morality by ushering in a form of nihilism, (...) social constructionism fails as an adequate school of thought for psychology. By way of an alternative capable of providing a more adequate account of moral action in psychology, this paper explores the contributions of William James and Emmanuel Levinas. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)