After meeting in Zurich, Nikos Kazantzakis and Elli Lambridi undertook a number of Nietzsche pilgrimages in Switzerland together in 1918, beginning with a trip to Silvaplana. At the time, Kazantzakis had written a thesis on Nietzsche and had translated The Birth of Tragedy and Thus Spoke Zarathustra into Greek, while Elli Lambridi was enrolled in a PhD in philosophy at the University of Zurich writing on Aristotle. They continually debated the nature of the philosopher-type in relation to Nietzsche and (...) Dionysianism, and this philosophical engagement is the central topic of this paper. Lambridi envisaged a Dionysian philosopher fully engaged in an ethical and natural life within a community of others and also envisaged a derived politics of affirmative communal responsibility. Kazantzakis considered that the philosopher should take a much more Apolline, spiritually focused and solitary path, continually ascending toward heroic self-redemption. As well as examining their recorded exchanges, this paper also addresses the fictional resumption of their relationship in The New People, a novel which Lambridi wrote some time after Kazantzakis’ death. In the novel, they resume their discussion of the philosopher-type in 2118, in an eternal recurrence event. In the end, the male character, Petros, learns that the grounding event of a Dionysian Nietzscheanism is an instinctive promise of responsibility for the future of others. (shrink)

The Christ of Kazantzakis is not a return to the traditional Christian understanding and can only be understood in terms of Kazantzakis's own life and thought.

This book explores the philosophical and theological thought of Nikos Kazantzakis. Kazantzakis is a well-known and highly influential Greek writer, having authored such works as Zorba the Greek and The Last Temptation of Christ, among many others. This volume focuses on the over-arching themes of Kazantzakis’ work, namely the importance of the natural world, the nature of humanity, and the nature of God, by means of an analysis of his major novels and other writings. Along the way attention is (...) given to the views of the important scholars who have interacted with Kazantzakis’s works, including Peter Bien, Darren Middleton, and Daniel Dombrowski. (shrink)

Examines the concept of God which emerges from the writings of Nikos Kazantzakis and argues that he was a process theist.

Hubris is a notion that has recently acquired special urgency, as it seems to express in the post-communist era the demands of justice during the tragic clash between governance and violence. This ethico-political notion deserves to be studied not only in ancient writings but in modern drama and thought as well. Nikos Kazantzakis' unduly neglected Capodistria (1944) dramatizes the dilemmas of civic action during the democratic constitution of a polity. A reading of this tragedy from the perspective of political (...) theory suggests ways in which the meaning of hubris in modernity may be better understood. (shrink)

In his Twilight of the Idols, Friedrich Nietzsche praises Heraclitus, the Greek pre-Socratic, for his “assertion that being is an empty fiction.” 1 The philosophical notion of being, which seems to refer to fixed entities or substances, is eclipsed (at least in the mind of Nietzsche [and perhaps other philosophers—Gilles Deleuze comes to mind]) by the notion of becoming. As a result of our innate nothingness—which I defend linguistically, via the structuralist concept of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign—it (...) would seem that we do, in fact, lack a fixed internal essence. Rather, we are constantly redefining (and free to redefine) our being, which is never fixed. It would seem that “un-fixed” being is becoming. In my paper, I aim to track this notion of becoming, as directly opposed to being, through two literary instances: the biblical Christ, and the philosopher-author Nikos Kazantzakis’ Zorba the Greek. (shrink)

_First English translation of Nikos Kazantzakis’s 1909 doctoral dissertation on Nietzsche._.

How should one live in order to live well? What are the defining characteristics of the good life? These questions - the perennial concern of classical scholars - have in the last 25 years become the subject of debates in contemporary social and political theory as well. Foucault, Taylor, Kekes, Cottingham and Nehamas have all stressed the importance of the?art of living? or?caring for the self? in light of contemporary political and economic developments. This article, as my contribution to the (...) debate, offers the analysis of two models of the?good life?: the one as presented by Plato and embodied in the literary character of Socrates, and the other as presented by Nikos Kazantzakis and embodied in the literary figure of Zorba. In general terms, Socrates advocates the rule of reason and the denigration and submission of the bodily Eros, while Zorba remains suspicious of the mind -?a careful little shopkeeper? - and stresses the significance of bodily experiences as ways of linking oneself with the rest of the universe. Hence in the article I formulate an ethic of sensual Eros by focusing on Zorba?s way of life and contrast it to the Socratic ethics. I conclude that the concern and respect for the body, for the house in which Eros dwells, is the necessary a priori for the living of the good life. This way of life is not one that rejects reason altogether, but what it does reject is the desire of reason to monopolize the individual?s life processes. Kako treba da se zivi da bi se zivjelo dobro? Sto su sustinske osobine dobrog zivota? Ova pitanja - kojima se teoreticari grcko-rimske filozofije vec odavno bave - postala su u poslednjih 25 godina i predmet debata u savremenoj drustvenoj i politickoj teoriji. Fuko, Tejlor, Kekes, Kotingham i Nehamas samo su najvazniji od onih koji su insistirali na vaznosti?umjetnosti zivljenja? ili?brige za sopstvo? u svjetlu savremenih politickih i ekonomskih desavanja. Ovaj rad, moj doprinos toj debati, nudi analizu dva modela?dobrog zivota?: jedan koji je predstavio Platon kroz svog knjizevnog junaka Sokrata i drugi koji je predstavio Nikos Kazantzakis kroz svog knjizevnog junaka Zorbu. Opste govoreci, Sokrat zastupa vladavinu razuma i unizavanje i potcinjenost tjelesnog Erosa, dok je Zorba pun sumnji vis-?-vis razuma -?tog pazljivog sitnog trgovca? - i instistira na vaznosti tjelesnih iskustava kao nacina za povezivanje sopstva sa ostatkom svijeta. Stoga u radu formulisem etiku sensualnog Erosa baziranu na Zorbinom nacinu zivota i uporedjujem je za Sokratovom etikom. Moj zakljucak je da je briga i uvazavanje tijela, kao kuce u kojoj Eros zivi, neophodan a priori za zivljenje dobrog zivota. Ovakav nacin zivota ne znaci odbacivanje razuma, ali znaci odbacivanje zelje razuma da monopolizuje sve zivotne procese pojedinca. (shrink)

We can appreciate the strength of Friedrich Nietzsche's thought in the transformation of many of the ideas and values that have formed our Western heritage. This strength is figured in part by the questions that Nietzsche generated concerning traditional concepts of reason, nature, God, time, religion, memory, and morality. Hans‐Georg gadamer (see Article 38), a leading continental philosopher speaking when he was ninety years old, remarked that an entire generation of thinkers and artists in early twentieth‐century Europe found in Nietzsche's (...) writings their entry into the ideas and images that incited their creative work. These writers range from Karl jaspers (Article 17) and Jean‐Paul sartre (Article 21) to Thomas Mann, Nikos Kazantzakis, and Maurice blanchot (Article 25). Martin heidegger (Article 18), Michel foucault (Article 49), Gilles deleuze (Article 51), Jacques derrida (Article 50), and Luce irigaray (Article 54) are among those continental philosophers who have been considerably influenced by Nietzsche and who have considerably influenced contemporary readings of Nietzsche. In England and the United States his work gained gradual acceptance particularly after the Second World War and after people came to understand that the use of his writings by the Third Reich in Germany constituted a shameless perversion of his thought. German National Socialism's interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy constituted a most flagrant of many misreadings of him. But his influence has been amplified by other misreadings in addition to many careful interpretations of his thought. His thought has been seen as a species of process metaphysics and compared to that of Bergson, Whitehead, and neo‐Darwinians. He has been read as an ethicist and as a strange theologian who replaced God as He is traditionally conceived with the will to power. His philosophy is frequently presented as nihilistic, as a body of beliefs and observations that leaves us with nothing to affirm and nothing to support hope and confidence for living. (shrink)

Relying on Pierre Hadot’s concept of philosophy as spiritual exercise, I examine Nikos Kazantzakis’ magnum opus Askitiki: Salvatores Dei (translated in English as The Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises). Specifically, I examine the extent to which Kazantzakis offers a version of spiritual exercise appropriate for neoclassical theism, analogous to St. Ignatius’ version of spiritual exercise in the service of classical theism.

In this paper we will try to find resemblances of the operation of human consciousness with systems with the intention to simulate it mathematically. Also we will try to do the same for the non-conscious operations and try to synthesize the human mind in form of system with subsystems.

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's ‘liberty condition’: that, after the social contract, each ‘nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before’. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the ‘legitimacy’ of social arrangements. I (...) raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's ‘liberty condition’: that, after the social contract, each ‘nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before’. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the ‘legitimacy’ of social arrangements. I (...) raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)

As the Global South is increasingly interpenetrated by neo-liberal and authoritarian regimes the idea of the South as a site of emancipatory resistance and exotic cultural difference has ended. This article offers an alternative route into the cultures of the South. It focuses on the shifting forms of the South in contemporary visual art and outlines the possibilities of non-coercive forms of cultural exchange and the cartographies of a cosmopolitanism from below. This perspective on the South is most evident in (...) the stories of embodied solidarity that stand in contrast to top down visions of socio-economic development and cultural homogenization. (shrink)

My subject is what I will call the “Myth of Formal Coherence.” In its normative telling, the Myth is that there are “requirements of formal coherence as such,” which demand just that our beliefs and intentions be formally coherent.1 Some examples are.

Our political thinking is driven, far more than philosophers recognize, by a concern for social equality and, more specifically, a concern to avoid relations of inferiority. Niko Kolodny argues that, in order to make sense of the most familiar ideas in our political thought and discourse - the justification of the state, democracy, and rule of law, as well as objections to paternalism and corruption - we cannot merely appeal to freedom (as libertarians like Nozick do) or to distributive fairness (...) (as liberals like Rawls do). We must, instead, appeal directly to claims against inferiority, that no one stands above or below. (shrink)

At first glance, love seems to be a psychological state for which there are normative reasons: a state that, if all goes well, is an appropriate or fitting response to something independent of itself. Love for one’s parent, child, or friend is fitting, one wants to say, if anything is. On reflection, however, it is elusive what reasons for love might be. It is natural to assume that they would be nonrelational features of the person one loves, something about her (...) in her own right. According to the “quality theory,” for example, reasons for love are the beloved’s personal attributes, such as her wit and beauty. In J. David Velleman’s provocative and ingeniously argued proposal, the reason for love is the beloved’s bare Kantian personhood, her capacity for rational choice and valuation. But no such nonrelational feature works. To appreciate just one difficulty, observe that whatever nonrelational feature one selects as the reason for love will be one that another person could, or actually does, possess. The claim that nonrelational features are reasons for love implies, absurdly, that insofar as one’s love for Jane is responsive to its reasons, it will accept any relevantly similar person as a replacement. (shrink)

Logothetis, N.K.: Single units and conscious vision. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences 353, 1801-1818 (1998) Abstract.

Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. I ask how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense (...) in which we ‘ought’ to have the attitudes what we have conclusive reason to have. The normativity of rationality is not straightforwardly that of reasons, I argue; there are no reasons to comply with rational requirements in general. First, this would lead to ‘bootstrapping’, because, contrary to the claims of John Broome, not all rational requirements have ‘wide scope’. Second, it is unclear what such reasons to be rational might be. Finally, we typically do not, and in many cases could not, treat rational requirements as reasons. Instead, I suggest, rationality is only apparently normative, and the normativity that it appears to have is that of reasons. According to this ‘Transparency Account’, rational requirements govern our responses to our beliefs about reasons. The normative ‘pressure’ that we feel, when rational requirements apply to us, derives from these beliefs: from the reasons that, as it seems to us, we have. (shrink)

Niko Kolodny It is often said that there is a special class of norms, ‘rational requirements’, that demand that our attitudes be related one another in certain ways, whatever else may be the case.1 In recent work, a special class of these rational requirements has attracted particular attention: what I will call ‘requirements of formal coherence as such’, which require just that our attitudes be formally coherent.2 For example, we are rationally required, if we believe something, to believe what it (...) entails. And we are rationally required, if we intend an end, to intend what we take to be necessary means to it. The intuitive idea is that formally incoherent attitudes give rise to a certain normative tension, or exert a kind of rational pressure on each another, and this tension, or pressure, is relieved just when one of the attitudes is revised. As John Broome observes, these requirements are, by their nature, ‘wide scope’, which is to say that there is no particular attitude that one must have or lack in order to satisfy them. This is because they require just formal coherence, and there is no particular attitude that one must have or lack in order to be formally coherent. (shrink)

We consider a paradox involving indicative conditionals (‘ifs’) and deontic modals (‘oughts’). After considering and rejecting several standard options for resolv- ing the paradox—including rejecting various premises, positing an ambiguity or hidden contextual sensitivity, and positing a non-obvious logical form—we offer a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that resolves the paradox by making modus ponens invalid. We argue that this is a result to be welcomed on independent grounds, and we show that rejecting the general validity of modus (...) ponens is compatible with vindicating most ordinary uses of modus ponens in reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Mill’s ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ regarding the human will and action cannot apply on all cases, and that the human mind has potentially the capacity to create freely a will or action that, no matter what kind of knowledge we possess, cannot be predicted. More precisely, I argue against Mill’s attempt of conjunction between the freedom of the will and the ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ while I attempt a comparison with the relevant Kantian approach. (...) I then claim that a will cannot be free and be predicted at the same time, as both the elements of freedom and unpredictability of the will are founded on the very process of its formulation as an outcome of genuine creativity. I, thus, attempt to propose a more substantially free view of free will and action than the ones presented by the prominent conceptions. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 2 Seiten: 895-918.

At first glance, love seems to be a psychological state for which there are normative reasons: a state that, if all goes well, is an appropriate or fitting response to something independent of itself. Love for one’s parent, child, or friend is fitting, one wants to say, if anything is. On reflection, however, it is elusive what reasons for love might be. It is natural to assume that they would be nonrelational features of the person one loves, something about her (...) in her own right. According to the “quality theory,” for example, reasons for love are the beloved’s personal attributes, such as her wit and beauty. In J. David Velleman’s provocative and ingeniously argued proposal, the reason for love is the beloved’s bare Kantian personhood, her capacity for rational choice and valuation.1 But no such nonrelational feature works. To appreciate just one difficulty, observe that whatever nonrelational feature one selects as the reason for love will be one that another person could, or actually does, possess. The claim that nonrelational features are reasons for love implies, absurdly, that insofar as one’s love for Jane is responsive to its reasons, it will accept any relevantly similar person as a replacement. (shrink)

Asif A. Ghazanfar,1,3,* Hjalmar K. Turesson,1,3 statistical pattern recognition [16, 17] and psychophys- Joost X. Maier,1 Ralph van Dinther,2 ics [13, 18–23] have suggested that formants are signif- Roy D. Patterson,2 and Nikos K. Logothetis1 icant contributors to these indexical cues. It is likely, 1Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics then, that detecting formants could have provided 72076 Tuebingen ancestral primates with indexical cues necessary for Germany navigating the complex social interactions that are the 2Centre for the Neural Basis (...) of Hearing essence of primate societies. One important indexical Department of Physiology cue is body size. Formant cues related to body size University of Cambridge could be used by monkeys to determine the sex (in sex- CB2 3EG Cambridge ually dimorphic species), degree of potential threat (e.g., United Kingdom whether a competitor is larger or smaller), and/or age of an individual, as such cues do for human listeners [13, 18, 20, 21]. Summary Formants are the result of acoustic filtering by the supralaryngeal vocal tract—the nasal and oral cavities Vocal-tract resonances (or formants) are acoustic sigabove the vocal folds. During vocal production, pulses natures in the voice and are related to the shape and of air generated by the rapid movement of the vocal length of the vocal tract. Formants play an important folds produce an acoustic signal. The frequency of these role in human communication, helping us not only to pulses—the glottal-pulse rate—determines the fundadistinguish several different speech sounds [1], but mental frequency of the signal, which in turn is perceived also to extract important information related to the as pitch. As the signal passes through the supralaryngphysical characteristics of the speaker, so-called ineal vocal tract, it excites resonances, resulting in the dexical cues. How did formants come to play such an enhancement of particular frequency bands; these are important role in human vocal communication? One the formants.. (shrink)

As prose dramatic texts Plato's dialogues would have been read by their original audience as an alternative type of theatrical composition. The 'paradox' of the dialogue form is explained by his appropriation of the discourse of theatre, the dominant public mode of communication of his time. The oral performance of his works is suggested both by the pragmatics of the publication of literary texts in the classical period and by his original role as a Sokratic dialogue-writer and the creator of (...) a fourth dramatic genre. Support comes from a number of pieces of evidence, from a statue of Sokrates in the Academy to a mosaic of Sokrates in Mytilene, which point to a centuries-old tradition of treating the dialogues in the context of performance literature and testify to the significance of the image of 'Plato the prose dramatist' for his original and subsequent audiences. (shrink)

Every attempt to examine our consciousness’s passive life and its dynamic in its various forms inevitably intersects with our primal awareness of the future. Even though Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness enjoys a certain fame, his conception of our primordial relation to the future has not been adequately accounted for. The book at hand aims to offer a close study of Husserl’s view of protentional consciousness and to trace its unique contribution to our overall awareness of time. It offers an extensive (...) analysis of various aspects of protention by investigating its connection to different fields and levels of experience. To achieve such a task, the book stresses the need to enrich the familiar formal account of protention with a material one. Thus, alongside issues pertaining exclusively to the form of protention, such as its relation to fulfillment as well as its double-intentional structure, various other dimensions are discussed, such as the phenomena of disappointment and correction as well as the role hyle plays in both of them. In the same vein, special attention is given to the relation between protentional consciousness and affectivity, thus shedding light on the dynamic unity of our living-present. What this study purports to show is that Husserl’s phenomenology is equipped to offer a solid account of the thinnest and subtlest ways in which we are aware of the future in our experiential life. (shrink)