Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143 (2010)
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Abstract |
We consider a paradox involving indicative conditionals (‘ifs’) and deontic modals (‘oughts’). After considering and rejecting several standard options for resolv- ing the paradox—including rejecting various premises, positing an ambiguity or hidden contextual sensitivity, and positing a non-obvious logical form—we offer a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that resolves the paradox by making modus ponens invalid. We argue that this is a result to be welcomed on independent grounds, and we show that rejecting the general validity of modus ponens is compatible with vindicating most ordinary uses of modus ponens in reasoning.
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Keywords | Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy |
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ISBN(s) | 0022-362X |
DOI | 10.5840/jphil2010107310 |
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References found in this work BETA
On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens.Bernard D. Katz - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):404.
Citations of this work BETA
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
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