Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?

Ethics 118 (3):437-463 (2008)
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Abstract

My subject is what I will call the “Myth of Formal Coherence.” In its normative telling, the Myth is that there are “requirements of formal coherence as such,” which demand just that our beliefs and intentions be formally coherent.1 Some examples are.

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Niko Kolodny
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.

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References found in this work

Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Does rationality give us reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.
Incoherence and Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-354.

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