Although psychologists study both the objective (behavior) and the subjective (phenomenology) components of cognition, we argue that an overemphasis on the subjective drives a wedge between psychology and other closely related scientific disciplines, such as comparative studies of cognition and artificial intelligence. This wedge is particularly apparent in contemporary studies of episodic recollection and future planning, two related abilities that many have assumed to be unique to humans. We shall challenge this doctrine. To do so, we shall adopt an ethological (...) approach to comparative cognition and this necessitates two requirements. The first is that memory and planning need to be characterized in terms of objectively defined properties as opposed to purely phenomenological ones; the ability to remember what happened, where, and how long ago is a critical behavioral criterion for episodic memory. The second requirement is the identification of an ethological context in which these memories would confer a selective advantage. As a consequence, we turn this debate into an empirical evaluation in nonlinguistic animals and one embodied in synthetic creatures. Indeed, our behavioral conception of flexibly deployable information about “what, where, and when” has so far supported a comparative cognition in animals as diverse as corvids and primates. We argue that this approach may clarify and challenge ideas that have been based solely on research with human subjects, without the need to be constrained by phenomenological assumptions based on human‐centric ways of thinking. (shrink)

We argue that there is nothing that can do the work that normative reasons are expected to do. A currently popular view is that in any given situation, a set of normative reasons (understood as a set of facts, typically about the agent’s situation) always determines the ways we prospectively should or should not respond. We discuss an example that we think shows no such collection of facts could have this normative significance. A radical response might be to dispense with (...) reasons and explain the facts about the ways we should respond using something else entirely (e.g., expected value). We think a more fruitful approach is to explore the possibility of using decision-theoretic tools in a reasons-centred framework. (shrink)

This chapter surveys elements of non-human cognition to explore ways to think across the boundary that is usually asserted between living and machinic intelligence, mainly drawing on the work of Catherine Malabou and N. Katherine Hayles. Many continental philosophers follow Martin Heidegger in his sceptical approach to modern technology, even if Heidegger advocates for a more authentic retrieval of Greek techne. Here, however, this chapter engages with Catherine Malabou’s recent book, Morphing Intelligence, to see how she conjoins a biological model (...) of neuroplasticity to a machinic conception of artificial intelligence. Malabou argues that the science of epigenetics applies to both living organisms and machines. Although her earlier work focuses more on biology and the living brain, Malabou comes to view AI in more plastic terms as well. She claims that a better understanding of automatism views plasticity in both neurological and cybernetic terms. These forms of plasticity not only are shaped but also shape material, machinic, and biological form in new and generative ways. Plasticity is not simply malleability, but a kind of programmativity that embodies a kind of metamorphosis. Hayles’s work helps supplement Malabou’s insights. In her book Unthought, Hayles demonstrates how cognition operates beyond consciousness in both organic and machinic terms. The expansion of cognition beyond its restriction to human consciousness allows a better, more plastic, ecology within which to think about all these various forms of intelligence, artificial or otherwise. (shrink)

The empirical literature exploring lawyers and their moral decision making is limited despite the “crisis” of unethical and unprofessional behavior in the bar that has been well documented for over a decade. In particular we are unaware of any empirical studies that investigate the moral landscape of the health lawyer’s practice. In an effort to address this gap in the literature, an interdisciplinary team of researchers at Vanderbilt University designed an empirical study to gather preliminary evidence regarding the moral reasoning (...) of health care attorneys. The primary research question was how health lawyers respond when they encounter ethical or moral dilemmas in their practice for which the law fails to offer a bright-line solution. In exploring this question, we sought to understand better what motivations or influences guide action when health lawyers confront ethical quandaries, and whether there are specific differences, e.g., gender, experience, or religiosity, that are associated with specific responses to situations testing ethical or moral boundaries. (shrink)

Writing in 1999, legal ethics scholar Brad Wendel noted that “[v]ery little empirical work has been done on the moral decision making of lawyers.” Indeed, since the mid-1990s, few empirical studies have attempted to explore how attorneys deliberate about ethical dilemmas they encounter in their practice. Moreover, while past research has explored some of the ethical issues confronting lawyers practicing in certain specific areas of practice, no published data exists probing the moral mind of health care lawyers. As signaled by (...) the creation of a regular column “devoted to ethical issues arising in the practice of health law” in the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, the time to address the empirical gap in the professional ethics literature is now. Accordingly, this article presents data collected from 120 health care lawyers. Presenting this population with a number of hypothetical scenarios relating to how they would respond when confronting an ethical dilemma without an obvious solution or when facing a situation in which their personal values were in tension with their professional obligations, this article represents a first step toward better understanding how lawyers who practice in health care settings understand and resolve the moral discomfort they encounter in their professional lives. (shrink)

This paper is an early draft of something that we've polished up and posted above: n-1 Guilty Men. Check that one out, if interested.

Ce texte se veut une analyse critique de l'approche de Thomason quant à la logique déontique. Alors que l'auteur défend que celle-ci doit être formalisée dans le cadre des logiques temporelles, nous soutenons que la temporalité est implicite à l'obligation, et de fait que la logique déontique n'a pas a être traitée dans la cadre d'une logique temporelle. Nous présenterons d'abord la position de Thomason. Il sera question des exemples dont l'auteur se sert pour justifier son point de vue philosophique (...) et du modèle sémantique qu'il propose pour rendre compte de l'obligation. Il sera ensuite sujet d'une critique des exemples de l'auteur et de son modèle sémantique. (shrink)

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of legal interpretation is the presumption that terms should be given their “ordinary” (i.e., general, non-technical) meanings. This principle is a central tenet of modern textualism. Textualists believe a universal presumption of ordinary meaning follows from their theory’s core commitment: A law should be interpreted consistently with what its text communicates to the ordinary public. This Article begins from this textualist premise, empirically examining what legal texts communicate to the public. Five original empirical studies (N (...) = 4,365) reveal a surprising finding: Ordinary people consider genre carefully and regularly take terms in law to communicate technical legal meanings, not ordinary ones. -/- This discovery carries implications for legal interpretation’s theory and practice. Modern textualists—especially at the Supreme Court—justify their theory through “democratic,” fair notice, and rule-of-law appeals to ordinary people. But the empirical studies reveal that fidelity to ordinary people does not imply an unwavering commitment to ordinary meaning. Instead, it requires interpreters to also look to technical meanings. On a practical level, the results support a new presumption of legal meaning and ground a new challenge to textualism’s claim to promote fair notice. As a case study, we consider Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, which held that both sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination are prohibited forms of sex discrimination. The Article’s empirics and theory offer a new justification of the Court’s landmark decision. (shrink)

En este artículo, se examinará la visión de Foucault del cuerpo y el surgimiento del cuerpo como un elemento indispensable del poder político. Por lo tanto, se discutirá cómo se objetiva la organización en períodos de poder disciplinario y regulatorio. En el contexto de la regulación del poder, trataremos de mostrar qué dinámica básica corresponde el alma, que es la prisión del cuerpo, al poder y al cuerpo. En ambos períodos, vemos que el poder elie el cuerpo como espacio. El (...) cuerpo representa el cuerpo de la sociedad y funciona como tal. En el estudio, se examinará la captura del alma como un elemento que afecta, moldea, cambia y transforma el cuerpo en la comprensión del poder regulador después del poder disciplinario. En última instancia, dado que este esfuerzo da como resultado la producción de nuevas dinámicas de poder, se intentará mostrar en un contexto crítico que el poder no permite ningún cambio, transformación y mejora de individuos y criminales a quienes percibe como cuerpos. (shrink)

Avicenna holds that since God has existed from all eternity and is immutable and impassible, he cannot come to have an attribute or feature that he has not had from all eternity. He also claims for the simultaneous causation. A puzzle arises when we consider God’s creating this world. If God is immutable and impassible, then his attributes associated with his creating this world are unchanging. So, God must have been creating the world from all eternity. But then God’s creative (...) act, one might object, seems to be no different from a matter of natural necessity. This is a threat to divine freedom, for God would then have no choice concerning his creative action. Anthony Ruffus and Jon McGinnis argue that this puzzle can be solved in such a way that Avicenna can consistently affirm divine freedom along with divine simplicity. They suggest that Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s interpretation might help to show that it is false that Avicenna’s God cannot choose absolutely. For it is still open to him to choose either to create eternally or to refrain from creating anything at all. Ruffus and McGinnis argue that since creating or not creating anything at all do not correspond to two distinct concepts, Avicenna’s account of divine simplicity, which denies any multiplicity in divine mind, is safeguarded along with divine freedom. I claim that God’s omnirationality requiring that he always acts for reasons is a serious threat to such an interpretation. (shrink)

Le concept de conflit revêt divers aspects. Entre les litiges, les violences, les différends, les désaccords, les guerres, il importe de définir les éléments de la conflictualité et le caractère institutionnel des recherches en matière de gestion et de résolution des conflits de nos jours. Néanmoins, nous sommes parvenus à percevoir que la clé du succès des résolutions des conflits pour une paix durable réside dans l’expérience humaine de la culpabilité et du pardon. Ce n’est certes pas des éléments nouveaux (...) pour les spécialistes et les diplomates en matière de gestion des conflits. Cependant, Ces deux notions sont reléguées au second plan au profit de compromis et de mesures coercitives à l’encontre des factions en conflits. Notre vision de la résolution des conflits est que sans la mise en exergue de l’expérience de la culpabilité et du pardon, les peuples vivront dans un conflit perpétuel qu’ils transmettront aux générations futures : la haine durable (sustainablehate). Est-il possible d’institutionnaliser le pardon et de mener des actions conduisant à une véritable culpabilité collective et individuelle préalable à toute réconciliation durable des peuples? La nature et la fréquence de nos conflits obligent à reconsidérer les méthodes d’approche jusqu’ici utilisées. En effet, c’est ce que tentent de faire certaines commissions pour la réconciliation appelée pour la plupart « Dialogue – Vérité – Réconciliation ; Dialogue – Justice – Réconciliation ; justice et paix, etc ». où les belligérants, les bourreaux et les victimes sont invités à l’aveu, à la vérité et au pardon pour un re-vivre ensemble. Mais dans l’espace d’un processus de réconciliation engagé à travers desdites commissions, les ballets de confessions aussi bien que les sentiments de victimisation se succèdent avant à l’arrière fond l’amnistie pour les bourreaux et l’octroi du pardon de la part des victimes. Cela, parait peu convainquant pour la raison que ces commissions sont en majeure partie installées par les vainqueurs du moment. Dans une certaine Afrique surtout, ces derniers (les vainqueurs) sont aidés par des alliés occidentaux de hauts niveaux. Il s’agit alors de processus où la paix est provisoire et se maintient au bout de la force ; et où les bourreaux sont toujours les autres. (shrink)

On one way of talking about a traditional metaethical topic, realists accept that some items appear on the list of what exists in the moral or more broadly normative domain of inquiry. They then divide over whether those items are like what science and experience suggest that all other items on the list of what exists across all domains are like – naturalistic and secular. Reductive naturalists answer this further question affirmatively. Why don’t nonnaturalists? I explore the answer that it’s (...) because normative entities are “just too different” in the sense that they are countably different things. However, I argue that this answer rests on the subtle presupposition that the normative domain doesn’t also contain uncountable entities of the sort that analytic metaphysicians call “stuff”. Taking intuitions of difference seriously points the way to a novel form of metaethical reductive naturalism. The key is to identify the stuff that matters. (shrink)

Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. They also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why provides further evidence for a kind of hybrid view of normative concept use.

The article of N. Kulish "Improvement of legal normalization of church-state relations in Ukraine - an important condition of the implementation of freedom of conscience and religion by believers" analyzes the impact of legal normalization of issues of the religious education on modern believer.

Sensations represent our subjective 'take' on sensory stimulation — how we feel about red light falling on the retina, salt dissolving on the tongue, a thorn piercing the skin. They tell — in the language of phenomenal properties -- what the experience is like for us. In so far as they represent the reality of this subjective relationship, they cannot be said to be illusory. The relationship, magical as it may seem, is not being misrepresented as something it is not. (...) If anything, it is being represented as something 'super-real'. (shrink)

Tres filósofos catalanes: Joaquín Xirau. Eduardo Nicol. José Ferrater Mora.--La herencia de Ortega y Gasset: José Gaos. Luis Recaséns Siches. Manuel Granell. Francisco Ayala. María Zambrano.--Dos filósofos independientes: Juan D. García Bacca. Eugenio Imaz.--Panorama general de la filosofía española en América.

This comparative study delves into the concepts of contemporary feminism and Islamic perspectives on gender equality and women’s rights, aiming to identify similarities, differences, and areas of convergence between the two frameworks globally. Drawing on a diverse range of feminist theories and Islamic sources, the study analyses key concepts, principles, and practices related to gender equality, women’s rights, and empowerment. Additionally, the article explores the inclusion of feminist perspectives from Sufism, further enriching the discourse on gender dynamics. By examining the (...) intersections and tensions between these frameworks, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding gender equality discourse and ongoing conversations on women’s rights within diverse cultural and religious contexts. Objectives of the Study: To do a comparative study and explore the contemporary concepts and Islamic perspectives on gender equality with incorporation of feminist ideals within Sufism. (shrink)

This groundbreaking volume highlights the contemporary relevance of Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), whose linguistic reworking of Freudian analysis radicalized both psychoanalysis and its approach to theology. Part I: Lacan, Religion, and Others explores the application of Lacan's thought to the phenomena of religion. Part II: Theology and the Other Lacan explores and develops theology in light of Lacan. In both cases, a central place is given to Lacan's exposition of the real, thereby reflecting the impact of his later work. Contributors include (...) some of the most renowned readers and influential academics in their respective fields: Tina Beattie, Lorenzo Chiesa, Clayton Crockett, Creston Davis, Adrian Johnston, Katerina Kolozova, Thomas Lynch, Marcus Pound, Carl Raschke, Kenneth Reinhard, Mario D'Amato, Noelle Vahanian, and Slavoj Žižek. Topics traverse culture, art, philosophy, and politics, as well as providing critical exegesis of Lacan's most gnomic utterances on theology, including "The Triumph of Religion."--Back cover. (shrink)

In the past 25 years or so, the issue of ethical universalizability has figured prominently in theoretical as well as practical ethics. The term, 'universaliz ability' used in connection with ethical considerations, was apparently first introduced in the mid-1950s by R. M. Hare to refer to what he characterized as a logical thesis about certain sorts of evaluative sentences (Hare, 1955). The term has since been used to cover a broad variety of ethical considerations including those associated with the ideas (...) of impartiality, consistency, justice, equality, and reversibility as well as those raised in the familar questions: 'What if everyone did that?' and 'How would you like it if someone did that to you? But this recent effloresence of the use of the term 'universalizability' is something that has deep historical roots, and has been central in various forms to the thinking about morality of some of the greatest and most influential philosophers in the western tradition. While the term is relatively new, the ideas it is now used to express have a long history. Most of these ideas and questions have been or can be formulated into a principle to be discussed, criticized, or defended. As we discuss these ideas below this prin ciple will be stated on a separate numbered line. The concepts of justice and equality were closely linked in Greek thought. These connections between these two concepts are apparent even in two authors who were hostile to the connection, Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)

Using mobile health research as an extended example, this article provides an overview of when the Common Rule “applies” to a variety of activities, what might be meant when one says that the Common Rule does or does not “apply,” the extent to which these different meanings of “apply” matter, and, when the Common Rule does apply, how it applies.

From early infancy, structures are created in engaging with the world. Increasingly complex forms of self, other, and world emerge with shared rhythms, affective patterns and interpersonal routines, cultural norms, concepts and symbols, and so on. These open up an increasing number of possibilities for new kinds and levels of engagement and for further developing a world together. However, these same structures, becoming more rigid, salient, and perhaps reified with time, may obscure or obstruct engagement and constrain development. We explore (...) this paradoxical relationship between structure and openness to engagement and attempt to understand the process of formation and change of structures in self and its relations to the world. (shrink)