Reply to article 'Political Perception and Ensemble of Macro Objectives and Measures: The Paradox of the Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare' by Rafael Ziegler in Environmental Values vol.16 no.1, pp.43-60.

The virtue of internalizing environmental costs so that prices reflect full social opportunity costs at the margin, reaffirmed by Terry Anderson and Donald Leal, is unarguable. Beyond that, however, Anderson and Leal's Free Market Environmentalism neglects the classic works in the intellectual tradition to which it is supposed to be a contribution; is unconvincing and inconsistent in the functions it ascribes to the ?environmental entrepreneur?; conflates problems of distribution and scale with the problem of allocation; ignores international dimensions; and misrepresents (...) the debate over ?sustainable development.? (shrink)

Reply to article 'Political Perception and Ensemble of Macro Objectives and Measures: The Paradox of the Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare' by Rafael Ziegler in Environmental Values vol.16 no.1, pp.43-60.

The search for a social goodness function in economic systems is reviewed, especially in light of the fact that the economy is a subsystem of a biosphere that has its own rules for determining success, or at least for limiting feasibility. The frequent perversity of reductionist quantitative success indicators in economics (profit, quotas, GDP) is mainly attributed to the preanalytic vision of the economy as an isolated circular flow, and of homo economicus as an atomistic individual isolated from community, both (...) social and biological. Specific examples of such perversity are considered. (shrink)

In this comprehensive collection of essays, most of which appear for the first time, eminent scholars from many disciplines—philosophy, economics, sociology, political science, demography, theology, history, and social psychology—examine the causes, nature, and consequences of present-day consumption patterns in the United States and throughout the world.

As a broad concept, 'globalization' denotes the declining significance of national boundaries. At a deeper level, globalization is the proposition that nation-states are losing the power to control what occurs within their borders and that what transpires across borders is rising in relative significance. The Ethical Dimensions of Global Development: An Introduction, the fifth book in Rowman & Littlefield's Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy Studies series, discusses key questions concerning globalization and its implications, including: Can general ethical principles be (...) brought to bear on questions of globalization? Do economic development and self-government require a duty of care? Is economic destiny crucial to individual autonomy? This collection provides readers with current information and useful insights into this complex topic. (shrink)

At the forefront of international concerns about global legislation and regulation, a host of noted environmentalists and business ethicists examine ethical issues in consumption from the points of view of environmental sustainability, economic development, and free enterprise.

I explore the connection between expertise and rationality. I first make explicit the philosophically dominant view on this connection, i.e., the ‘expert-consultation’ view. This view captures the rather obvious idea that a rational way of proceeding on a matter of importance when one lacks knowledge is to consult experts. Next, I enumerate the difficulties which beset this view, locating them to some extent in the current philosophical literature on expertise and rationality. I then propose that different lessons should be drawn (...) for rationality from the fact of expertise. One is that some empirical and phenomenological studies of the nature of expertise can be fruitfully applied by analogy to theories of the rational agent. (shrink)

The essay challenges the de facto dichotomy between the discipline of logic and the activity of social criticism, i.e., it provides an illustrated reminder to philosophers that the gulf between these two areas of philosophy is not quite as wide as our curriculum andspecialization designations tend to suggest. Social criticism plays some necessary roles in certain branches of logic, and the second-order accounting of the contents of these branches leads back to social criticism. These points suggest an adjusted conception of (...) logic that would, among other things, render phrases such as “applying logic to social criticism” as misleading since certain branches of logic would not even coherently exist apart from social criticism. The lead illustrations are the identification of basic, pervasive, and thought-impeding logical errors that have been missed by numerous logic texts, and the assessment of contemporary academic logic as properly a quest for communal sanity that lies caught between communal insanity and communal mendacity. (shrink)

I argue that the love of wisdom can be recovered by reawakening in humans the genuine sense of wonder, i.e., by recovering the transformed condition in which humans experience philosophical asking as a meaning-bestowing and existentially-transforming phenomenon. Wonder in this sense is primarily a metaphysical and not psychological state, and it is evoked by the transforming phenomenon of philosophical asking. Philosophical asking is not reducible to a something, e.g., a sentence in question-form, that provokes the setting up and critique of (...) theories but rather is essentially a way of existing, a dwelling, that is marked by the astonishment of watching the world, and ourselves, open up and transfigure by our very asking, i.e., by our existing as askers. (shrink)

What is required for one thing to be a reason for another? Must the reason, more precisely, be or involve a principle? In this essay I target the idea that justification via reasons of one's beliefs (e.g., epistemic or moral) requires that the 'justifying reasons' be or involve (substantive and significant) principles. I identify and explore some potential sources of a principles requirement, and conclude that none of them (i.e., the normative function of reasons, the abstract structure of reasons, the (...) universalizability constraint on [moral] reasons, and even the pragmatic considerations that attenuate 'real-world' reason-giving) mandate that reasons be principles. I then explore implications of this conclusion, and note especially the resultant and paradoxical permissibility of justifying reasons that manage to be lawlike (a sine qua non for justifying reasons) even while consisting of highly-detailed and situation-specific proposition sets, e.g., novel-length narratives. (shrink)

In this paper I identify a fallacy. The fallacy is worth noting for practical and theoretical reasons. First, the rampant occurrences ofthis fallacy-especially at moments calling for careful thought-indicate that it is more pernicious to clear thinking than many of those found in standard logic texts. Second, the fallacy stands apart from most others in that it contains multiple kinds oflogical error (i.e., fallacious and non-fallacious logical errors) that are themselves committed in abnormal ways, and thus it presents a two-tiered (...) challenge to oversimplified accounts of how an argument can go bad. (shrink)

This essay is primarily an analysis of Heidegger's Was Heisst Denken? I aim to provide a thematic unity for this enigmatic text, thereby rendering Heidegger's thoughts on thinking more available to those investigating the nature of human rationality and thinking. The procedure is to gather together some of the sundry themes and puzzling features resolved by unpacking this sentence: 'Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.' The chief results of this study include the establishment (...) of a global logic to the text, the identification of 'beingthoughtful' as the proper phenomenon to be studied, and receptivity as the distinguishing mark of the thoughtful. (shrink)

I explore a distinction that is philosophically significant but rarely a cynosure. The distinction is betvveen fallacies and logical errors, and I approach it by advancing overlooked albeit deleterious logical errors that are not fallacies but that fall squarely within the purview of Critical Thinking if not also Informal Logic. One key claim to emerge is that these logical errors -- just as basic and thought-impeding as the fallacies -- demand that we take a hard look at what is and (...) what should be guiding our activity in teaching such courses. Another is that although philosophers appeal to the notion of logical error in their explications of fallacies, the former notion is anything but clear and indeed usually explained in terms of the latter. Yet another is that the distinction illustrates why the oft encountered “false premise or bad inference” account of how thinking can go bad is oversimplified. (shrink)

The 'Discussion' section of this issue contains the following responses to Wilfred Beckerman's article 'Sustainable Development: Is it a Useful Concept?' Environmental Values 3,3 (1994): 191-209. Herman Daly, 'On Wilfred Beckerman's Critique of Sustainable Development'; Michael Jacobs, 'Sustainable Development, Capital Substitution and Humility: A Response to Beckerman'; and Henryk Skolimowski, 'In Defence of Sustainable Development'. These criticisms are answered by Beckerman in Environmental Values 4,2.

The 'Discussion' section of this issue contains the following responses to Wilfred Beckerman's article 'Sustainable Development: Is it a Useful Concept?' Environmental Values 3,3 (1994): 191-209. Herman Daly, 'On Wilfred Beckerman's Critique of Sustainable Development'; Michael Jacobs, 'Sustainable Development, Capital Substitution and Humility: A Response to Beckerman'; and Henryk Skolimowski, 'In Defence of Sustainable Development'. These criticisms are answered by Beckerman in Environmental Values 4,2.

The essay challenges the de facto dichotomy between the discipline of logic and the activity of social criticism, i.e., it provides an illustrated reminder to philosophers that the gulf between these two areas of philosophy is not quite as wide as our curriculum andspecialization designations tend to suggest. Social criticism plays some necessary roles in certain branches of logic, and the second-order accounting of the contents of these branches leads back to social criticism. These points suggest an adjusted conception of (...) logic that would, among other things, render phrases such as “applying logic to social criticism” as misleading since certain branches of logic would not even coherently exist apart from social criticism. The lead illustrations are the identification of basic, pervasive, and thought-impeding logical errors that have been missed by numerous logic texts, and the assessment of contemporary academic logic as properly a quest for communal sanity that lies caught between communal insanity and communal mendacity. (shrink)

I explore a distinction that is philosophically significant but rarely a cynosure. The distinction is betvveen fallacies and logical errors, and I approach it by advancing overlooked albeit deleterious logical errors that are not fallacies but that fall squarely within the purview of Critical Thinking if not also Informal Logic. One key claim to emerge is that these logical errors -- just as basic and thought-impeding as the fallacies -- demand that we take a hard look at what is and (...) what should be guiding our activity in teaching such courses. Another is that although philosophers appeal to the notion of logical error in their explications of fallacies, the former notion is anything but clear and indeed usually explained in terms of the latter. Yet another is that the distinction illustrates why the oft encountered “false premise or bad inference” account of how thinking can go bad is oversimplified. (shrink)

This review confirms Herman’s work as a praiseworthy contribution to East-West and comparative philosophical literature. Due credit is given to Herman for providing English readers with access to Buber’s commentary on, a personal translation of, the Chuang-Tzu; Herman’s insight into the later influence of I and Thou on Buber’s understanding of Chuang-Tzu and Taoism is also appropriately commended. In latter half of this review, constructive criticisms of Herman’s work are put forward, such as formatting inconsistencies, a (...) tendency toward verbosity and jargon, and a neglect of seemingly important hermeneutical issues. Such issues, seemingly substantive but neglected by Herman, are the influence of Buber’s prior familiarity with Hasidic teachings on his encounter with Chuang-Tzu, as well as the prevalence of Hasidic and Taoist thought in Buber’s conception of good and evil. (shrink)

This study investigates the determinants of paternal investment by birth fathers and stepfathers. Inclusive fitness theory predicts higher parental investment in birth children than stepchildren, and this has consistently been found in previous studies. Here we investigate whether paternal investment varies with childhood co-residence duration and differs between stepfathers and divorced birth fathers by comparing the investment of (1) stepfathers, (2) birth fathers who are separated from the child’s mother, and (3) birth fathers who still are in a relationship with (...) her. Path analysis was conducted using cross-sectional data from adolescents and younger adults (aged 17–19, 27–29, and 37–39 years) from the German Family Panel (pairfam), collected in 2010–2011 (_n_ = 8326). As proxies of paternal investment, we used financial and practical help, emotional support, intimacy, and emotional closeness, as reported by the children. We found that birth fathers who were still in a relationship with the mother invested the most, and stepfathers invested the least. Furthermore, the investment of both separated fathers and stepfathers increased with the duration of co-residence with the child. However, in the case of financial help and intimacy, the effect of childhood co-residence duration was stronger in stepfathers than in separated fathers. Our findings support inclusive fitness theory and mating effort theory in explaining social behavior and family dynamics in this population. Furthermore, social environment, such as childhood co-residence was associated with paternal investment. (shrink)

The role of Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs) in health research is well established. Ethics committees have the good of research participants in mind but they must also assess scientific merit including the design and conduct of studies. In this article the authors’ focus is on qualitative research method and the challenge that the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) poses for ethics committees when they assess proposals using the methods outlined in the National Statement.We set out (...) a process for judging the standard of qualitative research proposals and propose that qualitative health research can be assessed using a hierarchy designed for evaluating interview studies. We contrast well-designed studies with those that have design flaws in order to focus on the hallmarks of research merit in studies that use qualitative research methods. Finally, we show that our proposal is compatible with the National Statement.Ethics review provides an early opportunity to identify and redesign inadequate studies that will not contribute to our knowledge base. The challenge for members of ethics committees with little experience in qualitative studies is to be able to assess research excellence by assessing research merit in proposals, recognising the special design features of qualitative research methods. (shrink)

The classical notions of 'virtue' and 'leisure' offer excellent insights into the essentially moral nature of medical practice. This is especially evident in the understanding that professional caregiving has the potential to enhance the moral character as well as the moral awareness of the practitioner. Reflective awareness of the moral nature of the caregiving process can also contribute to coping with negative stress, which almost always has its origins in frustrations rooted in moral quandaries and evaluations. Understanding the process required (...) arises from implementation of caregiving in combination with deliberate, conscious development of spiritual awareness and reflection on moral meaning. (shrink)

Transcription is a fundamental cellular process and the first step in gene regulation. Although RNA polymerase (RNAP) is highly processive, in growing cells the progression of transcription can be hindered by obstacles on the DNA template, such as damaged DNA. The authors recent findings highlight a trade‐off between transcription fidelity and DNA break repair. While a lot of work has focused on the interaction between transcription and nucleotide excision repair, less is known about how transcription influences the repair of DNA (...) breaks. The authors suggest that when the cell experiences stress from DNA breaks, the control of RNAP processivity affects the balance between preserving transcription integrity and DNA repair. Here, how the conflict between transcription and DNA double‐strand break (DSB) repair threatens the integrity of both RNA and DNA are discussed. In reviewing this field, the authors speculate on cellular paradigms where this equilibrium is well sustained, and instances where the maintenance of transcription fidelity is favored over genome stability. (shrink)