En este artículo se sostiene que existe una primacía de la práctica y la acción sobre el conocimiento intelectual y la contemplación. Si esta tesis fuese falsa, no resulta comprensible por qué la prudencia y el hombre prudente son la virtud suprema y el modelo de la vida buena en Aristóteles. La cuestión inicial es 1) ¿Cómo entender la racionalidad del deseo o qué significa deseo razonado?, y esto implica dos cuestiones adicionales: 2) ¿Qué es el silogismo práctico y qué (...) relación tiene con la recta razón? y 3) ¿cuál es la relación entre el razonamiento práctico, la prudencia y el hombre prudente? Estas cuestiones son analizadas para establecer algunas de las semejanzas y diferencias entre el silogismo práctico , los diversos tipos de inferencias prácticas y otros tipos de razonamientos, tratando de mostrar la relación que existe entre la formación del carácter o modo de ser, la recta razón y el silogismo práctico. (shrink)

El silogismo práctico o razonamiento de la acción (EN VI, 12, 1144ª 31, “oigar sillogismoi tvn praktvn”) es presentado por muchos estudiososde la obra aristotélica como un esquema de explicación, que intenta darcuenta del movimiento que realiza el alma humana desde el apetito o deseopuro hasta la acción concreta. El punto de vista que aquí se argumentapuede ser presentado en dos tesis articuladas: 1) el razonamiento prácticono es un silogismo, comprende muchos más aspectos que son irreductiblesa la estructura formal de (...) un silogismo perfecto; 2) el silogismo práctico sebasa sobre todo en razonamientos retórico-dialécticos, bien sea un entimema,un paradigma, o un epiquerema; es un proceso discursivo de deliberacióncon silogismos imperfectos o cadenas de silogismos probables que orientanla deliberación a manera de sorites e inducciones retóricas. No se trata deuna demostración sobre cosas que son necesariamente y no pueden ser deotra forma, sino que se trata de lo posible y contingente, aquello que puedeo no puede ser, puesto que sólo se delibera sobre lo posible y esto se hacecon opiniones probables. Corresponde entonces a la retórica y la dialécticarazonar con este tipo de premisas. La regla de conducta en un silogismo práctico utiliza como premisa una opinión generalmente aceptada (a manerade hipótesis o conjetura), cuya aplicación al caso particular es contingente ysu resultado, la acción, también lo es, ya que puede ser o no realizada. Laacción como consecuencia del razonamiento desborda el marco lógico formaldel silogismo. (shrink)

Mi propósito central es evidenciar el rol fundamental de la noción de posibilidad en la consolidación y formulación del Pragmaticismo de Ch. S. Peirce. Ciertamente el Pragmaticismo es un intento de Peirce por establecer la diferencia específica de su propia concepción del pragmatismo y un esfuerzo por ofrecer una adecuada interpretación de su formulación inicial de la máxima pragmática. Los intentos de Peirce por caracterizar su concepción pragmática y sus reformulaciones e interpretaciones de la máxima pragmática se desarrollaron en el (...) tiempo durante un periodo de más de cuatro décadas y presentan una serie de variaciones. Intentaré ofrecer evidencia que permita ampliar la comprensión sobre el llamado “Peirce’s modal shift”, a fin de mostrar en qué sentido la noción de posibilidad real desarrollada por Peirce produjo una transformación en su concepción modal y cómo éste cambio se refleja en la formulación definitiva del Pragmaticismo. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta los resultados obtenidos a través del uso de herramientas informáticas (Provalis Research), también conocidas como CAQDAS (Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software), para el análisis de los escritos de Peirce, las bases estadísticas de una cronología para su último periodo intelectual y la justificación de una posible periodización del Pragmaticismo, además de la descripción de ciertos descubrimientos realizados en nuestro trabajo de archivo sobre los documentos y manuscritos originales de Peirce. Este trabajo es una parte de nuestra (...) investigación en la Universidad de Quebec en Montreal (UQAM) y la Biblioteca Houghton de la Universidad de Harvard. (shrink)

François Latraverse Profesor Asociado del Departamento de Filosofía de l’Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM). PhD. en Filosofía de la Sorbona (Paris I) y DEA en Linguística (Aix-en-Provence). Sus temas de interés son, entre otros, la Filosofía del Lenguaje, la Semiótica Filosófica, Historia de las Teorías del Signo, Pragmatismo, Wittgenstein y Peirce. En el año 1996 constituyó el Grupo de Investigación Peirce-Wittgenstein. Hace parte y dirige el Projet d’édition Peirce (UQAM), responsable de la producción del volumen 7 de los Writings (...) of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition (Indiana University Press), consagrado a los textos que C. S. Peirce elaboró para el Century Dictionary & Cyclopedia. Es autor de varias traducciones como: Fondements de la théorie des signes de Charles Morris (RS-SI), el Tractatus logico-philosophicus de L. Wittgenstein y Correspondance, rencontres, souvenirs de L. Wittgenstein et P. Engelmann (2010). Algunos de sus trabajos publicados son: La pragmatique: histoire et critique, Bruxelles, 1987; Peirce, Wittgenstein et le pragmatisme. Paris: L’Harmattan; «Signe, proposition, situation : éléments pour une lecture du Tractatus logico-philosophicus». Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. 56, no. 219, p. 125-140; (2000) «L’institution du signe: remarques sur la sémiotique de Port-Royal». RS/SI, vol. 20, no. 1-3; (1998) «Locke et le retournement sémantique», Sémiotiques, no. 14, p. 19-30. (shrink)

Arthur Schopenhauer was one of the greatest writers and German philosophers of the nineteenth century. His work influenced figures as diverse as Wagner, Freud and Nietzsche. Best known as a pessimist, he was one of the few philosophers read and admired by Wittgenstein. In this comprehensive introduction, Julian Young covers all the main aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Beginning with an overview of Schopenhauer's life and work, he introduces the central aspects of his metaphysics fundamental to understanding his work as (...) a whole: his philosophical idealism and debt to the philosophy of Kant; his attempt to answer the question of what the world is; his account of science; and in particular his idea that 'will' is the essence of all things. Julian Young then introduces and assesses Schopenhauer's aesthetics, which occupy a central place in his philosophy. He carefully examines Schopenhauer's theories of the sublime, artistic genius and music, before assessing his ethics of compassion, his arguments for pessimism and his account of 'salvation'. In the final chapter, he considers Schopenhauer's legacy and his influence on the thought of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, making this an ideal starting point for those coming to Schopenhauer for the first time. (shrink)

This is a clear and lucid account of Nietzsche's philosophy of art, combining exegesis, interpretation and criticism in a judicious balance. Julian Young argues that Nietzsche's thought about art can only be understood in the context of his wider philosophy. In particular, he discusses the dramatic changes in Nietzschean aesthetics against the background of the celebrated themes of the death of God, eternal recurrence, and the idea of the Übermensch. Young then divides Nietzsche's career and his philosophy of art (...) into four distinct phases, but suggests that these phases describe a circle. An attempt at world-affirmation is made in the central phases, but Nietzsche is predominantly influenced at the beginning and end of his career by a Schopenhauerian pessimism. At the beginning and end art is important because it 'redeems' us from life. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to compare disagreement in two different WhatsApp groups: one for members of the same family, and another for work colleagues. After the analysis, 427 instances of disagreement were identified in the family group, and 161 in the interactions between work colleagues. The most common strategy in both corpora is ‘Giving opposite opinions’. Nevertheless, the rest of the results present very significant dissimilarities, most notably the higher presence of disagreement in the family WhatsApp group. This (...) higher tolerance for disagreement is corroborated by the choice of linguistic strategies made. Whereas the family members tended to give emotional or personal reasons for disagreement, as well as negative comments on the topic, the colleagues preferred to express their disagreement with mitigating expressions and token agreement. Thus, in the corpora studied, the expression of disagreement seems to be less face threatening for family members than for work colleagues. (shrink)

Our recent article begins by describing a new technique for creating human–animal chimeras. This technique—known as interspecies blastocyst complementation—may enable us to generate human organs inside of human–pig chimeras. One central concern about farming human–pig chimeras for their organs is that their moral status would be uncertain and potentially significant. Our article is partly, but not only, about such concerns. At the heart of our paper are two broader questions. First, how should we treat beings of uncertain moral status? And (...) second, do our reasons for thinking that human–pig chimeras have uncertain moral status also provide reason to think regular, non-chimeric pigs have uncertain moral status? We thank Mike King, Christian Munthe, David Resnik, Per Sandin and Rob Streiffer for their commentaries on our paper, each of which serves to clarify the ethical issues at play. In this response, we want to respond to one criticism, acknowledge the force of several others, and point towards some philosophical work that remains to be done. First, the criticism. Resnik questions the parallel we draw between human–pig chimeras and regular pigs. In the case of regular pigs, there is currently a social consensus that it is morally acceptable to farm pigs for food. For Resnik, this consensus imposes a special burden on those who wish to argue against it; ‘one needs substantial evidence that the majority view is wrong’.1 Since an equivalent consensus does not exist in relation to human–pig chimeras, one might think that moral uncertainty concerns have less force in the context of meat production than human–animal chimera research. We do not think the social consensus in favour …. (shrink)

“La parte de los crímenes” plantea un reto inédito en cuanto al ejercicio de la narración de los feminicidios cometidos en México durante los años noventa del siglo pasado. Sobre ese fondo problemático, el presente artículo se despliega en dos partes. En la primera, siguiendo a Kant y a Lyotard, se propone mostrar la singularidad de la experiencia de lo sublime ocasionada por (el relato de) los crímenes. En la segunda, se abre la posibilidad de que una comprensión del hecho (...) en su conjunto pueda apelar a figuras de la razón, pero, en lugar de volver a Kant, lo resuelve apelando a algunos conceptos-idea de Giorgio Agamben que han venido a enriquecer el paisaje de la filosofía política contemporánea. (shrink)

In this paper I consider, in connection with dementia, two views of the person. One view of the person is derived from Locke and Parfit. This tends to regard the person solely in terms of psychological states and his/her connections. The second view of the person is derived from a variety of thinkers. I have called it the situated-embodied-agent view of the person. This view, I suggest, more readily squares with the reality of clinical experience. It regards the person as (...) embedded in a history and culture. The human person is also an embodied agent. I contend that this view encourages a more appropriate approach towards the ethical issues that arise in dementia and towards people with dementia. (shrink)

This paper argues that habits, just like beliefs, can guide intentional action. To do this, a variety of real-life cases where a person acts habitually but contrary to her beliefs are discussed. The cases serve as dissociations showing that intentional agency is possible without doxastic guidance. The upshot is a model for thinking about the rationality of habitual action and the rationalizing role that habits can play in it. The model highlights the role that our history and institutions play in (...) shaping what actions become habitual for us. (shrink)

Hasta ahora, las discusiones sobre el multiculturalismo se han presentado como una revisión progresista de los límites del liberalismo en cuanto a políticas de inclusión y reconocimiento. Este artículo plantea que la recepción del multiculturalismo en Latinoamérica, si no quiere ser puramente procedimental, puede plantearse como una deconstrucción de los conceptos de Sujeto y Estado. Para ello hemos adoptado el punto de vista de comunidades étnicamente diferenciadas (que Deleuze y Guattari han categorizado como máquinas territoriales), de modo que sus relaciones (...) de poder y sus procesos de subjetivación puedan ser vistos como expresión de lo intraestatal y lo preindividual, respectivamente. Aunque esta diferencia de perspectiva se plantea, básicamente, como un diferendo entre teorías, al final se sugieren criterios para un debate más amplio sobre las relaciones entre Estado y capitalismo alrededor de las condiciones de existencia de las sociedades premodernas. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo propongo revisar las aproximaciones de Mabel Moraña y Antonio Cornejo Polar al clivaje paradigmático entre las figuras de José María Arguedas y Mario Vargas Llosa en la cultura latinoamericana. En ese marco, tanto Cornejo Polar como Mabel Moraña desarrollan, en su propio lenguaje, preguntas por los dispositivos de poder y por las estrategias de resistencia que derivan de las relaciones entre literatura y máquinas sociales planteadas por Deleuze y Guattari, en una perspectiva decolonial. Este será el (...) contenido de la primera parte. En la segunda, quisiera seguir el derrotero de Cornejo Polar en la creación del concepto de 'subjetividad heterogénea', que condensa la experiencia de la migración interna en los países andinos y está presente con especial intensidad lingüística y performativa en El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo, la última obra de Arguedas. ABSTRACT This article intends to review the approaches of Mabel Moraña and Antonio Cornejo Polar to the paradigmatic cleavage between the figures of José María Arguedas and Mario Vargas Llosa in Latin American culture. Within this framework, both Cornejo Polar and Mabel Moraña develop, in their own language, questions about power devices and resistance strategies derived from relationships between literature and social machines raised by Deleuze and Guattari, from a decolonial perspective. This will be the content of the first part. In the second, it would like to follow Cornejo Polar's path in creating the concept of 'heterogeneous subjectivity', which condenses the experience of internal migration in the Andean countries and is present with particular linguistic and performance intensity in El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo, the last work of Arguedas. (shrink)

The recent tragic and widely publicised death of Jesse Gelsinger in a gene therapy trial has many important lessons for those engaged in the ethical review of research. One of the most important lessons is that ethics committees can give too much weight to ensuring informed consent and not enough attention to minimising the harm associated with participation in research. The first responsibility of ethics committees should be to ensure that the expected harm associated with participation is reasonable. Jesse was (...) an 18-year-old man with a mild form of ornithine transcarbamylase (OTC) deficiency, a disorder of nitrogen metabolism. His form of the disease could be controlled by diet and drug treatment. On September 13 1999 a team of researchers lead by James Wilson at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Human Gene Therapy (IHGT) injected 3.8 X 1013 adenovirus vector particles containing a gene to correct the genetic defect. He was the eighteenth and final patient in the trial. The virus particles were injected directly into the liver. He received the largest number of virus particles in a gene therapy trial.1 Four days later he was dead from what was probably an immune reaction to the virus vector. This was the first death directly attributed to gene therapy. It resulted in worldwide publicity, an independent investigation, the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) suspending all trials at the IHGT, an FDA, and a senate subcommittee investigation. At a special public meeting at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in December 1999, James Wilson, also the director of the IHGT, said they still did not understand fully what had gone wrong.2 Even though a massive dose had been used, only 1% of transferred genes reached the target cells. (None of the patients in the trial showed significant gene expression. Art …. (shrink)

This is a draft of my chapter on Negligence for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook in Moral Psychology. It discusses philosophical, psychological, and legal approaches to the attribution of culpability in cases of negligent wrongdoing.

The university that Alasdair MacIntyre defines as liberal is that which rejects the tradition as something pre-modern and with an impediment for the progress, including the pedagogic one. This university model has been extended in all instances, giving priority to the technical education in a pragmatic way. Thus, the global and sapiential vision of the university has been relegated. This last approach is the key for unifying the knowledge and to pass it onto other people and, therefore, to educate and (...) mold intellectually and morally. However, the professionalization of the philosophy and the criteria of the modern liberalism seem to dominate and inspire most universities in the present day. This situation has plainly shown an inability to become aware of their incompetence to properly educate professors and students alike, in a sapiential and moral manner, threfore deceiving themselves with a naive rhetoric. (shrink)

Introduction -- The type/token theory introduced -- Motivating the type/token theory : repeatability -- Nominalist approaches to the ontology of music -- Musical anti-realism -- The type/token theory elaborated -- Types I : abstract, unstructured, unchanging -- Types introduced and nominalism repelled -- Types as abstracta -- Types as unstructured entities -- Types as fixed and unchanging -- Types II : platonism -- Introduction : eternal existence and timelessness -- Types and properties -- The eternal existence of properties reconsidered -- (...) Types and patterns -- Defending the type/token theory I -- Unstructuredness and analogical predication -- Musical works as fixed and unchanging -- Abstractness and audibility (again) -- Works and interpretations -- Conclusion and resumé -- Defending the type/token theory II : musical platonism -- Platonism it is : replies to Anderson and Levinson -- The existence conditions of works of music -- Composition as creative discovery -- The nature of the compositional process : replies to objections -- Composition and aesthetic appraisal : a reply to Levinson -- Composition and aesthetic appraisal : understanding, interpretation, and correctness -- Musical works as continuants : a theory rejected -- A theory introduced -- Explicating and motivating the continuant view -- The continuant view and repeatability -- Further objections to the continuant view -- Musical works as compositional actions : a critique -- Currie's action-type hypothesis -- Davies's performance theory -- Sonicism I : against instrumentalism -- Sonicism introduced -- Sonicism motivated : moderate empiricism -- Instrumentation : timbral sonicism introduced -- Scores -- Instrumentation, artistic properties, and aesthetic content -- Levinson's rejoinder -- Sonicism II : against contextualism -- Introduction : formulating contextualism -- Contextualist ontological proposals -- Levinson's doppelgänger thought-experiments -- Artistic, representational, and object-directed expressive properties -- Aesthetic and non-object-directed expressive properties -- Conclusion : the place of context. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of moral responsibility are standardly framed by two platitudes. According to them, blame requires the presence of a moral defect in the agent and the absence of excuses. In this chapter, this kind of approach is challenged. It is argued that (a) people sometimes violate moral norms due to performance mistakes, (b) it often appears reasonable to hold them responsible for it, and (c) their mistakes cannot be traced to their moral qualities or to the presence of excuses. (...) In the end, the implications for discussions of moral responsibility are discussed. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to lay out an approach to addressing the problem of privacy protection in the global digital environment based on the importance that information has to improve users’ informational self-determination. Following this reasoning, this paper focuses on the suitable way to provide user with the correct amount of information they may need to maintain a desirable grade of autonomy as far as their privacy protection is concerned and decide whether or not to put their (...) personal data on the internet. Design/methodology/approach The authors arrive at this point in their analysis by qualitative discourse analysis of the most relevant scientific papers and dossiers relating to privacy protection. Findings The goal of this paper is twofold. The first is to illustrate the importance of privacy by default and informed consent working together to protect information and communication technology users’ privacy. The second goal is to develop a suitable way to administrate the mentioned “informed consent” to users. Originality/value To fulfil this purpose, the authors present a new concept of informed consent: active “informed consent” or “Opt-in” model by layers. “Opt-in” regimens have already been used with cookies but never with 2.0 applications, as, for instance, social network sites. (shrink)

In this article, I examine recent debates concerning the existence and the nature of basic actions. The discussion is structured around four theses, with which Arthur Danto introduced basic actions to contemporary theorists. The theses concern (i) the relationship between agency and causality, (ii) the distinction between basic and complex actions, (iii) the regress argument for basic actions, and (iv) the structure of practical knowledge in the light of these actions.

This volume brings together work in free will, ethics, metaethics, feminist theory, disability studies, experimental philosophy, and psychology. The theme for both the workshop and these papers was “Non-Ideal Agency and Responsibility,” and in these essays, our authors take a number of different and creative angles on this theme. Roughly half of the essays fall under the rubric of non-ideal agency. They discuss ways in which our agency is impacted by inherent psychological limitations, by the social contexts in which we (...) act, or by different ways in which our abilities can break down. The other half fall under the rubric of non-ideal responsibility. They discuss both the modes by which we assess imperfect exercises of our agency and the ways in which common forms of assessment are themselves imperfect. (shrink)

This paper defends a version of the Simple View, the claim that someone intentionally φs only if the person intends to φ. To do this, I raise a problem for Bratman’s classic argument (1984, 1987) against it. The problem brings into focus an evaluative dimension behind the View, whose recognition allows for an improved version of it. With this improved version, I then go on to answer other criticisms that have been raised to it.

The functions and expression pattern of urea cycle enzymes have undergone considerable changes during the course of evolution. Sequence analyses shows that urea cycle enzymes from mammals are homologous to microbial enzymes of the arginine‐metabolic pathway. Recently, an unexpected relationship was found between argininosuccinate lyase (EC 4.3.2.1), the fourth enzyme of the cycle, and δ‐crystallin, a lens structural protein of birds and reptiles.

Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction is the first systematic textbook in the philosophy of economics. It introduces the epistemological, metaphysical and ethical problems that arise in economics, and presents detailed discussions of the solutions that have been offered. Throughout, philosophical issues are illustrated by and analysed in the context of concrete cases drawn from contemporary economics, the history of economic ideas, and actual economic events. This demonstrates the relevance of philosophy of economics both for the science of economics and (...) for the economy. This text will provide an excellent introduction to the philosophy of economics for students and interested general readers alike. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre: narrative introduction to his work In the wake of the publication of the last book of the British philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative, this work proposes a way to understand his bibliographical production in the context of the narrative of his life and his intellectual career. It is elaborated a periodization of the itinerary of MacIntyre, based on the references that the author himself has made of (...) his academic life and in the proposals of several scholars of his thought. It is concluded that the narrative examination of MacIntyre’s work reveals that his philosophical project is basically marked by Aristotle and Aquinas, whose thought helped our author a solid proposal on the main issues of moral philosophy and philosophy of religion. This work is conceived as introductory because it focuses only on MacIntyre’s books, but it’s expected to serve as a solid basis for a thorough critical study —especially from a chronological perspective— of his entire work, which includes chapters of books, papers, interviews, among others. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for explaining the subjective character of pain experience in terms of what we will call ‘embodied predictive processing’. The predictive processing (PP) theory is a family of views that take perception, action, emotion and cognition to all work together in the service of prediction error minimisation. In this paper we propose an embodied perspective on the PP theory we call the ‘embodied predictive processing (EPP) theory. The EPP theory proposes to explain pain (...) in terms of processes distributed across the whole body. The prediction error minimising system that generates pain experience comprises the immune system, the endocrine system, and the autonomic system in continuous causal interaction with pathways spread across the whole neural axis. We will argue that these systems function in a coordinated and coherent manner as a single complex adaptive system to maintain homeostasis. This system, which we refer to as the neural-endocrine-immune (NEI) system, maintains homeostasis through the process of prediction error minimisation. We go on to propose a view of the NEI ensemble as a multiscale nesting of Markov blankets that integrates the smallest scale of the cell to the largest scale of the embodied person in pain. We set out to show how the EPP theory can make sense of how pain experience could be neurobiologically constituted. We take it to be a constraint on the adequacy of a scientific explanation of subjectivity of pain experience that it makes it intelligible how pain can simultaneously be a local sensing of the body, and, at the same time, a more global, all-encompassing attitude towards the environment. Our aim in what follows is to show how the EPP theory can meet this constraint. (shrink)

What is the correct concept behind measures of inflation? Does money cause business activity or is it the other way around? Shall we stimulate growth by raising aggregate demand or rather by lowering taxes and thereby providing incentives to produce? Policy-relevant questions such as these are of immediate and obvious importance to the welfare of societies. The standard approach in dealing with them is to build a model, based on economic theory, answer the question for the model world and then (...) apply the results to economic phenomena outside. Data come in, if at all, only in testing a limited number of the model's consequences. Despite some critical voices, economic methodology too has by and large subscribed to a "theory first" approach to applied economics. Error in Economics systematically develops an alternative to the theory-based orthodoxy. It places the methodical study of evidence at the centre of the scientific enterprise and thus provides a foundation for a methodology of evidence-based economics. But the book does not stop at the truism that claims should be based on the best available evidence. Rather, detailed studies in the areas of measurement, causal inference and policy analysis show what it means for a claim to be evidence-based in the context of a concrete case. The examples discussed concern topics as diverse as consumer price indices, radio spectrum auctions, the transmission mechanism, natural experiments on minimum wages and the evaluation of counterfactuals for policy. Error in Economics is essential reading for economic methodologists, philosophers of science and anyone interested in how claims about socio-economic matters are validated. (shrink)