In Jens Clausen & Neil Levy (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer. pp. 253-272 (2015)

John M. Doris
Washington University in St. Louis
Santiago Amaya
University of the Andes
Philosophical accounts of moral responsibility are standardly framed by two platitudes. According to them, blame requires the presence of a moral defect in the agent and the absence of excuses. In this chapter, this kind of approach is challenged. It is argued that (a) people sometimes violate moral norms due to performance mistakes, (b) it often appears reasonable to hold them responsible for it, and (c) their mistakes cannot be traced to their moral qualities or to the presence of excuses. In the end, the implications for discussions of moral responsibility are discussed.
Keywords Moral Responsibility  Performance Mistakes  Situationism  Excuses  Reason-Responsiveness
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.Noam Chomsky - 1965 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Vigilance and Control.Samuel Murray & Manuel Vargas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):825-843.
Responsibility and Vigilance.Samuel Murray - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):507-527.
Out of Habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.
Minding Negligence.Craig K. Agule - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-21.
The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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