Results for 'weighted voting'

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  1. The Perversity of Weighted Voting.Daniel Wodak - forthcoming - Journal of Politics.
    Weighted voting involves weighting representatives’ votes by the populations that they represent. Such systems have been adopted in some legislative bodies as a remedy for malapportionment, and are sometimes used to elect candidates for the executive branch of government. But they receive little attention. This note observes the neglected vices of weighted voting systems: they violate intuitive conditions of monotonicity and participation. These vices count significantly against the use of weighted voting, and reflecting on (...)
     
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  2.  10
    Too old to vote? A democratic analysis of age-weighted voting.Andrei Poama & Alexandru Volacu - 2023 - European Journal of Political Theory 22 (4):565-586.
    Are there any prima facie reasons that democracies might have for disenfranchising older citizens? This question reflects increasingly salient, but often incompletely theorized complaints that members of democratic publics advance about older citizens’ electoral influence. Rather than rejecting these complaints out of hand, we explore whether, suitably reconstructed, they withstand democratic scrutiny. More specifically, we examine whether the account of political equality that seems to most fittingly capture the logic of these complaints – namely, equal opportunity of political influence over (...)
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  3.  5
    On anonymous and weighted voting systems.Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (4):477-491.
    Many bodies around the world make their decisions through voting systems in which voters have several options and the collective result also has several options. Many of these voting systems are anonymous, i.e., all voters have an identical role in voting. Anonymous simple voting games, a binary vote for voters and a binary collective decision, can be represented by an easy weighted game, i.e., by means of a quota and an identical weight for the voters. (...)
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    Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment.Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki & Naoki Watanabe - 2017 - Theory and Decision 83 (1):131-153.
    By employing binary committee choice problems, this paper investigates how varying or eliminating feedback about payoffs affects: subjects’ learning about the underlying relationship between their nominal voting weights and their expected payoffs in weighted voting games; the transfer of acquired learning from one committee choice problem to a similar but different problem. In the experiment, subjects choose to join one of two committees and obtain a payoff stochastically determined by a voting theory. We found that: subjects (...)
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  5.  2
    Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games.Michael Zuckerman, Piotr Faliszewski, Yoram Bachrach & Edith Elkind - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence 180:1-19.
  6. Differential Voting Weights and Relational Egalitarianism.Andreas Bengtson - 2020 - Political Studies 68 (4):1054-1070.
    Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a “one-person, one-vote” scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as moral, epistemic, social, and empirical equals in a scheme with differential (...)
     
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  7.  4
    The All Affected Principle, and the weighting of votes.Kim Angell & Robert Huseby - 2020 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (4):366-381.
    In this article we defend the view that, on the All Affected Principle of voting rights, the weight of a person’s vote on a decision should be determined by and only by the degree to which that dec...
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  8.  30
    Plural voting and political equality: A thought experiment in democratic theory.Trevor Latimer - 2018 - European Journal of Political Theory 17 (1):1474885115591344.
    I demonstrate that a set of well-known objections defeat John Stuart Mill’s plural voting proposal, but do not defeat plural voting as such. I adopt the following as a working definition of political equality: a voting system is egalitarian if and only if departures from a baseline of equally weighted votes are normatively permissible. I develop an alternative proposal, called procedural plural voting, which allocates plural votes procedurally, via the free choices of the electorate, rather (...)
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  9. Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century.Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):286-306.
    Recent political developments cast doubt on the wisdom of democratic decision-making. Brexit, the Colombian people's (initial) rejection of peace with the FARC, and the election of Donald Trump suggest that the time is right to explore alternatives to democracy. In this essay, I describe and defend the epistocratic system of government which is, given current theoretical and empirical knowledge, most likely to produce optimal political outcomes—or at least better outcomes than democracy produces. To wit, we should expand the suffrage as (...)
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  10. The Voting Rights of Senior Citizens: Should All Votes Count the Same?Andreas Bengtson & Andreas Albertsen - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    In 1970, Stewart advocated disenfranchising everyone reaching retirement age or age 70, whichever was earlier. The question of whether senior citizens should be disenfranchised has recently come to the fore due to votes on issues such as Brexit and climate change. Indeed, there is a growing literature which argues that we should increase the voting power of non-senior citizens relative to senior citizens, for reasons having to do with intergenerational justice. Thus, it seems that there are reasons of justice (...)
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  11.  13
    Should We Increase Young People’s Voting Power?Kim Angell - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.
    This paper argues that democratic collectives have reason to increase the voting power of their younger members. It first presents an intuitive case for weighted voting in general, before drawing support from a prominent principle of democratic inclusion – the all-affected principle. On a plausible understanding of that principle, a decision may affect people to varying degrees, and this variation should be reflected in the strength of their say. The paper then argues that exposure time to a (...)
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  12.  12
    Justice, Symmetry, and Voting Rights Ceilings.Alexandru Volacu - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):643-658.
    In this article I aim to offer a first critical assessment of the most prominent arguments in favour of restricting the voting rights of senior citizens. The first argument discussed, most thoroughly articulated by van Parijs, maintains that intergenerational justice would be improved under schemes which restrict the voting rights of senior citizens, thereby diminishing their overall electoral weight. The second argument, reconstructed from Lau's defence of child enfranchisement, maintains that the cognitive decline associated with the process of (...)
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  13.  15
    Achievable Hierarchies In Voting Games.Jane Friedman, Lynn Mcgrath & Cameron Parker - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (4):305-318.
    Previous work by Diffo Lambo and Moulen [Theory and Decision 53, 313–325 (2002)] and Felsenthal and Machover [The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (1998)], shows that all swap preserving measures of voting power are ordinally equivalent on any swap robust simple voting game. Swap preserving measures include the Banzhaf, the Shapley–Shubik and other commonly used measures of a priori voting power. In this paper, we completely characterize the achievable hierarchies for any such measure (...)
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  14.  11
    Vote Buying and Voter Preferences.James Stacey Taylor - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):107-124.
    A common criticism of plurality voting is that it fails to reflect the degree of intensity with which voters prefer the candidate or policy that they vote for. To rectify this, many critics of plurality voting have argued that vote buying should be allowed. Persons with more intense preferences for a candidate could buy votes from persons with less intense preferences for the opposing candidate and then cast them for the candidate that they intensely support. This paper argues (...)
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  15.  96
    A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Votes of People with Short Life Expectancy From Being a Long-Term Burden to Their Country.Ognjen Arandjelović - 2023 - Social Sciences 12 (3):173.
    In response to the growing social discontent at what is perceived as generational injustice, due to younger generations of voters facing long-term negative consequences from issues disproportionately decided by the votes of older generations of voters, there have been suggestions to introduce an upper age voting threshold. These have been all but universally dismissed as offensive and contrary to basic democratic values. In the present article, I show that the idea is in fact entirely consonant with present-day democratic practices (...)
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  16.  8
    The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power.Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover & William Zwicker - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (1):83-116.
    If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is (...)
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  17. Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2013 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result (...)
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  18.  9
    Postulates and Paradoxes of Relative Voting Power - A Critical Re-Appraisal.Dan S. Felsenthal - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (2):195-229.
  19.  13
    Radical Democratic Inclusion: Why We Should Lower the Voting Age to 12.Martin O'Neill - 2022 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 91:185-212.
    Democratic societies such as the United Kingdom have come to fail their young citizens, often sacrificing their interests in a political process that gives much greater weight to the preferences and interests of older citizens. Against this background of intergenerational injustice, this article presents the case for a shift in the political system in the direction of radical democratic inclusion of younger citizens, through reducing the voting age to 12. This change in the voting age can be justified (...)
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  20.  15
    A (mainly epistemic) case for multiple-vote majority rule.Richard Bradley & Christopher Thompson - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):63-79.
    Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your (...)
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  21.  5
    Independent collective identity functions as voting rules.José Carlos R. Alcantud & Annick Laruelle - 2020 - Theory and Decision 89 (1):107-119.
    In this paper we study collective identity functions that deal with formation of clubs. Usually the choice offered to individuals is to cast a vote in favor of qualification or not, and the final outcome is qualification or non-qualification. In this context we show that independent collective identity functions are naturally characterized by voting rules, and in particular, consent rules can be represented by one single collection of weighted majorities. In addition, we consider the extended model where voters (...)
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  22.  2
    Class Is Not Dead—It Has Been Buried Alive: Class Voting and Cultural Voting in Postwar Western Societies.Dick Houtman, Peter Achterberg & Jeroen van der Waal - 2007 - Politics and Society 35 (3):403-426.
    By means of a reanalysis of the most relevant data source—the International Social Mobility and Politics File—this article criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase in crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences rather than a decline in class voting, proves responsible for the decline of traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. (...)
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  23.  5
    Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games.Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Joël Moulen - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):313-325.
    In this paper, we are concerned with the preorderings (SS) and (BC) induced in the set of players of a simple game by the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf–Coleman's indices, respectively. Our main result is a generalization of Tomiyama's 1987 result on ordinal power equivalence in simple games; more precisely, we obtain a characterization of the simple games for which the (SS) and the (BC) preorderings coincide with the desirability preordering (T), a concept introduced by Isbell (1958), and recently reconsidered by (...)
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  24.  3
    The probability of majority inversion in a two-stage voting system with three states.Serguei Kaniovski & Alexander Zaigraev - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (4):525-546.
    Two-stage voting is prone to majority inversions, a situation in which the outcome of an election is not backed by a majority of popular votes. We study the probability of majority inversion in a model with two candidates, three states and uniformly distributed fractions of supporters for each candidate. The model encompasses equal or distinct population sizes, with equal, population-based or arbitrary voting weights in the second stage. We prove that, when no state can dictate the outcome of (...)
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  25.  12
    Cognitive Impairment and the Right to Vote: A Strategic Approach.Linda Barclay - 2013 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2):146-159.
    Most democratic countries either limit or deny altogether voting rights for people with cognitive impairments or mental health conditions. Against this weight of legal and practical exclusion, disability advocacy and developments in international human rights law increasingly push in the direction of full voting rights for people with cognitive impairments. Particularly influential has been the adoption by the UN of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2007. Article 29 declares that states must ‘ensure that (...)
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  26.  5
    A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed.Ines Lindner - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (4):495-518.
    In general, analyses of voting power are performed through the notion of a simple voting game (SVG) in which every voter can choose between two options: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Felsenthal and Machover [Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1997), International Journal of Game Theory 26, 335–351.] introduced the concept of ternary voting games (TVGs) which recognizes abstention alongside. They derive appropriate generalizations of the Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices in TVGs. Braham and Steffen [Braham, M. and Steffen, F. (2002), (...)
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  27. The Democratic Imperative to Make Margins Matter.Daniel Wodak - forthcoming - Maryland Law Review.
    Many commentators lament that American democracy is in crisis. It is becoming a system of minority rule, wherein a party with a minority of the nationwide vote can control the national government. Partisan gerrymandering in the House of Representatives fuels this crisis, as does the equal representation of small and large states in the Senate. But altering these features of the legislature would not end minority rule. Indeed, it has long been held that majority rule cannot be guaranteed within any (...)
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  28.  9
    Simple Majority Achievable Hierarchies.Dwight Bean, Jane Friedman & Cameron Parker - 2008 - Theory and Decision 65 (4):285-302.
    We completely characterize the simple majority weighted voting game achievable hierarchies, and, in doing so, show that a problem about representative government, noted by J. Banzhaf [Rutgers Law Review 58, 317–343 (1965)] cannot be resolved using the simple majority quota. We also demonstrate that all hierarchies achievable by any quota can be achieved if the simple majority quota is simply incremented by one.
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  29.  13
    L.S. Penrose's limit theorem : proof of some special cases.Ines Lindner & Moshé Machover - unknown
    LS Penrose was the first to propose a measure of voting power (which later came to be known as ‘the [absolute] Banzhaf index’). His limit theorem – which is implicit in Penrose (1952) and for which he gave no rigorous proof – says that, in simple weighted voting games, if the number of voters increases indefinitely while the quota is pegged at half the total weight, then – under certain conditions – the ratio between the voting (...)
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  30.  14
    L S Penrose's limit theorem: tests by simulation.Pao-Li Chang, Vincent C. H. Chua & Moshé Machover - unknown
    L S Penrose’s Limit Theorem – which is implicit in Penrose [7, p. 72] and for which he gave no rigorous proof – says that, in simple weighted voting games, if the number of voters increases indefinitely and the relative quota is pegged, then – under certain conditions – the ratio between the voting powers of any two voters converges to the ratio between their weights. Lindner and Machover [4] prove some special cases of Penrose’s Limit Theorem. (...)
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  31.  3
    Combining Heterogeneous Classifiers for Word-Sense Disambiguation.Dan Klein, Christopher D. Manning & Kristina Toutanova - unknown
    This paper discusses ensembles of simple but heterogeneous classifiers for word-sense disambiguation, examining the Stanford-CS224N system entered in the SENSEVAL-2 English lexical sample task. First-order classifiers are combined by a second-order classifier, which variously uses majority voting, weighted voting, or a maximum entropy model. While individual first-order classifiers perform comparably to middle-scoring teams’ systems, the combination achieves high performance. We discuss trade-offs and empirical performance. Finally, we present an analysis of the combination, examining how ensemble performance depends (...)
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  32.  7
    Effort Games and the Price of Myopia.Yoram Bachrach, Michael Zuckerman & Jeffrey S. Rosenschein - 2009 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4):377-396.
    We consider Effort Games, a game-theoretic model of cooperation in open environments, which is a variant of the principal-agent problem from economic theory. In our multiagent domain, a common project depends on various tasks; carrying out certain subsets of the tasks completes the project successfully, while carrying out other subsets does not. The probability of carrying out a task is higher when the agent in charge of it exerts effort, at a certain cost for that agent. A central authority, called (...)
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  33.  5
    Monotonicity of power in games with a priori unions.J. M. Alonso-Meijide, C. Bowles, M. J. Holler & S. Napel - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (1):17-37.
    Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some given voting weight as to any player of the same game with smaller weight. This local monotonicity and a related global property however are frequently and for good reasons violated when indices take account of a priori unions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity). This paper introduces adaptations of the conventional monotonicity notions that are suitable for voting games (...)
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  34.  12
    Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives.Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (4):581-608.
    We consider a decision board with representatives who vote on proposals on behalf of their constituencies. We look for decision rules that realize utilitarian and (welfarist) egalitarian ideals. We set up a simple model and obtain roughly the following results. If the interests of people from the same constituency are uncorrelated, then a weighted rule with square root weights does best in terms of both ideals. If there are perfect correlations, then the utilitarian ideal requires proportional weights, whereas the (...)
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  35.  44
    Factions in Rousseau's du contrat social and federal representation.Luc Bovens & Claus Beisbart - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):12–20.
    Consider the following two seemingly unrelated questions. First, why does Rousseau (1993 [1762]) believe that the formation of factions or partial associations is not conducive to the general will in Du Contrat Social, II, 3? Second, why do federal assemblies typically strive for some form of degressive proportionality, i.e. a balance between equal and proportional representation, for the countries in the federation? We will show that there is a surprising connection between these questions. We turn to our first question. It (...)
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  36.  25
    Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach.Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):151-162.
    Many voting rules and, in particular, the plurality rule and Condorcet-consistent voting rules satisfy the simple-majority decisiveness property. The problem implied by such decisiveness, namely, the universal disregard of the preferences of the minority, can be ameliorated by applying unbiased scoring rules such as the classical Borda rule, but such amelioration has a price; it implies erosion in the implementation of the widely accepted majority principle . Furthermore, the problems of majority decisiveness and of the erosion in the (...)
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  37.  72
    General representation of epistemically optimal procedures.Franz Dietrich - 2006 - Social Choice and Welfare 2 (26):263-283.
    Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log-likelihood-ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom (Epistemic Monotonicity) which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not (...)
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  38.  2
    No-show paradox in Slovak party-list proportional system.Vladimír Dančišin - 2017 - Human Affairs 27 (1):15-21.
    The phenomenon of the paradoxes of the largest remainders methods has been studied by numerous authors. Nevertheless, the examples presented in their studies do not deal with the case where a party’s possible additional votes can directly lead to a loss in the party’s number of representatives. This paradox, which can be called the no-show apportionment paradox, has not previously been mentioned in the literature. It is based on the assumption that a voter’s favourite party may lose a seat if (...)
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  39. Numbers without aggregation.Tim Henning - 2023 - Noûs.
    Suppose we can save either a larger group of persons or a distinct, smaller group from some harm. Many people think that, all else equal, we ought to save the greater number. This article defends this view (with qualifications). But unlike earlier theories, it does not rely on the idea that several people's interests or claims receive greater aggregate weight. The argument starts from the idea that due to their stakes, the affected people have claims to have a say in (...)
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  40.  12
    Normative Uncertainty and Social Choice.Christian Tarsney - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1285-1308.
    In ‘Normative Uncertainty as a Voting Problem’, William MacAskill argues that positive credence in ordinal-structured or intertheoretically incomparable normative theories does not prevent an agent from rationally accounting for her normative uncertainties in practical deliberation. Rather, such an agent can aggregate the theories in which she has positive credence by methods borrowed from voting theory—specifically, MacAskill suggests, by a kind of weighted Borda count. The appeal to voting methods opens up a promising new avenue for theories (...)
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  41.  35
    Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation.Stephan Hartmann, Gabriella Pigozzi & Jan Sprenger - 2007 - Journal for Logic and Computation 20:603--617.
    The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the \textit{discursive dilemma}. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, we address the question of how (...)
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  42.  11
    Participation: The right of rights.Jeremy Waldron - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (3):307–337.
    This paper examines the role of political participation in a theory of rights. If political participation is a right, how does it stand in relation to other rights about which the participants may be making political decisions? Suppose a majority of citizens vote in favour of some limit on (say) the free exercise of religion. If their decision is allowed to stand, does that mean that we are giving more weight to the right to participate than to the right to (...)
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  43.  4
    A Utilitarian Assessment of Alternative Decision Rules in the Council of Ministers.Claus Beisbart, Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2005 - European Union Politics 6 (4):395-419.
    We develop a utilitarian framework to assess different decision rules for the European Council of Ministers. The proposals to be decided on are conceptualized as utility vectors and a probability distribution is assumed over the utilities. We first show what decision rules yield the highest expected utilities for different means of the probability distri- bution. For proposals with high mean utility, simple bench- mark rules (such as majority voting with proportional weights) tend to outperform rules that have been proposed (...)
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  44.  82
    Bounded Mirroring. Joint action and group membership in political theory and cognitive neuroscience.Machiel Keestra - 2012 - In Frank Vandervalk (ed.), Thinking about the Body Politic: Essays on Neuroscience and Political Theory. Routledge. pp. 222--249.
    A crucial socio-political challenge for our age is how to rede!ne or extend group membership in such a way that it adequately responds to phenomena related to globalization like the prevalence of migration, the transformation of family and social networks, and changes in the position of the nation state. Two centuries ago Immanuel Kant assumed that international connectedness between humans would inevitably lead to the realization of world citizen rights. Nonetheless, globalization does not just foster cosmopolitanism but simultaneously yields the (...)
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  45.  7
    Representation and Waldron's Objection to Judicial Review.Dimitrios Kyritsis - 2006 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 (4):733-751.
    Jeremy Waldron objects to judicial review of legislation on the ground that it effectively accords the views of a few judges ‘superior voting weight’ to those of ordinary citizens. This objection overlooks that representative government does the same. This article explores the concept of political representation and argues that delegates may be institutionally bound to heed the convictions of their constituents, but they are not their proxies. Rather, they are best viewed as their trustees. They ought to decide according (...)
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  46.  1
    Ethics briefings.Veronica English, Gillian Romano-Critchley, Julian Sheather & Ann Somerville - 2002 - Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (2):127-128.
    Two recent announcements have again triggered the perennial debate about altruism versus commercialism. In Israel, the health minister has reversed a ban on the import of ova, which will allow people to pay for human eggs, imported primarily from Romania. This is the first time the Israeli government has allowed the purchase of body tissue or parts for medical use. The decision was taken in response to a High Court challenge to the 6 month old prohibition, by women who were (...)
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  47.  13
    Financial Conflicts of Interest at FDA Drug Advisory Committee Meetings.Michael J. Hayes & Vinay Prasad - 2018 - Hastings Center Report 48 (2):10-13.
    The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's drug advisory committees provide expert assessments of the safety and efficacy of new therapies considered for approval. A committee hears from a variety of speakers, from six groups, including voting members of the committee, FDA staff members, employees of the pharmaceutical company seeking approval of a therapy, patient and consumer representatives, expert speakers invited by the company, and public participants. The committees convene at the request of the FDA when the risks and harms (...)
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  48. Grande Sertão: Veredas by João Guimarães Rosa.Felipe W. Martinez, Nancy Fumero & Ben Segal - 2013 - Continent 3 (1):27-43.
    INTRODUCTION BY NANCY FUMERO What is a translation that stalls comprehension? That, when read, parsed, obfuscates comprehension through any language – English, Portuguese. It is inevitable that readers expect fidelity from translations. That language mirror with a sort of precision that enables the reader to become of another location, condition, to grasp in English in a similar vein as readers of Portuguese might from João Guimarães Rosa’s GRANDE SERTÃO: VEREDAS. There is the expectation that translations enable mobility. That what was (...)
     
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    Intensity of preference and related uncertainty in non-compensatory aggregation rules.Giuseppe Munda - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):649-669.
    Non-compensatory aggregation rules are applied in a variety of problems such as voting theory, multi-criteria analysis, composite indicators, web ranking algorithms and so on. A major open problem is the fact that non-compensability implies the analytical cost of loosing all available information about intensity of preference, i.e. if some variables are measured on interval or ratio scales, they have to be treated as measured on an ordinal scale. Here this problem has been tackled in its most general formulation, that (...)
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    Equality and Democracy.Thom Brooks - 2007 - Ethical Perspectives 14 (1):3-12.
    In a recent article, Thomas Christiano defends the intrinsic justice of democracy grounded in the principle of equal consideration of interests. Each citizen is entitled to a single vote, equal in weight to all other citizens. The problem with this picture is that all citizens must meet a threshold of minimal competence. -/- My argument is that Christiano is wrong to claim a minimum threshold of competency is fully consistent with the principle of equality. While standards of minimal competency may (...)
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