In A Theory of Justice John Rawls proposes that the two principles of justice should be realized through a four-stage sequence of institutional action that starts with a constitution agreed upon by delegates to a constitutional convention. A largely overlooked aspect of this proposal is that delegates are taken to hold conflicting opinions about justice. Their disagreement is one of the factors that determine their institutional choices. This paper employs Bernard Williams’s theory of the political value of liberty to explain (...) and vindicate the role assigned to disagreement at the constitutional convention. Constitutional norms ought to be sensitive to the fact that the functioning of a political order, even one suitably ordered by the most reasonable conception of justice, inevitably involves loss of a precious liberty; the factoring of disagreement into the constitutional convention can fruitfully be understood as a way of modelling this requirement. This exegetical exercise enriches our understanding of the point of constitutions. At the same time it suggests that Rawls may not be as guilty of the cardinal sin of moralism that Williams famously accused him of. (shrink)

Jeremy Waldron objects to judicial review of legislation on the ground that it effectively accords the views of a few judges ‘superior voting weight’ to those of ordinary citizens. This objection overlooks that representative government does the same. This article explores the concept of political representation and argues that delegates may be institutionally bound to heed the convictions of their constituents, but they are not their proxies. Rather, they are best viewed as their trustees. They ought to decide according to (...) what they think is in their constituents’ interest. In this sense, a strong element of independent judgment is involved in their institutional role. So, if we have no problem with assigning their views superior voting weight, it should not be thought particularly objectionable to give judges the same power. What is more, once we acknowledge the independence they enjoy, the question arises whether and by what institutional means we ought to constrain and check their power. The judiciary is well suited effectively to carry out this supervisory function, because it is immune from political pressure by the legislature that would reduce it to its instrument. Hence, in some cases the institution of judicial review is morally justified. (shrink)

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto authority's power) in the identification (...) of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority. (shrink)

According to legal conventionalism, a legal system cannot come into existence and be sustained over time unless legal officials see themselves as working together with their fellow participants in the practice of law for the purpose of achieving coordination or alternatively realizing a joint endeavor. This thesis has traditionally been thought to support a positivist understanding of law. The paper challenges this piece of common wisdom. It aims to establish that the idea of cooperation among legal officials that figures so (...) prominently in conventionalist accounts of law may in a suitable form be appropriated by a robust version of natural-law theory. It claims that participants in the practice of law may be understood as having reasons of political morality to heed the acts and decisions of their fellow participants and calibrate their own behavior accordingly. It takes the value of democracy to illustrate the point. Democracy furnishes a reason for courts to give effect to democratically reached decisions rather than work out on their own how best to adjudicate disputes before them. (shrink)