The Spectrum of Consciousness (1977)--one of the founding texts of transpersonal psychology--introduces the full-spectrum model, showing how the psychological systems of the West can be integrated with the contemplative traditions of the East. No Boundary: Eastern and Western Approaches to Personal Growth (1979) is a simple yet comprehensive guide to psychologies and therapies available from both Western and Eastern sources. Several important early articles: "The Psychologia Perennis," "Are the Chakras Real?" and "Where It Was, I Shall Become.".

Larry Temkin famously argues that what he calls spectrum arguments yield strong reason to reject Transitivity, according to which the ‘all-things-considered better than’ relation is transitive. Spectrum arguments do reveal that the conjunctions of independently plausible claims are inconsistent with Transitivity. But I argue that there is very strong independent reason to reject such conjunctions of claims, and thus that the fact that they are inconsistent with Transitivity does not yield strong reason to reject Transitivity.

ABSTRACT I consider paradoxical spectrum arguments involving transitive relations like ‘better than’. I argue that, despite being formally different from sorites arguments, at least some spectrum arguments arise from vagueness, and that vagueness might often be the most natural diagnosis.

Scientific realism is typically associated with metaphysics. One current incarnation of such an association concerns the requirement of a metaphysical characterization of the entities one is being a realist about. This is sometimes called “Chakravartty’s Challenge”, and codifies the claim that without a metaphysical characterization, one does not have a clear picture of the realistic commitments one is engaged with. The required connection between metaphysics and science naturally raises the question of whether such a demand is appropriately fulfilled, and how (...) metaphysics engages with science in order to produce what is called “scientific metaphysics”. Here, we map some of the options available in the literature, generating a conceptual spectrum according to how each view approximates science and metaphysics. This is done with the purpose of enlightening the current debate on the possibility of epistemic warrant that science could grant to such a metaphysics, and how different positions differently address the thorny issue concerning such a warrant. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad-spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation-involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad-spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering (...) and successively defends the theses that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically theorised, (iii) as multiply realised functional kinds. Thereby, I claim to theoretically secure and justify the maximum scope, flexibility, and impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our representational devices in our whole cognitive life—in other words, a broad-spectrum version of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad‐spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation‐involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad‐spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering (...) and successively defends the theses that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically theorised, (iii) as multiply realised functional kinds. Thereby, I claim to theoretically secure and justify the maximum scope, flexibility, and impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our representational devices in our whole cognitive life—in other words, a broad‐spectrum version of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

This chapter examines the spectrum inversion hypothesis as an argument against certain kinds of account of what it’s like to be conscious of color. The hypothesis aims to provide a counterexample to accounts of what it’s like to be conscious of color in non-qualitative terms, as well as to accounts of what it’s like to be conscious of color in terms of the representational content of conscious visual states (which, according to some philosophers, is in turn given an account (...) in non-qualitative terms). I explain the hypothesis’s reasoning in sections 1 and 2. I then take up background issues: since the counterexample provided by the hypothesis is typically given as a possibility rather than an actuality, I briefly discuss the kind of possibility involved in section 3, and the methodologies used to evaluate the plausibility of possibilities in section 4. In section 5, I describe some general considerations that are commonly used against the spectrum inversion hypothesis. I take up attempts to support the hypothesis with findings from color science in section 6. I end with comments skeptical of both the motivation for the spectrum inversion hypothesis and the methodology used to support it. (shrink)

This article shows that introducing the positive comparative relation parity only helps one block so‐called “Spectrum Arguments” in order to avoid their unsavoury implications if one specifies parity in a specific way with respect to its persistence. The article illustrates how parity must both admit of persistency and be weakly non‐persistent for parity to block Spectrum Arguments, and identifies some consequences of that discovery for the general debate on Spectrum Arguments, value theory and comparability problems.

Formerly a spectral apparition that haunted behaviorism and provided a puzzle about our knowledge of other minds, the inverted spectrum possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. The inverted spectrum hypothesis raises the possibility that two individuals might think and behave in the same way yet have different qualia. The traditional supposition is of an individual who has a subjective color spectrum that is inverted with regard to that had by other individuals. (...) When he looks at red objects, this individual has the qualia normally produced in others by blue objects. And when presented with a blue object, this individual experiences qualia that most persons experience only when presented with red objects. And so forth - the Invert's color spectrum is the inverse of normal; there are systematic inter-subjective differences in qualia. (shrink)

Even if spectrum inversion of various sorts is possible, spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is not. So spectrum inversion does not pose a challenge for the intentionalist thesis that, necessarily, within a given sense modality, if two experiences are alike with respect to content, they are also alike with respect to their phenomenal character. On the contrary, reflection on variants of standard cases of spectrum inversion provides a strong argument for intentionalism. Depending on one’s (...) views about the possibility of spectrum inversion, the impossibility of spectrum inversion without a difference in representation can also be used as an argument against a variety of reductive theories of mental representation. (shrink)

This paper examines a little studied type of perspective shift that I call protagonist projection, following Holton :625–628, 1997). PP is a way of describing the mental state of a protagonist that conveys, to some extent, her perspective. Similarly to its better known cousin free indirect discourse, the shift in perspective is achieved without an overt operator. Unlike FID, PP is not based on a presumed speech-act of a protagonist. Rather, it gives a linguistic form to pre-verbal perceptual content, sensations, (...) feelings or implicit beliefs. I propose to analyse PP in a bi-contextual framework, extending Eckardt’s approach to FID. Under the resulting analysis, FID and PP are two instances of a more general category of perspective shift. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying was legalized by the Supreme Court of Canada in June 2016 and became a legal, viable end of life care option for Canadians with irremediable illness and suffering. Much attention has been paid to the balance between physicians’ willingness to provide MAiD and patients’ legal right to request medically assisted death in certain circumstances. In contrast, very little attention has been paid to the challenge of making MAiD accessible to vulnerable populations. The purpose of this paper (...) was to examine the extant literature and resources that are available on the provision of MAiD in Canada. We found that the provision of EOLC in Canada offers insufficient access to palliative and EOLC options for Canadians and that vulnerable Canadians experience disproportional barriers to accessing these already limited resources. Consequently, we argue that palliative care, hospice care and MAiD must be considered a spectrum of EOLC that is inclusive and accessible to all Canadians. We conclude by imploring Canadian healthcare professionals, policy makers and legislators to consider MAiD as a viable EOLC option for all Canadians. (shrink)

The spectrum argument purports to show that the better-than relation is not transitive, and consequently that orthodox value theory is built on dubious foundations. The argument works by constructing a sequence of increasingly less painful but more drawn-out experiences, such that each experience in the spectrum is worse than the previous one, yet the final experience is better than the experience with which the spectrum began. Hence the betterness relation admits cycles, threatening either transitivity or asymmetry of (...) the relation. This paper examines recent attempts to block the spectrum argument, using the idea that it is a mistake to affirm that every experience in the spectrum is worse than its predecessor: an alternative hypothesis is that adjacent experiences may be incommensurable in value, or that due to vagueness in the underlying concepts, it is indeterminate which is better. While these attempts formally succeed as responses to the spectrum argument, they have additional, as yet unacknowledged costs that are significant. In order to effectively block the argument in its most typical form, in which the first element is radically inferior to the last, it is necessary to suppose that the incommensurability is particularly acute: what might be called radical incommensurability. We explain these costs, and draw some general lessons about the plausibility of the available options for those who wish to save orthodox axiology from the spectrum argument. (shrink)

Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 286-302, December 2021.

Wilber's groundbreaking synthesis of religion, philosophy, physics, and psychology started a revolution in transpersonal psychology.

Wilber's groundbreaking synthesis of religion, philosophy, physics, and psychology started a revolution in transpersonal psychology. He was the first to suggest in a systematic way that the great psychological systems of the West could be integrated with the noble contemplative traditions of the East. Spectrum of Consciousness, first released by Quest in 1977, has been the prominent reference point for all subsequent attempts at integrating psychology and spirituality.

The possibility that what looks red to me may look green to you has traditionally been known as "spectrum inversion." This possibility is thought to create difficulties for any attempt to define mental states in terms of behavioral dispositions or functional roles. If spectrum inversion is possible, then it seems that two perceptual states may have identical functional antecedents and effects yet differ in their qualitative content. In that case the qualitative character of the states could not be (...) functionally defined. (shrink)

We study the set of possible sizes of maximal independent families to which we refer as spectrum of independence and denote \\). Here mif abbreviates maximal independent family. We show that:1.whenever \ are finitely many regular uncountable cardinals, it is consistent that \\); 2.whenever \ has uncountable cofinality, it is consistent that \=\{\aleph _1,\kappa =\mathfrak {c}\}\). Assuming large cardinals, in addition to above, we can provide that $$\begin{aligned} \cap \hbox {Spec}=\emptyset \end{aligned}$$for each i, \.

This paper compares the incidence of the diagnosis of Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) among White and Asian children with reference to data obtained from thirteen local education authorities (LEAs) in England. It begins by outlining some of the theoretical debates associated with the definition, diagnosis and prevalence of ASD. The empirical component underpinning this work uses logistic modelling to ascertain whether the proportion of children with a statement of special educational need (SEN) for ASD is different for Asian and (...) for White children and whether the proportion of children with a statement of SEN for ASD varies between LEAs. The discussion speculates as to possible reasons for the differences found and identifies areas for further research. (shrink)

I explore the view that the imago Dei is essential to us as humans but accidental to us as persons. To image God is to resemble God, and resemblance comes in degrees. This has the straightforward—and perhaps disturbing—implication that we can be more or less human, and possibly cease to be human entirely. Hence, I call it the spectrum view. I argue that the spectrum view is complementary to the Biblical data, helps explain the empirical reality of horrendous (...) evil, and offers an elegant rapprochement between the traditional view of hell and its rivals. (shrink)

Slaman and Wehner have constructed structures which distinguish the computable Turing degree 0 from the noncomputable degrees, in the sense that the spectrum of each structure consists precisely of the noncomputable degrees. Downey has asked if this can be done for an ordinary type of structure such as a linear order. We show that there exists a linear order whose spectrum includes every noncomputable Δ 0 2 degree, but not 0. Since our argument requires the technique of permitting (...) below a Δ 0 2 set, we include a detailed explanation of the mechanics and intuition behind this type of permitting. (shrink)

It has been proposed that the ways in which the criminal justice system treats offenders with Autism spectrum condition should duly account for how the condition influences the offenders’ behavior. While the recommendation appears plausible, what adhering to it means in practice remains unclear. A central feature of ASC is seen to be that people with the condition have difficulties with understanding and reacting to the mental states of others in what are commonly considered as adequate ways. This article (...) aims to clarify how the difficulties affect the moral weight to be given to the good and bad motives of offending in sentencing offenders with ASC. I start by explicating the main points of departure of the endeavor. After that I assess the moral significance of the good and bad motives of offenders with ASC in view of four cases and a comparison with how we commonly treat people who are not as able to understand and react to the mental states of others as neurotypical adults. I suggest that considerations pertaining to what has been called the primary orientation of morality provide grounds for deeming the good motives of offenders with ASC as morally significant as those of otherwise similar neurotypical offenders and the bad motives of offenders with ASC as less morally significant than those of otherwise similar neurotypical offenders. After considering three possible objections to the suggestion, I conclude by briefly elucidating its purported import. (shrink)

Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are an issue of growing public health significance. This set of neurodevelopmental disorders, which includes autistic disorder, Asperger syndrome, and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), is characterized by abnormalities in one or more of the following domains: language use, reciprocal social interactions, and/or a pattern of restricted interests or stereotyped behaviors. Prevalence estimates for ASDs have been increasing over the past few decades, with estimates at ~5/10,000 in the 1960s, and current estimates as (...) high as 1/88 (Newschaffer et al. 2007; CDC 2012).1 While ASDs encompass a wide range of phenotypes and degrees of severity, the disorders .. (shrink)

How we ought to diagnose, categorise and respond to spectrum disabilities such as autism and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a topic of lively debate. The heterogeneity associated with ADHD and autism is described as falling on various continua of behavioural, neural, and genetic difference. These continua are varyingly described either as extending into the general population, or as being continua within a given disorder demarcation. Moreover, the interrelationships of these continua are likewise often vague and subject to diverse (...) interpretations. -/- In this paper, I explore geneticists' and self-advocates’ perspectives concerning autism and ADHD as continua. These diagnoses are overwhelmingly analysed as falling on a continuum or continua of underlying traits, which supports the notion of “the neurodiversity spectrum”, i.e., a broader swath of human neural and behavioural diversity on which some concentrations of different functioning are diagnosed. I offer a taxonomy of conceptions of the genetic, phenotypic, and endophenotypic dimensionality within and beyond these diagnostic categories, and suggest that the spectrum of neurodiversity is characteristically endophenotypic. (shrink)

Offers a philosophical critique of neoclassical and post-neoclassical economics.

In 1970, K. Kunen, working in the context of Kelley–Morse set theory, showed that the existence of a nontrivial elementary embedding j:V→V is inconsistent. In this paper, we give a finer analysis of the implications of his result for embeddings V→V relative to models of ZFC. We do this by working in the extended language , using as axioms all the usual axioms of ZFC , along with an axiom schema that asserts that j is a nontrivial elementary embedding. Without (...) additional axiomatic assumptions on j, we show that that the resulting theory is weaker than an ω-Erdös cardinal, but stronger than n-ineffables. We show that natural models of ZFC+BTEE give rise to Schindler’s remarkable cardinals. The approach to inconsistency from ZFC+BTEE forks into two paths: extensions of ZFC+BTEE+Cofinal Axiom and ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom, where Cofinal Axiom asserts that the critical sequence is cofinal in the ordinals. We describe near-minimal inconsistent extensions of each of these theories. The path toward inconsistency from ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom is paved with a sequence of theories of increasing large cardinal strength. Indeed, the extensions of the theory ZFC +“j is a nontrivial elementary embedding” form a hierarchy of axioms, ranging in strength from Con to the existence of a cardinal that is super-n-huge for every n, to inconsistency. This hierarchy is parallel to the usual hierarchy of large cardinal axioms, and can be used in the same way. We also isolate several intermediate-strength axioms which, when added to ZFC+BTEE, produce theories having strengths in the vicinity of a measurable cardinal of high Mitchell order, a strong cardinal, ω Woodin cardinals, and n-huge cardinals. We also determine precisely which combinations of axioms, of the form result in inconsistency. (shrink)

Invasive neural devices offer novel prospects for motor rehabilitation on different levels of agentive behavior. From a functional perspective, they interact with, support, or enable human intentional actions in such a way that movement capabilities are regained. However, when there is a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended movement, the complexity of the relationship between the end user and the device sometimes makes it difficult to determine who is responsible for the outcome – a circumstance that has been coined as (...) “responsibility gap” in the literature. So far, recent accounts frame this issue around the theme of control but more work is needed to explore the complicated terrain of assigning responsibility for neural device-mediated actions from this control perspective. This paper aims at contributing to this tendency by offering more fine-grained distinctions of how that control capacity is facilitated by the machine and how it can be exercised by the end user. This results in a novel framework that depicts an in-depth exploration of the control aspect of responsibility in a way that incorporates the diversity of relationships between neurotechnologies, the various conditions they treat, and the individual end user’s experience. (shrink)

When women become perpetrators of suicide bombing, their agency – their ability to act upon and affect the world – is often denied. There are a number of reasons for this and one this thesis considers is that – as females – they are not expected to be violent. Accordingly, such women are judged to be coerced or incompetent, and so unable to rule themselves sufficiently as agents. Models of autonomy propose various frameworks for assessing whether acts or persons are (...) self-governing, and the relational approach in particular has garnered much support recently. However, some aspects of the relational account remain under-theorised, including how autonomy might be measured. In this thesis, I aim to bring these two elements together by examining whether an extension of the relational model may offer a way in which to estimate the autonomy of the bombers in a more nuanced fashion. I make two claims. First, that the relational conception of the agent and autonomy ‘fits’ the bombers. Second, that my spectrum view, which is rooted in the relational approach, maps the bomber’s autonomy approximately but in detail. As such, my spectrum view is a befitting notion of autonomy and allows a graded and comparative representation of the bomber’s autonomy. (shrink)

We prove two results on the stability spectrum for Lω1,ω. Here [Formula: see text] denotes an appropriate notion of Stone space of m-types over M. Theorem for unstable case: Suppose that for some positive integer m and for every α μ, K is not i-stable in μ. These results provide a new kind of sufficient condition for the unstable case and shed some light on the spectrum of strictly stable theories in this context. The methods avoid the use (...) of compactness in the theory under study. In this paper, we expound the construction of tree indiscernibles for sentences of Lω1,ω. Further we provide some context for a number of variants on the Ehrenfeucht–Mostowski construction. (shrink)

There is a spectrum of child psychiatric and neurological disorders, in all of which a comorbidity with obsessive-compulsive disorder and ritualized behavior is very common. Therefore, they may appear as a basis for the rituals in children that cross into adolescence and adulthood. Resolving the nature of these disorders may help us to better understand “Why ritualized behavior?” (Published Online February 8 2007).

To Korean people by the end of the 19th century who had previously enjoyed only traditional music genres, the music introduced by the hands of the missionaries must have been very new and unfamiliar. One hundred and a few decades since the meagre beginning of the meeting between the two has now passed, Korea has transformed into a modernized society where all kinds of music are performed and enjoyed, among which Western classical and popular music exist with considerable weight. In (...) the course of the development, there were constant exchanges between Korean traditional music and Western music. Korean traditional music has been subject at one end to defensive modification under the motto of transmission and at another end to aggressive destruction of some core aspects of the tradition under the motto of re-creation. This phenomenon creates important aesthetic issues in this study deals with the spectrum between the two ends drawn up by the traditional vocal genre, gagok. (shrink)

As an artist I am interested in creative states of consciousness and the direct expression of altered states of consciousness in forms such as musical improvisation and the automatic writings and drawings of the Surrealist Artists. I have been investigating a particular spectrum of altered states characterized by an enhanced experience where out-of-the-ordinary information is accessed or an enhanced ability is realized beyond what would ordinarily be possible. Within this realm we would find the ‘peak performance’ state of athletes (...) and musicians, as well as a state of intellectual inspiration where a complex problem is solved and also the phenomenon of premonition. It is related to the ‘flow state’ as described in Flow, The Psychology of Optimal Experience (Mihályi Csíkszentmihályi, 1990) and the experience of the American clairvoyant Edgar Cayce who resolved complex medical ailments when in a self-induced hypnotic trance. Additional examples include Haitian Vodou ritualized possession and all experiences where healing and foretelling of the future takes place through a communion with spirits. It is a broad spectrum that has been described in various ways throughout history and within all cultures. But though the descriptions vary, this spectrum of consciousness shares the common characteristic of accessing extraordinary information or demonstrating extraordinary skill or ability. This article is an attempt to help clarify and define this particular spectrum of consciousness. (shrink)

Recall that a subset X of a Boolean algebra A is independent if for any two finite disjoint subsets F , G of X we have ∏ x∈F x ∏ y∈G −y≠0. The independence of a BA A , denoted by Ind, is the supremum of cardinalities of its independent subsets. We can also consider the maximal independent subsets. The smallest size of an infinite maximal independent subset is the cardinal invariant i , well known in the case A= P (...) / fin . In this article we consider the collection of all cardinalities of infinite maximal independent subsets of a BA A ; we call this set the spectrum of infinite maximal independent subsets , denoted by Spind. Note that infinite maximal independent subsets exist in any BA which is not superatomic. The main result is that any set of infinite cardinals can occur as Spind for some infinite BA A . Beyond this we give results concerning the way that Spind changes under various algebraic operations. However, the basic components of most algebras that we deal with are free algebras. (shrink)

Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in (...) order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent. (shrink)

Let T be a complete countable first order theory and λ an uncountable cardinal. Theorem 1. If T is not superstable, T has 2 λ resplendent models of power λ. Theorem 2. If T is strictly superstable, then T has at least $\min(2^\lambda,\beth_2)$ resplendent models of power λ. Theorem 3. If T is not superstable or is small and strictly superstable, then every resplendent homogeneous model of T is saturated. Theorem 4 (with Knight). For each μ ∈ ω ∪ {ω, (...) 2 ω } there is a recursive theory in a finite language which has μ resplendent models of power κ for every infinite κ. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory lays (...) out but who are nevertheless not responsible agents. Attending to the moral psychology of such individuals will, I think, help shed light on an important gap in the conversational theory. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 46-48.

Thanks to the work of Stephen Newmyer, Plutarch’s importance for modern philosophical debates concerning animal rationality and rights has been brought to the forefront. But Newmyer’s important scholarship overlooks Plutarch’s commitment to a range of rational functions that can be ascribed to animals of various sorts throughout the Moralia. Through an application of the ‘spectrum of animal rationality’ described in the treatise On Moral Virtue to the dialogues where his interlocutors explore the rational capacities of non-human animals (especially Whether (...) Land or Sea Animals are Smarter and Gryllus), this article argues that Plutarch’s commitment to a broad and inclusive sense of ‘reason’ conditions any positive account of animal rationality. Rather, any suggestions of the rational capacities of non-human animals are deeply implicated in Plutarch’s universal system of reason, which differentiates grades of rationality to animals based on natural difference – not unlike his contemporary Stoics. While modern proponents of animal rationality might find some of Plutarch’s ideas unpalatable, the upshot of this study is a fuller sense of Plutarch’s articulate and inclusive sense of reason, which is able to accommodate not only Platonist and Peripatetic notions, but also those of the Stoics and Epicureans, who are especially singled out in the humorous dialogue Gryllus. Thus, Plutarch’s ‘eclecticism’ can be explained as a deep commitment to a universal notion of ‘reason’, marked by a range of functions accessible to all animals – including his philosophical enemies. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. The first is to defend a recent critique of the leading medical theory of suffering, which alleges too narrow a focus on violent experiences of suffering. Although sympathetic to this critique, I claim that it lacks a counterexample of the kinds of experiences the leading theory is said to neglect. Drawing on recent clinical cases and the longer intellectual history of suffering, my paper provides this missing counterexample. I then answer some possible objections to my (...) defence, before turning to my second aim: an expansion of my counterexample into a spectrum of suffering that varies according to the selves and purposes that suffering affects. Next, I connect this spectrum to the tolerability of suffering, which I distinguish from its affective intensity. I conclude by outlining some applications of this distinction for the psychometric reliability of assessment instruments that measure suffering in clinical contexts. (shrink)