One of the core insights from Eleanor Rosch’s work on categorization is that human categorization isn’t arbitrary. Instead, two psychological principles constrain possible systems of classification for all human cultures. According to these principles, the task of a category system is to provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort, and the perceived world provides us with structured rather than arbitrary features. In this paper, I show that Rosch's insights give us important resources for making progress on the 'feasibility question' (...) in conceptual engineering: the question of how we can implement conceptual engineering projects in ways that are practically feasible. Specifically, I show that one overlooked upshot of Rosch's work is that naming practices play an extremely important role in the construction of perceived similarities within and dissimilarities between categories, and, correspondingly, the dissemination of social stereotypes that serve as markers between different categories that are otherwise similar. Thus, naming practices will be a crucial constraint for the feasibility of certain ameliorative projects. (shrink)

How feasible are conceptual engineering projects of social concepts that aim for the engineered concept to be widely adopted in ordinary everyday life? Predominant frameworks on the psychology of concepts that shape work on stereotyping, bias, and machine learning have grim implications for the prospects of conceptual engineers: conceptual engineering efforts are ineffective in promoting certain social-conceptual changes. Specifically, since conceptual components that give rise to problematic social stereotypes are sensitive to statistical structures of the (...) environment, purely conceptual change won’t be possible without corresponding world change. This tradition, however, tends to ignore that concepts don’t only encode statistical, but also causal information. Paying attention to this feature of concepts, I argue, shows that conceptual engineering is not only possible. There is an imperative to conceptually-engineer. (shrink)

This essay contributes to our understanding of the relation between the philosophies of Hegel and Sellars. While most treatments of this relation have focused on metaphysics or epistemology, I focus on ethics, and in particular on the formulation of moral agency. I argue that Hegel and Sellars arrive at a similar metaphilosophical rejection of individual moral agency in favor of conceptions of moral agency as the outcome of social mediation. To demonstrate this, I trace how Hegel and Sellars offer (...) parallel resolutions of the ‘Kantian paradox’: the apparent problem that, in Kantian ethics, moral agents must both freely self-legislate the moral law unto themselves and stand in a dutiful relation to the moral law as a necessary function of practical reason. Drawing Hegel and Sellars together in this way casts new light on Sellars’s understudied ethical theory and further evidences the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s moral philosophy. (shrink)

In the discussion of such social questions as how should alcoholics be treated by society? and what kind of people are responsible in the face of the law?, is disease a value-free or value-laden notion, a natural or a normative one? It seems, for example, that by the utterance alcoholism should be classified as a disease we mean something like the following: the condition called alcoholism is similar in morally relevant respects to conditions that we uncontroversially label diseases, and (...) therefore we have a moral obligation to consider alcoholism a disease. So there are grounds to think that, in the discussion of social questions, our concept of disease is strongly value-laden. However, it does not follow that the medical concept of disease is likewise value-laden. In this paper I distinguish between the medical and social concepts of disease, arguing that the naturalist-normativist debate is concerned with the former, but not the latter. Therefore, we need not settle the naturalist-normativist debate in order to conclude that the social concept of disease is value-laden. (shrink)

In the discussion of such social questions as "how should alcoholics be treated by society?" and "what kind of people are responsible in the face of the law?", is "disease" a value-free or value-laden notion, a natural or a normative one? It seems, for example, that by the utterance 'alcoholism should be classified as a disease' we mean something like the following: the condition called alcoholism is similar in morally relevant respects to conditions that we uncontroversially label diseases and, (...) therefore, we have a moral obligation to consider alcoholism a disease. So there are grounds to think that, in the discussion of social questions, our concept of disease is strongly value-laden. However, it does not follow that the medical concept of disease is likewise value-laden. In this paper I distinguish between the medical and social concepts of disease, arguing that the naturalist-normativist debate is concerned with the former, but not the latter. Therefore, we need not settle the naturalist-normativist debate in order to conclude that the social concept of disease is value-laden. (shrink)

Alan Turing’s 1950 imitation game has been widely understood as a means for testing if an entity is intelligent. Following a series of papers by Diane Proudfoot, I offer a socio-technological interpretation of Turing’s paper and present an alternative way of understanding both the imitation game and Turing’s concept of intelligence. Turing, I claim, saw intelligence as a social concept, meaning that possession of intelligence is a property determined by society’s attitude toward the entity. He realized that as long (...) as human society held a prejudiced attitude toward machinery—seeing machines a priori as mindless objects—machines could not be said to be intelligent, by definition. He also realized, though, that if humans’ a priori, chauvinistic attitude toward machinery changed, the existence of intelligent machines would become logically possible. Turing thought that such a change would eventually occur: He believed that when scientists overcome the technological challenge of constructing sophisticated machines that could imitate human verbal behavior—i.e., do well in the imitation game—humans’ prejudiced attitude toward machinery will have altered in such a way that machines could be said to be intelligent. The imitation game, for Turing, was not an intelligence test, but a technological aspiration whose realization would likely involve a change in society’s attitude toward machines. (shrink)

This paper aims to consider some semantic aspects of the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice overlooked in recent literature. First, we examine different cases of hermeneutical injustices and we propose to classify them according to their semantic structure. The core of this classification lies in the distinction between cases related to problems of content and cases related to problems of circulation of social concepts. Second, we criticize a semantic conception, implicit in much of the literature concern- ing hermeneutical injustice, (...) according to which concepts are mere labels. We show that this conception cannot provide an adequate understanding of the different cases of hermeneutical injustice that we identify: first, because it fails to capture the dynamics of conceptual change or refinement that these cases involve and, second, because it leads to diagnosing them as mere problems of concept application. (shrink)

Is there such a thing as a social conception of disability? Recently two writers in this journal have suggested not only that there is a coherent social conception of disability but that all non-social conceptions, or “medical models” of disability are fatally flawed. One serious and worrying dimension of their claims is that once the social dimensions of disability have been resolved no seriously “disabling” features remain. This paper examines and rejects conceptions of disability based on (...) social factors but notes that physical and mental conditions which disadvantage the individual have social dimensions. (shrink)

In this paper I develop and defend a social conception of dignity. To that end, I look at what Holocaust survivors say about dignity (and the related Hebrew word, kavod) since many have described their experiences in these terms. Unlike traditional conceptions, on my account dignity admits of degrees—one can have more or less dignity.

In their social concepts, Christian Churches attach particular importance to education. Secular education is considered in the context of modern science and culture. The Church recognizes the authority and achievements of modern science, but believes that the rational picture of the world formed by scientific research is not complete and inclusive. The religious worldview cannot be dismissed as a source of insight into the truth and understanding of history, ethics, and many other humanities that have a basis and (...) right to be present in the secular education and upbringing system in the organization of public life. The Church strongly opposes the ideologization of science and aims to restore the lost connection with religious spiritual values. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is argued that Weber's particular combination of Von Kries' naturalistic paradigm and Rickert's antinaturalistic paradigm might become less puzzling if we return to the interpretation that emerged in the middle of the nineteen-twenties within the South-Western School of neo-Kantianism. The basic intuition which underlies this interpretation is that the social sciences are best understood as generalizing cultural sciences. On this understanding, they differ both from the natural sciences and the historical sciences.

In this thesis I critically examine the traditional account of privacy as a negative right of non-interference and offer instead an alternative framework based on obligations and trust. Privacy is most often described as a value best protected as a right, more accurately as a negative right of non-intrusion. This means that privacy is associated with the private sphere: the individual should be left to decide when he wants to be alone and what he wants to share with others. I (...) begin with an examination of three different distinctions between the public and the private and then I go on to examine two models of privacy: the separation model, where privacy consists of restricted access, and the control model which consists in individual control over certain aspects of one's life. I argue that these models fail to meet many privacy concerns. This becomes most apparent when examining the privacy challenges associated with information technology and biobanks. My alternative account of privacy recognizes how deeply privacy is embedded in social norms and structure. Privacy does not apply to situations where an individual is in isolation, but rather depends on relations to others. This means that privacy is a relational concept: it is an important value in structuring relations between individuals or social institutions. I argue that the framework of rights does not provide an appropriate framework for protecting privacy. Instead, I introduce a framework based on obligations and trust, inspired by Onora O’Neill’s account of perfect and imperfect obligations. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Statues of Ugolochomma Conclusion.

_Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning_ offers a provocative re-reading of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind, and explores the tensions between Wittgenstein's ideas and contemporary cognitivist conceptions of the mental. This book addresses both Wittgenstein's later works as well as contemporary issues in philosophy of mind. It provides fresh insight into the later Wittgenstein and raises vital questions about the foundations of cognitivism and its wider implications for psychology and cognitive science.

Analyses of biological concepts of disease and social conceptions of health indicate that they are structurally interdependent. This in turn suggests the need for a bridge theory of illness. The main features of such a theory are an emphasis on the logical properties of value terms, close attention to the features of the experience of illness, and an analysis of this experience as action failure, drawing directly on the internal structure of action. The practical applications of this theory (...) are outlined for a number of problems in each of the three main practical areas, clinical work, teaching and research. In each case the resources of the theory suggest new models and generate new results. The full practical significance of the theory, however, is shown to consist in the way in which it ties together biological and social theories into an integrated picture of the conceptual structure of medicine as a whole. It is argued, finally, that practical efficiency of this kind is a test of theory not only in the philosophy of medicine but also in general philosophy. (shrink)

The ideas and conceptions of the Frankfurt philosophical-sociological school, above all the "critical theory of society," the principles of "negative dialectics" and the "great refusal," the utopia of "pacified existence," occupy an important place in the contemporary ideological struggle between the world systems of socialism and capitalism, and comprise a significant ideological and theoretical arsenal of bourgeois ideology and revisionism. And this is not accidental. The "critical theory of society" formulated and argued for by T. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse, (...) J. Habermas, and others, which proclaims a protest against any social status quo, is used for the critique both of capitalism and actually existing socialism. At the same time it is also interpreted as an imaginary alternative to Marxism, and from, moreover, both right and "left" positions. Therefore the social theory of the Frankfurt school impacts upon the most diverse currents—from bourgeois social thought to the right and "left" varieties of revisionism. The complex evolution made by the representatives of this school in the last half-century contributed to this wide dissemination of the ideas of the Frankfurt school. Theoretical arguments are found in it both by those whose ideology, being directed to the progressive forces, is developed in the direction of Marxism, and by those who fled the soil of Marxism and are hostile to it. (shrink)

Many theorists, including Nietzsche, Adorno, and Foucault, have regarded genealogy as an important technique for social criticism. But it has been unclear how genealogy can go beyond the accomplishments of other, more mundane, critical methods. I propose a new approach to understanding the critical potential of history. I argue that theorists have been misled by the assumption that if a claim is deserving of criticism, it is because the claim is false. Turning to the criticism of concepts rather (...) than criticism of claims, I expand on the distinction between "descriptive semantics" and "foundational semantics" to show that genealogy can be uniquely qualified to explore the foundations of concepts, and hence to criticize concepts that are problematic in nonobvious ways. (shrink)

The capability approach constitutes a significant contribution to social theory but its potential is diminished by its insufficient treatment of the social construction of meaning. Social meanings enable people to make value judgements about what they will do and be, and also to evaluate how satisfied they are about what they are able to achieve. From this viewpoint, a person’s state of wellbeing must be understood as being socially and psychologically co-constituted in specific social and cultural (...) contexts. In this light, the telos of ‘living well’ which is at the heart of Sen’s version of the capability approach is inadequate and must be modified to a telos of ‘living well together’ which includes consideration of the social structures and institutions which enable people to pursue individual freedoms in relation to others. The policy significance of the capability approach can be further strengthened by paying greater consideration to the political economy of policy decision-making processes and the ways in which conflicts and distributions of power are institutionalized. (shrink)

이 글은 ‘롤스의 정의론이 지닌 이론적 결함을 유교의 인간관을 통해 치료할 수 있는가’라는 문제의식에서 출발한다. 이러한 문제의식은 롤스가 유교의 인간관을 바탕으로 자신의 이론을 정당화할 경우 얻을 수 있는 이론적 혜택이 있는지를 비판적으로 검토하는 작업과 연결된다. 작업의 초점은 유교의 인간관이 롤스가 정의의 원칙을 정당화하는 과정에 개입함으로서 기여할 수 있는 부분들에 대한 검토와 해명을 시도함으로써 양자 간의 이상적 결합을 시도하는데 있다. 이러한 시도가 성공적인 것으로 밝혀진다면 기존의 정의론은 동양철학적 관점을 통해 새로운 이론적 방향을 발견하는 계기를 마련할 수도 있다. 보통 정의론은 인간의 본성과 (...) 사회의 본성에 대한 전제에서 출발하여 사회의 구체적인 맥락 및 제도 그리고 관계를 초월하여 모든 사회에 적용될 수 있는 근본적인 규범적 원칙을 도출하려는 기획을 갖는다. 롤스 역시 최소한의 선 이론으로서 칸트의 의무론적 자유주의에 기초하여 합리적인 이기심을 지닌 개인을 전제로 정의의 원칙을 정당화한다. 이러한 방법은 외부의 사회적 맥락들에 휘둘리지 않고 공정으로서의 정의를 실현했지만 무연고적 자아, 원자적 인간관, 반사회적 개인주의라는 공동체주의의 비판에 직면했다. 그런데 한 가지 의문점은 과연 롤스가 추구한 사회 즉 차등의 원칙을 바탕으로 민주적 평등(demacratic eauqlity)을 추구한 롤스에게 그러한 비판이 그다지 적절한 것으로 보이지 않는다는 것이다. 롤스는 자유로운 선택능력을 지닌 개인들에 대한 동등한 고려와 존중을 바탕으로 함께 더불어 잘 살아갈 수 있는 원칙을 제시함으로써 질서정연한 사회를 꿈꾼다. 그런데 그를 반사회적이고 원자적 개인주의자로 규정하는 것은 다소 성급한 것이다. 만약 롤스에게 가해진 비판 중 몇 가지가 그가 자신의 의도를 제대로 반영하지 못하는 이론적 도구인 자유주의적 인간관을 전면에 내세운 데서 비롯된 것이라면 우리는 기꺼이 새로운 도구를 시험해보는 전략을 구상해볼 수 있을 것이다. 앞서 언급했듯이 이 글은 유교의 인간관을 롤스가 자신의 의도와 달리 직면하게 된 비판에서 벗어날 수 있는 통로를 제공하는 새로운 도구로서 제안하고 그것의 유용성을 비판적으로 검토하는데 목적을 둔다. 이러한 목적을 위해 우리는 먼저 롤스의 인간관과 정의의 원칙의 정당화 과정을 살펴볼 것이다. 이어서 그에 대한 비판들을 살펴본 후, 유교의 인간관이 롤스의 정의의 원칙을 정당화 하는 과정에 개입함으로서 기여할 수 있는 부분들은 없는지 검토하고자 한다. 결론에서는 롤스가 유교의 인간관을 통해 그의 의도를 오해 없이 제대로 전달할 수 있으며 보다 안정된 이론적 체계를 구축할 수 있다고 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

Sally Haslanger is concerned with the debate between social constructionists and error theorists about a given category, such as race or gender. For example, social constructionists about race claim that the term “race” refers to a social kind, whereas error theorists claim that the term “race” is an empty term, that is, nothing belongs to this category. It seems that this debate depends in part on the meaning of the corresponding expression, and this, according to some theorists, (...) depends in turn on our intuitions as competent speakers. But then, what should we say if competent users of the expressions “race” and “gender” understand the terms so that being a natural or biological property is a necessary condition in order to fall under the term? If that were the case, then it would seem that a social constructionist view would be out of the question. Haslanger has argued that a social constructionist view could still be defended in that situation. In order to argue for this, she draws on the classical arguments for semantic externalism, which show that the intuitions of competent speakers concerning the nature of a given category, and the objective type that actually unifies the instances of that category, may come apart. In this paper I will argue that the arguments for semantic externalism concerning natural kinds do not really offer support for Haslanger’s claim that ordinary intuitions concerning social kinds are not relevant. (shrink)

Drawing on the intellectual tradition of the leading comparative political science scholar, Giovanni Sartori, the contributors examine the theoretical and methodological basis of: Concept Analysis, Comparative Political Analysis and Qualitative Methods.

Professor Hartshorne, together with many other recent thinkers, has rightly rebelled against these distortions and perversions of theological doctrine. He cannot accept the view that "the most wicked acts are caused by God, made inevitable even though 'not necessary') by his decision". He is repelled by the "otherworldliness" of traditional religion, so often embraced as "the flight from the one task we surely face, that of human welfare on earth, to a questionable one, the winning of a heavenly passport". He (...) objects to religious irrationalism and "obscurantism--the theory that we can best praise God by indulging in contradiction and semantical nonsense". (shrink)

I review recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. I argue that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowledge attributions are a central part of primate social (...) cognition, used to predict others’ behavior and guide decision-making. The core primate knowledge concept is that of truth detection (across different sensory modalities) and retention (through memory) and may also include rudimentary forms of indirect truth discovery through inference. In virtue of their evolutionary heritage, humans inherited the primate social-cognitive system and thus share this core knowledge concept. (shrink)

This book is a guide to working with social science concepts. Concepts are the prisms through which we see the social world. They are foundational to the social science enterprise, and the quality of investigations hinges in part on how well researchers make use of them. Most social science concepts are drawn from ordinary language used in everyday ways; however, many social scientists "reconfigure" ordinary words to meet their research needs. They tinker (...) with the meanings of words to fit their theoretical aims and make them precise, useful tools of measurement and comparison. This book examines social science concepts through an interpretivist lens with the aim of providing concrete conceptual guidance for future research. Specifically, this book seeks to: 1) identify characteristic dangers that attend the making and use of reconfigured concepts; 2) lay out ways in which a select number of interpretivist approaches have been used to mitigate these dangers; 3) introduce practical tools that rework these interpretivist approaches into explicit and useable research methods; 4) show concretely how these elucidation tools can be gainfully used by social scientists working both within and outside of the interpretivist tradition. It will be an essential guide for social science research. (shrink)