Both scienticity and artistry have been listed in cluster concept definitions for both science and art. However, these clusters have not been considered together before. I contrast and combine these different clusters for the first time, and I argue that doing so better elucidates the properties of the natural sciences, humanities and fine arts than the science and art cluster concepts do separately. This is because all disciplines have varying levels of scienticity and artistry, but this is not (...) captured fully by the science or art cluster concepts separately. An integrated scienticity and artistry cluster provides a new way of describing the commonly argued notion that the sciences and arts share qualities, methods and practices, but the integrated scienticity-artistry cluster shows how, when and where these qualities blend into each other across disciplines. (shrink)

Redazione Ruth Castillo Ochoa Universitat d’Alacant -/- .

In his Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant presents four antinomies. In his attempt to solve the first of these antinomies he examines and analyzes "thesis" and "antithesis" more thoroughly and employs the terms `part', `whole' and `boundary' in his argumentation for their validity. According to Kant, the whole problem surrounding the antinomy was caused by applying the concept of the world to nature and then using both terms interchangeably. While interesting, this solution is still not that much more than (...) a well thought out idea if it does not also include an adequate formal explication. Since the aforementioned terms all have counterparts in modern mereotopology, a discipline that has seen significant progress in recent times, we will apply these concepts to Kant's analysis in an attempt to evaluate Kant's solution in light of modern analytic philosophy. (shrink)

In his Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant presents four anti- nomies. In his attempt to solve the first of these antinomies he examines and analyzes"thesis" and "antithesis" more thoroughly and employs the terms `part', `whole' and `boundary' in his argumentation for their validity. According to Kant, the whole problem surrounding the antinomy was caused by applying the concept of the world to nature and then using both terms interchangeably. While interesting, this solution is still not that much more than (...) a well thought out idea if it does not also include an adequate formal explication. Since the aforementioned terms all have counterparts in modern mereotopology, a discipline that has seen significant progress in recent times, we will apply these concepts to Kant's analysis in an attempt to evaluate Kant's solution in light of modern analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The article explores specificities of thematization of science and scientific rationality in Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. This analysis focuses on the concept of scienticity, character- istic for Heidegger’s “early” line of thought, as well as continuation and divergence of exposition of “science” and the nature of “theoretical attitude” as the subject of interpretation of transcen- dental phenomenology of E. Husserl. This research places an emphasis on particularity of Hei- degger’s explication of existential concept of science as opposed to prevailing (...) logico-epistemolog- ical philosophy of science, and foundation of thematization of scientific “subject matters” and theoretical attitude upon the universe of ontological understanding of being of entities (regional ontologies). It also focuses on Heidegger’s assertion of fundamental ontological projection in a status of a peculiar “science of knowledge”, which gives ground for a priori pre-conditions of specific sciences. Separate attention is paid to a specifically Heideggerian approach to explication of the rooting of initial scientific orientation in the sphere of pre-scientific experience, which ar- ticulates itself in so called “fundamental concepts”, as well as positioning of contemplative ‘present-at-hand’ paradigm of theoretical knowledge as a derivative modus of a primary use of ‘ready-to-handness’ as a phenomenological founding basis of everydayness’ experience. The author came to the attention that scientific knowledge is a project Dasein. It is within the framework of self-design that Dasein thematizes what happens to another region of being that is the subject of scientific knowledge. In other words, making things available in researching, applying themes, provided that the design allowed late as the systematic development of the most modern buildings, such as is done in the world, and possibly everyday greeting improvised performance. (shrink)

Advocates of scientic realism typically respond to the challenge of the pessimistic meta-induction by turning to the history of science. The episode most frequently discussed is the shift from Fresnel's wave theory of light to Maxwell's electromagnetism. This particular history is taken to represent one of the hardest problems for the realist, for while it exhibits continuity on the empirical level, it simultaneously represents a dramatic shift in ontology. Thus, various authors have proposed methods for defeating the pessimistic meta-induction based (...) solely on consideration of the Fresnel-Maxwell case. In this paper, I present another case study from physics--Fermi's 1934 theory of beta-decay and the ensuing search for a universal description of weak interactions. I argue that the degree of success of two recent proposals for scientic realism--that of John Worrall (1989, 1994, 2007) and Juha Saatsi (2005)--changes importantly in light of this new case study. (shrink)

According to scientic realism the ultimate best explanation of the facts and patterns of the framework of common sense or the \manifest image" takes place by showing that these facts and patterns are not real but that they, yet in some sense have counterparts within the scientic image explainable by the best-explaining theories. This explanation can be called eliminative explanation, for it ia part and parcel of this realist idea of explanation that the explananda become eliminated in the process of (...) explanation. The paper investigates some types of realist explanation under the phrase `cor- rective explanation', viz. a correspondence rule account below) and a reinterpretation view ). While in them no elimination directly takes place they can be regarded as being conducive to, and giving reasons for, the ultimate elimination of the explananda. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the doctrine that logic does not require its own epistemology, for its methods are continuous with those of science. Although most recently urged by Williamson, the idea goes back at least to Lakatos, who wanted to adapt Popper's falsicationism and extend it not only to mathematics but to logic as well. But one needs to be careful here to distinguish the empirical from the a posteriori. Lakatos coined the term 'quasi-empirical' `for the counterinstances to putative mathematical (...) and logical theses. Mathematics and logic may both be a posteriori, but it does not follow that they are empirical. Indeed, as Williamson has demonstrated, what counts as empirical knowledge, and the role of experience in acquiring knowledge, are both unclear. Moreover, knowledge, even of necessary truths, is fallible. Nonetheless, logical consequence holds in virtue of the meaning of the logical terms, just as consequence in general holds in virtue of the meanings of the concepts involved; and so logic is both analytic and necessary. In this respect, it is exceptional. But its methodologyand its epistemology are the same as those of mathematics and science in being fallibilist, and counterexamples to seemingly analytic truths are as likely as those in any scientic endeavour. What is needed is a new account of the evidential basis of knowledge, one which is, perhaps surprisingly, found in Aristotle. (shrink)

The relationship between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences is underdeveloped and complicated, for reasons we will explain in this chapter, and the philosophical discussion of this relationship has the same properties. Many reasons for the lack of development relate to a traditional philosophical issue: explanation. The explanatory structure of cognitive science reasoning and argumentation is unusual and difcult to t into the traditional model of scientic explanation, though they do relate, in an odd way, to the traditional “reasons” (...) explanations discussed in the philosophy of social science, through the notion of “folk psychology.” The cognitive science explanations themselves, as they relate to traditional “social science” topics, involve additional problems. They depend on a strategy of reducing complexity by beginning with those aspects of mind that can be most readily simplied, such as perception and body movements. Therefore, traditional social science topics, such as social interaction, which cannot be readily simplied, are something of an afterthought. (shrink)

According to Karl Popper, who is the latest link in the chain of Western rationalist-empiricist debate, knowledge does not have any infallible base in either senses or reason. Taking modern science as the paradigm of human knowledge, he argues that the process of growth of scientic knowledge involves imaginative proposals of hypotheses or conjectures and their refutation on empirical grounds in a continuing series of steps. Thus, scientific knowledge continuously evolves in a series of revolutions whereby the accepted theoretic constructs (...) are falsified, therefore destroyed, and new ones accepted in their place. Experiment, as provoked and controlled stimulation of the senses, plays a critical role in this process of growth and so long as it fails to falsify the hypotheses these are provisionally accepted by the scientists. (shrink)

Les hommes sont-ils sujets ou assujettis à la structure objective du monde naturel et social ? Est-ce l’idéologie ou la critique de l’idéologie qui les fait sujets ? Les deux, selon Marx, car les hommes ne sont pas libres mais le deviennent à travers l’histoire, dialectiquement, en se libérant de la nécessité qui les conditionne. Depuis, le marxisme s’est scindé, un matérialisme objectif y affrontant un idéalisme subjectif, et aujourd’hui Althusser retourne le socialisme scientifique contre l’utopie communiste, à l’inverse d’Habermas. (...) Une critique scientiste de l’humanisme idéologique s’oppose alors à une critique humaniste de l’idéologie scientiste. Et s’il fallait plutôt critiquer ensemble humanisme et scientisme comme les deux versants contraires mais complémentaires d’un même rationalisme métaphysique et idéologique ?Are men subjects or are they subjected to objective structure of natural and social world ? Is it ideology or criticism of ideology which makes them subjects ? Both, according to Marx, because men aren’t but become free throught history, dialectically, being liberated from necessity which determines them. Since, marxism has been splitting up into an objective materialism fronting a subjective idealism, and today Althusser, at the opposite of Habermas, returns scientific socialism against communist Utopia. Then, a scienticist criticism of ideological humanism is opposed to a humanist criticism of scienticist ideology. So, shouldn’t we criticize both humanism and scienticism as two contrary but complementary sides of a single metaphysical - and ideological - rationalism ? (shrink)

e accelerated development and the specialization of elds have in the last decades caused also the separation and specialization in the elds of science and philosophy. e individual philosophic systems have lost their complexity and connection with dierent layers of the life-world, and specialized themselves for special questions and problems, in much the same way as have the scientic disciplines. A renewed connection between phenomenology and physics would with an intertwining of a solid philosophic apparatus, concerned with the fundamental questions, (...) and a new physical knowledge, which reects the discussed reality, enable an approaching towards the answers to some of the essential questions. A connection between them would ensure not only a more solid interpretation and understanding of the physical phenomena, but also the actualization and a rmer installment of the philosophic deliberation, which by ignoring the actual physical knowledge omits one of the essential aspects of possible answers to the fundamental problems. (shrink)

e paper seeks to evaluate the critical perspective on scientism and epistemological objectivism put forward by a version of hermeneutic phenomenology. It is a version that addresses the issues of the meaningful constitution of research objects in natural-scientic research. In opposing Habermas’ quasi- transcendental epistemology of the empirico-analytical sciences, the paper offers an attempt at interpretative investigation of the formation of knowledge- guiding interests in these sciences. e possibility of a “dialogical research of nature” is scrutinized.

The article considers the topic of realism in science. First, it presents some considerations of Max Planck on this issue. Second, it displays several arguments in favour of scientic realism, provided one takes into consideration the metaphysical presuppositions of the scientific endeavour, and assumes that scientific knowledge is partial.

Joseph Rouse has drawn from Heidegger’s early philosophy to develop what he calls a “practical hermeneutics of science.” With this, he has not only become an important player in the recent trend towards practice-based conceptualisations of science, he has also emerged as the predominant expositor of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. Yet, there are serious shortcomings in both Rouse’s theory of science and his interpretation of Heidegger. In the first instance, Rouse’s practical hermeneutics appears confused on the topic of realism. In (...) the second instance, Rouse suppresses Heidegger’s distinction between existence and essence, and hence fails to grasp the latter’s corollary distinction between scientic research and everyday practice. I argue that, by accepting a correction in his interpretation of Heidegger, Rouse would find the means to resolve the debilitating tensions in his stance towards realism. (shrink)

In June 1998 Hans Primas turned 70 y ears old. Although he himself is not fond of jubilees and although he lik es to play the decimal system of numb ers do wn as contingent, this is nev ertheless a suitable o ccasion to re ect on the professional work of one of the rare distinguished contemp orary scientists who attach equal imp ortance to exp erimen tal and theoretical and conceptual lines of researc h. Hans Primas' in terests ha (...) ve covered an enormous range: metho ds and instruments for n uclear magnetic resonance, theoretical c hemistry , C - and W -algebraic formulations of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem and its various implications, holism and realism in quantum theory , theory reduction, the w ork and p ersonality of Wolfgang Pauli, as well as Jungian psychology . In man y of these elds he provided imp ortan t and original fo o d for though t, in some cases going far b eyond the ev eryda y business in the scientic world. As is the case with other scien tists who are conceptually innov ativ e, Hans Primas is read more than he is quoted. His in uence is due to his writings. Even with the current ood of publications, he still p erforms the miracle of ha ving scientists eagerly a waiting his next publication. His external life, by wa y of contrast, is not very sp ectacular. With the exception of a brief p erio d as a guest professor at Washington Univ ersity at St. Louis, he has never b een a wa y from Zuric h for an y length of time. He has nev er b een a warded an y prizes, nev er organized a congress, nev er done any organizational work in a scientic so ciety . He delib erately distanced himself from the hustle and bustle of national and in ternational scien tic business. (shrink)

In this paper, I address a question in social epistemology about the unity of a scientic community to- wards its inner groups (teams, labs...). I investigate the reasons why these groups might want to \go it alone", working among themselves and hiding their discoveries from other groups. I concentrate on the intermediate results of a longer project, where the first steps can help to achieve a more advanced result. I study to what extent the isolation of research groups might be (...) damaging to the epistemic progress of the whole community. In order to get an idea of the reason why scientists might not share their intermediate results with others, consider for example Schawlow and Townes in the summer of 1958 (the historical material is drawn from Broberg, 1991, chap. 3): together they had just designed the principle of functioning of what would be known as the laser, with the intention of constructing the rst laser, relying on their theoretical ideas. Should they have published their theoretical discovery, or rather taken advantage of their advance on possible oppo- nents and start the experimental work? They chose to publish their theoretical ideas in a scientic journal, and they also led a patent application. On the one hand, it was a valuable choice: the patent was granted and their paper was published, making them soon famous. Further- more, another scientist called Gould was to le a simi- lar patent application a few months later, in March 1959; it was refused, because of the priority of Schawlow and Townes. If the latter had not submitted their idea in 1958, the patent would certainly have been acknowl- edged to Gould. In this sense, publishing their intermediate result was a worthy strategy. On the other hand, history showed that their publication had also some drawbacks for them. Schawlow and Townes' publication triggered a race among many American laboratories for the rst experimental construction of the laser. In addition to bringing them competitors, their publication helped these competitors in crucial ways; so much so that it was another scientist, Maiman, and not Schawlow and Townes, who was able to build the rst working laser, in May 1960, and to publish the result. If Schawlow and Townes had not published their theoretical idea, there are chances that they would have been the first ones to build a laser. Their publication of the first theoretical result certainly prevented them from getting the second experimental one. In short, the best publishing strategy about an intermediate result is no easy question for a scientist. Consider now the whole community, concerned with the results available to all and with the pace of the epistemic progress. Schawlow and Townes' publication enabled the rst laser to be built quicker, as other teams could rely on their theoretical work. More generally, being able to reuse other's works seems to be a rm basis of scientic progress. Thus, for the whole community, it seems that there are only benets if intermediate results are published. As this is not necessarily the best strategy for those who reach these intermediate results, there might be a conflict between the interests of individuals and those of the whole community. The question Schawlow and Townes faced was whether they should make their discovery publicly known, or keep it for themselves to progress alone. This alternative can also arise for an entire lab, when competing with other labs on some long-run project: should it make its discoveries known to its opponents, or only share them internally among its members? At a higher level still, this question arises for what can be called scientic schools, which are groups of labs sharing some particular approach|methodological, experimental or interpre- tational, for example. At each level within the scientic community, there are competitive groups of scientists which may decide to go it alone and to prevent their results from being accessible to others. If they had good reasons for doing so, there would be dramatic consequences for the whole community: other groups would not be able to reuse their results, labour force would be wasted in achieving them again, and the progress of the eld would be slowered. 9 The aim of this paper is to investigate this risk of division: to assess the conditions under which it may oc- cur, its damage for the community, and to draw the limit of an acceptable pluralism. The reasoning with benets and drawbacks which has been sketched for Schawlow and Townes seems to be implicitly an informal economic argument. In order to clarify and to rene such an argument, I will investigate it in a rational decision framework, supposing some utility or preferences for the groups of scientists, and I will propose a formal model, in game theory. In social epistemology of science, formal models have been proposed for various questions (for example, Kitcher 1990, 1993, Goldman 2009, Strevens 2003, 2006, Weisberg and Muldoon, forthcoming, Zollman 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), but not for the question of the division of the scientic community. I will concentrate on the normative aspect of the question, ignoring the descriptive and historical question of whether groups do go it alone or not. The model I propose is sequential: two groups are competing on a research program, which consists of several results which have to be obtained in order. The groups always carry out some research for the next result, which they reach with some probability per unit of time. When a group, say A, reaches a result, it can either make it public for the other group, or continue its research. After a result is made public, the competitor B can start from it so as to continue its own research. Thus, when A publishes it loses its lead, and its competitor will be able to compete with it in the near future. But it is also recognized as the rst to reach this step. I consider two dierent cases, one in which the number of steps is limited, another where the limit concerns the number of temporal intervals. In both cases, assuming that all steps are equally dicult and equally rewarding, it turns out that the best strategy for a group concerned with its own reward is to make public every step it takes. Thus, there is no risk that groups might separate: a scientist, whatever its group, will publish for all. Finally, I turn to more complex situations, where results have varying size or diculty: there, groups can indeed be better o going it alone. (shrink)

The conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other (...) book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. (shrink)

This chapter begins by asking why Rorty would endorse a physicalist agenda which, on the face of it, ran counter to his aims in philosophy; and concludes both that his motivation was confused, and that he failed to detach physicalism from metaphysics and scienticism. I begin by showing the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty's position on consciousness, and the centrality of consciousness to his overall project. I then summarize Rorty's position, which was essentially derived from Ryle, but uniquely driven by (...) metaphilosophy. My assessment begins by disputing Rorty's thesis about the historical origins of the concept of consciousness, before following him into his favorite argumentative territory by talking about the social utility of first‐person reflection on consciousness, and his own motivations for wanting to undermine such reflection. I conclude that because of his obsession with religion, Rorty became entangled in a scientistic agenda he should have opposed. (shrink)

Though formal metascience has made rapid advances over the past few decades, it has seldom been seen to contribute much to the rational reconstruction of scientic development; for the most part, logical concepts have found application in the synchronic analysis of scientic theories. It should be important, therefore, to consider to what extent diachronic or dynamic aspects of scientic theorizing may also be captured within the connes of a formal metascientic framework, and what tools are best suited for constructing a (...) general model of theory dynamics. (shrink)

This article explores the possibility of a phenomenological method in the field of philosophy of science. It reconstructs the idea of scienticity, which is significant both for philosophy as a science and for philosophy's relationship to nonphilosophical sciences. The concepts of intentionality, eidetic objectness, and absolute evidence are discussed as conditions for the possibility of philosophy as a rigorous science. The concepts of constituting, objectivation, and regional ontology are examined in the context of the possibility of founding of sciences (...) with a dogmatic standpoint in philosophy. It is suggested that the phenomenological program of philosophy of science remains current, though it also continues a tradition of thinking about science that stretches back to Plato. Phenomenological philosophy of science is a clarification of the meaning of scienticity, the very principles of a scientific relationship to the world. (shrink)

It used to be a common view in the philosophy of science as well as among the scientists themselves that scientic change has been and will be continuos. Even in the most radical changes of theories the growth of knowledge was claimed to be cumulative. Thus, for instance, physicists may say that in radical, revolutionary changes of theories there obtains, however, some kind of correspondence between the old and new theories; the old theory can be regarded at least as a (...) limiting case of the new one. Thus, for instance, classical particle mechanics is a limiting case of both relativistic particle mechanics and quantum mechanics. Some philosophers, as, e.g., Stegmuller [17], go even further when they claim that there always obtains a reductive correlation in scientic change. The old theory can be reduced to the new one in some specic, or perhaps only intuitive, sense of reduction. However, in the light of what physicists say about correspondence and logicians about reduction, it seems obvious that correspondence should be distinguished from reduction and that one may claim the existence of the former relation, rather than the latter, in the scientic changes. We are not ready to say here what a correspondence relation would exactly consist of, but we will discuss what we think ought to be at least required in comparison with reduction and the related notion of interpre- tation. A detailed case study seems to sustain our views correspondence. (shrink)

This paper serves to introduce the papers from the symposium by the same title, by describing the sort of work done in philosophy of psychology conceived as a branch of the philosophy of science, distinguishing it from other discussions of psychology in philosophy, and criticizing the claims to set limits on scientific psychology in the largely psychologically uninformed literatures concerning "folk psychology' and "wide" and "narrow" content. Philosophy of psychology as philosophy of science takes seriously and analyzes the explanatory structures, (...) conceptual problems, and evidentiary practices of extant scientific psychology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s ZarathustraKathleen Marie HigginsThe Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, by Stanley Rosen; 286 pp. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, $18.95 paper.In Ecce Homo Nietzsche remarks that he wants to be read the way good old philologists read Horace. Stanley Rosen has fullled this Nietzschean wish. His Mask of the Enlightenment interprets Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra with astute attention, and it delivers on Rosen’s (...) stated aim of avoiding both the obscurantism of postmoderns and the selective attention of analytic philosophers. It is philological in the best sense, balancing its consideration of detail with a sense of the book’s larger context, as well as the context of textual predecessors to whom Nietzsche refers and responds.Rosen reads Nietzsche as a fundamentally political thinker, who seeks to transform humanity’s collective circumstances. The ultimate goal of this effort [End Page 193] is “to breed a new race of mankind” that would supersede the decadent existing race (p. 56). This positive aim, however, requires the destruction of the existing race to make room for the new one.Zarathustra, according to Rosen, is an artistic statement of these aspirations and a tactic for achieving them. From the beginning, Zarathustra calls for the appearance of the superman and the destruction of contemporary European culture. Aware of how far his contemporaries are from the superman, Zarathustra utilizes a double rhetoric, concealing his real intent from all but the select few.Zarathustra addresses noble lies to the crowd, which make his doctrines appear to be afrmative and salvational, but try to seduce the majority to their own self-destruction. Preaching the coming of the superman and the doctrine of eternal recurrence (the view that time recurs cyclically), Zarathustra’s real purpose is to accelerate nihilism and hasten the destruction of current European culture. This aim, however, is concealed by the seemingly afrmative character of these doctrines.Zarathustra’s esoteric message rests on Nietzsche’s materialistic reductionism, according to Rosen. Nietzsche understands reality, fundamentally, to be nothing but chaotic uctuations among accumulating points of force. Even the expression “will to power” suggests a more coherent ontological structure than reality exhibits. The doctrine of “will to power” is an exoteric idea that conceals Nietzsche’s belief that the world is a chaos of uctuating points of force. Will, subjectivity, and physics are all illusions that disguise a cruel and uncaring world.The doctrine of eternal recurrence, in its esoteric sense, reects this vision. Claiming that the sequence of temporal events recurs endlessly, the doctrine is an image for the universe’s spontaneous being, which has no inherent value. This vision is nihilistic, for it implies the illusory status of our subjective selves, any sense of progress, and even our scientic theories. If reality is ultimately chaos, our lives are meaningless.So understood, the doctrine of eternal recurrence is not obviously compatible with Zarathustra’s call for the superman. The superman project is doomed to fail, since eternal recurrence implies that the condition of decadence will recur, even if a superman is generated at some point. Eternal recurrence is also incompatible with amor fati, the love of fate that Zarathustra preaches. Eternal recurrence is an image of chance, of the random happening of force-points, while amor fati is a deterministic vision. Chance and necessity are the same in their human signicance. Both deny human freedom. Chance means that our behavior arises from the un-ordered movements of force points.One of the achievements of Rosen’s book is its mapping of such tensions within Zarathustra, tensions that motivate the drama of the book. These tensions are numerous. Zarathustra preaches the superman to those he seeks as followers, but followers are inherently incapable of the superman’s creative [End Page 194] spontaneity. Zarathustra’s bombast, used to attract attention, is in tension with the subtlety of his actual message. The activism implied by Zarathustra’s preaching is at odds with the fatalism of amor fati. The rank-ordering of human types, a feature of Zarathustra’s elitism, is incompatible with his inner doctrine that the world is chaos.Rosen concludes that some of these tensions... (shrink)