In modern science, established by the scientific revolution in 16th and 17th century, the scientific observation process is understood as a process where the observer directly grasps Nature as the observed and scientific mathematical formulation is understood as a direct description of reality. Husserl criticized this lack of distinction between method and the object of investigation in modern science and emphasized the importance of phenomena in the observation process. A similar approach was used by Bohr in his interpretation of quantum (...) experiments that seemed inexplicable from the modern science point of view. Many contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics follow Bohr’s opposition to the realism of modern science. Among them is informational foundations of quantum theory that connects parts of his interpretation with the latest quantum experiments, but due to the complexity and individuality of Bohr’s interpretation, its philosophical consistency is mostly lost. In IFQT there is no direct connection between information and the observed. This ambiguous ontic status of information is often criticised, however, it can be solved by supplementation with Husserl’s philosophical understanding of the observation process. If Husserl’s definition of the relationship between the thing and the phenomenon is transmitted to the relationship between the observed and information in IFQT information can be understood as the direct answer to the question about the observed and thereby the observer’s only knowledge about it. This helps to reject the main criticism of IFQT and to additionally support its explanations of quantum phenomena. (shrink)

The omnipresence of information and its role of the central/basic element within different contexts represents one of the main characteristics of our contemporaneity. In everydayness of inauthentic Da-sein the amount of pure information obscures deeper questions; nevertheless, the understanding of its role is crucial for the contemporary approach towards interpreting phenomena in our environment. Transfer of the concept of information is therefore crucial for the contemporary description of physical reality, evolution and for contemporary construction of the subjective time and its (...) link with the objective one, while its multiple connections with contemporary space-time can be most directly seen in literature. Reflection of these transfers by combining and rethinking their findings consequently emphasizes the vanishing border between different fields and makes complex, clear and contemporary review of the question and the partly constructed answer of us and our environment possible. (shrink)

Several contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics use the concept of information as a tool for addressing and explaining the quantum world. In the article, I focus on Zeilinger-Brukner's informational foundations of quantum theory. I propose that with a phenomenological approach—which, unlike most of the contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics, exceeds the mere dichotomy between realism and anti-realism—we can address the epistemological questions re-opened by IFQT and the parts of the interpretation that are recognized as problematic by its critics. After the (...) phenomenological supplementation IFQT can provide both, ontic and epistemic answer to the question "Why quantum?" As we apply Husserl's concept of the world as our common objective ground to the IFQT explanation, we can make a justifiable step away from the solipsism/subjectivism, which is, according to the critics, the main problem of IFQT. Thus, I propose in conclusion, a phenomenological approach to quantum physics can offer a background for the much needed dialog between realists and anti-realists as well as for a comprehensive contemporary interpretation of the quantum world. (shrink)

e accelerated development and the specialization of elds have in the last decades caused also the separation and specialization in the elds of science and philosophy. e individual philosophic systems have lost their complexity and connection with dierent layers of the life-world, and specialized themselves for special questions and problems, in much the same way as have the scientic disciplines. A renewed connection between phenomenology and physics would with an intertwining of a solid philosophic apparatus, concerned with the fundamental questions, (...) and a new physical knowledge, which reects the discussed reality, enable an approaching towards the answers to some of the essential questions. A connection between them would ensure not only a more solid interpretation and understanding of the physical phenomena, but also the actualization and a rmer installment of the philosophic deliberation, which by ignoring the actual physical knowledge omits one of the essential aspects of possible answers to the fundamental problems. (shrink)