The rigid relation principle, introduced in this article, asserts that every set admits a rigid binary relation. This follows from the axiom of choice, because well-orders are rigid, but we prove that it is neither equivalent to the axiom of choice nor provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without the axiom of choice. Thus, it is a new weak choice principle. Nevertheless, the restriction of the principle to sets of reals is provable without the axiom of (...) choice. (shrink)

We construct a computable vector space with the trivial computable automorphism group, but with the dependence relations as complicated as possible, measured by their Turing degrees. As a corollary, we answer a question asked by A.S. Morozov in [Rigid constructive modules, Algebra and Logic, 28 570–583 ; 379–387 ].

It is generally assumed that rigidity plays a key role in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of identity statements, both between proper names and between natural kind terms. However, while the notion of rigid designation is well defined for singular terms, there is no generally accepted definition of what it is for a general term to be rigid. In this paper I argue that the most common view, according to which rigid general terms are the ones (...) which designate the same kind in all possible worlds, fails to deliver a posteriori necessities. I also present an alternative view, on which the work of explaining a posteriori necessities is not done by rigidity, but by a related metasemantic notion, which I call actuality - dependence. (shrink)

Epistemic modal predicate logic raises conceptual problems not faced in the case of alethic modal predicate logic : Frege’s “Hesperus-Phosphorus” problem—how to make sense of ascribing to agents ignorance of necessarily true identity statements—and the related “Hintikka-Kripke” problem—how to set up a logical system combining epistemic and alethic modalities, as well as others problems, such as Quine’s “Double Vision” problem and problems of self-knowledge. In this paper, we lay out a philosophical approach to epistemic predicate logic, implemented formally in Melvin (...) Fitting’s First-Order Intensional Logic, that we argue solves these and other conceptual problems. Topics covered include: Quine on the “collapse” of modal distinctions; the rigidity of names; belief reports and unarticulated constituents; epistemic roles; counterfactual attitudes; representational vs. interpretational semantics; ignorance of co-reference vs. ignorance of identity; two-dimensional epistemic models; quantification into epistemic contexts; and an approach to multi-agent epistemic logic based on centered worlds and hybrid logic. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that questions about the semantics of rigid designation are commonly and illicitly run together with distinct issues, such as questions about the metaphysics of essence and questions about the theoretical legitimacy of the possible-worlds framework. I discuss in depth two case studies of this phenomenon – the first concerns the relation between rigid designation and reference, the second concerns the application of the notion of rigidity to general terms. I end by drawing (...) out some conclusions about the relations between rigid designation, semantic frameworks, reference, and essence. (shrink)

Between James Parkinson's 'shaking palsy' and the first report of the post-encephalitic manifestation — initially not recognizable as a complication of that incipient 'Spanish flu' epidemic — it took over a hundred years to arrive at a clear appreciation and differentiation of its most disabling feature: rigidity. This paper traces the development, step by hesitant or bold step, of the pertinent ideas and terms regarding muscle tone before and after Parkinson, their basis in neuropathological advances as they were made for (...) related syndromes of basal ganglia disorders, toward the eventual clinical correlation. Chief credits, after Sauvages, must go to Charcot for emphasizing the increase in muscle tone, and to Kinnier Wilson for establishing the extrapyramidal connection. (shrink)

The arguments by Pandres that the double valued spherical harmonics provide a basis for the irreducible spinor representation of the three dimensional rotation group are further developed and justified. The usual arguments against the inadmissibility of such functions, concerning hermiticity, orthogonality, behaviour under rotations, etc., are all shown to be related to the unsuitable choice of functions representing the states with opposite projections of angular momentum. By a correct choice of functions and definition of inner product those difficulties do not (...) occur. And yet the orbital angular momentum in the ordinary configuration space can have integer eigenvalues only, for the reason which have roots in the nature of quantum mechanics in such space. The situation is different in the velocity space of the rigid particle, whose action contains a term with the extrinsic curvature. (shrink)

The question of transtemporal identity of objects in general and persons in particular is an important issue in both philosophy and psychology. While the focus of philosophers traditionally was on questions of the nature of identity relation and criteria that allow to settle ontological issues about identity, psychologists are mostly concerned with how people think about identity, and how they track identity of objects and people through time. In this article, we critically engage with widespread use of inferring folk (...) judgments of identity from study participants’ use of proper names in response to experimental vignettes. We provide reasons to doubt that using this method one can reliably infer judgments of numerical identity over time and transformations. We also critically examine allegedly-Kripkean justification of this method and find it lacking. Merely assuming that names are rigid designators will not help. A study participant’s use of proper names can be taken to track the participant’s identity judgments only if supported by the participant’s belief that names used in the scenario are used rigidly. (shrink)

Mon but ici est de réconcilier deux conceptions relativement populaires dans leurs domaines respectifs : d’une part, la théorie des contreparties (TC) de David Lewis, en métaphysique modale, d’autre part, la thèse de la rigidité mise en avant par Saul Kripke en sémantique. De prime abord, le concept de rigidité ne semble pas pouvoir s’appliquer dans TC : un terme rigide est censé désigner le même objet au travers des mondes possibles, tandis que TC formule les conditions de vérité des (...) énoncés modaux de re en termes non pas d’identité transmonde mais de similarité comparative. Je soutiens néanmoins qu’il peut y avoir de la rigidité au travers des ressemblances. Partant d’une suggestion de Lewis, je montre qu’on peut définir un concept de rigidité, la rigidité lewisienne (rigiditéL), qui est adapté à TC. Malheureusement, la thèse de la rigiditéL ainsi reformulée bute sur un obstacle de taille : l’extrême prodigalité de la relation de ressemblance qui prévaut dans TC entraîne une prolifération des relations de contrepartie, ce qui a pour effet de trivialiser la thèse de la rigiditéL, en faisant de tous les termes singuliers, sans discrimination, noms propres aussi bien que descriptions définies, des désignateurs rigidesL. Suivant une piste d’Allan Gibbard et de Lewis, je propose alors de relativiser la rigiditéL à un aspect de similarité variable selon le contexte conversationnel. De là, je forge un concept plus contraignant, celui d’hyper-rigiditéL, à l’aune duquel le contrepartiste peut enfin capturer la différence entre noms propres et descriptions définies. (shrink)

The article discusses an idea of how to extend the notion of rigidity to predicates, namely the idea that predicates stand in a certain systematic semantic relation to properties, such that this relation may hold rigidly or nonrigidly. The relation (which I call signification) can be characterised by recourse to canonical property designators which are derived from predicates (or general terms) by means of nominalization: a predicate signifies that property which the derived property designator designates. Whether signification (...) divides into rigid and non-rigid cases will then depend uponwhether canonical property designators divide into rigid and non-rigid ones. But, I shall argue, they do not, and so the only notion of rigidity gained this way is trivial. To show this, I first focus on the kind of canonical property designators which could be thought to be nonrigid, canonical designators such as having the colour of ripe tomatoes which themselves contain non-rigid property designators. An argument to the effect that such complex canonical designators are non-rigid is rebutted, five arguments to the effect that they are rigid are formulated, and finally an explanation of their rigidity based on the general nature of canonical property designators is presented. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to discuss whether general terms are rigid and if they are, how their rigidity should be interpreted. To this end, I first present the problems related to the rigidity of general terms. The most important ones among them are the following: What do general terms refer to? Is there any difference between the terms called “natural kind terms” and other general terms? After that, I discuss the arguments of three competent interpretations which try (...) to overcome these problems. The first interpretation holds that general terms refer to (or apply to) each and every object in their extensions. According to this view, only general terms related to essential properties like “cat”, “gold” turn out to be rigid. After I try to expose the drawbacks of this view, I examine the arguments of the second interpretation which holds that general terms refer to abstract kinds. I also argue for this interpretation. According to this interpretation general terms which refer to the same kind in all possible worlds turn out to be rigid. The main objection to this view is that this interpretation makes so many general terms rigid and it trivializes the notion of rigidity. Arguing that this is an unfair objection, I also focus on the philosophical importance of the subject and show that the interpretation I argue for realizes this philosophical importance. The third interpretation, on the other hand, rejects the rigidity of general terms. I also discuss the drawbacks of this view. -/- Another subject I discuss in the thesis is the rigidity of artifactual kind terms. The kinds of human made objects for specific purposes are usually called “artifactual kinds”. I argue that artifactual kind terms could rigidly refer to artifactual kinds. I reply to the critiques of this view with regard to the semantics of artifactual kind terms and metaphysics of artifactual kinds. (shrink)

The principal question addressed is whether there is a division among common nouns which is similar to a familiar division among noun phrases that designate particular-level individuals: the one which is captured in the relevant literature as the difference between de jure rigid and not de jure rigid singular terms. In relation with the previous philosophical literature relevant to noun rigidity it is argued that the extant positions on the matter are not defended on the basis of (...) well-founded syntactic categories and proper semantic arguments. Proper ways to argue for rigidity ascriptions to nouns are described. Then, such arguments are sought for the case of rigid/non-rigid division among count common nouns. It is shown that there are plausible, albeit inconclusive, reasons to hold that among common nouns (N-bar expressions) only simple common nouns are kind designators, and that if that is the case these simple common nouns will have to be reckoned as de jure rigid designators. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with the problem of applying the notion of rigidity to general terms. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke has clearly suggested that we should include some general terms among the rigid ones, namely, those common nouns semantically correlated with natural substances, species and phenomena, in general, natural kinds -'water', 'tiger', 'heat'- and some adjectives -'red', 'hot', 'loud'. However, the notion of rigidity has been defined for singular terms; after all, the notion that Kripke has (...) provided us with is the notion of a rigid designator. But general terms do not designate single individuals: rather, they apply to many of them. In sum, the original concept of rigidity cannot be straightforwardly applied to general terms: it has to be somehow redefined in order to make it cover them. As is known, two main positions have been put forward to accomplish that task: the identity of designation conception, according to which a rigid general term is one that designates the same property or kind in all possible worlds, and the essentialist conception, which conceives of a rigid general term as an essentialist one, namely, a term that expresses an essential property of an object. My purpose in the present paper is to defend a particular version of the identity of designation conception: on the proposed approach, a rigid general term will be one that expresses the same property in all possible worlds and names the property it expresses. In my opinion, the position can be established on the basis of an inference to the best explanation of our intuitive interpretation and evaluation, relative to counterfactual circumstances, of statements containing different kinds of general terms, which is strictly analogous to our intuitive interpretation and evaluation, relative to such circumstances, of statements containing different kinds of singular ones. I will argue that it is possible to offer a new solution to the trivialization problem that is thought to threaten all versions of the identity of designation conception of rigidity. Finally, I will also sketch a solution to the so-called 'over-generalization and under-generalization problems', both closely related to the above-mentioned one. (shrink)

We show it is consistent that there is a Souslin tree S such that after forcing with S, S is Kurepa and for all clubs $$C \subset \omega _1$$ C ⊂ ω 1, $$S\upharpoonright C$$ S ↾ C is rigid. This answers the questions in Fuchs (Arch Math Logic 52(1–2):47–66, 2013). Moreover, we show it is consistent with $$\diamondsuit $$ ♢ that for every Souslin tree T there is a dense $$X \subseteq T$$ X ⊆ T which does not (...) contain a copy of T. This is related to a question due to Baumgartner in Baumgartner (Ordered sets (Banff, Alta., 1981), volume 83 of NATO Adv. Study Inst. Ser. C: Math. Phys. Sci., Reidel, Dordrecht-Boston, pp 239–277, 1982). (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for (...) definite descriptions. If we, like Kripke, account for this difference by means of the intensions of names and descriptions, we have to conclude that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, the difference in scope behavior between names and description can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their (standard) intension. The relational modality account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentences (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Given an alternative definition of consequence for relational modality, and a restriction to models with reflexive accessibility relations and non-empty world-bound domains, relational modality also turns out to be model theoretically equivalent with rigidity semantics with respect to logical consequence. Here we introduce the semantics, give the truth definition for relational modality models, and prove the equivalence results. (shrink)

Characterizations of autism include multiple references to rigid or inflexible features, but the notion of rigidity itself has received little systematic discussion. In this paper we shed some light on the notion of rigidity in autism by identifying different facets of this phenomenon as discussed in the literature, such as fixed interests, insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, black-and-white mentality, intolerance of uncertainty, ritualized patterns of verbal and non-verbal behavior, literalism, and discomfort with change. Rigidity is typically approached (...) in a disjointed fashion (i.e., facet by facet), although there are recent attempts at providing unifying explanations. Some of these attempts assume that the rigidity facets mainly relate to executive functioning: although such an approach is intuitively persuasive, we argue that there are equally plausible alternative explanations. We conclude by calling for more research on the different facets of rigidity and on how they cluster together in the autistic population, while suggesting some ways in which intervention could benefit from a finer-grained view of rigidity. (shrink)

In the last two sections of Structure, Thomas Kuhn first develops his famous threefold conception of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and, subsequently, a conception of scientific progress as growth of empirical strength. The latter conception seems to be at odds with the former in that semantic incommensurability appears to imply the existence of situations where scientific progress in Kuhns sense can no longer exist. In contrast to this seeming inconsistency of Kuhns conception, we will try to show in this (...) study that the semantic incommensurability of scientific terms appears to be fully compatible with scientific progress. Our argumentation is based on an improved version of the formalization of Kuhns conception as developed in the 1970s by Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmüller: In order to be comparable, incommensurable theories need the specification of relations that refer to the concrete ontologies of these theories and involve certain truth claims. The original structuralist account of reduction fails to provide such relations, because (1) it is too structural and (2) it is too wide. Moreover, the original structuralist account also fails to cover important cases of incommensurable theories in being too restrictive for them. In this paper, we develop an improved notion of “reduction” that allows us to avoid these shortcomings by means of a more flexible device for the formalization of (partially reductive) relations between theories. For that purpose, we use a framework of rigid logic, i.e., logic that is based on a fixed collection of objects. (shrink)

The term flow refers to a particular type of experience characterized by feelings of fusion with an on-going activity, effortlessness and fluidity. This article concerns the results of an empirical investigation and phenomenological analysis of this type of experience. The analysis yields a distinction between three phenomenological structures, identified as arising in different combinations within concrete experiences of flow. These results are discussed in relation to the theories of Alfred Schutz and Erving Goffman regarding the organization of experience in (...) everyday life, and in relation to the theory of Otto Friedrich Bollnow regarding moods in everyday life. The results of the analysis are also discussed in relation to different uses of the flow concept in a variety of contexts found in recent theoretical contributions. These differences of usage and approach are explained in the light of the results of the phenomenological analysis, which distinguishes qualitatively different varients within the phenomenon termed flow experience. In conclusion, the need to adopt a broader concept of experience in sociological analysis is emphasized, as well as the need for further empirical studies of the contextual frames of different variants of flow experiences. (shrink)

Saul Kripke's thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for (...) definite descriptions. If one, like Kripke, accounts for this difference by means of the intensions of the names and the descriptions, the conclusion is that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, this difference can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed 'relational modality', simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their descriptive content. That account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentence (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Here we present the relational modality account and compare it with others, in particular Kripke's own. (shrink)

Natural kind terms have exercised philosophical fancy ever since Kripke, in Naming and Necessity, claimed them to be rigid designators. He there drew attention to the peculiar, name-like behavior of a family of prima facie loosely related general terms of ordinary English: terms such as ‘water’, ‘tiger’, ‘heat’, and ‘red’. Just as for ordinary proper names, Kripke argued that such terms cannot be synonymous with any of the definite descriptions ordinary speakers associate with them. Rather, the name-like behavior of (...) these so-called natural kind terms is to be explained, just as in in the case of proper names, by the doctrine of rigid designation. And as a consequence of thus extending the notion of rigid designation to general terms, he famously endorsed the claim that so-called ‘theoretical identifications’, i.e. statements like (1) Water is H2O, are necessary, if true. (shrink)

O pentecostalismo é a religião que mais cresce, em número de fiéis, no Brasil de acordo com a última contagem populacional do IBGE. Este crescimento não se deu somente através dos métodos de evangelismo pessoal e de massa já empregados há anos pelas igrejas pentecostais, mas também teve um importante acréscimo se forem analisados os efeitos secularizantes da modernidade e que inevitavelmente afetaram essas igrejas. Com o incremento do número de pentecostais, houve também alterações significativas de suas tradições doutrinárias. Sendo (...) a secularização promovedora de pluralismo religioso, as denominações pentecostais passam por um processo de secularização, notadamente com um pluralismo doutrinário a fim de manterem-se plausíveis em meio à sociedade secularizada. Este trabalho cita o caso da igreja Assembleia de Deus, principal denominação pentecostal do País por seu número de fiéis, por sua trajetória histórica e sua consequente secularização. Palavras chave: Assembleia de Deus. Pentecostalismo. Pluralismo religioso. Secularização.The author points out that according to the latest data from the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), Pentecostalism is the fastest growing religion in Brazil. One reason for this growth binds to different methods of evangelism, used for many years by the Pentecostal churches. Another possible reason for the fast growth of Pentecostalism is related to the effects produced by the process of secularization of modernity that inevitably have affected the churches. Along with the increase in the number of Pentecostals, there were also significant changes in their doctrinal traditions. Because secularism promotes religious pluralism, the Pentecostal denominations undergo a process of secularization, especially with a doctrinal pluralism in order to maintain themselves plausible amid a secularized society. This paper cites the case of the Assembly of God church, a leading Pentecostal denomination in Brazil in terms of number of followers, and because of its historical trajectory and its consequent secularization. Keywords : Assembly of God. Pentecostalism. Religious pluralism. Secularization. (shrink)

The complexity of equivalence relations has received much attention in the recent literature. The main tool for such endeavour is the following reducibility: given equivalence relations R and S on natural numbers, R is computably reducible to S if there is a computable function f:ω→ω that induces an injective map from R-equivalence classes to S-equivalence classes. In order to compare the complexity of equivalence relations which are computable, researchers considered also feasible variants of computable reducibility, such as the polynomial-time reducibility. (...) In this work, we explore Peq, the degree structure generated by primitive recursive reducibility on primitive recursive equivalence relations with infinitely many equivalence classes. In contrast with all other known degree structures on equivalence relations, we show that Peq has much more structure: e.g., we show that it is a dense distributive lattice. On the other hand, we also offer evidence of the intricacy of Peq, proving, e.g., that the structure is neither rigid nor homogeneous. (shrink)

We investigate in an algebraic setting the question of which logical languages can express the properties integral, permutational, and rigid for algebras of relations.

Cross-linguistic studies focus on inverse correlations (trade-offs) between linguistic variables that reflect different cues to linguistic meanings. For example, if a language has no case marking, it is likely to rely on word order as a cue for identification of grammatical roles. Such inverse correlations are interpreted as manifestations of language users’ tendency to use language efficiently. The present study argues that this interpretation is problematic. Linguistic variables, such as the presence of case, or flexibility of word order, are aggregate (...) properties, which do not represent the use of linguistic cues in context directly. Still, such variables can be useful for circumscribing the potential role of communicative efficiency in language evolution, if we move from cross-linguistic trade-offs to multivariate causal networks. This idea is illustrated by a case study of linguistic variables related to four types of Subject and Object cues: case marking, rigid word order of Subject and Object, tight semantics and verb-medial order. The variables are obtained from online language corpora in thirty languages, annotated with the Universal Dependencies. The causal model suggests that the relationships between the variables can be explained predominantly by sociolinguistic factors, leaving little space for a potential impact of efficient linguistic behavior. (shrink)

Excerpt from La Notion du Necessaire Chez Aristote Et Chez Ses Predecesseurs, Particulierement Chez Platon: Avec des Notes sur les Relations de Platon Et d'Aristote Et la Chronologie de Leurs OEuvres Il est donc du plus haut interet de voir comment la question a ete posee et traitee par les Grecs. C'est chez Aristote qu'on saisit le mieux les difficultes qu'elle souleve. Dans la solution qu'il entreprend d'en donner, nous verrons constamment sa pensee se mouvoir, comme entre deux poles, entre (...) les deux propositions qui resument toute sa doctrine la necessite et l'uni versalite comme condition d'intelhgibilite, l'indi vidualite comme sujet du reel. Rien de fige chez lui les cadres rigides du systeme eclatent sans cesse sous la poussee des tendances contradictoires. Et cette contradiction meme n'est pas a eliminer elle est signe de richesse; elle fait le vivant interet de la pensee aristotelicienne. Nous mettrons en pleine lumiere ces tendances diverses, en meme temps que nous ferons effort pour voir, d'apres les textes eux-memes, com ment elles se concilient chez Aristote, sans chercher d'ailleurs a donner une solution qui ne pourrait etre logiquement satisfaisante qu'a condition d'etre histo riquement inexacte. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

A fundamentally new understanding of the classical electromagnetic interaction of a point charge and a magnetic dipole moment through order v 2 /c 2 is suggested. This relativistic analysis connects together hidden momentum in magnets, Solem's strange polarization of the classical hydrogen atom, and the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift. First we review the predictions following from the traditional particle-on-a-frictionless-rigid-ring model for a magnetic moment. This model, which is not relativistic to order v 2 /c 2 , does reveal a connection (...) between the electric field of the point charge and hidden momentum in the magnetic moment; however, the electric field back at the point charge due to the Faraday-induced changing magnetic moment is of order 1/c 4 and hence is negligible in a 1/c 2 analysis. Next we use a relativistic magnetic moment model consisting of many superimposed classical hydrogen atoms (and anti-atoms) interacting through the Darwin Lagrangian with an external charge but not with each other. The analysis of Solem regarding the strange polarization of the classical hydrogen atom is seen to give a fundamentally different mechanism for the electric field of the passing charge to change the magnetic moment. The changing magnetic moment leads to an electric force back at the point charge which (i) is of order 1/c 2 , (ii) depends upon the magnetic dipole moment, changing sign with the dipole moment, (iii) is odd in the charge q of the passing charge, and (iv) reverses sign for charges passing on opposite sides of the magnetic moment. Using the insight gained from this relativistic model and the analogy of a point charge outside a conductor, we suggest that a realistic multi-particle magnetic moment involves a changing magnetic moment which keeps the electromagnetic field momentum constant. This means also that the magnetic moment does not allow a significant shift in its internal center of energy. This criterion also implies that the Lorentz forces on the charged particle and on the point charge are equal and opposite and that the center of energy of each moves according to Newton's second law F=Ma where F is exactly the Lorentz force. Finally, we note that the results and suggestion given here are precisely what are needed to explain both the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift and the Aharonov–Casher phase shift as arising from classical electromagnetic forces. Such an explanation reinstates the traditional semiclassical connection between classical and quantum phenomena for magnetic moment systems. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Nietzsche collapses the rigid dichotomy between nature and culture, as well as body and mind, by insisting on their mutually constitutive nature. This forces him to reconceptualize the role of women, who had traditionally been considered to be wedded to both the natural realm and the body. Nietzsche hails women for their insight that culture can never capture nature, and for being attuned to the interplay between the two realms. He attributes an enormous (...) power to the maternal figure who becomes a symbol for life as a whole. Her power arouses his own resentment, and he redoubles his efforts to exclude her, once again driving a wedge between nature and culture. Key Words: feminism • Nietzsche • subjectivity • Zarathustra. (shrink)

The philosophies of education serve as the guide of the teachers in handling the teaching-learning process. However, a belief will remain as a belief unless it is practiced. This study aimed to find the relationship between the philosophical beliefs and practices of the 30 teachers of the schools in San Roque, Mabini, Bohol - San Roque Elementary School and San Roque National High School, S.Y. 2019-2020. The study utilized a quantitative method descriptive survey research design. The research instrument used was (...) a self-constructed questionnaire in which the reliability was tested by a Cronbach’s Alpha using Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) software. Simple percentage and weighted mean were some of the statistical treatments used. Kendall’s tau_b, a non-parametric test, was used to determine the correlation between philosophical beliefs and their equivalent pedagogical practices. All of the statistical treatments were also run using the SPSS software. Further, the researcher assured the proper observation of the research ethics protocol. Based on the results, the philosophies of Progressivism (3.63) and Perennialism (3.31) were the most and least prevailing philosophical beliefs, respectively. On the other hand, the most and least prevailing philosophies practiced are Progressivism (3.69) and Essentialism (3.19), respectively. Moreover, research findings revealed that there was a significant relationship between the philosophical beliefs of teachers and their pedagogical practices. In conclusion, this study claims that teachers’ pedagogical practices are dependent to their philosophical beliefs; and as the teachers believed on a particular philosophy of education, they practice it accordingly to the extent of their adherence to the belief. (shrink)

Barbarism was by no means unique to the past 100 years, Jonathan Glover tells us, but ''it is still right that much of 20th-century history has been a very unpleasant surprise.'' This was the century of Passchendaele, Dresden, Nanking, Nagasaki and Rwanda; of the Final Solution, the gulag, the Great Leap Forward, Year Zero and ethnic cleansing -- names that stand for killings in the six and seven figures and for suffering beyond comprehension. The technological progress that inspired the optimism (...) of the Victorians turned out also to multiply the effects of old-fashioned evil and criminal stupidity. (shrink)

Presents the fundamental ideas of Indian thinkers that have shaped the mind of Indian from 1770 to the post-modern era in the middle of 20th century in India. Lists the most Indian influential figures in the field of philosophy, political theory, activicism such as Rabindranath Tagore, Ram Mohan Roy, Swami Vivekananda, and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

My argument is that Chalmers' zombie fiction and his rigid-designator-argument going back on Kripke comes down to a petitio principii. Rather, at the core it appears to be more related to the essential 'privacy' of the phenomenal internal perspective. In return for Chalmers I argue that the 'principle self-preservation' of living organisms necessarily implies subjectivity and the emergence of sense. The comparison with a robot proves instructive. The mode of 'mere physical' being is transcended if, in the form of (...) phenomenal perception, sense appears on the stage of higher animals – a transition explained here as an emergence phenomenon based on the systemic co-operation of perception, valuation and action ('perc-val-act system'). Some fundamental considerations are added: Those consequences implied by the principle self-preservation reveal the natural-biological origin of the organism – primarily seeming a more insignificant circumstance – as a momentous fundamental difference (end-in-itself-character, subjectivity, constitution of sense) compared to technical artefacts (robot). And the emergentist approach indicates the – maybe paradoxical – possibility of a dualism of physical and psychical phenomena in an overall physical system, that is not dualistic at the same time. (shrink)

Biological taxonomists rely on the so-called ‘type method’ to regulate taxonomic nomenclature. For each newfound taxon, they lay down a ‘type specimen’ that carries with it the name of the taxon it belongs to. Even if a taxon’s circumscription is unknown and/or subject to change, it remains a necessary truth that the taxon’s type specimen falls within its boundaries. Philosophers have noted some time ago that this naming practice is in line with the causal theory of reference and its central (...) notion of rigid designation: a type specimen fixes the reference of a taxon name without defining it. Recently, however, this consensus has come under pressure in the pages of this journal. In a series of articles by Alex Levine, Joseph LaPorte, and Matthew Haber, it has been argued that type specimens belong only contingently to their species, and that this may bode problems for the relation between type method and causal theory. I will argue that this ‘contingency debate’ is a debate gone wrong, and that none of the arguments in defense of contingency withstand scrutiny. Taxonomic naming is not out of step with the causal theory, but conforms to it. However, I will also argue that this observation is itself in need of further explanation, since application of the type method in taxonomic practice is plagued by errors and ambiguities that threaten it with breaking down. Thus, the real question becomes why taxonomic naming conforms to the causal theory in the first place. I will show that the answer lies in the embedding of the type method into elaborate codes of nomenclature. (shrink)

This paper provides a detailed examination of Kit Fine’s sizeable contribution to the development of a neo‐Aristotelian alternative to standard mereology; I focus especially on the theory of ‘rigid’ and ‘variable embodiments’, as defended in Fine 1999. Section 2 briefly describes the system I call ‘standard mereology’. Section 3 lays out some of the main principles and consequences of Aristotle’s own mereology, in order to be able to compare Fine’s system with its historical precursor. Section 4 gives an exposition (...) of Fine’s theory of embodiments and goes on to isolate a number of potential concerns to which this account gives rise. In particular, I argue that Fine’s theory threatens to proliferate primitive sui generis relations of parthood and composition, whose characteristics must be stipulatively imposed on them, relative to particular domains; given its ‘superabundance’ of objects, Fine’s system far outstrips the already inflated ontological commitments of standard mereology; and there is a legitimate question as to why we should consider Fine’s primitive and sui generis relations of parthood and composition to be genuinely mereological at all, given their formal profile. These three objections lead me to conclude that we ought to explore other avenues that preserve the highly desirable, hylomorphic, features of Fine’s mereology, while avoiding its methodological and ontological excesses. (shrink)

The Rigidity Thesis states that no rigid term can have the same semantic content as a nonrigid one. Drawing on Dummett (1973; 1991), Evans (1979; 1982), and Lewis (1980), Stanley (1997a; 1997b; 2002) rejects the thesis since it relies on an illicit identification of compositional semantic content and the content of assertion (henceforth, assertoric content). I argue that Stanley’s critique of the Rigidity Thesis fails since it places constraints on assertoric content that cannot be satisfied by any plausible notion (...) of content appropriately related to compositional semantic content. For similar reasons, I also challenge a recent two-dimensionalist defense of Stanley by Ninan (2012). The moral is far-reaching: any theory that invokes a distinction between semantic and assertoric contents is unsatisfactory unless it can plausibly explain the connection between them. (shrink)

This article explores the contribution of the virtue of integrity to the concept of mature care. The virtue of integrity is understood as both a personal and a social virtue. The argument is that the virtue of integrity is a necessary condition for providing mature care. An example from a psychiatric acute ward illustrates that a nurse acting with the virtue of integrity displays clear self‐boundaries and self‐respect as well as respect towards the inherent integrity of the patient. The article (...) also addresses some problems related to lack of the virtue of integrity by discussing the problems connected to detachment and rigidity. (shrink)

In this paper, I elaborate on the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT) of tropes and substances, which I have defended elsewhere, using my metatheory about formal ontology and especially fundamental ontological form. According to my metatheory, for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order. The full fundamental ontological form is generically identical to a simple formal ontological relation or relations jointly in (...) an order. Regarding generic identity, I follow Fabrice Correia and Alexander Skiles, who consider it a form of generalized identity as distinguished from numerical identity. The SNT states that for any trope to have the full fundamental ontological form is for it to be a strongly rigidly or generically (existentially) dependent individual simple part. Therefore, the common dichotomous set-up of asking whether tropes are fundamentally properties rather than objects or vice versa is a non-starter to me in formal ontological terms. The elaboration of the SNT also supplies me with the resources to respond to the arguments against tropes by Douglas Ehring, Robert K. Garcia and Herbert Hochberg. Finally, I argue that non-fundamentally but necessarily, every trope is a proper part of a substance and is concrete in the SNT. (You may access the published paper via the external link below.). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is (i) to defend Frege's view that the referents of predicates are certain kinds of functions, or "concepts", i.e. incomplete entities, and not their extensions (i.e. sets of objects described by those predicates); and (ii) to justify, by a natural augmentation of Frege's semantic theory with modal ingredients, Frege's position that the sameness between concepts, or property-sharing, turns only on the sameness of extensions. Several problems with the doctrine that a predicate's extension is its referent (...) are presented, including the regress argument and an argument from the modern philosophy of language related to natural kind terms. In this connection, it is also pointed out that all referential expressions are in a sense rigid. (shrink)