Acta Philosophica Fennica 94:129-159 (2018)

Authors
Jani Hakkarainen
Tampere University
Abstract
In this paper, I elaborate on the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT) of tropes and substances, which I have defended elsewhere, using my metatheory about formal ontology and especially fundamental ontological form. According to my metatheory, for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order. The full fundamental ontological form is generically identical to a simple formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order. Regarding generic identity, I follow Fabrice Correia and Alexander Skiles, who consider it a form of generalized identity as distinguished from numerical identity. The SNT states that for any trope to have the full fundamental ontological form is for it to be a strongly rigidly or generically (existentially) dependent individual simple part. Therefore, the common dichotomous set-up of asking whether tropes are fundamentally properties rather than objects or vice versa is a non-starter to me in formal ontological terms. The elaboration of the SNT also supplies me with the resources to respond to the arguments against tropes by Douglas Ehring, Robert K. Garcia and Herbert Hochberg. Finally, I argue that non-fundamentally but necessarily, every trope is a proper part of a substance and is concrete in the SNT.
Keywords trope  substance  formal ontology  internal relation  generic identity  fundamentality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Some Formal Ontological Relations.E. J. Lowe - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (3):297-316.
Some Formal Ontological Relations.E. J. Lowe - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (3):297–316.
Two Ways to Particularize a Property.Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):635-652.
Tropes and Relations.Käthe Trettin - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12:155-159.
Tropes and Relations.Käthe Trettin - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12:155-159.
Questions of Ontology.Kathrin Koslicki - 2015 - In Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology After Carnap. Oxford University Press.
Tropes as Character-Grounders.Robert K. Garcia - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):499-515.
Trope Sheaves. A Topological Ontology of Tropes.Thomas Mormann - 1995 - Logic and Logical Philosophy of Science 3:129-150.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-10-16

Total views
212 ( #53,181 of 2,499,746 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #32,415 of 2,499,746 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes