The so-called war on terror has recently revived interest in the just-war tradition . George Weigel has played an important role in this renaissance, and his recent article on JWT has occasioned a new debate concerning its merits. At the heart of this debate is the nature of violence. Weigel holds that the JWT is not based on a presumption against violence, whereas his critics argue that it is. After critically summarizing Weigel’s position, I counter his divorcing of (...) the JWT from the presumption against violence. By looking closely at the terms used in the debate concerning this presumption, I show that violence, in the scholastic tradition that nurtured the JWT, is understood as disordered force. As disordered, violence is contrary to reason, and thus also to justice . If just war aims at order, it itself may not be disordered. Thus, I argue that the JWT is best described as a two-fold presumption against violence: a just war is waged to counter violence, and a just war may not itself use violence. Consequently, since the JWT, grasped as a presumption against violence, concludes the link between justice and ordered force as the link between end and means, it avoids abstract ethical intentionalism: the proper end of the just war, as opposed to a mere intention, dictates the means that it has at its disposal. (shrink)

This essay discusses four recent books on the Western, and one book on the classical Chinese, traditions of just war. It concentrates on the jus ad bellum moral criteria, giving attention to the centrality of the state in just war morality, to some challenges in reconceptualizing the jus ad bellum in the context of non-state agents, and to controversies over a “presumption against war.”.

The debate over whether the just war theory begins with a "presumption against violence" has raged among Christian ethicists for more than thirty years. One camp argues that the theory begins with a presumption against violence that can be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The other camp claims that the just war tradition instead begins with a presumption against injustice. A careful analysis of the debate, however, reveals that the term "presumption against violence" (...) has been used in three different ways, and that clarifying these usages can show the common ground in the debate and move it toward a resolution. (shrink)

For all its problems, there is still much to be gleaned from the argument-is-war paradigm. Much of the conceptual vocabulary that we use to talk about wars is commonly applied to arguments. Other concepts in the war-cluster can also be readily adapted to arguments. Some parts, of course, do not seem to apply so easily, if at all. Of most interest here are those war-concepts that have not been deployed in thinking about arguments but really should be because of the (...) light they can shed on argumentation. In particular, the concepts, principles, and lessons from Just War theory provide a valuable lens for looking at arguments. We can theorize about Just and Unjust Arguments. Ultimately, however, the analogy between arguments and wars breaks down. There is a strong presumption against wars. There can be no such generic presumption against arguments. The argument against argument is always context-specific. Thus, wars need to be justified in ways that arguments do not. Conversely, sometimes it can be the failure to argue that needs to be justified, again, in ways that a failure to go to war would not. Even so, self-defense justifications, the special justifications for pre-emptive attacks, and the possible need for humanitarian interventions can all be appropriately imported into the discourse of argumentation. (shrink)

War, Richard Norman reminds us, is treated as the great exception to the strong moral prohibition against the killing of other humans. Despite the widespread belief that war is, in many cases, permissible, its morally exceptional character suggests that there is a strong presumption against its permissibility. Norman argues that this presumption cannot be successfully rebutted and, in particular, that just-war theory, which attempts to provide such a rebuttal, fails in this endeavor. But Norman’s work is (...) more than a critique of just-war theory. He also takes up the more general task of demonstrating the basis of the moral presumption against war, that is, the basis and the nature of the prohibition against killing. This is a necessary preliminary, for only when we understand the prohibition can we adequately address the question whether the presumption against war that it establishes can be sustained. Norman provides interesting and subtle arguments concerning both the prohibition against killing and the just-war rebuttal to the presumption against war, but in the end it is not clear that his position can be coherently distinguished from the just-war position he criticizes. (shrink)

This essay challenges a "meta-theory" in just war analysis that purports to bridge the divide between just war and pacifism. According to the meta-theory, just war and pacifism share a common presumption against killing that can be overridden only under conditions stipulated by the just war criteria. Proponents of this meta-theory purport that their interpretation leads to ecumenical consensus between "just warriors" and pacifists, and makes the just war theory more effective in reducing recourse to war. Engagement with (...) the new meta-theory reveals, however, that these purported advantages are illusory, made possible only by ignoring fundamental questions about the nature and function of political authority that are crucial to all moral reflection on the problem of war. (shrink)

Contrary to the received understanding that Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez ruled out religious war by grounding just cause in natural law, they supported a robust view of papal authority for war when necessary for the defense of the church against heretics, schismatics, and pagans as well as for the spread of Christianity and Christendom throughout the world. They believed that religious wars were in accord with natural law as a means to its fulfillment in Christianity, as a (...) justification for the defense of the church as the one true faith, and as a moral obligation to provide all of humanity with the opportunity to receive Christian truth and grace. The neo‐Thomists' vigorous support for religious war was in the mainstream of the Christian just war tradition from the time of the wars against pagans in the early middle ages through their own time. This finding and the continuation into the modern era of sanctified patriotism stemming from the mixing of church and state especially during war that began in early Middle Ages, along with the historic roots of the recently prominent presumption against war, argue for a more complex understanding of the normative Christian just war tradition than that found among supporters of the classic interpretation of that tradition. (shrink)

The conduct of hostilities is very bad for the environment, yet relatively little attention has been focused on environmental military ethics by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. Contemporary ecological concerns pose significant challenges to jus in bello. I begin by briefly surveying existing literature on environmental justice during wartime. While these jus in bello environmental issues have been addressed only sparsely by just war theorists, environmental jus ad bellum has rarely been tackled within JWT or the morality (...) of war. In line with the theme of this special issue, I focus my discussion of war and the natural environment primarily on the jus ad bellum level. I set out with the presumption against the use of force, and its possible exceptions. The principal question raised is whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war. Beyond just cause, I consider what might be a proportionate response to “environmental aggression,” or negligent harm to nature. The use of force is clearly justified in response to military attacks, against the natural environment or otherwise. Where harm to nature or its inhabitants are not caused by military aggression, just war theory criteria point in favor of responding via measures short of war. Finally, I suggest that responding by means that are not themselves harmful to nature serves to fulfill the further jus ad bellum criterion of “right intention.”. (shrink)

The principle of absolute sovereignty may have been consigned to history, but a strong presumption against foreign intervention seems to have been left in its stead. On the dominant view, only massacre and ethnic cleansing justify armed intervention, these harms must be already occurring or imminent, and the prudential constraints on war must be satisfied. Each of these conditions has recently come under pressure. Those looking to defend the dominant view have typically done so by invoking international peace (...) and stability, or the value of communal self-determination. But the internal aspect of legitimacy has been overlooked in all of this. If a government insists on defending the human rights of foreigners, it must also be sure not to violate the rights of its own citizens in the process. I argue that the current presumption against humanitarian intervention cannot be substantially relaxed for internal reasons, or given the obligations that states owe to their own constituents. (shrink)

In this essay, I compare two pioneer thinkers of the “just war” tradition across cultures: Gratian in the Christian tradition, and Mengzi (Mencius) in the Confucian tradition. I examine their historical-cultural contexts and the need for both to discuss just war, introduce the nature of their treatises and the rudimentary theories of just war therein, and trace the influence both thinkers’ theories have had on subsequent just war ethics. Both deemed just cause, proper authority, and right intention to be necessary (...) conditions for initiating a just war. However, Gratian’s theory has a presumption against injustice whereas Mengzi’s theory has a presumption against war. As a jurist of the Church, Gratian sought to discriminate just from unjust wars, while Mengzi, a moral-political advisor to rulers, was more concerned with avoiding bloodshed and building lasting peace. In addition to examining these thinkers’ respective historical influences, I submit that Gratian’s Decretum and the Mengzi are pioneering in two more senses. First, they offer important clues to understanding how just war ideas were developed very differently in medieval Europe and in premodern China. Second, both embodied features that helped shape their subsequent intellectual tradition, which in turn molded the different legacies of these two works. (shrink)

Reinhold Niebuhr, the father of Christian realism, died in the early 1970s. Since that time, discussions in theological ethics have been dominated by two competing accounts of just-war rationality: the presumption against harm position (PAH) and the presumption against injustice position (PAI). Starting from the accounts of moral tragedy found in the PAI and PAH positions, this article argues that there are reasons for Christian realists to reject both positions. Basil Mitchell’s account of ‘cumulative case’ argumentation (...) provides a model for arguing about war that better fits with Christian realism than either of these alternative positions. (shrink)

In light of the well-established international legal principle of non-use of force in international relations, Nigel Biggar’s In Defence of War may give rise to concern in the academy of international lawyers. But the gap between the book’s conclusions and the current international law on the use of force turns out to be less significant upon closer inspection than at first sight. This essay reviews Biggar’s concept of ‘just war as punishment’, his view on the legal status of the ‘unjust (...) warrior’, and his position on ‘humanitarian intervention’ from the perspective of international law. The essay is critical of the relevant passages in several more specific respects. At the same time, the essay reads the book as an elaborate general word of caution against an overarching presumption in favour of a maximalist interpretation of the principle of non-use of force in international relations—and it finds merit in that cautionary approach. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that when states commit, assist, or culpably fail to prevent crimes against humanity against their own people, they should, subsequently, have primacy in prosecuting those crimes. They have a presumptive right (and duty) to punish perpetrators, and so a claim against third parties not to do so. In contrast to those who emphasise the importance of national sovereignty, I set out a victim-centred justification for this claim. I argue that victims of crimes (...) against humanity, and members of groups that have been targeted for these crimes, have a special interest in having their status as members of their political community re-affirmed. Punishment by their state of war-related crimes against them has the expressive function of re-affirming their status as equal members of their national community, and the state’s commitment to protecting their rights. I set out some reasons to think that this is valuable for victims and members of targeted groups. These interests, I argue, are weighty enough to ground the primacy of states in prosecution. (shrink)

Nelson Maldonado-Torres argues that European modernity has become inextricable from the experience of the warrior and conqueror. In _Against War_, he develops a powerful critique of modernity, and he offers a critical response combining ethics, political theory, and ideas rooted in Christian and Jewish thought. Maldonado-Torres focuses on the perspectives of those who inhabit the underside of western modernity, particularly Jewish, black, and Latin American theorists. He analyzes the works of the Jewish Lithuanian-French philosopher and religious thinker Emmanuel Levinas, the (...) Martiniquean psychiatrist and political thinker Frantz Fanon, and the Catholic Argentinean-Mexican philosopher, historian, and theologian Enrique Dussel. Considering Levinas’s critique of French liberalism and Nazi racial politics, and the links between them, Maldonado-Torres identifies a “master morality” of dominion and control at the heart of western modernity. This master morality constitutes the center of a warring paradigm that inspires and legitimizes racial policies, imperial projects, and wars of invasion. Maldonado-Torres refines the description of modernity’s war paradigm and the Levinasian critique through Fanon’s phenomenology of the colonized and racial self and the politics of decolonization, which he reinterprets in light of the Levinasian conception of ethics. Drawing on Dussel’s genealogy of the modern imperial and warring self, Maldonado-Torres theorizes race as the naturalization of war’s death ethic. He offers decolonial ethics and politics as an antidote to modernity’s master morality and the paradigm of war. _Against War_ advances the de-colonial turn, showing how theory and ethics cannot be conceived without politics, and how they all need to be oriented by the imperative of decolonization in the modern/colonial and postmodern world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey: Idealist and Pragmatic Christians on Politics, Philosophy, Religion, and WarBradley BurroughsReinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey: Idealist and Pragmatic Christians on Politics, Philosophy, Religion, and War Kevin Carnahan Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2010. 302 pp. $75.00.In a time when the “war on terror” and the polarization of American political culture have raised acute questions about politics, war, and the use of power, Kevin Carnahan (...) believes ethicists could benefit from the legacies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey. During a similarly vexed period, Niebuhr and Ramsey found themselves at odds over the morality of the Vietnam War. Carnahan’s project seeks to elucidate the underlying sources of this disagreement, examining in turn how each thinker construes the task of moral theology, the nature of political society, and the moral status of war. Throughout these treatments, Carnahan illustrates how Niebuhr and Ramsey elaborated “overlapping but divergent” positions profoundly influenced by their respective encounters with pragmatism and idealism.Even as he shows how Niebuhr modified the pragmatist inheritance and Ramsey the idealist, Carnahan highlights how both were shaped especially by the way in which these traditions sought to counter specific moral dangers. For pragmatists, the key danger lay in the kind of moral fanaticism that blithely assumes its own righteousness. Sensitized to this threat, Niebuhr articulated a moral theology centered upon an understanding of love as an ideal that is always relevant yet never fully realizable in history, a construal that subverts all pretensions to righteousness. Idealism, on the other hand, sets itself against the danger of atomistic individualism, which Ramsey opposed by depicting social institutions in their essential forms as “‘garments of skin’... with which God... clothed naked human relations” (129) and by characterizing love as fundamentally a matter of upholding the covenants implied in such institutions. Ultimately, Niebuhr’s opposition to fanaticism predisposed him to focus upon the idolatries at play in political society and war and allowed him rather early on to descry the pretentiousness of the Vietnam War. Meanwhile, Ramsey’s thought included a presumption in favor of supporting the policies developed by social and political leaders that led him to defend American intervention in Vietnam until sometime around 1973. [End Page 218]The book’s expository work is generally surefooted and illuminative, although it at times falls into redundancy, baldly reiterating its thesis. Nonetheless, it complements existing scholarship on Niebuhr and Ramsey with an investigation of the philosophical premises of their ethical thought that each was eager to conceal. Such work will benefit scholars of Niebuhr and Ramsey as well as advanced students seeking to grasp the general architecture of their thought. Moreover, many will find Carnahan’s interpretations of Niebuhr and Ramsey impressive. For example, Carnahan portrays Niebuhr as a more Barthian and ecclessially minded thinker than most accounts. Although Carnahan understandably does not treat such indictments in detail, his rendering undercuts charges leveled by many of Niebuhr’s critics, including Bennett, Yoder, and Hauerwas. Unfortunately, though, Carnahan’s arguments on some of these disputed points are predicated upon a relatively narrow selection of essays. Still, the book unsettles assumptions and suggests further possibilities for inquiry.In addition to his expository work, Carnahan also makes a further contribution as he subjects both Niebuhr and Ramsey to constructive criticism that exposes—and identifies ways of reinforcing—some of the weaknesses of pragmatism and idealism. Eschewing a synthesis, Carnahan instead offers a mutually constructive dialogue capable of helping thinkers of both stripes think through the issues that confront contemporary America. Even if he does not elaborate on a more precise application of his insights to contemporary politics, he offers advice helpful to pragmatists and idealists alike and leaves many of us hoping that he has more to say on such matters. [End Page 219]Bradley BurroughsEmory UniversityCopyright © 2012 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

MOST of us feel an aversion to lying and believe that it always stands in need of justification. One expression of this is to say that there is a prima facie duty not to lie. Another is Sissela Bok's "Principle of Veracity" which holds that lying has an "initial negative weight" so that there is always a presumption against telling a particular lie. Still a third variation can be found in Arnold Isenberg's "constancy principle" which holds that what (...) is inherently bad in any lie is the same for all, constant from one lie to the next. While these sorts of view are plausible, the literature on lying provides little in the way of a specific account for the negative weight inherent in all lies--their common disvalue. What follows is proposed as such an account, one which should also help clarify why some lies are worse than others, why some are excusable and others justifiable. Without presuming to be exhaustive, the view offered maintains that there are at least two inherent negative components of all lies; further, each of these inherent disvalues disposes the liar toward a particular, contingent harm. The inherent disvalues and the harms they threaten collectively constitute sufficient grounds for the presumption against lying. (shrink)

The deceased's prior consent to posthumous reproduction is a common requirement in many common law jurisdictions. This paper critically evaluates four arguments advanced to justify the presumption against consent. It is argued that, in situations where death is caused by sudden trauma, not only is there inadequate justification for the presumption against consent, but there are good reasons to reverse the presumption. The article concludes that the precondition of prior consent may be inappropriate in these (...) situations. (shrink)

(2002). Against war as a response to terrorism. Philosophy & Geography: Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 29-34.

In a world riven with conflict, violence and war, this book proposes a philosophical defense of pacifism. It argues that there is a moral presumption against war and unless that presumption is defeated, war is unjustified. Leading philosopher of non-violence Robert Holmes contends that neither just war theory nor the rationales for recent wars defeat that presumption, hence that war in the modern world is morally unjustified. A detailed, comprehensive and elegantly argued text which guides both (...) students and scholars through the main debates clearly but without oversimplifying the complexities of the issues or historical examples. (shrink)

As assisted reproductive technologies become increasingly popular, debate has intensified over the ethical justification for restricting access to ART based on various medical and non-medical factors. In 2010, the Australian state of Victoria enacted world-first legislation that denies access to ART for all patients with certain criminal or child protection histories. Patients and their partners are identified via a compulsory police and child protection check prior to commencing ART and, if found to have a previous relevant conviction or child protection (...) order, are given a “presumption against treatment.” This article reviews the legislation and identifies arguments that may be used to justify restricting access to ART for various reasons. The arguments reviewed include limitations of reproductive rights, inheriting undesirable genetic traits, distributive justice, and the welfare of the future child. We show that none of these arguments justifies restricting access to ART in the context of past criminal history. We show that a “presumption against treatment” is an unjustified infringement on reproductive freedom and that it creates various inconsistencies in current social, medical, and legal policy. We argue that a state-enforced policy of restricting access to ART based on the non-medical factor of past criminal history is an example of unjust discrimination and cannot be ethically justified, with one important exception: in cases where ART treatment may be considered futile on the basis that the parents are not expected to raise the resulting child. (shrink)

van Els, Paul. "Drie pleidooien tegen oorlog" (Three Pleas Against War). In Tien stellingen tegen Confucius: Het pleidooi van de Chinese wijsgeer Mozi, edited by Carine Defoort and Nicolas Standaert, 106–133. Kapellen: Uitgeverij Pelckmans, 2009.

We are living under an ever-present threat of nuclear destruction; The Revolution Against War is the first step towards a new worldview. These selected writings by Robert S. Hartman, and edited by axiologist Clifford G. Hurst, outline cultural, political, and moral discussions on war and peace. Robert S. Hartman at the age of 23, escaped from Germany shortly after Hitler was elected to power in 1933. He spent his life learning and teaching in a variety of fields as a (...) philosopher, business consultant, writer, activist, economist, ethicist, and mathematician. (shrink)

Warren Quinn suggests a presumption against usefully involving others in foreseeably harmful agency. Frances Kamm offers her Party Case, in which one throws a party only because one expects one’s guests will feel indebted to clean up, to argue that Quinn’s presumption should not apply to all agency undertaken because it will bring about this involvement but only to agency in which this involvement is intended. I offer impermissible and intentional variants of Party Case and consider other (...) cases to argue that the permissibility of usefully involving others depends on their independent rights, rather than whether their involvement is intended. (shrink)

This paper questions the moral foundations of the equal war-right to kill in international law. Although there seems to be a moral difference between fighting a just and unjust war, this need not reflect on our moral assessment of soldiers, since unjust combatants can be non-culpable by virtue of excuse. Under the aspect of immunity from blame, an equal war-right to kill is upheld, and belligerent equality restored among innocents. It must therefore be proven that innocent threats can be justifiably (...) killed. If this fails, there is nothing about the people who kill and are killed in war that justifies their killing. This leads to a strong presumption against war and to question the notion of just war. Further, there should be an incentive to increase protection of combatants in war. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis ed. by Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, Gerard F. PowersJames W. McCarty IIIPeacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis Edited by Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Gerard F. Powers Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010. 480pp. $27.00Peacebuilding results from a four-year research project sponsored by the Catholic Peacebuilding Network. A wide-ranging and interdisciplinary set of fifteen essays, Peacebuilding not only brings (...) to the fore the unique ways that Roman Catholic theology and practice has contributed to the global work of peacebuilding, but it also makes the case that the Catholic Church needs to develop a more robust theology of peacebuilding to complement and strengthen traditional Catholic approaches to the ethics of war and peace. The two most bold proposals along these lines are Daniel Philpott’s call for a papal encyclical on peacebuilding (92, 120) and Maryann Cusimano Love’s proposal of “just peace” criteria for guiding peacebuilding work in a fashion similar to the way “just war” criteria have guided the conduct of war (82, 425–27).Peacebuilding is organized into two main sections. The first documents and theorizes the work of Catholic actors and organizations in peacebuilding work. In one of the most helpful essays in this section, John Paul Lederach describes how the “ubiquitous presence” of the Catholic Church in a society is, in fact, one of the most unique contributions the Church has to make to global peacebuilding. Lederach uses the phrase “ubiquitous presence” to describe the unique role Catholic “actors” play within the “pyramid approach” to peacebuilding that he develops elsewhere (see Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Peacebuilding [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 79). Because of its hierarchical structure, the Catholic Church—especially in Catholic-majority countries—has the potential to cultivate peacebuilding allies among different sectors of a society: the elite, “midlevel” actors, and at the grassroots level. Many other peacebuilding actors—politicians, civil society activists, and the historic peace churches, for instance—do not have such a ubiquitous presence. While Lederach has previously emphasized the importance of midlevel actors in peacebuilding, in this essay he argues that the “ubiquitous presence” of the Catholic Church [End Page 213] in a society provides a basis for making connections for peacebuilding work among a range of sectors within a society. Several of the other contributors to this book draw on this observation and demonstrate its usefulness to a variety of settings. In my estimation, this is the most important contribution of the volume.The second section consists of six essays that both expand upon existing Catholic moral theology and make the case that Catholic theology needs to develop a more robust theology of peacebuilding. Here we find a range of arguments—from Robert Schreiter’s proposal for a practical theology of reconciliation and Peter Phan’s outline of a fourfold Catholic understanding of interreligious dialogue to Kenneth Himes’s discussion of the ways peacebuilding theory challenges and complements contemporary Catholic social teaching. Himes, in particular, claims that the current acceptance of a Catholic “presumption against war” requires a more robust Catholic approach to conflict transformation; in making his case, he draws on resonances between contemporary peacebuilding theory and recent reflections on jus post bellum (justice after war) as a new category of just war thinking.As in nearly every edited collection, the quality of the essays in Peacebuilding varies. I found the essays in the first section to be the most stimulating. Not only do they highlight the peacebuilding work the Catholic Church is currently doing around the world, they also ground their proposals for how we should understand and do peacebuilding from a Catholic perspective in relevant historical examples.Indeed, the varied nature of the essays in Peacebuilding is precisely what makes it a valuable resource for both researchers and teachers of peacebuilding. On the one hand, it includes essays that break new ground and move forward our understanding of the unique nature of Catholic peacebuilding. On the other, it includes essays that introduce the topic of peacebuilding to students of religion and ethics. This book, then, serves as an excellent resource for a range... (shrink)

Limited strikes are arguably different from war insofar as they are more circumscribed, less destructive, and cost less in blood and treasure to employ. However, what they can achieve is also considerably more circumscribed than what is set out by the goals of war. How do we morally evaluate limited strikes? As part of the roundtable, “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” this essay argues that we need to turn to the ethics of limited of force, orjus ad vim, to do (...) so. Two moral assumptions that are the keystone tojus ad vimcan shed light on the moral imperatives and ethical dilemmas of undertaking limited strikes. First, such strikes should be seen as an alternative to war, and not part of thejus ad bellumlast resort process. What I call the “Rubicon assessment” determines at what level force should be used: at the level of war, with all its costs and unpredictability, or at that of the more predictable and less costly limited force. Second, limited strikes should adhere to a “presumption against escalation”; that is, a moral commitment not to escalate to war. This essay highlights these moral principles in five different limited strike scenarios: “hot pursuit,” “red line,” “the last straw,” “the point of no return,” and “the right of retaliation.” The conclusion explores the notion of justice after limited strikes, or what I calljus post vim, to show that while what can be accomplished by limited strikes is inherently constrained, they can, if used morally and in tune with diplomacy, be of service in the quest for peace. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis ed. by Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, Gerard F. PowersJames W. McCarty IIIPeacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis Edited by Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Gerard F. Powers Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010. 480pp. $27.00Peacebuilding results from a four-year research project sponsored by the Catholic Peacebuilding Network. A wide-ranging and interdisciplinary set of fifteen essays, Peacebuilding not only brings (...) to the fore the unique ways that Roman Catholic theology and practice has contributed to the global work of peacebuilding, but it also makes the case that the Catholic Church needs to develop a more robust theology of peacebuilding to complement and strengthen traditional Catholic approaches to the ethics of war and peace. The two most bold proposals along these lines are Daniel Philpott’s call for a papal encyclical on peacebuilding (92, 120) and Maryann Cusimano Love’s proposal of “just peace” criteria for guiding peacebuilding work in a fashion similar to the way “just war” criteria have guided the conduct of war (82, 425–27).Peacebuilding is organized into two main sections. The first documents and theorizes the work of Catholic actors and organizations in peacebuilding work. In one of the most helpful essays in this section, John Paul Lederach describes how the “ubiquitous presence” of the Catholic Church in a society is, in fact, one of the most unique contributions the Church has to make to global peacebuilding. Lederach uses the phrase “ubiquitous presence” to describe the unique role Catholic “actors” play within the “pyramid approach” to peacebuilding that he develops elsewhere (see Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Peacebuilding [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 79). Because of its hierarchical structure, the Catholic Church—especially in Catholic-majority countries—has the potential to cultivate peacebuilding allies among different sectors of a society: the elite, “midlevel” actors, and at the grassroots level. Many other peacebuilding actors—politicians, civil society activists, and the historic peace churches, for instance—do not have such a ubiquitous presence. While Lederach has previously emphasized the importance of midlevel actors in peacebuilding, in this essay he argues that the “ubiquitous presence” of the Catholic Church [End Page 213] in a society provides a basis for making connections for peacebuilding work among a range of sectors within a society. Several of the other contributors to this book draw on this observation and demonstrate its usefulness to a variety of settings. In my estimation, this is the most important contribution of the volume.The second section consists of six essays that both expand upon existing Catholic moral theology and make the case that Catholic theology needs to develop a more robust theology of peacebuilding. Here we find a range of arguments—from Robert Schreiter’s proposal for a practical theology of reconciliation and Peter Phan’s outline of a fourfold Catholic understanding of interreligious dialogue to Kenneth Himes’s discussion of the ways peacebuilding theory challenges and complements contemporary Catholic social teaching. Himes, in particular, claims that the current acceptance of a Catholic “presumption against war” requires a more robust Catholic approach to conflict transformation; in making his case, he draws on resonances between contemporary peacebuilding theory and recent reflections on jus post bellum (justice after war) as a new category of just war thinking.As in nearly every edited collection, the quality of the essays in Peacebuilding varies. I found the essays in the first section to be the most stimulating. Not only do they highlight the peacebuilding work the Catholic Church is currently doing around the world, they also ground their proposals for how we should understand and do peacebuilding from a Catholic perspective in relevant historical examples.Indeed, the varied nature of the essays in Peacebuilding is precisely what makes it a valuable resource for both researchers and teachers of peacebuilding. On the one hand, it includes essays that break new ground and move forward our understanding of the unique nature of Catholic peacebuilding. On the other, it includes essays that introduce the topic of peacebuilding to students of religion and ethics. This book, then, serves as an excellent resource for a range... (shrink)

In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of actions which are seen as particularly problematic and presumed to be always or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly strong justification to override the presumption against them. One of these actions is assassination, in particular, assassination of heads of state. In this essay I argue that the presumption against assassination is incorrect. In particular, I argue that if in a given scenario (...) war is justified, then assassination of the enemy state's leader is also justified, and in fact ought to be pursued as a means short of war. I defend this position on both consequential and deontic grounds, arguing that assassination is both more discriminate than war and serves to harm only those most responsible for the situation which justifies war in the first place. I conclude by arguing that a norm of assassination, far from being a destabilizing force, as some have argued, would in fact serve to reinforce international norms of rights and respect for persons by making clear that tyrants and would-be oppressors cannot hide behind military forces or notions of sovereignty to protect themselves from judgment and retribution. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze two methods of reading archives: ‘against the grain’ and ‘along the grain’. First one focuses mainly on revealing what is marginalized and omitted in archive’s dominant narration. The other carefully studies the logic of an archive itself. As such, reading against the grain allows to reveal victims’ forgotten stories, while reading along the grain helps to understand perpetrators’ perspective that may further lead to better recognition of the mechanisms of organized violence. I apply (...) both approaches to the album War against War (1924) by Ernst Friedrich, which contains archival photographs from World War I. Keywords: War against War; World War I; archival photographs; reading against the grain; reading along the grain. (shrink)

Thomas Carson offers the most comprehensive and up-to-date investigation of moral and conceptual questions about lying and deception. Part I addresses conceptual questions and offers definitions of lying, deception, and related concepts such as withholding information, "keeping someone in the dark," and "half truths." Part II deals with questions in ethical theory. Carson argues that standard debates about lying and deception between act-utilitarians and their critics are inconclusive because they rest on appeals to disputed moral intuitions. He defends a version (...) of the golden rule and a theory of moral reasoning. His theory implies that there is a moral presumption against lying and deception that causes harm — a presumption at least as strong as that endorsed by act-utilitarianism. He uses this theory to justify his claims about the issues he addresses in Part III: deception and withholding information in sales, deception in advertising, bluffing in negotiations, the duties of professionals to inform clients, lying and deception by leaders as a pretext for fighting wars, and lying and deception about history, and cases of distorting the historical record by telling half-truths. The book concludes with a qualified defence of the view that honesty is a virtue.Readership: Scholars and advanced students of philosophy, as well as historians and students of history. (shrink)

The international law regulating resort to armed force, still known by the Latin phrase, the jus ad bellum, forms a principal substantive subfield of international law, along with human rights law, international environmental law, and international economic law. Among theologians, philosophers, and political scientists, just war theory is a major topic of study. Nevertheless, only a minority of scholars and practitioners know both jus ad bellum and just war theory well. Lack of knowledge has led to the erroneous view that (...) the two areas are in conflict. This article responds to this misapprehension, explaining the deep compatibility of international law and just war theory. Today's jus ad bellum, especially the peremptory norm against aggression, is not only the law; it also forms the minimum threshold of a just war under just war theory. In other words, for a war to be morally just, it must at least be lawful. To go to war in violation of the jus ad bellum is both a legal and a moral wrong. Compliance not only fulfills the general moral good of obedience to law; it forms the first step toward fulfilling moral obligations in the grave area of war. This characterization of the relationship between law and morality is seen in the history of the legal prohibition on force and in the actual set of rules that make up the contemporary regime. Comprehensive and persuasive accounts of the jus ad bellum and just war theory consistently reflect this thesis. (shrink)

There is a general presumption against arming outlaw states. But can that presumption sometimes be overturned? The argument considered here maintains that outlaw states can have legitimate security interests and that transferring weapons to these states can be an appropriate way of promoting those interests. Weapons enable governments to engage in wrongful oppression and aggression, but they also enable them to fend off predators in a manner that can be beneficial to their citizens. It clearly does not (...) follow from the fact that a state is oppressive or aggressive that it will never be a victim of wrongful aggression itself, and while an outlaw state’s primary aim in repelling such aggression will often be the preservation of its own power, its defensive manoeuvres will sometimes also serve its citizens’ interests. In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states may sometimes contribute to the protection of innocents. (shrink)

Do pacifists and proponents of justified violence share a starting point? Whether or not just war theory contains an embedded presumption against violence is an important and disputed question. Substantively it is important not only because it has implications for the possibility of dialogue among Christians of different persuasions but also because the belief that the tradition advances no moral reservations about the use of force may have the effect of lowering the moral barriers against the resort (...) to war. Conceptually it is important because it reflects a fundamental methodological disagreement concerning the meaning and resolution of conflicts among moral duties. (shrink)

This paper argues against assigning Zygmunt Bauman to the category of a ‘white’, ‘European’ theorist and the tendency to speak of an undifferentiated ‘Eurocentrism’. To argue this, I return to a set of articles by Bauman which reflected on the history of European Jewry. These encourage us to place Bauman in a historical and social context in which he is best identified as emerging from the racialized and classed politics of East European Jewry. Bauman traces how this group were (...) made the outsiders of the assimilatory project of West European Jewry then, as Jewish socialists, were victims of the political anti-Semitism of communist regimes. Not only does this encourages us to be critical of the claims that he spoke from an elite ‘white European’ position, it also has further lessons for sociology which, in its own ‘war against forgetfulness’, has tended to impose simplistic racialized and political categories onto theorists. (shrink)