Various approaches and methods are used in philosophical counselling. Two main trends can be observed: the first is the use of contemplative methods and the second constitutes approaches based on dialogical critical thinking. The author defends the idea that developing philosophical counselling on the basis of critical thinking presupposes that it is possible for counsellor and client to hold a philosophical dialogue where the relationship is one of expert/lay person. J. Šulavík has described this relationship in (...) greater detail. In the Socratic model, the philosopher and the lay person hold a dialogue whereby they ascertain opinions via inductive comparison and by defining things, creating a shared concept. While the Platonic and Enlightenment models were grounded in the authority of the expert philosopher, in the Socratic and postmodern models, the expert philosopher loses the power to manipulate those who know “less”. Lay people are not passive consumers of a particular “optimal” philosophy but through their own “philosophising” create philosophy and tailor it for themselves. While philosophising, therefore, the philosopher does not take on the role of “producer” of philosophy but of “adviser” (consultant). It is therefore supposed that people have a general need for philosophy and that ultimately they should create and reflect upon their own philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, Ran Lahav and others claim, helps clients deepen their philosophical self‐understanding. The counsellor's role is the minimalist one of providing the client with the philosophical tools needed for reflective self‐evaluation. Respect for the client's autonomy entails refraining from intervening with substantive moral criticism, theories, and methods; the client's ways of working out fundamental questions like ‘Who am I and what do I really want?’cannot be assessed by the counsellor in terms of their (...) truth‐value, but only in terms of whether they reflect the client's autonomous choice to express him/herself in a certain way. I argue that this view, which is informed by an anti‐realist account of self and life‐history, undermines the distinction between self‐knowledge and self‐deception. Once interpretive and criteriological free rein is given to the client, and once personal, pragmatic and aesthetic considerations take precedence over truth‐value, then the way is left open to clients to generate the most morally convenient self‐interpretation to suit their current needs. I defend the view that truth matters in philosophical counselling; more specifically, that there is a basic distinction between true and false forms of self‐understanding. To do this, I offer a broadly realist account of self and reflective self‐evaluation. If this is right, then philosophical counsellors shoulder a significant burden of responsibility in helping their clients achieve an accurate, defensible, action‐guiding and truth‐oriented self‐understanding. (shrink)

Philosophical counseling is an educational activity in which philosophers engage in dialogue with clients who wish to address questions or manage problems that arise during the course of everyday life. This chapter offers three contrasting perspectives on the question of what philosophical counselors do: first, an institutional scope of practice for philosophical counseling; second, an anecdotal list of common issues for which clients seek philosophical counseling; and third, a heterogeneous set of views by (...) several pioneers of philosophical counseling. From what we have seen thus far, it may already be clear that there exist both parallels and anti‐parallels between philosophical counseling and psychotherapy. First and foremost, anyone who wants to become a philosophical counselor should earn an accredited graduate degree in philosophy in whichever area of specialization captures their interest. (shrink)

I offer a method for philosophical counseling that is contrasted with Marinoffs. This version of philosophical counseling is primarily epistemic and suggests therapy as the examination of the justification of a client's beliefs, with a goal of enabling the client to change belief systems if the client so chooses.

Many philosophical counselors seem to be counselors who use or point to phil­osophical texts or use abstract indeed logical or rational methods when working with a client. I want to introduce the idea of a counseling philosopher, who uses the client’s own concrete experiences as the basis for philosophizing with the client about the nature of the client’s dilemma - using ‘the between’ (Buber) as that special creative space where one em­ploys the art of (...) philosophizing to the unique situation. Otherwise, the particularity of that client gets subsumed under theory or methods, much like what has happened in psychology and which gave rise to Achenbach’s criticisms of psychology/psychiatry. The dialogical of which Buber and Friedman speak is the give and take between client and counseling philosopher of understanding and expanding perceptions confirmed through the actual relationship. Philosophy as an art (and not a method) helps us restore the trust Buber talks about which allows us to engage the world directly and not through categories of thought grounded in psychological or philosophical texts and theories. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling is an approach that aims to assist people to deal with life events in an effective manner. As such, it is of interest to nurses who are concerned with helping clients who require assistance effectively to manage life events. The approach utilizes both ancient and contemporary philosophical promises and theories. On the promise side, it offers the belief that philosophy can be concerned with providing answers to the question of how people ought to live a good (...) or healthy life. On the theory side, it offers the belief that philosophical inquiry and theory can help people towards such answers. Thus the theory and practice of philosophical counselling is relevant to nurses whose practice aims to promote in their clients a good or healthy lifestyle. The practice of philosophical counselling, in a substance abuse centre, will be explored to demonstrate the theory and methods of the approach. (shrink)

Though there has been interest in philosophical counselling in South Africa since at least the 1990s little has been accomplished by way of formalizing and developing the practice into a profession. We ask what would be required for it to become a fully-fledged profession? We argue that in order to count as a profession, a practice must meet certain normative, cognitive, and organizational criteria, but that philosophical counselling in South Africa falls short both cognitively and organizationally. This has (...) implications for individual philosophical practitioners, it would seem, who cannot any longer consider themselves professionals. We argue that being a professional is not contingent on belonging to an established profession, but rather that to claim to be a professional is to claim that one can be trusted because one has the client’s good at heart. Exploring the idea of trust highlights again, though this time from an ethical rather than from a sociological perspective, that there is an urgent need to fill the cognitive and organizational gap that exists in South Africa. We propose that in order to facilitate the professionalization of philosophical counselling in South Africa, we should adopt an approach that focuses on the training of philosophical counsellors in the hopes that an organizational component will grow out of this rather than following previous attempts to put organizations first. (shrink)

This paper presents a general framework for philosophical counseling founded upon the distinction between philosophical discourse and philosophy as a lived experience. Clients enter counseling, usually, philosophically unsophisticated, but with a set of perspectives and a predicament. I outline the two general processes of philosophical counseling that address such a reported predicament.The first process---critique---involves a critical examination of the client’s philosophical perspectives, as they are related to the reported predicament. Through the use (...) of the Socratic method, the counselor attempts to examine the relation, meaning, implications, etc., of such perspectives. This, I argue, leads to a destabilization of the client, where previously unquestioned beliefs and values become doubtful. As such, a second process---creation---is needed in order to overcome the destabilization of the initial process. For this process to succeed, I argue, philosophical counseling must avoid the problem of suggestion by not relying on any first-order philosophical assumptions. (shrink)

Starting from the four principles of Pólya's problem-solving method, by analogy, in this paper we propose a new method of philosophical counseling. Thus, the objectives of this study are as follows: the review of several methods of philosophical counseling; justifying the need for a new method, which we called the IPAA method; developing the four principles – the principle of identification (I), the principle of planification (P), the principle of application (A) and the principle of assumption (...) (A). In order to achieve these, we took into account the fact that the nature of the philosophical problems faced by the clients of the philosophical counselors, whether they are existential, moral or metaphysical, can be solved on their own. Therefore, we argued that if in the first instance, clients really need the input of the philosophical counselors, as long as the latter uses the IPAA method – a problem-solving method – they can offer clients the opportunity to self-counsel. The novelty of the IPAA method consists in the fact that it offers the client, assisted and guided at the beginning by the counselor, the possibility to carry out the act of counseling outside the office, being empowered to apply the four methodical principles mentioned above. The present study is relevant in that the new IPAA method, a method focused on solving everyday problems, is a useful method for both philosophical counselors, as its application in the office helps them to train the clients in researching, understanding and assuming their own lives, as well as for the clients, because if they are assisted in the first instance by the counselor's expertise, they can independently clarify and solve their daily difficulties. (shrink)

When philosophers cultivate a professional interest in philosophical practice as a form of counseling therapy, the implicit bias of their practice is likely to emulate the “helping profession” model of client engagement. The effort seems noble enough, but emulating the model of the helping professions might actually be incommensurate with the philos­pher’s calling. The philosophical temperament emulates a less constraining but more aggressive model of intervention than we find operating in the professional domain of therapeutic (...) class='Hi'>counseling practices. While the philosophical temperament resolves to question and analyze its subject-matter without the encumbrances of social constraint or the promise of utility, it employs methods of philosophical questioning and analysis decidedly more agonistic than can be motivated under the auspices of the “helping profession” model of therapeutic intervention. The philosophical temperament is a challenging temperament, a probing, testing, exploring, engaging temperament whose only vested commitment is to further inquiry. After setting up this distinction between philosophical practice and the helping professions I pose some thoughts regarding the philosophical encounter within a counseling situation, with emphasis on the challenge of translating back and forth between the client’s subject matter and the philosopher’s frame of reference. In the course of negoti­ating these challenges, the philosophical temperament encounters two divergent paths we must learn to travel with equal facility: we must make room for beneficial critique in philosophical counseling while motivating effective critical perspective within the client’s own world-view. The challenge is to see such a philosophical encounter as a place of translation, in which the counselor’s philosophical temperament is exposed to the alterity of the client’s domain of experience without losing its critical facility. In this way, the philosophical encounter is exercised in a movement between worlds, as an interweaving dance of translation and innovation characteristic of a “place” of mutual engagement. The resulting tension in these dialogical encounters is a direct consequence of the philosophical intervention in a client’s personal life. The philosopher’s challenge is to negotiate carefully between two domains of translation (between the cognitive-emotive domain of lived-experience and the philosophical domain of conceptual thinking, reflective inquiry and critical analysis), and to establish connections between these domains to facilitate philosophical encounters in a space of shared listening. (shrink)

This paper introduces and examines the concept of permitted suicide in the context of philosophical counseling. It argues that clients suffering from serious, irremediable physical illnesses, such as Lou Gehrigs, multiple sclerosis, cancer, and HIV, should be free to philosophically explore the option of suicide with their philosophical counselors without undue fear of paternalistic intervention to thwart a rational suicide decision. Legal liability, professional duties, and qualifications of philosophical counselors who counsel such clients are explored. It (...) is argued that, within certain professional and legal limits, philosophical counselors are uniquely qualified to take on this professional challenge. (shrink)

Hume claims that judgment is the active device through which beliefs influence emotions. Without such a device, Hume reasons that beliefs and emotions would not in­teract at all, because beliefs are always about ideas while emotions are reactions to events in the world. Judgment is the link between the theoretical and the applied aspects of the human being, and is, if Hume is right, crucial for any system of philosophical counseling to be successful. No client would attempt (...) to modify his or her beliefs, or reflect on the thoughts of philosophers, without some expectation of an emotional payoff. The counseling process hinges on a link between reason and the emotions, but what is the nature of this link? Since judgment is itself (if we are lucky) a primarily rational process, the question of the connection between reason and the emotions seems to be left unanswered. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between reason and the emotions by taking judgment to be judgment of truth or falsity. Once a belief is deemed to be true by the client, an assessment is made as to how this truth will affect the client’s well being. I argue that this is true even if the client is severely depressed or believes that he/she does not deserve good treatment or good fortune, or seems otherwise unconcerned with his/her well being. If the truth is judged to be a threat to the well being of the client, an emotional reaction ensues. Likewise, if the truth is judged to be a benefit to the client, an emotional reaction will occur. I argue further that even though different truths will be taken as either benefits or threats depending on the client, the ultimate interpretation of the true statement as either benefit or threat will automatically generate an emotional response. If this ontology is correct, then the philosophical counselor will take as his/her primary role 1) a practitioner of epistemology (determining when beliefs are justified and true) and 2) a trainer in interpretation (determining when beliefs are to be interpreted as blessings or threats.). (shrink)

Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as an activity rather than a subject. Thus, his work is highly relevant to the contemporary philosophical counseling movement. This paper explores the ways in which his views on how to do philosophy shed light on how we can approach philosophical counseling. First, Witgenstein's anti-theoretical approach to conceptual analysis highlights the dangers of interpreting clients? symptoms in light of theory. Second, his notion that "pictures hold us captive" underscores the need to help (...) clients recognize unfounded assumptions underlying their apparent dilemmas. Finally, Wittgenstein's Socratic conception of philosophy as a means to lead an authentic life shows the value of philosophizing beyond the confines of the academy. (shrink)

Far more than the dialectic philosophy of Socrates, the rhetorical humanist tradition avoids objectivist epistemology, charts a traversable path to practical wisdom, and aptly highlights the importance of aesthetic style. In those and other ways, we argue, it offers a preferable historical basis for today’s philosophical counseling. Advocates of that contemporary practice tend to cite Socrates as its historical progenitor and favor the narrow propositional logic that is ascribed to him. Some practitioners, though, have also grown more attuned (...) to metaphorical and narrative elements in a client’s worldview. We aim to supplement their claims by drawing from principles of classical rhetorical theory, showing a way to rethink the practice of philosophical counseling today. (shrink)

The title of this paper is deliberately ambiguous. It could refer either to the central val­ue that philosophical counseling has for philosophy in general, or else it could refer to something (such as personal autonomy, or personal well-being) that philosophical counselors believe to be of value, and that they are able to help their clients pursue. In fact, this paper will be addressing both of these topics in order to demonstrate the links that hold between them, and, (...) in so doing, will attempt to further elucidate the nature of philosophical counseling itself. (shrink)

Tolerance is not neutrality, nor should tolerance in counselling be equated with a spiritual and emotional vacuum. Tolerance applies to style rather than stance, and a counsellor needs a conception of the ideal — broadly speaking, a moral position. Originally proclaimed against religious and political tyranny, the political ideal of tolerance has in the twentieth century become confused with permissiveness, and is thus sometimes charged with generating many of the ills of modern society, including crime and family breakdown. Counselling has (...) become the universal remedy, replacing punishment and compulsion. The counsellor needs (a) a view of human nature (b) a conception of what is good for those possessing that nature. Constants in the first mean there cannot be too much variation in the second. Society is varied and plural, so the counsellor must be non‐judgemental, but while this means accepting the person, it does not necessarily mean endorsing the conduct. A distinction is drawn between therapeutic and philosophical counselling; the latter considers a problem, where the former focusses on the client, but both may fall short of offering a holistic view. Counselling may also exacerbate some of the problems of modern life by too readily accepting the conditions which cause them. Some ethical problems raised by confidentiality and informed consent are discussed. It is concluded that the counsellor must be tolerant, but not morally ambivalent, nor a relativist. (shrink)

The current state of Ukrainian society is characterized by socio-economic instability, there are dynamic, unique processes in which each person is involved. In this connection, there are increasing demands on the professionalism of specialists in the field of practical psychology, their philosophical counseling in the context of postmodernism, aimed at helping people become the subject of their life, work, social and value relationships, to teach them to find meanings and maximize self-actualization. This is represented in the change of (...) priorities in the professional development of practical psychologists, its focus on the development of specialists' subjectivity, their ability to independently solve professional and life tasks. An important role in enhancing the development of professionalism is the understanding of the essential characteristics of existential professional activity, expressed most often in professional meanings and values. The basis of a meaningful professional and personal life is the key ability of the practical psychologist to see and accept the needs of the profession and life and to find the most correct explanations for them. The purpose of the article is to investigate the importance and necessity of the activity of a practical psychologist, its peculiarities, the study of types of psychological aid: counseling, psychological rehabilitation, correction, psychotherapy, training, education and prevention; as well as the need to identify the main areas of professional activity of practical psychologists in the context of postmodernism. (shrink)

Philosophical counseling is a diverse and burgeoning type of mental health service delivery. Despite competing approaches to theory and practice, the field has largely strayed from an ethical critique of its methodology and counselor training requirements. This article outlines several ethical considerations and training recommendations that are proposed to bolster the quality and effectiveness of philosophical practice. As philosophical counseling gains increasing recognition in North America, recently established national organizations in philosophical practice may profit (...) from revisiting their interim codes for professional conduct Proposed training suggestions for counselor preparation may further assist institutions and board-regulated agencies in establishing competent and acceptable standards of client care. (shrink)

This edited volume comprehensively examines the critical ethical challenges that arise in the practice of counselling and psychotherapy. It translates philosophical positions and professional ethical guidelines in a way that can be applied to practice. The various chapters focus on specific ethical issues that emerge in working with a range of different client groups; for example, children, couples and families. While some ethical imperatives are common across the board, others could be more closely associated with certain client (...) groups. Practitioners might experience uncertainty in working with vulnerable client groups; for example, lesbian/gay/transgender/intersex (LGBT) clients, or persons who report intimate partner violence. Several chapters raise questions, provide information and additional resources to enhance ethically informed practice. Chapter contributions also highlight the ethical dilemmas that might be unique to certain contexts; for example, private practice, schools and consultation-liaison settings. This volume also addresses contemporary and relatively less understood playing fields like 'digital ethics' related to therapist-client interface in the internet space and the navigation of ethical dilemmas in the newly emerging field of employee assistance programmes which address mental health needs in the corporate sector. Written by experienced practitioners of psychotherapy, and culturally contextualized, this is a valuable resource for academics and practitioners interested in psychotherapy and counselling. (shrink)

This paper recounts experience from the author’s philosophical counseling supervision experience. The paper then gives an overview of the narrative turn in bioethics, showing how the bioethical narrative turn disputes the assumption that client case notes can provide reliable empirical information about what happens in philosophical counseling sessions. The paper concludes that interpretation by philosophical peer reviewers is an in-eliminable aspect of peer review. Accountability for our counseling practices and improvement in them requires (...) that we avoid a solipsistic stance and submit in some way to the interpretive interventions of other philosophical counselors. (shrink)

Why do counsellors and psychotherapists practice? What is the purpose? What real benefit does the client gain and what benefit accrues to society as a whole? Do liberal and postmodern values leave counselling and psycho-therapy vulnerable to being devalued by consumerism, individualism and relativism? This unique text subjects counselling and psychotherapy to a proper and thorough moral and ethical analysis. Using radical new theories, the author opens up the field of counselling to rational debate, giving it a thorough analysis (...) that is political, sociological and philosophical in outlook. Drawing on the communicative ethics of Habermas, he provides a new basis for understanding the purpose of counselling and psychotherapy. Using an argument that is both challenging and stimulating, the liberal and postmodern approaches are decisively investigated and rejected. Of interest to specialists and non-specialists alike, this work offers a new vision for counselling, which is both appealing and soundly argued. (shrink)

The article addresses a common difficulty of counselors in confronting clients with the problems in their thinking and behavior in a way that they could start benefiting from a constructive self-reflective state in the long run, a state that would replace the common tendency to hide oneself, to blame, to victimize or to repress aspects of their humanity connoted as negative in order to maintain a positive self image. The highlight is on the main characteristics of efficient confrontations with oneself (...) and others, so as to engender reasoning competence training without an unnecessary loss in the quality of the consultative relationship. Working in psychotherapy and having progressively integrated more philosophical work into this professional practice, the author puts together a few concepts and ideas that are likely to facilitate the processes in the psychotherapeutic and the philosophical approaches to intrapsychic and interpersonal dialogue. (shrink)

Moral distress is a well-documented phenomenon in the nursing profession, and increasingly thought to be implicated in a nation-wide nursing shortage in the US. First identified by the philosopher Andrew Jameton in 1984, moral distress has also proven resistant to various attempts to prevent its occurrence or at least mitigate its effects. While this would seem to be bad news for nurses and their patients, it is potentially good news for philosophical counselors, for whom there is both socially important (...) and philosophically interesting work to be done. In an effort to encourage such work, this paper explicates the philosophical (as opposed to more purely psychological or institutional) contours of the problem. A subsequent paper, titled 'A Philosophical Counseling Approach to Moral Distress,' will highlight ways in which such a response would differ from the strategies so far deployed within the nursing profession. (shrink)

This volume describes the main theoretical aspects of this practice based on an open-ended dialogue between a philosophical practitioner and a client or a group ...

To claim that respect is one of the cornerstones of professional ethics is uncontroversial. However, it has become commonplace in the philosophical literature to distinguish between different kinds of respect. This paper considers the distinction between ‘recognition respect,’ said to be owed to persons as such, and ‘appraisal respect,’ said to be owed to those persons whom merit it, in the context of the professional–client relationship. Using the practice of counselling as an example, it is argued that both (...) kinds of respect have a place in the professional–client relationship, which is in turn articulated as a relationship between equally fallible moral agents. (shrink)

This is Michael Picard's translation of Gerd Achenbach’s _Philosophische Praxis_ Beset by life-problems you can neither get rid of nor solve? Stuck? Over- or under-burdened by reality? Not living up to your potential? Philosophical Praxis is the alternative to psychotherapy for people not satisfied to muddle through life or merely exist. Not a method or a teaching, not diagnosis, treatment, or therapy, not a ready-made rule of life for you to conform to. It is no preformed application, but the (...) use of philosophy to aid the individual, organization and society to come to self-understanding, so that people may thrive and live up to being themselves. Philosophical Praxis is not the prepossession of any trained philosopher, but a specialization in the practice of philosophy aimed to liberate guests (not ‘clients’) through sympathetic co-thinking toward their own fresh appraisals of their life and its circumstances. This book is the chief statement of German philosopher, Gerd Achenbach, founder of Philosophical Praxis, who in pioneering this revival of philosophy for life spawned a global movement. (shrink)

Ancient philosophical schools developed and discussed perspectives and practices on the emotion of anger useful in contemporary philosophical practice with clients, groups, and organizations. This paper argues the case for incorporating these insights from four main philosophical schools (Platonist, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic) sets out eight practices drawn from these schools, and discusses how these insights can be used by philosophical practitioners with clients.

Reasoning can promote psychological development, so even if the role of philosophical counselor is defined strictly in terms of assisting the reasoning of the client, we can expect client-centered philosophical inquiry to yield psychological benefits. The practices of philosophical counseling and psychotherapy permeate one another to some degree while also diverging in characteristic focus. Philosophical counselors are particularly well suited to helping clients think through their situation in the world.

To the Editor: I was glad to see the Times taking an interest in the growing field of philosophical counseling, as evidenced by its March 21 article “The Socratic Shrink”. However, while providing...

Being a relatively new practice started by Gerd Achenbach no more than 40 years ago, the methods and techniques implied in philosophical counseling, as well as the qualities a philosophical counsellor should possess are still up for debate. The theme of the current paper revolves around the traits of the philosophical counselor, starting from Roger Paden’s statement that the three characteristics identified by Carl Rogers as being essential for a counsellor are also suitable when it comes (...) to philosophical counsellors as well, with the mention that the approach should nonetheless be modified when it comes to unconditional positive regard, as he believes it to be incompatible with the nature of philosophical counselling. Our thesis is that the two are not incompatible and that, at least in the case of alienation, the philosophical counsellor should also grant the client unconditional positive regard. In support of our thesis, we will bring Rogers’ own ideas, Ran Lahav’s view of philosophical counselling as creating a link between philosophical discourse and everyday life, as well as the perspectives developed in the area of community philosophy. (shrink)

Regularly, the question on the quality of philosophical practice is raised. Practicing philosophers, policy makers, scientists and last but not least clients wonder how to assess the quality of philosophical practice. Professionals want to value the format of different practices and clients want to know what to expect from visiting a philosophical practice. Understanding the quality of philosophical practice is important for determining its value and its role in society. Quality indicators can provide such information. A (...) quality indicator is not a norm or criterion. A quality indicator is a sign or signal evoking reflection on the structure and process of the philosophical practice and the outcomes of the philosophizing that takes place there. As quality is an abstract phenomenon related to the way or how a philosophical practice is, the quality indicator should inform us on “the how”of a philosophical practice. With respect to the philosophizing in philosophical practice, reflexivity seems to be essential for recognizing it as philosophy. Just like the color of a litmus paper points at the presence or absence of an acid in a solution, the presence or absence of reflexivity informs us about the quality of the dialogue in philosophical practice. Reflexivity deepens such a dialogue every time it is applied. When applied consciously by the philosophical practitioner it can be called intentional depth. This intentional depth determines the quality of a philosophical practice. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss my early career as a failed philosophical practitioner when the field of philosophical counseling was still in its infancy. I describe setting up a private practice and discuss various details from my field notes with regards to some of the earliest clients I received. I further depict experimenting with philosophical group therapy in an inpatient psychiatric unit of a general hospital, which by all objective standards turned out to be a disaster. (...) Musings on how philosophy may be successfully applied in the consulting room is considered through a phenomenological-existential approach to therapy. (shrink)

Critiques existing theoretical approaches and practices of philosophical counseling and presents a new model.

The article poses three questions relating to the self-definition of philosophical counselling: 1. Is it an alternative to psychological and psychotherapeutic approaches? 2. What is the therapeutic nature of philosophical counselling? 3. Is it contemplation or critical reasoning? The first part introduces some examples of the concepts that sharply distinguish philosophical counselling from psychological and psychotherapeutic approaches. It also considers those that mix these different approaches. The second part deals with the question of whether or not (...) class='Hi'>philosophical counselling can be considered to be a therapy. Some philosophical counsellors work on the belief that there is a synchrony between modern philosophical counselling and the classical conception of philosophy as therapy. Many, however, are of the opinion that it is not possible to speak of it in terms of therapy. The third part gives examples of the way in which philosophical counselling is understood to be contemplation and on the other hand of those who employ approaches based on critical thinking in philosophical counselling. (shrink)

The main aim of this essay is to open up an area of philosophical counseling that may be described as philosophical counseling for philosophers, where philosophical disabilities or impairments can be identified and treated. This is done by going to the field of mental imagery, which is the context in which the author presents his own imagery impairments and the negative impact they have had on his work in philosophy. The author also tries to show (...) how attending to differences in imaging ablity can help to settle such classic disputes in philosophy as that between Locke and Berkeley on abstract general ideas. (shrink)

In this paper, we deal with the issue of contradictory beliefs, particularly with regard to Philosophical Counseling: both voices from the philosophical tradition (with no claim of being exhaustive!) and concepts developed by philosophical practitioners will be considered, in order to make clear what a wide range of resources for dealing with contradictions is available to the philosopher who may wish to engage in Philosophical Counseling. Among the philosophical practitioners, we devote special consideration (...) to Ben Mijuskovic and Gerd Achenbach, and this for two main reasons: first, because the issue of contradiction plays a central role in their concept of Philosophical Counseling and, accordingly, it is given special consideration in their writings; second, because their approaches to Philosophical Counseling are so different that by looking at them one can get an impression of the variety of the positions one can adopt in Philosophical Counseling with respect to the issue of contradiction. (shrink)

This paper completes an argument that the problem of moral distress offers philosophical counselors an opportunity to do work that is both socially useful and philosophically interesting in its own right. A previous Philosophical Practice article answered the question, What's Philosophical About Moral Distress? by conceptualizing it as a phenomenon that arises within a moral worldview (Matchett 2018). The present paper investigates ways in which a philosophical counseling response to moral distress might differ from the (...) strategies deployed by the nursing profession to date. Though they are often quite subtle, the presence of some differences opens the possibility that philosophical counseling might be more effective than those strategies; in addition to helping individual nurses feel better, this could strengthen the nursing profession's efforts to mitigate nursing shortages and enhance quality of patient care. Though case studies are necessary to support these claims, there are reasons to think they are warranted. (shrink)

This paper approaches philosophical counseling practice from the idea that philosophy itself is primarily a way of living and only secondarily a subject matter to be grasped and comprehended. Three things are shown to follow from this view: first, charging a fee for access to this practice is inimical to the practice itself; secondly, contrary to scientific ‘objectivity’ as the means to truthspeaking, this view of philosophy calls for a consciously articulated autobiographical expression or personal admission on the (...) part of the philosophical practitioner; and, finally, an understanding of philosophical counseling practice emerges from this view of philosophy that is depicted as naturally occurring therapeutic interacting. (shrink)

This article explores various interpretations of philosophical counselling. These interpretations are determined by the nature and status of the key concepts from which they are derived. The first is “critical thinking”, which a number of authors have based their conceptions on; just two examples are mentioned in the article—Elliot D. Cohen and Tim LeBon. Many philosophical practitioners, especially those whose philosophizing is influenced by Socrates, use critical thinking, and indeed believe that it is what philosophical practice is (...) all about. Pierre Grimes is another example of someone who has been influenced by Socrates. Eckart Ruschmann and Ran Lahav believe that interpreting world beliefs is the basis of philosophical counselling. Others think philosophical counselling stems from interpretations of the concept of “wisdom”. The article also discusses Ran Lahav’s more recent views and those of Gerald Rochelle. The concept of “virtues” is discussed in relation to the work of Arto Tukiainen, Lydia B. Amir and Jess Fleming. (shrink)

권태는 지루함이나 따분함의 감정 이외에도 낙담, 우울, 냉담한 마음 등과 같은 인간 정신의 어둡고 우울한 면을 반영하는 기분이다. 이런 권태의 기분은 인간을 사로잡는 본질적이고 근원적인 것으로 어느 시대를 막론하고 누구에게나 나타나는 현상이기 때문에 하이데거는 근본기분(Grundstimmung)이라고 말한다. 근본기분은 인간 현존재가 그때마다 바로 지금 거기서 자기의 존재 가능과 관련하여 자기 존재로 존립하게 하는 하나의 주요 계기이자 인간 현존재가 드러나며 개시(開示)되는 현존재의 근원적인 존재 방식이다.4세기 이집트 사막에서 은둔 수도 생활을 했던 사막교부 에바그리우스는 권태(아케디아)를 체계화시킨 최초의 인물로서 그의 주저 『프락티코스』에서 ‘아케디아’(ἀκηδία)를 다루고 있다. 아케디아는 (...) 수도승의 수행 생활을 방해하는 여덟 가지 ‘로기스모이’(λογισμοι 악한 생각들)중의 하나로 영적 태만, 영적 무기력, 나태, 게으름, 우울, 냉담한 마음과 같은 영혼의 내적 상태를 의미한다.사막의 수도승도 오늘을 사는 현대인도 인간이 처한 환경에서 근본기분으로 느끼는 ‘권태’의 모습은 하나로 수렴될 수 있다. 하이데거는 권태가 지닌 두 가지 구조 계기를 “붙잡힘”(Hingehaltenheit)과 “공허에 내맡김”(Leergelassenheit)이라고 분석한다. 우리는 일상에서 권태로움을 견디지 못하고 ‘시간 죽이기’(Zeitvertreib)를 하지만 이런 시간 죽이기와 관련된 표면적 권태는 오히려 우리가 불필요한 일에 몰입하게 만듦으로써 역설적으로 우리를 공허 속으로 내민다. 하이데거는 인간이 시간 죽이기와 무관한 “그저 지루할 뿐인 깊은 권태”, 즉 근본 권태와 마주할 때 비로소 진정성 있게 자기 존재와 공명하게 된다고 말한다. 하지만 일상성에 빠져있는 ‘그들’(das Man)은 권태를 일깨우는 것이 아니라 오히려 그것에 대항하여 떨쳐내려고 하고, 현존재의 심연 밑바닥까지 내려가는 일을 피하곤 한다. 철학상담은 권태로 인해 삶의 의미를 잃어버리고 공허와 우울 및 무기력에 빠진 사람들에게 인간의 근원적 존재 방식에 대한 이해와 수용, 그리고 침묵 속에서 일상에 새로운 의미를 주는 ‘경이’의 발견이라는 철학적 통찰로 내담자를 안내하고 공감적 대화로 동반하면서 내담자 스스로가 자신을 초월하여 진정한 자기됨으로 나아가도록 도울 수 있다. (shrink)

State statutes, case law, and professional codes of ethics in the mental health professions typically stress either a duty or the permissibility of disclosing confidential information in order to prevent clients from seriously harming themselves. These sources are intended to address cases where clients are deemed to be suffering from cognitive dysfunction for which paternalistic intervention, including involuntary hospitalization, is considered necessary to prevent self-destructive behavior.The counselor’s moral and legal responsibility is less apparent when mentally competent clients desire suicide as (...) release from irremediable suffering due to severe physical illness, and this desire is defensible within these clients’ value systems. This paper will explore moral and legal dimensions of a counselor’s decision not to intervene in such cases. The concept of permitted suicide will be introduced and defined, and guidelines for its application developed. (shrink)

This commentary shows how philosophical counseling offers an alternative way for consultants to facilitate "closure" in bioethical disputes.

Outlined are several ways in which philosophical knowledge can contribute to personal and social well-being. In the introduction, "What is Philosophical Practice, Counseling, and Psychoanalysis" I describe how the ancient philosophical tradition of care for the soul or self has been revived among philosophers and others in the last twenty-five years. The sections "The Philosophical Counseling Hotline" and "Personal Well-being and the Philosophical Café '" are accounts of specific applications of ideas of the (...) contemporary German philosopher Gerd B. Achenbach, the founder of the international philosophical practice movement. In the conclusion "Philosophical Benevolence" I argue for benevolence as a skeptical touchstone for philosophy in practice. (shrink)

Notwithstanding recent successes of philosophical counseling, which appear to be leading to its legitimization as a professional practice in America and abroad, many forces concen to condition its emergent structure and function. This paper briefly elucidates some of the influences to which philosophical counseling is subject, that lie beyond its unilateral control. These include its portayal by the media to the public, its scope of practice, its relations with psychology and psychiatry, its foreseeable effects in particular (...) cases, and its perception by (and of) analytical philosophy. (shrink)

The practice of ‘Philosophical Counselling’ (henceforth ‘PC’) is growing. But what exactly is PC? The variety of attempts to define PC can be summarised in terms of three overlapping sets of opposites: practical versus theoretical definitions; monistic versus pluralistic definitions; and substantive versus antinomous definitions. ‘Practical’ definitions of PC include descriptive accounts of its actual practice. ‘Theoretical’ definitions exclude such accounts. ‘Monistic definitions’ refers to definitions of PC that define it in terms of the work of one specific philosopher (...) or approach in philosophy. ‘Pluralistic’ definitions draw on the work of a variety of philosophers or approaches. ‘Substantive’ definitions are definitions that purport to say what PC is, while ‘antinomous’ definitions of PC say what it is not . My aim is not to define PC definitively. The aim of this article is rather to: (i) provide an overview of the wide variety of efforts to define PC; and, (ii) briefly suggest a preliminary understanding of PC that seems to cover most of the other definitions thereof. For David Fourie (1946-2013). (shrink)

The last two and a half decades has seen the emergence of philosophical counseling. While it is practiced in many countries comparatively little has been said on its general character. In this paper I will seek to understand philosophical counseling by exploring its points of convergence to and deviation from its complimentary parts – philosophy and counseling. The practical and applied orientation of philosophical counseling seems worlds apart from what many consider to exemplify (...) philosophy – theoretical, intellectual and abstract concern with foundational questions. Given this it is worth exploring how philosophical counseling coincides with what is understood in academic circles as philosophy. On the other hand, the field of counseling has largely been the domain of psychology. Given the influence and orientation of the practice it would seem likely that philosophical counseling would be significantly different from the common conception of psychological counseling, but in what ways? Understanding how the practice lies in relation to the discipline of philosophy and psychological counseling will go some way to grasping its nature. (shrink)