This book is mainly a study of research–work in criminology in Britain and America; it is a very competent report on what the social scientist knows about criminality by one who has the practical experience of the magistrate’s court, allied to the theoretical knowledge of the sociologist. It was written “for the interested layman”. The work is in three parts: Part I, which is the most strictly sociological, presents a picture of the “social pathology” of England and Wales, and then (...) reviews the theories “explaining” criminality; Part II, which might be considered as an exercise in the sociology of knowledge, considers the changing attitudes towards the criminal, and the effects of the rise of psychiatry; Part III, draws conclusions, methodological and practical. (shrink)

At the turn of the twentieth century, so-called “glass diseases” seriously affected the use of scientific and technical glassware. It had become apparent by 1900 that glass, a supposedly neutral and inert material, not only interacted with its environment but also interfered with anything it contained—chemically, physically, and biologically. Starting from the assumption that modern laboratory research depends on containers that regulate the spatial, material, and epistemic enclosure of its experimental milieus and objects, this essay argues that the standardization of (...) glass quality from the 1900s to the 1930s must be understood as a reconfiguration of a “marginal” but nonetheless constitutive element of modern laboratory environments. The aim here is thus to weave various threads together into an (un)natural history of a modern material, one that considers epistemology, technology, and ontology—or, more specifically, the changing requirements and functions of glassware in the modern laboratory, the invention of specifically adapted glass substances, and the parallel advancement of glass science and its theories of what glass actually is. (shrink)

Modern man's pathology of normalcy -- The concept of mental health -- Humanistic science of man -- Is man lazy by nature?.

Benenson et al. provide a compelling case for treating greater investment into self-protection among females as an adaptive strategy. Here, we wish to expand their proposed adaptive explanation by placing it squarely in modern state-based and behavioural life-history theory, drawing on Veit'spathological complexityframework. This allows us to make sense of alternative “lifestyle” strategies, rather than pathologizing them.

This paper is a response to Christopher Boorse's recent defense of his Biostatistical Theory of health and disease. Boorse maintains that his concept of theoretical health and disease reflects the "considered usage of pathologists." I argue that pathologists do not use "disease" in the purely theoretical way that is required by the BST. Pathology does not draw a sharp distinction between theoretical and practical aspects of medicine.

An original study of late Enlightenment aesthetics, poetics, and environmental medicine as overlapping ways of comprehending the dislocations of historical existence lodged in the movements of bodies and minds This book studies later eighteenth-century medicine, aesthetics, and poetics as overlapping forms of knowledge increasingly concerned about the relationship between the geographical movements of persons displaced from home and the physiological or nervous "motions" within their bodies and minds. Looking beyond familiar narratives about medicine and art's shared therapeutic and harmonizing ideals, (...) this book explores Enlightenment and Romantic-era aesthetics and poetics in relation to a central but less well known area of eighteenth-century environmental medicine: pathology. No mere system of diagnosis or classification, philosophical pathology was an art of interpretation, offering sophisticated ways of reading the multiple conditions and causes of disease, however absent from perception, in their palpable, embodied effects. For medical, anthropological, environmental, and literary authors alike, it helped to locate the dislocations of modern mobility when a full view of their causes and conditions remained imperfectly understood or still unfolding. Goodman traces the surprising afterlife of the period's exemplary but unexplained pathology of motion, medical nostalgia, within aesthetic theory and poetics, arguing that nostalgia persisted there not as a named condition but as a set of formal principles and practices, perturbing claims about the harmony, freedom, and free play of the mind. (shrink)

In 1905 two different microbes were proposed to fill the vacant role of etiologic agent for syphilis, one, the Cytorrhyctes luis, by John Siegel, the other, Spirochaeta pallida, by Fritz Schaudinn. After gathering and reviewing the evidence the majority of medical scientists decided in favor of Schaudinn's candidate. In a previous issue Jean Lindenmann challenged Ludwik Fleck's suggestion that under suitable social conditions Siegel's candidate could just as well have won acceptance by the scientific community (). To refute this counterfactual (...) thesis, Lindenmann presented an asymmetric account of the dispute over the etiology of syphilis. He adopted the view of the proponents that Schaudinn's spirochete had already been there in syphilitic lesions for centuries, only awaiting the discovery of an appropriate staining technique to be revealed. Here a more symmetric analysis of the episode will be attempted, paying serious attention to the arguments put forward by the spirochete's opponents, who expatiated on the many possibilities of inadvertently creating artifacts through microscopic preparation and staining. The symmetric account that is presented in this rejoinder thus aims to trace the simultaneous construction of facts and artifacts. It will not, however, resurrect Fleck's counterfactual thesis. (shrink)

More than three decades after its advent in political science, rational choice theory has yet to add appreciably to the stock of knowledge about politics. In Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory we traced this failure to methodological defects rooted in the aspiration to come up with universal theories of politics. After responding to criticisms of our argument, we elaborate on our earlier recommendations about how to improve the quality of rational choice applications. Building on suggestions of contributors to this (...) volume, we lay out an empirically based research program designed to delineate the conditions under which rational choice explanations are likely to be useful. (shrink)

Boyer & Lienard's (B&L's) biological model of ritual achieves a rather straightforward account of features shared by ritual pathology and the idiosyncratic rituals of children; but complexities accrue in extending it to human ritual culture generally. My commentary suggests that the ritual cultural traditions of animals such as songbirds share structural features, handicap-based origin, as well as the enabling neural mechanism of vocal learning with human ritual culture. (Published Online February 8 2007).

This article examines the construction of image recognition algorithms for the classification of plant pathology problems. Rooted in science and technology studies research on the effects of agricultural big data and agricultural algorithms, the study ethnographically examines how algorithms for the recognition of plant pathology are made. To do this, the article looks at the case of a German agtech startup developing image recognition algorithms for an app that aims to help small-scale farmers diagnose plant damages based on digital (...) images of their symptoms. The study posits that the construction of these algorithms can be grasped as a succession of layers, at each of which the startup’s employees carry out different selection practices. It is argued that these practices gradually inscribe a selective recognition of the phenomenon of plant pathology into the algorithms of the app. This selective recognition is reflected in the fact that the emerging algorithms are effective in identifying isolated plant damages on isolated crops, while ignoring most agroecosystem-related actors and relations through which plant damages arise. The article concludes that the app’s selective recognition of plant pathology is likely to perpetuate or even exacerbate the pesticide use of its users. This is because the app’s view of plant pathology as a phenomenon comprised of isolated plant damages on isolated crops is more compatible with the use of chemical pesticides than with approaches to crop protection that strive for a more moderate use of these substances (e.g., integrated pest management, agroecology, organic agriculture). (shrink)

In their pursuit of adaptively biased misbelief-making systems, McKay & Dennett (M&D) describe a putative doxastic shear-pin system which enables misbeliefs to form in situations of extreme psychological stress. Rather than discussing their argument, I consider how this shear-pin system might combine with both pathological belief-making ( breakdowns caused by neuropathy) and normal belief-making to explain a spectrum of delusions.

Though the resurgence of Hindu nationalism as a political phenomenon is well-understood, Meera Nanda is correct in suggesting that the ascendancy of Hindutva has other dimensions, such as the avent placed by cultural nationalist on 'Vedic science'. However, apart from this rudimentary insight, Nanda's contribution, far from being a resounding demonstration of potmodernism's complicity in the projects of Hindu nationalism, is a striking testament to her own commitment to a rigidly positivist, ferociously intolerant, and intellectually sterile conception of modern (...) science and the Enlightenment rationality which she views as the pinnacle of human achievement. Nanda displays an impoverished understanding of the scholarly contributions of the last three decades and is unable to countenance the idea of a plurality of sciences; at the same time, in veiw of her deliberate conflation of Hindutva with Hinduism, and her attempts to equate Hinduism as such with Nazism, it is clear that Hinduism itself stands condemned, and not merely resurgent Hindu nationalism. Nanda's book is an indiscriminate and uninteresting assault upon the innumerable enemies of reason, and it is, ironically, likely to have the result of further eroding confidence in self-proclaimed champions of rationality such as herself and the modern science of which she claims herself to be a true and peerless inheritor. (shrink)

In order to address why the number of patients suffering from anxiety and depression are seemingly exploding in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) countries, it is sensible to look at the evolution of human fearfulness responses. Here, we draw on Veit's pathological complexity framework to advance Grossmann's goal of re-characterizing human fearfulness as an adaptive trait.

In his Contributions to Philosophy, Martin Heidegger introduces "acceleration" as one of the three symptoms--along with "calculation" and the "outbreak of massiveness"--of our technological way of "being-in-the-world." In this article, I unpack the relationship between these symptoms and draw a twofold conclusion. First, interpreting acceleration in terms of time pathologies, I suggest the self is becoming increasingly fragmented and emotionally overwhelmed from chronic sensory arousal and time pressure. This experience makes it difficult for us to qualitatively distinguish what matters to (...) us in our everyday lives, resulting in a pervasive cultural mood of indifference, what Heidegger calls "profound boredom." Second, by drawing on Heidegger's hermeneutic method, I argue that the practice of mainstream psychology, by adopting the reductive methodology of the empirical sciences, largely ignores our accelerated socio-historical situation, resulting in therapeutic models that have a tendency to construct and perpetuate the very pathologies the psychologist is seeking to treat. (shrink)

Between 2001 and 2006 there was an ‘epidemic’ of complete withdrawal from daily life among numerous children in refugee families seeking asylum in Sweden. It became embedded in many distinct controversies, including the politics of immigration, and acrimonious disagreements between pediatricians dealing with individual families, and government-employed sociologists commissioned to report on what was going on. Most of the cases resolved themselves when an amnesty was agreed in 2006, although there remain many doubts about the statistics. After describing this phenomenon, (...) the paper proposes a model called Imitation & Internalisation. Most of the children may have begun by imitating others who had fallen ill, but soon internalized it to the extent that it became an integral part of their psychophysical and social constitution. The model can be applied to phenomena as diverse as hypnotism, the placebo effect, and catching faith by association with believers. (shrink)

The taxonomy proposed by Pessoa et al. should be extended to include “pathological” completion phenomena in patients with unilateral brain damage. Patients with visual field defects (hemianopias) may “complete” whole figures, while patients with parietal lobe damage may “complete” partial figures. We argue that the former may be consistent with the brain “filling-in” information, and the latter may be consistent with the brain ignoring the absence of information.

This paper, "The Ecological Pathology of Man," is an expanded excerpt from the author's book, "The Pathology of Man: A Study of Human Evil." ¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶ When taken as a serious and dispassionate object of study from the standpoint of the science of pathology, the human species is easily recognized as a global pathogen. Incontrovertible evidence on all sides tells us this, and yet we have steadfastly avoided an honest look in the mirror. We so often choose—willfully and with strong (...) convictions sustained by homocentric prejudice—to hide the facts from ourselves, and to proceed with untroubled ignorance to overlook the worldwide human and natural devastation for which our species is responsible. (shrink)

In 1905 two different microbes were proposed to fill the vacant role of etiologic agent for syphilis, one, the Cytorrhyctes luis, by John Siegel, the other, Spirochaeta pallida, by Fritz Schaudinn. After gathering and reviewing the evidence the majority of medical scientists decided in favor of Schaudinn’s candidate. In a previous issue Jean Lindenmann challenged Ludwik Fleck’s suggestion that under suitable social conditions Siegel’s candidate could just as well have won acceptance by the scientific community . To refute this counterfactual (...) thesis, Lindenmann presented an asymmetric account of the dispute over the etiology of syphilis. He adopted the view of the proponents that Schaudinn’s spirochete had already been there in syphilitic lesions for centuries, only awaiting the discovery of an appropriate staining technique to be revealed. Here a more symmetric analysis of the episode will be attempted, paying serious attention to the arguments put forward by the spirochete’s opponents, who expatiated on the many possibilities of inadvertently creating artifacts through microscopic preparation and staining. The symmetric account that is presented in this rejoinder thus aims to trace the simultaneous construction of facts and artifacts. It will not, however, resurrect Fleck’s counterfactual thesis. (shrink)

Abstract:We examine the moral and managerial significance of some empirical studies in cognitive psychology. We suggest that these results may plausibly be interpreted as expressing deontological commitments of experimental subjects, even though psychologists who discuss the results seem to suppose that they show that people are irrational consequentialists. We argue that the plausibility of our interpretation suggests how managers who wish to take seriously entrenched social views on morality might best craft corporate policy on corporate responsibility, and we suggest that (...) the form of argument we employ may be regarded as a kind of appeal to reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

emantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the Truth-Teller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the Truth-Teller and the Open-Pair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relative-truth: the truth value of a pathological sentence (...) use varies with the context of its assessment. It always has a determinate truth value, but this truth value is relative to the context of its assessment. I start by considering a fairly esoteric pathology: the Truth-Teller, that is, sentences which assert nothing but their own truth. I make the case that truth value of a given truth-teller use must in general depend on the context of its assessment, and that one can indeed change its truth value at will. I then show how the notion of assessment-sensitive truth can help us provide solutions to other semantic paradoxes such as the Liar and the Open Pair and that those solutions are immune to revenge problems. I conclude by situating my proposal among the main approaches to the semantic paradoxes, and by drawing a very broad moral about pathological self-reference and intentionality. (shrink)

The Normal and the Pathological is one of the crucial contributions to the history of science in the last half century. It takes as its starting point the sudden appearance of biology as a science in the 19th-century and examines the conditions determining its particular makeup.Canguilhem analyzes the radically new way in which health and disease were defined in the early 19th-century, showing that the emerging categories of the normal and the pathological were far from being (...) objective scientific concepts. He demonstrates how the epistemological foundations of modern biology and medicine were intertwined with political, economic, and technological imperatives.Canguilhem was an important influence on the thought of Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser, in particular for the way in which he poses the problem of how new domains of knowledge come into being and how they are part of a discontinuous history of human thought. (shrink)

Delusions are usually defined as false beliefs about the state of affairs in the public world. Taking this premise as unquestionable, the debate in cognitive science tends to oscillate between the so-called 'rationalist approach'- proposing some breakdown in the central intellective modules embodying human rationality - and the 'empiricist approach' - proposing a primary peripheral deficit , followed by explanatory efforts in the form of delusions. In this article the foundational assumption about delusion is questioned. Especially in the case (...) of schizophrenia, delusions are not epistemic statements about external world but metaphorical reports of altered structure of experiencing . Delusions as epistemic statements or beliefs occur paradigmatically in delusional disorder . These two types of delusions are compared from a primarily phenomenological stance. (shrink)

The article is the text of a lecture given at the Faculty of the Humanities, March 2001. It argues that one implication of recent advances in the sciences of life may be that the binary opposition of the normal and the pathological is put into question. Canguilheim’s distinction between vital and social norms is challenged and superseded by a Foucauldian genealogical approach to programs for the government of individuals, and the norms of life that emerged in the nineteenth and (...) twentieth centuries are argued to be fundamentally social. Viewing genetics, biopsychiatry, and the commercialisation of drug development and biomedicine, the author argues that the logic of normalisation is loosing its hold, and being replaced by strategies for the continuous molecular management of variation, the modulation of susceptibilities, and the capitalisation of life itself. (shrink)

What is now familiarly referred to as the ‘embryonic stem (ES) cell’ is a recent biological category whose origins lie in research into benign and malignant teratomas carried out in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. In these studies, the question of the normal or pathological character of the ES cell was a matter of considerable debate and indeed the term ES cell was often used interchangeably with that of the embryonal carcinoma (EC) cell. This article argues that the indecisiveness (...) of the entity known as the ES cell—its refusal to commit to established demarcations between the normal and the pathological—continues to haunt the field of stem cell science. Exploring the prehistory of research into ES cells, early theories of cancer (in particular the embryonal theory expounded by Julius Cohnheim) and recent theoretical critiques of the somatic mutation theory, the article not only points to a shift in understandings of the normal and the pathological but asks under what conditions such shifts are able to take place. (shrink)

A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOCICAL CONSTITUTION: A SELF-REFERENTIAL, TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH TO CONCEPTUAL PATHOLOGY. (Vol. I: French; Vol. II: English) -/- Steven James Bartlett -/- Doctoral dissertation director: Paul Ricoeur, Université de Paris Other doctoral committee members: Jean Ladrière and Alphonse de Waehlens, Université Catholique de Louvain Defended publically at the Université Catholique de Louvain, January, 1971. -/- Universite de Paris X (France), 1971. 797pp. -/- The principal objective of the work is to construct an analytically precise methodology which can serve (...) to identify, eliminate, and avoid a certain widespread _conceptual fault_ or _misconstruction_, called a "projective misconstruction" or "projection" by the author. It is argued that this variety of error in our thinking (i) infects a great number of our everyday, scientific, and philosophical concepts, claims, and theories, (ii) has largely been undetected, and (iii), when remedied, leads to a less controversial and more rigorous elucidation of the transcendental preconditions of human knowledge than has traditionally been possible. The dissertation identifies, perhaps for the first time, a _projective_ variety of self-referential inconsistency, and proposes an innovative, self-reflexive approach to transcendental argument in a logical and phenomenological context. The strength of the approach lies, it is claimed, in the fact that a rejection of the approach is possible only on pain of self-referential inconsistency. The argument is developed in the following stages: A general introduction identifies the central theme of the work, defines the scope of applicability of the results reached, and sketches the direction of the studies that follow. The preliminary discussion culminates in a recognition of the need for a _critique of impure reason_. The body of the work is divided into two parts: Section I seeks to develop a methodology, on a purely formal basis, which is, on the one hand, capable of being used to study the transcendental foundations of the special sciences, including its own proper transcendental foundation. On the other hand, the methodology proposed is intended as a diagnostic and therapeutic tool for dealing with _projective_ uses of concepts. The approach initiates an analysis of concepts from a perspective which views _knowledge as coordination_. Section I describes formal structures that possess the status of preconditions in such a coordinative account of knowledge. Special attention is given to the preconditions of _identifying reference_ to logical particulars. The first section attempts, then, to provide a self-referential, transcendental methodology which is essentially revisionary in that it is motivated by a concern for conceptual error-elimination. Phenomenology, considered in its unique capacity as a self-referential, transcendental discipline, is of special relevance to the study. Section II accordingly examines a group of concepts which come into question in connection with the central theme of _phenomenological constitution_. The "_de-projective methodology_" developed in Section I is applied to these concepts that have a foundational importance in transcendental phenomenology. A translation is, in effect, proposed from the language of consciousness to a language in which preconditions of referring are investigated. The result achieved is the elimination of self-defeating, projective concepts from a rigorous, phenomenological study of the constitutive foundations of science. The dissertation was presented in a two volume, double-language format for the convenience of French and English researchers. Each volume contains an analytical index. (shrink)

Although the AI paradigm is useful for building knowledge-based systems for the applied natural sciences, there are dangers when it is extended into the domains of business, law and other social systems. It is misleading to treat knowledge as a commodity that can be separated from the context in which it is regularly used. Especially when it relates to social behaviour, knowledge should be treated as socially constructed, interpreted and maintained through its practical use in context. The meanings of terms (...) in a knowledge-base are assumed to be references to an objective reality whereas they are instruments for expressing values and exercising power. Expert systems that are not perspicuous to the expert community will lose their meanings and cease to contain genuine knowledge, as they will be divorced from the social processes essential for the maintenance of both meaning and knowledge. Perspicuity is usually sacrificed when knowledge is represented in a formalism, with the result that the original problem is compounded with a second problem of penetrating the representation language. Formalisms that make business and legal problems easier to understand are one essential research goal, not only in the quest for intelligent machines to replace intelligent human beings, but also in the wiser quest for computers to support collaborative work and other forms of social problem solving. (shrink)

Murphy (2006) criticizes psychiatric nosology from the perspective of the philosophy of science, arguing that the model of pathology as encapsulated in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders reflects a folk conception of the mental, and of malfunctioning, that is inadequately integrated with cognitive and behavioral neuroscience. The present paper supports this view through a case study of research on pathological gambling. It argues that recent modeling based on fMRI studies and behavioral genetics suggests a stipulative, (...) non-seamless reduction of pathological gambling to a specific disorder of the mesolimbic dopamine system. This argument is agnostic as between prior philosophical commitments to realism or empiricism. (shrink)

In this paper it is suggested that Canguilhem's examination of the history of the distinction between the normal and the pathological contains material of relevance to current debates about the nature of medicine, in particular concerning the status of quantitative indicators as indicators of the need for medical intervention. His arguments against the equation of health with normality are presented, together with his own suggested definition of health and the implications of this definition for physiology and medicine.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 313-316 [Access article in PDF] Normativity and Pathology Mike Gane Keywords: positivism, sociology, pathology, normativity. THE STRENGTH OF VICTORIA MARGREE'S contribution to the examination of the thematic of pathology and its Nietzschean/Canguilhemian variation is that it reveals the challenging complexity of this theme. My comments on this contribution are developed from an interest in the ways that the concern with pathology was part (...) of the initial program of the social sciences, particularly sociology, as it was inaugurated by Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim in its formative period. Margree touches on the importance of social analysis at the end of her paper; my comments work to some extent in the opposite direction—from the social to the psychological. My concerns lead me to contest a number of her epistemological positions, particularly those concerning the notion of positivism and "objective" analysis.For the first positivist philosophers, positivism was primarily a method; in fact it embraced the set of methods developed by the sciences to obtain the highest degree of objectivity. It was explicitly opposed to methodological reductionism, arguing that each science had specific methods applicable to its own domain. Canguilhem was certainly against methodological reductionism (Renard 1996, 127), but Margree's conception of positivism in psychology as biological reductionism is quite a different and is a later-derived variation of positivism. As such perhaps it should not be conflated with early notions of pathology. Sociological positivism as developed in Durkheim's methodology, although different in many aspects from that of Comte, retained the idea that scientific objectivity was to be the result of epistemological procedures, not what might be called ontological reduction to a physical level of the object. Durkheim tries to clarify the rules governing the analysis of abnormal forms and to define social dysfunction and teratology. The general field of abnormal forms or pathology in the analysis of social life fell into decline after Durkheim and was abandoned in favor of the study of social deviance. The very idea of a study of social pathology itself was critiqued by Szasz and Foucault in particular as a new form of power, which came into existence at the end of the eighteenth century as an essential component of the disciplinary society. Foucault was himself clearly indebted to Canguilhem, and he made this evident on several occasions, such as his lectures at the Collège de France Les Anormaux given in 1974 and 1975 (Foucault 1999). Thus, although the field of pathology and abnormal forms continues in psychology it has been abandoned in sociology, leaving only traces (such as the concept of anomie) in the works of some thinkers such as Baudrillard, whose usage may be ironic more than an attempt to revive the terrain. Could it be that Canguilhem and Foucault [End Page 313] have then more or less swept the field clear of such scientism, even though the reconceptualization in terms of normativity suggested by Canguilhem has not been widely taken on? Indeed there may be important differences between the conceptualization of Canguilhem and Foucault (after all, as Margree points out, Canguilhem can be read as attempting to invert the relation between normativity and normative, not to withdraw from the terrain altogether). Foucault seems to approach a position elaborated in sociology earlier by Max Weber in his rejection of the attempt to use the field of pathology as a way of evading moral choices. Canguilhem discusses responsibility in "Thérapeutique, expérimentation, responsibilité" (1983, 391), noting the importance of professionalization and legal controls on professional practice.The fundamental issues posed by the project of social science continue to be haunted by the same set of problems as established in analysis of pathological phenomena, whether it be conceived in terms of order and disorder (chaos), social breakdown, radical evil, "failed states," even deviation or noncompliance with "correct" forms of language or behavior (harassment, racism, child abuse) and so on, or pathology (perversion, dysfunction, disease, illness, abnormalities). The question in part is: is there anything lost by replacing pathology with more political, religious, moral, and legal terminologies? From Foucault's point... (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work draws our attention to how the body is always our way of having a world and never merely a thing in the world. Our conception of the body must take account of our cultures, our historically located sciences, and our interpersonal relations and cannot reduce the body to a biological given. Normality, Abnormality, and Pathology in Merleau-Ponty takes up Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body to explore the ideas of normality, abnormality, and pathology. Focusing on the lived experiences (...) of various styles of embodiment, the book challenges our usual conceptions of normality and abnormality and shows how seemingly objective scientific research, such as the study of pathological symptoms, is inadequate to the phenomena it purports to comprehend. The book offers new insights into our understandings of health and illness, ability and disability, and the scientific and cultural practices that both enable and limit our capacity for diverse experiences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 317-319 [Access article in PDF] Canguilhem and Social Pathology Victoria Margree Keywords: Canguilhem, organism, society, pathology. MIKE GANE'S COMMENTARY on my paper "Normal and Abnormal" engages with the important question of the possibility of a concept of social pathology. However, I would like to begin my response by conceding a couple of his points around my definitions of epistemological positions. First, I agree (...) that the critique of my original piece was indeed directed most specifically toward biological reductionism, and that this should not perhaps be conflated with all positions that might be grouped under positivism. Indeed, I found Gane's description of scientific objectivity as conceived by sociological positivism ("[as] the result of epistemological procedures, not what might be called ontological reduction to a physical level of the object") tantalizingly reminiscent of Bachelard's own conception of objectivity in the physical sciences, a conception that Canguilhem must have been in sympathy with, and that Bachelard himself explicitly opposes to the epistemology of the "positivists" in his own arena (Bachelard 1984). Second, Professor Gane is quite correct to foreground the changes that take place in Canguilhem's thinking around the pathological once his attention turns to the new discoveries of the genetic sciences. For the purposes of the original piece, my focus was on the work conducted in the thesis on the Normal and the Pathological of 1943, and the version of normativity/health elaborated there shall continue to provide the main frame of reference for my reply.However, it is the attention to the problem of social pathology that forms the major ground of Gane's response, and it is toward this issue that I will direct my remaining comments. Without reaching any final conclusions, I would like to outline what I believe would be at least one major tendency in Canguilhem's thinking on the possibility of such a concept, and then to explore some of the productive aporias or difficulties in this.Canguilhem's early theorization of health as normativity would seem to explicitly prohibit its extension to an idea of social pathology. For Canguilhem health, as Greco (1998) explains, is a meaningful concept because it is indexed to the inherent teleology of the living organism. Because a society is not alive, does not possess the intrinsic teleology of the organic body, terms such as health or disease cannot be attributed to society in anything other than an explicitly metaphorical way.In my original paper, I argued that for Canguilhem environmental features can be characterized as possessing pathological value for organisms—indeed, health for Canguilhem is always a matter of relations and not a quality inherent in isolated features. I then suggested that because the human environment is an irreducibly social one, social norms, such as impose a fixed regularity [End Page 317] upon what sorts of mental phenomena count as normal, could possess pathological value for the individual. As the previous paragraph ought to suggest, this was perhaps already to strain against the limits of Canguilhemian thinking by veering close to an idea of social pathology. Institutionalized racism and intolerance of aberrant mental experiences may not be diseases for the social body in quite the same way that cancer may be for the organic body, but because these could be argued to be detrimental to the health and normativity of those who live within that society, I argued that they could be said to have a pathological value in relation to the individual.This is a formulation that I suspect Canguilhem could not accept. As Greco again explains, for Canguilhem society is not an environment. Social norms do not possess vital value for the human organism (Greco 1998, or Canguilhem 1991 in the "New Reflections"). Social norms in fact present constraints with respect to which the individual has a choice, whereas environmental norms are determining for the health of the individual.Now, it seems to me that there are at least a couple of problems with this. First, what about societies that use violence to back up their social injunctions? Is it not the case that... (shrink)