This paper aims to integrate insights from psychoanalytic theory into business ethics research on the sources of ethical failures within organizations. We particularly draw from the analysis of sources and outcomes of neurotic processes that are part of human development, as described by the psychoanalyst Karen Horney and more recently by Manfred Kets de Vries; we interpret their insights from a stakeholder theory perspective. Business ethics research seems to have overlooked how “neurotic management styles” could be the antecedents (...) of unethical behavior within organizations. After showing the connection between five managerial neuroses and the corresponding potential ethical failures within organizations that have been already identified within business ethics research, we suggest three organizational strategies to counteract these failures. First, we argue that managers should pay greater attention at the complexity of human motivation, avoiding the simplistic view of compliance‐based approaches. Second, we discuss the importance of developing a conversation around values within organizations, enabling healthy individual growth and limiting the emergence of neurotic processes. Finally, we discuss the role of the business ethicist in facilitating such a process, suggesting a parallel between the role of the business ethicist and that of the psychoanalytic therapist. (shrink)

This paper aims to integrate insights from psychoanalytic theory into business ethics research on the sources of ethical failures within organizations. We particularly draw from the analysis of sources and outcomes of neurotic processes that are part of human development, as described by the psychoanalyst Karen Horney and more recently by Manfred Kets de Vries; we interpret their insights from a stakeholder theory perspective. Business ethics research seems to have overlooked how “neurotic management styles” could be the antecedents (...) of unethical behavior within organizations. After showing the connection between five managerial neuroses and the corresponding potential ethical failures within organizations that have been already identified within business ethics research, we suggest three organizational strategies to counteract these failures. First, we argue that managers should pay greater attention at the complexity of human motivation, avoiding the simplistic view of compliance‐based approaches. Second, we discuss the importance of developing a conversation around values within organizations, enabling healthy individual growth and limiting the emergence of neurotic processes. Finally, we discuss the role of the business ethicist in facilitating such a process, suggesting a parallel between the role of the business ethicist and that of the psychoanalytic therapist. (shrink)

In this article, we tried to reveal the relationship between personality traits and escape behavior in traffic accidents. Different from common computer simulations, this study, for the first time, established a real database recording the escape behavior and personality traits of subjects when watching a first-person-view driving video with explosion. Then, we used a modeling method of general linear to establish a quantitative model of the influence of personality traits, explosion, and their interaction on escape behavior. In (...) the model, we introduced escape response time, escape time, escape direction, escape speed, escape trajectory, and other motion characteristics to study individual escape behavior in accidents. Through the analysis, we concluded several conclusions, including that high neurotic individuals tend to escape with shorter response time and slower speed by choosing doors far from the explosion source. These conclusions may provide some references for the effective escape of the crowd and the successful escape of the individual under traffic accidents. (shrink)

In trying to make sense out of our behavior, we reach a point at which we stop talking about what we did and start talking about what we wish we had done, about what we mean to do next. But we think we are still talking about our motives and intentions in what we did. How do we know when we cross the line between finding out what actually happened and ascribing to a situation what we think ought to (...) have happened?This is a serious question, precisely because we usually do not know the difference between what we do and what we imagine that we do. For since all action is governed by our conception of “how we would have it” and “what we would bring about,” we can always honestly claim to have meant what we did for the best. We frequently find ourselves in the situation in which we don't know why we did what we did, but by casting about, we can always turn up a purpose for which our action must have been meant - a purpose which we now perceive.The reasons we ascribe to our actions, like our excuses, are governed by the demands made on us now, rather than by the factual content of what we did. Thus the behavior of reason-giving or excusing is meant to satisfy the social situation in which we presently find ourselves: the demand for explanation, the need to be “in the right,” the need to reinforce our convictions. The verbal account of what we did is thus literally about (as representing and serving) where we are now rather than what we did then.Our verbal account is about the context of social obligation in which we have to explain ourselves, not about the behavior we claim to interpret. This is why, proverbially, we will give any excuse which will satisfy the accuser and why “understanding” i.e. inventing reasons for our conduct, is no corrective. The addict, alcoholic, neurotic and criminal recidivist are frequently rational and even persuasive in giving reasons for what they do. And we wonder why if they understand their problems so well they can't do something about them. The problem is that the habitué doesn't understand his behavior at all. He is simply trained to give a certain after the fact explanation as a conditioned response to his habitual behavior. What he “understands” is not what makes him go back to the pill, the bottle or to crime, but what to tell people each time after he does. Naturally, when the habit-triggering occasion arises, it is never that reason - the stated one - which leads to repetition, but some new, special crisis, difficulty or impulse.Bluntly stated, our reasons and justifications have little or nothing to do with our actual behavior. We continue to suppose that we intend to do this or that immediately before we do it. But insofar as this intention is expressed it is a separate verbal act having its own conditions and consequences; insofar as it is unexpressed (and in general) intention is disclosed only through conduct. It is only the powerful social convention of justification that supports the illusion that verbal expressions are causal antecedents of acts.Two conclusions follow. First, the “sense” of our activity is either evident in the activity or else it is nonexistent, since not yet discovered meaning is meaning not yet achieved. Second, our verbal justifications are acts having a peculiar sense of their own. They express the relation of our convictions and objectives to the convictions and objectives of those to whom our explanations are addressed. Here is where, in the process of making sense of our activity, the crossover from discovery to invention occurs. This is why we may never discover the extent to which our justifications are inventions superimposed on the conduct they are supposed to represent. Insofar as our justification satisfies those to whom it is addressed, (including ourselves) it is right. But we take this rightness, which is actually the the compatibility of our values and objectives, to be the rightness of the act in question. The reasons we give for our actions make great sense, but despite our invincible “rightness” our actions, taken in themselves, make no more sense.What are our options? They are either to put ourselves in the power of those to whom we explain ourselves, or to take responsibility for our own nonsense. Take our conduct out of the medium of talk - of habitual justification - in which it is suspended and sustained, and what is it? Whatever has become of the “importance” of our appointments, our meetings, our appearances, our obligations, our consistency? Experience, not persuasion and reasoning, is the corrective. Only the direct experience of futility is powerful enough to break our addiction to justification. (shrink)

As individuals and as communities we have suddenly awakened to find ourselves enveloped in a welter of unprecedented changes—social, political, economic and scientific. If our minds are to keep pace with the restless current on which we are being carried along, if our senses are to become alert to the teeming dislocations that mark the present, it will be necessary to raise our sights to the farther reaches of a rapidly oncoming future. In this hurrying hour the outstanding domains of (...) man's thought are found wanting. Accepted tenets in many fields of his activity are giving way to rapidly broadening concepts. In this moment of new assessments it is safe to predict that the field of psychopathology must also gird itself for very radical alterations. It is safe to predict that present-day preoccupations with interpersonal affects, domestic transferences, sexual irregularities, marital conflicts, psychotic episodes, and the vast array of neurotic symptoms that comprise our psychiatric systems will in the scientific reckoning of the future appear to us quite obsolete and inept. They will appear to us as humdrum and archaic, I feel sure, as old wives' tales when contrasted with the basic and encompassing constructs of an organismic phylobiology. (shrink)

Human personality influences the way people interact with dogs. This study investigated the associations between the personality of animal shelter volunteers and behavior during on-leash walks with shelter dogs. Video recording and a canine leash tension meter were used to monitor the on-leash walking. Personality was measured in five dimensions with the NEO Five-Factor Inventory. Neurotic volunteers pulled the leash harder and tended to interact with dogs using more body language; dogs being walked by neurotic volunteers in (...) turn displayed more lip-licking and body shaking and were more likely to be rated as well-behaved. Extroverted volunteers were associated with stronger maximal leash tension at both the human and dog ends of the leash, and they praised the dog more, often in a high pitched voice. These volunteers eliciting more tail-wagging and body shaking by the dog. Extroverted volunteers were also more tolerant of different dog behaviors. Volunteers with personalities characterized by “openness to experiences” were less likely to verbally attract the attention of dogs, praise dogs and talk to them in a high-pitched voice; however, dogs walked by these volunteers were more likely to pull on the leash, and engaged in more lip-licking but less sniffing. “Agreeable” volunteers liked to verbally attract the attention of the dogs and more commonly initiated hand gestures and physical contact, causing the dogs to pull less frequently; dogs in these dyads displayed more gazing and lip-licking behaviors. Conscientious volunteers were less likely to pull the leash and tended to have more physical contact with the dogs but did not favor verbal communication and did not use a high pitched voice. (shrink)

Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not a second mind with its (...) own rationality but that it is non-propositional in character. However, I then will argue that this characterization is not discriminating enough to explain the dynamical unconscious and overlooks the crucial role of “counter-cathexis”. With counter-cathexis the relevant desire turns out to be a complex with two inseparable aspects , so that the causing belief–desire pair is still part of the space of reasons, although it cannot ratio.. (shrink)

The paper offers contextual and integrating comments about sex, evolution and psychopathology as a point of departure toward a new and more scientific understanding of human neurosis. The evolved roots of neurotic behavior are firmly linked to theorems of evolution, which is emerging as the basic science of psychopathology. Evolutionary tenets serve to: 1) redefine key aspects of neuroses, 2) place neurotic behavior in a broad and integrated evolutionary context, and 3) pose basic questions for all (...) psychopathology. Readers who wish to expand, clarify or confirm elements of might well consult basic books in either field as a passing familiarity with psychiatry and biology is assumed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:100 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY porary philosophers, mesmerized by neurology, does not even appear to exist: that our casual, mechanical view of nature, when extended beyond the workings of gears and pulleys and the collision of billiard balls to become a general conception of how things happen, is a metaphysical prejudice. In sum, this is a valuable addition to the thought of Wittgenstein, and an important work of philosophy in (...) its own right. A. R. LoucH ~laremon$ Graduate ~ehool Final Integration in the Adult Personality. By A. Reza Arasteh. (Leiden: E. J. BriU, 1965. Pp. 404.) This amazing work bears the subtitle ".4 Measure ]or Health, Social Change, and Leaderahip." But though many readers might consider such a design a formidable task, the book actually accomplishes infinitely more. It offers a completely novel approach to depth psy= chology and psychiatry, incorporating these disciplines into the broader context of an original monolithic philosophy of our time. It also shows a unique and quite unexpected way of how to overcome the "departmentalization of sciences" which has resulted in "fragmented theories of man." Thus it provides something many of us have been looking for rather desperately: a holistic psychology and philosophy, directed toward human life in its entirety and, by its own nature, encompassing a great healing force. Dr. A. Reza Arasteh has obtained this fortunate result by amalgamating Western concepts with oriental ideas and, therefore, for the first time has eliminated from our thinking another cleavage which threatened to invalidate our psycho-philosophical findings. For, in the jet and space age where there is actually one world, what use could a Western psychiatrist make of his psychodynamic training when called upon to treat a person from the Near or Far East with a completely different frame of reference based on an apparently distinct culture and tradition? Arasteh, an Iranian now with the George Washington University's Department of Psy= chiatry, has done something quite unusual for a Persian scholar and psychologist brought up in Islamic cultural tradition: he has devoted many years of thorough research to our Western neuropsychiatric, psychological and philosophical heritage and compared and confronted it with his home=grown Near-Eastern and Far-Eastern wisdom, doctrines, and scientific methods. This confrontation performed by a searcher who has delved equally deep into the basic sources of Western and Eastern culture has given Arasteh the golden opportunity to explore the weaknesses and strengths of both approaches to life and more: the insight that if both cultures were to adopt the positive findings of their seemingly opposite doctrines and drop their own negative ones, they could overcome the shortcomings barring the road to full in= tegration and personal maturity. In other words: a pooling of the best philosophical and psychological discoveries of the East and West would help to bring about a monolithic, yet diversified approach to the problems of life and man which was lost after the Middle Ages. It would help to overcome and use for his best the anxiety of modern man who is fumbling in uncertainties while desperately longing for meaningfulness. According to Arasteh, the West has reached the end of its tether because of an overemphasis on intellectual solutions and endeavors which even in their most brilliant forms fall short of any substantial activity of life. It is a fallacy to believe, as Freud and long before him Socrates did, that a purely intellectual understanding of problematic or even neurotic behavior will lead any man to overcome and eliminate these failures. The intellect never has the power to change a personality and bring about what the Iranian psychologist calls a total "rebirth." Oriental attitudes toward life, on the other hand, are too much focused on inner feelings and socio-psychological directedness, thereby neglecting the independent action of the intelhgent individual. Religion and family, in some countries even connected with ancestor worship, have been and sometimes still are at the foreground of oriental thought. BOOK REVIEWS 101 Yet, in the basic chapter of h/s work, titled, "Principles of Psyehocultural Analysis: A Technique for Developing Fully Integrated Individuals," Arasteh stresses a very important point all too frequently overlooked in our era of specialization: "Regardless of language, culture and temporal... (shrink)

Freud's early attempts to account for repression and for the occurrence of neurotic symptoms in terms of detachable and displaceable quantities of affect?charge (cathexis) has continued to be a basic aspect of psychoanalytic theory. This is unfortunate since the account is inadequate and its central concept, that of a quantity of energy, is unsuited to the task at hand. We see that, despite the appropriateness of describing neurotic behavior in dynamic/economic terms, the use of energy concepts on (...) the theoretical level is an explanatory dead?end. (shrink)

Freud seems to have been torn between a literary and a scientific model for his enterprises. On the one hand he stresses the scientific nature of his researches to an extent which makes the suspicious reader wonder whether he protests too much. On the other hand it is well known that he regarded many writers, though predominantly Shakespeare, as anticipating his findings on the unconscious. In one famous passage in the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis he places his discovery of the (...) unconscious on a par with the discoveries of Darwin and Copernicus in their effect upon man's picture of himself. He is justified, of course, and if we add Marx to this triumvirate we add a figure even closer to Freud in claiming a scientific status for his work, a scientific status which is, to the uncommitted, dubious. Theodore Mischel argues that Freud increasingly construes neurotic behaviour upon the model of ordinary intentional behaviour and, though he continued to show interest in the view that the unconscious impulses which are repressed are physiological in nature, this ideal of a reduction of the psychological to the physiological became a less active ingredient in his published work as his collaboration with Fliess receded into the past. So although he may have paid lip service to some form of psycho-physical identity, believing that mental phenomena are ultimately no more or less than physical happenings in the neurones of the brain, in mature Freud this seems to have been an idly spinning wheel. Roy Schafer has recently pointed out that many of Freud's followers use the concepts of natural science , whilst simultaneously retaining traces of anthropomorphism in their metapsychology. For instance Heinz Hartmann emphasizes the concept of a ‘higher organizing function’ which resists formulation in the mechanistic metapsychology he favours. Similar difficulties obtrude in the work of Waelder and Kohut. The significance of these conflicts leads Schafer to frame basic Freudian insights in terms of the theory of action, stressing the manner in which an action may be described in differing ways and thus allowing us to present the fact that a patient's behaviour may both tell and not tell us of his deepest anxieties. Yet curiously Schafer denies that freedom plays any part in his account whereas we would have expected a concept so central to agency to have an equally central role in any recasting of psycho-analysis in terms of the theory of action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:100 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY porary philosophers, mesmerized by neurology, does not even appear to exist: that our casual, mechanical view of nature, when extended beyond the workings of gears and pulleys and the collision of billiard balls to become a general conception of how things happen, is a metaphysical prejudice. In sum, this is a valuable addition to the thought of Wittgenstein, and an important work of philosophy in (...) its own right. A. R. LoucH ~laremon$ Graduate ~ehool Final Integration in the Adult Personality. By A. Reza Arasteh. (Leiden: E. J. BriU, 1965. Pp. 404.) This amazing work bears the subtitle ".4 Measure ]or Health, Social Change, and Leaderahip." But though many readers might consider such a design a formidable task, the book actually accomplishes infinitely more. It offers a completely novel approach to depth psy= chology and psychiatry, incorporating these disciplines into the broader context of an original monolithic philosophy of our time. It also shows a unique and quite unexpected way of how to overcome the "departmentalization of sciences" which has resulted in "fragmented theories of man." Thus it provides something many of us have been looking for rather desperately: a holistic psychology and philosophy, directed toward human life in its entirety and, by its own nature, encompassing a great healing force. Dr. A. Reza Arasteh has obtained this fortunate result by amalgamating Western concepts with oriental ideas and, therefore, for the first time has eliminated from our thinking another cleavage which threatened to invalidate our psycho-philosophical findings. For, in the jet and space age where there is actually one world, what use could a Western psychiatrist make of his psychodynamic training when called upon to treat a person from the Near or Far East with a completely different frame of reference based on an apparently distinct culture and tradition? Arasteh, an Iranian now with the George Washington University's Department of Psy= chiatry, has done something quite unusual for a Persian scholar and psychologist brought up in Islamic cultural tradition: he has devoted many years of thorough research to our Western neuropsychiatric, psychological and philosophical heritage and compared and confronted it with his home=grown Near-Eastern and Far-Eastern wisdom, doctrines, and scientific methods. This confrontation performed by a searcher who has delved equally deep into the basic sources of Western and Eastern culture has given Arasteh the golden opportunity to explore the weaknesses and strengths of both approaches to life and more: the insight that if both cultures were to adopt the positive findings of their seemingly opposite doctrines and drop their own negative ones, they could overcome the shortcomings barring the road to full in= tegration and personal maturity. In other words: a pooling of the best philosophical and psychological discoveries of the East and West would help to bring about a monolithic, yet diversified approach to the problems of life and man which was lost after the Middle Ages. It would help to overcome and use for his best the anxiety of modern man who is fumbling in uncertainties while desperately longing for meaningfulness. According to Arasteh, the West has reached the end of its tether because of an overemphasis on intellectual solutions and endeavors which even in their most brilliant forms fall short of any substantial activity of life. It is a fallacy to believe, as Freud and long before him Socrates did, that a purely intellectual understanding of problematic or even neurotic behavior will lead any man to overcome and eliminate these failures. The intellect never has the power to change a personality and bring about what the Iranian psychologist calls a total "rebirth." Oriental attitudes toward life, on the other hand, are too much focused on inner feelings and socio-psychological directedness, thereby neglecting the independent action of the intelhgent individual. Religion and family, in some countries even connected with ancestor worship, have been and sometimes still are at the foreground of oriental thought. BOOK REVIEWS 101 Yet, in the basic chapter of h/s work, titled, "Principles of Psyehocultural Analysis: A Technique for Developing Fully Integrated Individuals," Arasteh stresses a very important point all too frequently overlooked in our era of specialization: "Regardless of language, culture and temporal... (shrink)

theories. What was Freud thinking, when, and why and what were the major influences which shaped his ideas? We follow the inner movement of his theory construction, its meaning and coherence, as well as his conceptual logic and personal directions concerning his evolving views of the reciprocal interactions between mind and body, the motivational force of instinctual drives, and the dominant role of sexuality rooted in evolutionary biology in human development, behaviour, and the creation of neurotic disturbances. We follow (...) Freud's construction and sequential reconstructions of his theoretical models concerning the nature, dynamics, and principles of unconscious mental functioning, including his changing concepts on the nature and purpose of dreams. We trace his changing views on the role of deferred action of early childhood experiences and the determining role of unconscious fantasy, psychic reality, in the formation of adult character structure and neuroses. Through such historical analysis this book provides grounding for a meaningful understanding of Freud's familiar concepts: id, ego, superego, and the Oedipus complex. We explore what these concepts meant to Freud, why he conceived them, and what functions they served in his theory of mind. This is the perfect book for students and trainees wanting to learn more about the development of Freud's ideas, as well as for established psychoanalysts and psychotherapists interested in expanding their knowledge of Freud's theories. (shrink)

The long-term persistence of neurotic symptoms, such as anxiety, poses difficult problems for any psychological theory. An attempt is made to revive the Watson-Mowrer conditioning theory and to avoid the many criticisms directed against it in the past. It is suggested that recent research has produced changes in learning theory that can be used to render this possible. In the first place, the doctrine of equipotentiality has been shown to be wrong, and some such concept as Seligman's “preparedness” is (...) required, that is the notion that certain CS are biologically prepared to be more readily connected with anxiety responses than others. In the second place, the law of extinction has to be amended, and the law of incubation or enhancement added, according to which the exposure of the CS-only may, under certain specified conditions, have the effect of increasing the strength of the CR, rather than reducing it. The major conditions favouring incubation are Pavlovian B conditioning, that is a type of conditioning in which the CR is a drive; a strong UCS, and short exposure of the CS-only. (shrink)

If each of the subtypes of autism is defined simply as constituted by a set of symptoms, then the criteria for its observation are straightforward, although, of course, some of those symptoms themselves might be hard to observe definitively. Compare with telling whether or not someone is bleeding: while it might be hard to tell if someone is bleeding internally, we know what it takes to find out, and when we have the right access and instruments we can settle the (...) issue. But matters are not so simple for the autism subtypes. For one thing, how do we settle which symptoms to group together under one heading? One key difference between “autism disorder” and “Asperger’s disorder” is that the former exhibit language delays (sometimes extreme), whereas the latter do not. But is that a sign of genuinely distinct conditions or is that an artifact of the distinct groups of subjects that Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger worked with? And in general, although there are certainly types of behavior that are taken to be indicative of autism, none by itself is taken by diagnosticians to be either necessary or sufficient for a definitive diagnosis for any of the autism subtypes. What is the diagnostician to do? This is not merely an academic issue, as many parents can attest. Are we in a situation, then, that each practitioner has his or her own “pet” signs that are the “real keys” to the diagnosis? That would suggest that the term “autistic” might meet the fate of the outdated term “neurotic,” which turned out to be a pseudo-scientific term for an inexact clumping together of unrelated phenomena. The assumption amongst specialists seems to be that we will reach the point with "autism" that we have with "water": there will be a root essence to autism whose presence or absence settles a diagnosis. If that is to be the case, however, we have to settle the level of application of the concept. Does the term apply to people who exhibit particular behaviors? Or is it possible to exhibit “autistic” behaviors without actually being autistic, because autism is instead a particular feature of the mind (as, for example, in Baron-Cohen’s “impaired theory of mind module” theory, discussed below) which usually but not necessarily has behavioral effects? Or is autism located instead in the brain, perhaps in damage to key areas, which in turn would typically have an effect on modules of the mind? Or perhaps autism is located in genetics or biology, so that some people with damage to the brain caused by accidents so that they exhibit autistic symptoms would not actually be autistic. Conversely, supposing one had an “autistic brain” but showed none of (or not a sufficient number of) the symptoms, would one not be autistic? The assumption is that the genotypes and phenotypes will line up neatly, but if they do not, what happens to the concept “autistic?” (There is an analogy in the philosophy of sex and gender: androgen insensitive individuals tend to self-identify as female and have outward female traits, but have XY chromosomes—should we go with chromosomes or self-identity in assigning sex category?) Finally, the implications for these complications for diagnosis and categorization, with the attendant social and medical implications is discussed. The typical assumption of the medical profession is that autism cannot be “cured.” That assumes that autism is not simply the symptoms. However, at the same time, the tests used to diagnose ASDs work simply from the symptoms (for example, Baron-Cohen’s Sally/Anne test, which ASD children of a certain age almost all fail, but which practically no ASD adult fails). This implies an inherent confusion over the status of the concept. I conclude that attempts to make sense of some true or accurate summary of what it is to be autistic (such as one would find in the DSM) are almost certainly misguided and will vanish into history along with “neurotic.” But as with racial terms, which are similarly shifting and perverse, the term has already passed into the public sphere and will have a lasting and dangerous influence beyond its short scientific shelf-life. (shrink)

The surah of el-Muddaththir is one of the first surahs of the Qurʾān according to the chronological order of the revelation. In this surah, between the verses 11-26, the story of the harsh opposition by polytheists of Mecca is told through the story of Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah. In this study, we tried to examine these verses in the framework of the social psychological models named “social identity theory”, “realistic conflict theory” and “stereotype psychology”, which are subgroups of the discipline of (...) social psychology. This study includes the interdisciplinary collaboration between theology and social science and supports that using social science as a tool to understand the Qurʾān will be insightful. This study consists of two parts. The first part includes the theoretical background information about the relevant concepts of social psychology. The second part explains the Qurʾānic verses in the light of these social psychology concepts. SUMMARY According to the social identity theory that was developed under the discipline of social psychology, every individual has two types of identities; one personal identity and one social identity. Personal identity refers to individual’s specific qualities such as his/her psychological characteristics or physical and mental capacities. On the other hand, an individual’s social identity takes form as a result of his/her involvement in groups with the same race, religion, or political views as himself/herself. In this context, when an individual expresses his/her social identity, that individual actually reflects his/her involvement in such groups. The phenomenon of which identity would govern on individual’s behavior highly depends on his/her mental or social state. The realistic conflict theory proposes competition may arise as a result of conflicting goals between different group members. This competition to reach similar goals would result in an intergroup hostility. The competition between groups would create to a biased positive view for the group that the individual is a part of and negative view about the other group. This would lead to creating stereotypes against the other group. In social psychology, stereotype is described as images in an individual’s mind, which are partially constructed by the individual’s social environment and partially constructed by the individual’s personality. These stereotypes determine our behavior and expectations against the outside world, so that they help us filter out the objective reality and shape the way that we perceive the events, other individuals or other groups. The stereotypes created against the other group are not created by only a couple crazy or neurotic members. In contrast, in the case of a fight between two groups, the stereotypes are created by the members of each groups, who are known to be the most reliable and influential individuals. In this study, the verses 11-25 of el-Muddaththir are studied using the framework explained above. The verses 11-17 mention the worldly goods that are given by Allah to Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah, without mentioning his name explicitly. However, Walīd continues to be greedy and obstinate toward the verses revealed by Allah. Therefore, the verses mention that he will be obliged to climb a slippery mountain, his life in the world will turn to a misery, and he will suffer in the afterlife. If the story is evaluated in the framework of the social psychology theories, it can be concluded that the verses actually refer to the group of disbelievers/polytheists for which Walīd was a prominent figure, as well as Walīd himself. Obviously, he was not alone and the verses indicated that the polytheists of Mecca formed an opposition group; therefore, they formed a different social identity. As a conclusion, there were one group of disbelievers and another of group of believers which were going to be the subject of the following verses of the Qurʾān. The social identity of the polytheists would also play a significant role in their daily decisions. The two circumstances that were believed to be the asbāb al-nuzūl (occasions of revelation) of the verses that were reviewed above supports this conclusion. The verses 18-26 discuss what Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah’s tribe would prefer him to say about the Qurʾān. These verses not only simply repeat his words “This is not but magic imitated (from others), this is not but the word of a human being", but also reflect the way he thinks with his strong negative attitude; i.e., the grimace on his face, the way he reacts with frowning and turning his back... In social psychology, the expressions of Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah can be described as “stereotypes.” These expressions are considered as one of the first stereotypes about the Qurʾān because it is discussed in some of the early verses according to the chronological order of revelation. Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah must have said these words under the influence of his social identity. In other words, these expressions must be a product of the intergroup conflict between the believers and the disbelievers against the believers’ claim of the Qurʾān being the words of Allah. The behavior of ʿUmar against the Qurʾān is also as important as the behavior of Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah. Both of them were deeply affected by the charm of the Qurʾān; however, ʿUmar chose to believe in the Qurʾān hile Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah ended up with denial. We believe that different behaviors of these two individuals are due the influence of their personal and social identities on their decisions. The choice of ʿUmar can be explained by his personal identity being dominant than his social identity. On the other hand, Walīd’s choice was a result of his social identity suppressing his personal identity, as well as stereotypes being more influential on him. In other words, ʿUmar made a choice with his personal identity rather than the disbeliever social identity. This would fit better with his personality because he was a clever, independent thinker that would help him make rational choices. The social group that he was a member of was not powerful enough to have an influence on him. In addition, he was not in a leadership position in Mecca. On the other hand, Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah was a poet and he was rich, as well as he was a prominent figure in Mecca. He was even one of the people that the polytheists of Mecca claimed that the Qurʾān could have been revealed to. Therefore, it was more likely for Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah to behave under the influence of his social identity because he had more dominant and strong ties to his social identity compared to ʿUmar. (shrink)

When philosophers want an example of a person who lacks the ability to do otherwise, they turn to psychopathology. Addicts, agoraphobics, kleptomaniacs, neurotics, obsessives, and even psychopathic serial murderers, are all purportedly subject to irresistible desires that compel the person to act: no alternative possibility is supposed to exist. I argue that this conception of psychopathology is false and offer an empirically and clinically informed understanding of disorders of agency which preserves the ability to do otherwise. First, I appeal to (...) standard clinical treatment for disorders of agency and argue that it undermines this conception of psychopathology. Second, I offer a detailed discussion of addiction, where our knowledge of the neurobiological mechanisms underpinning the disorder is relatively advanced. I argue that neurobiology notwithstanding, addiction is not a form of compulsion and I explain how addiction can impair behavioural control without extinguishing it. Third, I step back from addiction, and briefly sketch what the philosophical landscape more generally looks like without psychopathological compulsion: we lose our standard purported real-world example of psychologically determined action. I conclude by reflecting on the centrality of choice and free will to our concept of action, and their potency within clinical treatment for disorders of agency. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.4 (2005) 343-348 [Access article in PDF] Doomed by Nature: The Inevitable Failure of our Naturally Selected Functions Andreas De Block Keywords psychoanalysis, Darwinism, evolutionary psychiatry, pathogenic metaphysics In their very thoughtful and stimulating replies, the three commentators foreground several topics crucial for both psychoanalysis and philosophical psychiatry. In my short response, I focus primarily on what the commentators believe to be the paper's main (...) shortcomings. The first critique reads as follows: Freud never claimed that the Homo sapiens is a fundamentally sick animal, but in fact thought that normalcy is possible and that normal behavior need not be interpreted as neurotic, perverse or psychotic. The second is that current Darwinian psychiatry does not substantiate the view that Homo sapiens is essentially an ill animal, whatever Freud's position might be. Third and last, the proposal that all human beings are ill to the core seems to be more of a religious slogan than a scientifically useful description. What Freud Really Said A transhistorical approach to Freud's work is far from simple, considering that it spans a period of over forty years and that it underwent considerable changes during that time. Not only did Freud introduce some radically new concepts during that time, such as narcissism and the death drive. Also, he regularly changed his position on the aim of psychoanalytic therapy, the ontogenesis of anxiety, and the nature of human sexuality. That Freud sometimes saw homosexuality as an inborn drive did not keep him on other occasions from thinking that homosexual desire was a result of the repression or projection of an oedipal (heterosexual) drive. Examples like these show that any exegesis of Freud's writings inevitably has to deal with some tensions. Freud's work contains numerous apparent, as well as real, contradictions, so that it is no surprise at all that Katherine Morris can produce textual evidence "proving" that Freud never held the view I attribute to him. According to her, Freud thought that we are not all neurotics and that normalcy is possible.I do not deny that several passages in Freud's work underscore the possibility of non-neurotic normalcy. Indeed, Freudian theory even describes processes—sublimation, the transformation from Id to Ego, the resolution of the oedipal complex, among others—that explain how human beings can escape neurosis and other mental disorders. But Freud's illustrations of these mechanisms or processes make clear that he could not conceive [End Page 343] of a nonpathogenic psychodynamics. Consider, for instance, how Freud emphasizes throughout his study of Leonardo da Vinci that Leonardo's sublimations make him extremely vulnerable to psychic exhaustion or "neurasthenia" (1910). Freud never tires of repeating that there is only a gradual difference between a neurotic patient and Leonardo da Vinci, the sublimating ("healthy") artist and scientist.Morris (2005) is right, of course, in arguing that a gradual difference between normality and mental illness does not imply that there is no difference at all. Quantity should not be thought the opposite of quality, because small quantitative differences can transform an "articulation" into a "breach." To use Hegel's famous example, there is a continuum between 110° C and -10° C, but everybody knows that that water evaporates above 100° C and freezes below 0° C. Applied to mental disorders, quantitative differences in levels of testosterone and serotonin may lead to qualitative differences in behavior; in other words, categorical and dimensional approaches to mental illnesses are not mutually exclusive. Having established that, we now need to take a closer look at how Freud articulated the differences between seemingly normal individuals and the mentally ill.Freud held that neurosis, psychosis, and perversion are caused by the interplay between instincts and defense mechanisms. Further, he thought that the pathogenic instincts were almost exclusively sexual. Now, although it is true that he sometimes recognized that the fear of death and the death drive are important factors for psychic life (Deeley 2005) and for the etiology of psychosis, more often than not he interpreted the fear of death as a symbolization of... (shrink)

In order to appreciate the role of the phenomenon of shame in the context of the clinic – both as normal self evaluation and as neurotic response – a philosophical anthropological description of shame is offered. Not only are Biblical metaphors recast, but more recent phenomenological psychological descriptions taken from Max Scheler and others are cited. These necessarily require some account of the patient's body in shame, taken from both his perspective and the physician's. In short, the corporeality of (...) shame is constituted as "ce que enveloppe le corps". Keywords: Shame, Behavior CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In Black Skin, White Masks Frantz Fanon discusses the neurotic condition that typifies the oppressed black subject, their 'psychoexistential complex'. He argues that this neurotic condition is closely related to another, the 'psychoexistential complex' of the white oppressor. Both of these complexes sustain and are sustained by social and economic injustice. But Fanon does not delve in detail into the nature of this second neurosis, for he was primarily interested in discussing this neurosis only insofar as it helps (...) him understand the first. My aim in this paper is to provide an account of the white neurosis, and why it should be understood literally as a neurotic condition. Typical, white oppressors, not solely those who are militantly committed to oppressing others, are alienated from the world and from themselves, making their behaviour seem like that of soulless dolls, to use J.M. Coetzee's image from Age of Iron. (shrink)

The paper aims to examine the extent of individual freedom of human being in relation to their instinctual bodily attachment. The starting point of examination is Gehlen’s biological anthropology which pointed to human freedom of instinctual pressures. Human freedom proves to be an opportunity to build one’s world through action. Freedom of action burdens human beings with constant decision-making. The automatism of habit, which provides solid patterns of unconscious behaviours, allows relief from freedom of action. By their upbringing, social institutions (...) additionally automate and thus stabilise individuals’ actions. In their world produced from freedom, human beings generate a second-degree, self-produced non-freedom. Freud points to the oppressive character of culture and civilisation, which requires the individual to sacrifice instinctual gratification for the sake of cultural prosperity. As instinctual repression grows with the development of culture, the modern human being becomes neurotic because they cannot tolerate the degree of renunciation that culture demands of them. (shrink)

Wish-fulfilment as a singular means of satisfying ineluctable desire is a pivotal concept in classical psychoanalysis. Freud argued that it was the thread that united dreams, daydreams, phantasy, omnipotent thinking, neurotic and some psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions, art, myth, and religious illusions. The concept's theoretical exploration has been largely neglected within psychoanalysis since, but contemporary philosophers have recognised it as providing an explanatory model for much of the kind of irrational behaviour so problematic for psychiatry, social (...) psychology and the philosophy of mind. Although critically neglected in contemporary psychological and psychoanalytic thought, the concept remains clinically fundamental, under different labels: it encompasses the processes of omnipotent phantasy, symbolic or substitutive satisfaction, actualisation in transference and acting out, symptom formation and defenses such as projective identification. Wish-fulfilment can be shown to be a specifically psychoanalytic compartment of a common-sense psychological theory of action that illuminates not just clinical material but also the paradoxes of irrationality – such as weakness of will and self-deception – that preoccupy philosophers. The first half of this book develops a comprehensive and novel theory of wish-fulfilment, explores its radical implications for the structure of mind, and locates it against the backdrop of both contemporary psychoanalytic and philosophical thought. In the second half, the book applies the theory to illuminate important features of self-deception and delusion, religion, insanity defences, creative writing and the exclusion of mind and intention in the biological drift of modern psychiatry. The book will be essential to philosophers of mind, psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, psychologists, social theorists, and students in these disciplines; as well as readers interested in understanding how the mind works in mental illness, self-deception, religion, and creative writing. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to characterize some personality traits of women with ischemic heart disease, in order to determine their relationship to activity and inactivity, and define the implications of that relationship for ways of coping with coronary pain. The study comprised N = 100 women aged 33 to 80 years, hospitalized in the Department of Cardiology, who underwent angiography for the assessment of coronary arteries. Psychological studies have been conducted using clinical interviews, involving the IPAT Anxiety Scale (...) Questionnaire, the Pain Coping Strategies Questionnaire and the NEO Five-Factor Personality Inventory. The results obtained indicate that where a group of one hundred women with ischemic heart disease was concerned, their level of anxiety and fear stood at an almost neurotic level. In the structure of anxiety and fear one may observe the predominance of a strong tendency towards self-blame, experiencing feelings of guilt, and exhibiting high levels of internal tension. Among the personality traits in question, the following clearly dominated: extroversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness. The principal strategies for dealing with pain on the part of women with IHD were “prayer and hope”, “declarations of coping” and “diverting attention”. In women with ischemic heart disease, it would thus be advisable to employ psychotherapeutic strategies aimed at lowering the tendency towards selfdestructive behaviour and reducing any elevated levels of internal tension. Psychotherapeutic activities conducted among women with IHD should focus on strengthening psychological resilience, and on working out ways to cope with the disease by undertaking tasks which give them a chance to enrich their own development. (shrink)

The study offers new insights by examining the influence of personality traits on tourists' intentions to visit ecotourism sites using the lens of the theory of planned behavior. It also investigates whether environmental knowledge moderates the effect of extraversion, neuroticism, and environmental concern on tourists' ecotourism intentions. We applied structural equation modeling on 350 responses collected through the Amazon M-Turk platform. Results highlight that extroverts are more likely to express ecotourism intentions than neurotic tourists. However, it was also (...) noted that neurotic tourists' intention to visit ecotourism sites could be influenced if their environmental concerns were emphasized. The study offers important new insights to managers, policy-makers, and practitioners about the roles of personality traits, environmental knowledge, and environmental concern vis-a-vis their relative significance in shaping tourists' decision-making and choices for ecotourism sites. As a result, managers/practitioners need to devise specific communication strategies to enhance awareness and a sense of responsibility among neurotic tourists. (shrink)

In this volume, a well-known psychoanalyst, dance therapist, and educational consultant chronicles her clinical work with deeply troubled children who fall between the cracks of our diagnostic and educational systems. These children, who frequently turn out to have been sexually or punitively abused, have no real emotional home despite the fact that they live in materially comfortable circumstances. In spite of their apparent brightness and precocity, they do not thrive in the classroom, where their disruptive behavior, tendency to act (...) out, and fragmented learning bring them to the attention of teachers, counselors, and school psychologists. Standard diagnoses do not explain their plight; such children are neither retarded nor learning disabled nor neurotic. Through poignant case studies, Siegel reviews the developmental circumstances that bring these middle-class waifs to a critical impasse with both their parents and the educational establishment. Time and again she discovers that the children's expectable developmental course has been derailed by their accommodation to parental abuse and deformed parental expectations. Psychodynamic treatment invariably uncovers the maladaptive solutions that fueled the children's behavioral and learning disturbances. This volume speaks to a broad clinical and non-clinical readership: psychoanalytic clinicians; psychologists; counselors; social workers; art, dance, and music therapists; special education teachers; child therapists; and child care workers. They will all join in admiration of Siegel's treatment approach which focuses on what is healthy in deeply traumatized children and, in so doing, helps debunk the myth of the untreatable child. (shrink)

In this volume, a well-known psychoanalyst, dance therapist, and educational consultant chronicles her clinical work with deeply troubled children who fall between the cracks of our diagnostic and educational systems. These children, who frequently turn out to have been sexually or punitively abused, have no real emotional home despite the fact that they live in materially comfortable circumstances. In spite of their apparent brightness and precocity, they do not thrive in the classroom, where their disruptive behavior, tendency to act (...) out, and fragmented learning bring them to the attention of teachers, counselors, and school psychologists. Standard diagnoses do not explain their plight; such children are neither retarded nor learning disabled nor neurotic. Through poignant case studies, Siegel reviews the developmental circumstances that bring these middle-class waifs to a critical impasse with both their parents and the educational establishment. Time and again she discovers that the children's expectable developmental course has been derailed by their accommodation to parental abuse and deformed parental expectations. Psychodynamic treatment invariably uncovers the maladaptive solutions that fueled the children's behavioral and learning disturbances. This volume speaks to a broad clinical and non-clinical readership: psychoanalytic clinicians; psychologists; counselors; social workers; art, dance, and music therapists; special education teachers; child therapists; and child care workers. They will all join in admiration of Siegel's treatment approach which focuses on what is healthy in deeply traumatized children and, in so doing, helps debunk the myth of the untreatable child. (shrink)

Inconsistent information between an organization’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments and perceived CSR (in-)action is a big challenge for organizations because this is typically associated with perceptions of corporate hypocrisy and related negative stakeholder reactions. However, in contrast to the prevailing corporate hypocrisy literature we argue that inconsistent CSR information does not always correspond to perceptions of corporate hypocrisy; rather, responses depend on individual predispositions in processing CSR-related information. In this study, we investigate how an individual’s moral identity shapes reactions (...) to inconsistent CSR information. The results of our three studies show that individuals who symbolize—i.e., display—their moral identity to the public more than they internalize moral values react less negatively to inconsistent CSR information. We also show that this weakens their anger and willingness to change company behavior. Furthermore, we find that this effect is amplified for extraverted but weakened for neurotic individuals. Our findings underline the importance of individual predispositions in processing CSR information. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.4 (2005) 335-342 [Access article in PDF] Psychoanalysis as a Hybrid of Religion and Science Quinton Deeley Keywords Freud, psychoanalysis, religion, science, evolution Introduction De Block's paper, "Freud as an Evolutionary Psychiatrist," discusses Freud's writ-ings—including a recently discovered paper on the evolution of psychopathology—to establish the Freudian "philosophy of man" that human beings are "ill to the core" (i.e., that mental illness is an inevitable (...) byproduct of human psychological processes). This perspective is then used as a basis for proposing a way in which psychoanalysis can be integrated with contemporary evolutionary psychology. However, this undertaking raises fundamental questions about psychoanalysis itself, which are addressed in this commentary. First, to what extent is a systematic theoretical unity imposed on, rather than discovered in, Freud's writings? Also, has De Block succeeded in grounding the Freudian philosophy of man in evolutionary theory, and how is this ambition affected by general questions about the scientific status and evidence for psychoanalytic conceptions? Further, if there is only limited experimental evidence for psychoanalytic concepts, how are claims to knowledge justified in psychoanalytic discourse, and how does this relate to the forms of epistemic justification found in religion and science? Finally, is psychoanalysis closer to religious or scientific discourse, and if it combines features of both, what kind of activity is it? The Exposition of the Freudian Philosophical Project The key claim of De Block's paper is that any evolutionary psychology faithful to Freud's account of human nature must be constrained by a fundamental premise: the psychological organization of human beings is such that "there is a quantitative, but not a structural, difference between psychiatric patients and so-called healthy or normal individuals" (2005, 323). From De Block's perspective, this reflects the Freudian perspective that the normal operation of psychological processes inevitably results in some degree of mental distress: "every repression produces symptoms, every defense mechanism produces more suffering than is strictly necessary" (2005, 321). As a result, "when Freud writes that there is only a gradual difference between neurotics and normals, he does not mean the normals are non-neurotic, but only that they suffer less under their neurosis" (2005, 318). This Freudian perspective is variously summarized throughout the paper; for example, "we think there is only one underlying motive of Freud's research, which [End Page 335] could also function as a cornerstone of a 'Freudian' philosophy. This underlying motive is the intuition that there is no substantial difference between the so-called normal human being and the mentally insane" (2005, 315).De Block's exposition of the Freudian account of human nature also emphasizes the doctrine of psychosexuality: "the Freudian philosophy of man presumes primarily that every human being has to react in some way of another to sexual problems" (2005, 317). One of the problems confronting any expositor of Freud is the fact that his voluminous writings show considerable development in his thought. This heterogeneity raises the question of the extent to which the coherence of Freudian theory as a systematic whole is imposed by expositors, rather than lying in the corpus itself. De Block's approach to this heterogeneity is to extract different kinds of relations between sexuality and psychopathology from Freud's writings (e.g., neurosis and the Oedipal instincts, psychosis and narcissism), and then to argue that they explain Freud's interest in less obviously sexual aspects of mind, behavior, and society. As De Block comments after his exegesis of different connections between sexuality and psychopathology: but probably, he [Freud] only meant that in neurosis, people wrestle first and foremost with love, in perversion with sex and violence, and in psychosis with identity and issues related to identity, such as death and "the meaning of life." At least, such an interpretation can explain why Freud—in some of his works—recognized the importance of problems like aggression, love, and death for the human psyche and human psychopathology...; he nevertheless refused to modify the primacy of sexuality in psychopathology. (2005, X) Whether all of Freud's explanations of psychological phenomena involve... (shrink)

Animal behaviour and welfare research are part of a wider endeavour to optimize the health and wellbeing of humans, animals and ecosystems. As such, it is part of the One Health research agenda. This article applies ethical principles described by the One Health High Level Expert Panel to animal behaviour and welfare research. These principles entail that animal behaviour and welfare research should be valued equitably alongside other research in transdisciplinary and multisectoral collaboration. It should include and promote a multiplicity (...) of marginalized voices, including those of animals, and it should apply and describe a harmonious balance between human—animal-environment interactions. Lastly, it should describe how humans need to change behaviour, adopt sustainable solutions and recognize the importance of animal welfare and the integrity of the whole ecosystem. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper presents a philosophical analysis of three cognitive states familiar and important to psychoanalysts—phantasy, neurotic-belief, and belief-proper. It explores the differences among these three propositional attitudes and finds that the development of secondary process capacities of reality testing and truth directness out of earlier primary process operations plays a crucial role. Difficulties in the proper typing of cognitive states are discussed, as are the consequences of such confounds. This use of a philosophical method serves to sharpen the familiar (...) psychoanalytic clinical concepts of phantasy and neurotic-belief. In addition, these same clinical concepts, once properly specified, have much to offer the philosophy of mind, where current understanding of representational cognitive states is restricted to those that are largely conscious and rational. When psychoanalytic concepts such as phantasy and neurotic-belief can be better integrated within the discipline of philosophy of mind, both philosophers and psychoanalysts will have a more complete and adequate theory of mind. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.

We review and present a new meta‐analysis of research suggesting that ethicists in the United States appear to behave no morally better overall than do non‐ethicist professors. Measures include: returning library books, peer evaluation of overall moral behavior, voting participation, courteous and discourteous behavior at conferences, replying to student emails, paying conference registration fees and disciplinary society dues, staying in touch with one's mother, charitable giving, organ and blood donation, vegetarianism, and honesty in responding to survey questions. One (...) multi‐measure study found ethicists tending to embrace more stringent moral views, especially about meat eating and charitable donation. The same multi‐measure study found ethicists and other professors to show similarly small‐to‐medium correlations between their expressed normative attitudes and their self‐reported or directly measured behavior. (shrink)

Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer from. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B, represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C, and as a result fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic". Natural science is neurotic in this sense in so far as (...) a basic aim of science is represented to be to improve knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science does not suffer too much from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences, and of academic inquiry more generally. Freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far reaching, beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences. (shrink)

Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer from. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B, represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C, and as a result fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic". Natural science is neurotic in this sense in so far as (...) a basic aim of science is represented to be to improve knowledge of factual truth as such, when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth. Science does not suffer too much from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences, and of academic inquiry more generally. Freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far reaching, beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences. (shrink)

The paper gives an overview of primate research and the economic-ethical 'lessons' we can derive from it. In particular, it examines the complex, multi-faceted and partially conflicting nature of (non-) human primates. Our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos, apparently walk on two legs: a selfish and a groupish leg. Given evolutionary continuity and gradualism between monkeys, apes and humans, human primates seem to be bipolar apes as well. They, too, tend to display a dual structure: there seems to (...) be a pro-social and a self-interested side to our species and a bipolar tension seems to exist between competition and cooperation respectively between self-interest and the common good. We are apparently at the same time Homines oeconomici and Homines culturali. Our inner ape tries to combine self-interested and common good motives. Based on de Waal's Russian doll model, the essay investigates the evolutionary origins of morality and 'eusociality'. With the help of selected case studies stemming from behavioural sciences/economics, the paper illustrates examples of empathy, altruism, reciprocal fairness, pro-social and other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion and altruistic punishment in (non-)human primates. Beside this selfless and groupish side, the paper also reflects on the self-interest and egoistic nature of (non-)human primates and the behavioural and cognitive differences between monkeys, apes and humans. (shrink)