We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...) moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

In attempting to build intelligent litigation support tools, we have moved beyond first generation, production rule legal expert systems. Our work integrates rule based and case based reasoning with intelligent information retrieval.When using the case based reasoning methodology, or in our case the specialisation of case based retrieval, we need to be aware of how to retrieve relevant experience. Our research, in the legal domain, specifies an approach to the retrieval problem which relies heavily on an extended object (...) oriented/rule based system architecture that is supplemented with causal background information. We use a distributed agent architecture to help support the reasoning process of lawyers. (shrink)

The paper presents color as a case study for the analysis of phenomena that pertain to several levels of reality and are typically framed by different sciences and disciplines. Color, in fact, is studied by physics, biology, phenomenology and aesthetics, among others. Our thesis is that color is a different entity for each level of reality, and that for this reason color generates different observables in the epistemologies of the different sciences. By analysing color as a paradigmatic case of an (...) entity naturally spreading over different levels of reality, the paper raises the question as to whether making explicit the usually implicit ontological assumptions embedded within the different observables exploited by the different sciences may eventually clarify some of the difficulties of developing a comprehensive theory of color. (shrink)

While Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason maintains that things in themselves cannot be known, he also seems to assert that they affect our senses and produce representations. Following Jacobi, many commentators have considered these claims to be contradictory. Instead of adding another artificial solution to the existing literature on this subject, I maintain that Kant’s use of terms such as thing-in-itself, noumenon, and transcendental object becomes perfectly consistent if we take them to acquire a different meaning in the (...) various parts of the work. Challenging the opposed interpretations of Allison and Langton, I argue that Kant’s account of things in themselves is primarily relevant to the second-order reflection on the possibility and limits of a scientific metaphysics that the Critique undertakes. (shrink)

Spatial objects may not only be perceived visually but also by touch. We report recent experiments investigating to what extent prior object knowledge acquired in either the haptic or visual sensory modality transfers to a subsequent visual learning task. Results indicate that even mental object representations learnt in one sensory modality may attain a multi-modal quality. These findings seem incompatible with picture-based reasoning schemas but leave open the possibility of modality-specific reasoning mechanisms.

The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by (...) the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally. (shrink)

The problem of multi-peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P1 … Pn and disagree with a group of ‘epistemic peers’ of yours, who believe ∼P1 … ∼Pn, respectively. However, the problem of multi-peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so-called ‘steadfast view’ in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in the face of (...) peer disagreement about P. After some terminology is defined (§1), Peter van Inwagen's challenge to the steadfast view will be presented (§2). The preface paradox will then be presented and diagnosed (§3), and it will be argued that van Inwagen's challenge relies on the same principle that generates the preface paradox (§4). The reasonable response to multi-peer disagreement will be discussed (§5), and an objection addressed (§6). (shrink)

Focusing on DOTA, the multidirectional object dataset in aerial view of vehicles, CMDTD has been proposed. The reason why it is difficult for applying the general object detection algorithm in multidirectional object detection has been analyzed in this paper. Based on this, the detection principle of CMDTD including its backbone network and multidirectional multi-information detection end module has been studied. In addition, in view of the complexity of the scene faced by aerial view of vehicles, a unique data expansion (...) method is proposed. At last, three datasets have been experimented using the CMDTD algorithm, proving that the cascaded multidirectional object detection algorithm with high effectiveness is superior to other methods. (shrink)

This paper traces the background to R. A. Fisher's multi-factorial theory of inheritance. It is argued that the traditional account is incomplete, and that Karl Pearson's well-known pre-Fisherian objections to the theory were in fact overcome by Pearson himself. It is further argued that Pearson's stated reasons for not accepting his own achievement has to be seen as a rationalization, standing in for deeper-seated metaphysical objections to the Mendelian paradigm of a type not readily discussed in a formal scientific (...) paper. The apparent, post-Fisherian, continued acceptance of Pearson's objections is presented as an interesting problem for the historian and sociologist. (shrink)

A similarity relation is a reflexive and symmetric binary relation between objects. Similarity is relative: it depends on the set of properties of objects used in determining their similarity or dissimilarity. A multi-modal logical language for reasoning about relative similarities is presented. The modalities correspond semantically to the upper and lower approximations of a set of objects by similarity relations corresponding to all subsets of a given set of properties of objects. A complete deduction system for the language (...) is presented. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Two objects o1, o2 of an information system are said to be complementary with respect to attribute a if α(o1) = -α(o2), where α(o) is the set of values of attribute a assigned to o. They are said to be complementary with respect to a set of attributes A if they are complementary with respect to each attribute α ε A. A multi-modal logical language for reasoning about complementarity relations is presented, with modalities [A] and ?A? parameterised (...) by subsets of a given set ATTR of attributes. Two complete deduction system for the language are presented: a Rasiowa-Sikorski style system using signed formulae, and an equivalent sequent calculus system in Gentzen style complete for theories. (shrink)

T. M. Scanlon suggests that the binding nature of promises itself plays a role in allowing a promisee rationally to expect follow through even while that binding nature itself depends on the promisee’s rational expectation of follow through. Kolodny and Wallace object that this makes the account viciously circular. The chapter defends Scanlon’s theory from this objection. It argues that the basic complaint is a form of wrong kinds of reason objection. The thought is that the promisee’s reason to expect (...) compliance are undermined if the promise is binding only when the promisee forms that very expectation. The chapter suggests that other uncontroversially rational processes of multi-person coordination involve beliefs with the very same feature. Focal point reasoning in the theory of games is one example. In coordination situations it can be rational to believe that another person will do something precisely because that person expects you to believe what one does about what they’ll do. An examination of the reasoning in such cases motivates a group reflection principle that vindicates the reasoning employed in Scanlon’s account. -/- . (shrink)

Economists often consult multiple models in order to combat model uncertainty in the face of misspecification. By examining modeling practices at the Bank of England, this paper identifies an important, but underappreciated modeling procedure. Sometimes an idealized model is manipulated to reproduce the results from another distinct auxiliary model, ones which it could not produce on its own. However, this procedure does not involve making the original model “more realistic,” insofar as this means adding in additional causal factors. This suggests (...) that there are ways to make models more representationally adequate that do not involve de-idealization in the straightforward sense. (shrink)

This article attempts to study cost minimizing multi-objective fractional solid transportation problem with fuzzy cost coefficients c ˜ i j k r {\tilde{c}}_{ijk}^{r}, fuzzy supply quantities a ˜ i {\tilde{a}}_{i}, fuzzy demands b ˜ j {\tilde{b}}_{j}, and/or fuzzy conveyances e ˜ k {\tilde{e}}_{k}. The fuzzy efficient concept is introduced in which the crisp efficient solution is extended. A necessary and sufficient condition for the solution is established. Fuzzy geometric programming approach is applied to solve the crisp problem by (...) defining membership function so as to obtain the optimal compromise solution of a multi-objective two-stage problem. A linear membership function for the objective function is defined. The stability set of the first kind is defined and determined. A numerical example is given for illustration and to check the validity of the proposed approach. (shrink)

This article considers two important problems for the idea that what we ought to do is determined by the balance of competing reasons. The problems are distinct, but the object of the article is to explore how they admit of a single solution. It is a consequence of this solution that objective reasons—facts that count in favor—are in an important sense less objective than they have consistently been assumed to be. This raises but does not answer the question (...) as to what evidence we ever had that reasons are as objective as has been assumed. (shrink)

Conscientious objection in the health care field—that is, refusal on the part of a medical professional to perform or cooperate in a procedure when it violates his or her conscience—is a growing concern for international legislators and a source of contentious debates among ethicists and the general public. Recognizing a general right to conscientious objection based on individual liberty, and thus a subjective right, could have negative consequences. Conscientious objection in health care settings should be fully protected, however, when the (...) objection is based on principles that are fundamental to the medical profession and the legal system. Examples from Italy and other nations show how protections there safeguard conscientious objection when a health professional objects to taking a human life. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 12.4 (Winter 2012): 611–620. (shrink)

In order to establish that judgments about practical reasons can be objective, it is necessary to show that the applicable standards provide an adequate account of truth and error. This in turn requires that these standards yield an extensive set of substantive, publicly accessible judgments that are presumptively true. This output requirement is not satisfied by the standards of universalizability, consistency, coherence, and caution alone. But it is satisfied if we supplement them with the principle that desire is a (...) source of minimal reasons. This principle is justified despite currently fashionable arguments against the claims of desire. (shrink)

Objectivity in evaluation can be understood either in terms of satisfaction of certain formal criteria or in terms of correspondence to facts of a certain kind. Morality includes metaphysical claims which distinguish arbitrary wants from rational ends, but the weakness of the interpretation of such claims within formalist liberal views results in the collapse of that distinction and in mistaking moral ignorance for moral freedom. Only by showing that respect for persons is justified by the metaphysics of human nature - (...) by the fact of human equality - can claims of moral objectivity be defended. For that defense one must look to the socialist tradition. (shrink)

It is sometimes held that there is something in the nature of religious faith itself that renders it useless or undesirable to reason objectively in support of such faith, even if the reasoning should happen to have considerable plausibility. Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript is probably the document most commonly cited as representative of this view. In the present essay I shall discuss three arguments for the view. I call them the Approximation Argument, the Postponement Argument, and the Passion (...) Argument; and I suggest they can all be found in the Postscript. I shall try to show that the Approximation Argument is a bad argument. The other two will not be so easily disposed of, however. I believe they show that Kierkegaard’s conclusion, or something like it, does indeed follow from a certain conception of religiousness—a conception which has some appeal, although for reasons which I shall briefly suggest, I am not prepared to accept it. (shrink)

Both the production of knowledge and the product, knowledge itself, are social phenomena. This generally accepted fact is generally thought to require relativism, scepticism, and Kuhnian incommensurability, as well as casting serious doubt on the potential of our cognitive traditions to provide us with objective knowledge about an objective world. This thesis exposes and critiques the presuppositions about the nature of reasoning and objectivity which underlie these fears. Combining a Nietzschean, perspectivist account of objectivity with a conception (...) of reasoning drawn from Lockean epistemology and pedagogy, I build a new account of cognitive optimality, dubbed 'Linkmaking'. The phrase deliberately encompasses several meanings. We 'make links' by noticing connections between objects in the world, by linking ideas together to form a theory or a curriculum; by forming social connections, and by developing interdisciplinary practices. I defend the view that we cannot fully address any of these kinds of Link without reference to all of the others. I further show that out best means to critically assess our cognitive groups is to evaluate the extent to which those groups encourage Linkmaking practices. The major potential challenge to Linkmaking is Kuhnian incommensurability. Having demonstrated the flaws inherent in Kuhn's account, this thesis defends the weaker, Doppeltian form of incommensurability, which grants us insight into the genuine problems which can occur in interdisciplinary research. We then see that the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge, inspired by the strong, relativistic version of the Kuhnian incommensurability thesis, has held sway among sociologists because they do not generally study interdisciplinary practices, which highlight scientists' objectivity. Furthermore, social scientists who accept Kuhnian constructivism doubt their own potential for objectivity, presuming the presence of strong incommensurability where there is none. Undertaking Linkmaking practices both cures this illusion, and improves the cognitive optimality of the group. (shrink)

In this paper, a complex non- linear programming problem with the two parts (real and imaginary) is considered. The efficient and proper efficient solutions in terms of optimal solutions of related appropriate scalar optimization problems are characterized. Also, the Kuhn-Tuckers' conditions for efficiency and proper efficiency are derived. This paper is divided into two independently parts: The first provides the relationships between the optimal solutions of a complex single-objective optimization problem and solutions of two related real programming problems. The (...) second part is concerned with the theory of a multi-objective optimization in complex space. (shrink)

Versions of this paper have been read to philosophical colloquia at Occidental College and California State University, Fullerton. I am indebted to participants in those discussions, to students in many of my classes, and particularly to Marilyn McCord Adams, Van Harvey, Thomas Kselman, William Laserow, and James Muyskens, for helpful comment on the ideas which are contained in this paper (or which would have been, had it not been for their criticisms).

Function optimization underlies many real-world problems and hence is an important research subject. Most of the existing optimization methods were developed to solve primarily unconstrained problems. Since real-world problems are often constrained, appropriate handling of constraints is necessary in order to use the optimization methods. In particular, the performances of some methods such as Genetic Algorithms can be substantially undermined by ineffective constraint handling. Despite much effort devoted to the studies of constraint-handling methods, it has been reported that each of (...) them has certain limitations. Hence, further studies for designing more effective constraint-handling methods are needed. For this reason, we investigated the guidelines for a method to effectively handle constraints. The guidelines are that the method 1) takes the approach of repair operators, 2) monotonically decreases both the number of violated constraints and constraint violations, and 3) searches over the boundaries of violated constraints. Based on these guidelines, we designed a new constraint-handling method Pareto Descent Repair operator in which ideas derived from multi-objective local search and gradient projection method are incorporated. Experiments comparing GA that use PDR and some of the existing constraint-handling methods confirmed the effectiveness of PDR. (shrink)

Evolutionary multi-objective optimization algorithms have been successfully applied in many real-life problems. EMOAs approximate the set of trade-offs between multiple conflicting objectives, known as the Pareto optimal set. Reference point approaches can alleviate the optimization process by highlighting relevant areas of the Pareto set and support the decision makers to take the more confident evaluation. One important drawback of this approaches is that they require an in-depth knowledge of the problem being solved in order to function correctly. Collective (...) intelligence has been put forward as an alternative to deal with situations like these. This paper extends some well-known EMOAs to incorporate collective preferences and interactive techniques. Similarly, two new preference-based multi-objective optimization performance indicators are introduced in order to analyze the results produced by the proposed algorithms in the comparative experiments carried out. (shrink)

Effective and personalized treatment relies heavily on skin disease categorization. In the stratification of skin disorders, it is crucial to identify the subtypes of illnesses to provide an efficient therapy. To attain this aim, researchers have focused their attention on cluster algorithms for the stratification of skin disorders in recent decades. But, cluster algorithms have real-world drawbacks, including experimental noises, a large number of dimensions, and a poor ability to comprehend. Cluster algorithms, in particular, determine the quality of clusters using (...) a single internal evaluation operation in the majority of cases. A single internal assessment procedure is difficult to design and robust for all datasets, which is a problem. The multi-objective particle swarm obtained high sensitivity in the existing work, but it is not able to anticipate all kinds of classes. An optimized cluster distance parameter for K-means clustering is determined using a hybrid particle swarm and moth flame optimization. Multi-objective is guided by two cluster value indices, including the K-means clustering misclassification rate and neural network classification rate. Hybrid PSO will solve the multi-objective problem to identify the optimal cluster for clustering. On the dermatological dataset from the UCI repository, MATLAB R2020a will be used to evaluate the proposed method. This will be followed by an evaluation of the proposed method’s performance using the cluster evaluation indices. (shrink)

AI research is being challenged with ensuring that autonomous agents learn to behave ethically, namely in alignment with moral values. Here, we propose a novel way of tackling the value alignment problem as a two-step process. The first step consists on formalising moral values and value aligned behaviour based on philosophical foundations. Our formalisation is compatible with the framework of (Multi-Objective) Reinforcement Learning, to ease the handling of an agent’s individual and ethical objectives. The second step consists in (...) designing an environment wherein an agent learns to behave ethically while pursuing its individual objective. We leverage on our theoretical results to introduce an algorithm that automates our two-step approach. In the cases where value-aligned behaviour is possible, our algorithm produces a learning environment for the agent wherein it will learn a value-aligned behaviour. (shrink)

GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the (...) way we think it is, determines what we ought to do. In his new book Jonathan Dancy agrees: the world itself has normative significance, reality, as Dancy puts it, is practical. On this, most general level Dancy and Moore agree. But unlike Moore’s, Dancy’s objectivism is not embedded in any particular normative theory. And whereas Moore strikes me as hard-nosed, and his position as sharp-edged, Dancy’s position looks, in comparison, softer and subtler. Contrasting the two positions will help to bring out these features of Dancy’s view. But it will also help to explain the worry that Dancy’s view might have departed too far from its origin. (shrink)

Ethotic arguments, such as arguments from expert opinion and ad hominem arguments, play an important role in communication practice. In this paper, we argue that there is another type of reasoning from ethos, in which people argue about actions in the world. These subspecies of ethotic arguments are very common in public debates: societies are involved in heated disputes about what should be done with monuments of historical figures such as Stalin or Colston: Should we demolish the building they (...) funded? Should we revere their statues? Should the street named after them be renamed?; and the general public vividly argue about what should be done with the legacy of producers, directors and actors in debates of the #MeToo movement: Should their new movies be distributed? Should their scenes be deleted from motion pictures? Should their stars from the Hollywood Walk of Fame be removed? Many arguments in these debates boil down to the character of the public figures: He was a slave trader!—But he is a part of our history; He harassed a young girl!—But he is an important actor. The reasoning step here is legitimised by the association between a person and an extra-linguistic object: the association between a historical figure and their statue or between an actor and their movie. The nature of this association is explained in the paper using Peirce’s theory of signs. We propose to extend an existing approach to patterns of reasoning from ethos that will help us to shed new light on ethotic argumentation and open an avenue for a systematic account of these unexplored argument forms. (shrink)

Based on the concept of “passengers self-help hubbing,” we build a flight schedule optimization model where maximizing the number of feasible flight connections, indicating transfer opportunities, as one objective and minimizing total slot displacements as the other objective. At the same time, the “Demand Smoothing Model” is introduced into the flight schedule optimization model to reduce the queuing delays for arrival and departure flights. We take into account all aircraft itineraries, the difficulty level of schedule coordination, and the (...) maximum displacement of any single flight acceptable to airlines when optimizing flight schedule. Given an original schedule, the model produces a feasible modified schedule that obeys the slot limits specified for an airport without canceling any flights, increases transfer opportunities, and improves on-time performance for hub airports while reducing interference with airline scheduling preferences. The model was verified with the operating data of the Urumqi international airport, and the results show that minor adjustments to flight schedules can increase the transfer opportunities of the airport and significantly reduce flight queuing delays. (shrink)

According to some scholars, such as Rodych and Steiner, Wittgenstein objects to Gödel’s undecidability proof of his formula $$G$$, arguing that given a proof of $$G$$, one could relinquish the meta-mathematical interpretation of $$G$$ instead of relinquishing the assumption that Principia Mathematica is correct. Most scholars agree that such an objection, be it Wittgenstein’s or not, rests on an inadequate understanding of Gödel’s proof. In this paper, I argue that there is a possible reading of such an objection that is, (...) in fact, reasonable and related to Gödel’s proof. (shrink)

GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the (...) way we think it is, determines what we ought to do. In his new book Jonathan Dancy agrees: the world itself has normative significance, reality, as Dancy puts it, is practical. On this, most general level Dancy and Moore agree. But unlike Moore’s, Dancy’s objectivism is not embedded in any particular normative theory. And whereas Moore strikes me as hard-nosed, and his position as sharp-edged, Dancy’s position looks, in comparison, softer and subtler. Contrasting the two positions will help to bring out these features of Dancy’s view. But it will also help to explain the worry that Dancy’s view might have departed too far from its origin. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason (...) for which one believes that p. (shrink)

Current mainstream approaches to conscientious objection either uphold the standards of public health care by preventing objections or protect the consciences of health‐care professionals by accommodating objections. Public justification approaches are a compromise position that accommodate conscientious objections only when objectors can publicly justify the grounds of their objections. Public justification approaches require objectors and assessors to speak a common normative language and to this end it has been suggested that objectors should be required to cast their objection in terms (...) of public reason. We provide critical support for such a public reason condition and argue that it would be neither too demanding nor too permissive. We also respond to objections that it unfairly favours secular over religious objectors and that public reasons cannot be held with the kind of sincerity thought to characterize conscientious objections. (shrink)

We present a propositional and a first-order logic for reasoning about higher-order upper and lower probabilities. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics and we prove decidability in the propositional case. Furthermore, we show that the introduced logics generalize some existing probability logics.

We present a propositional and a first-order logic for reasoning about higher-order upper and lower probabilities. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics and we prove decidability in the propositional case. Furthermore, we show that the introduced logics generalize some existing probability logics.