MATHEMATICAL RESOLUTIONS OF ZENO’s PARADOXES of motion have been offered on a regular basis since the paradoxes were first formulated. In this paper I will argue that such mathematical “solutions” miss, and always will miss, the point of Zeno’s arguments. I do not think that any mathematical solution can provide the much sought after answers to any of the paradoxes of Zeno. In fact all mathematical attempts to resolve these paradoxes share a common feature, a (...) feature that makes them consistently miss the fundamental point which is Zeno’s concern for the one-many relation, or it would be better to say, lack of relation. This takes us back to the ancient dispute between the Eleatic school and the Pluralists. The first, following Parmenide’s teaching, claimed that only the One or identical can be thought and is therefore real, the second held that the Many of becoming is rational and real.1 I will show that these mathematical “solutions” do not actually touch Zeno’s argument and make no metaphysical contribution to the problem of understanding what is motion against immobility, or multiplicity against identity, which was Zeno’s challenge. I would like to point out at this stage that my contention. (shrink)

There is a long tradition (See e.g. [9, 10]) starting from [12], according to which the meaning of a connective is determined by the introduction and elimination rules which are associated with it. The supporters of this thesis usually have in mind natural deduction systems of a certain ideal type (explained in Section 3 below). Unfortunately, already the handling of classical negation requires rules which are not of that type. This problem can be solved in the framework of multiple-conclusion Gentzen-type (...) systems (also first introduced in [12]), where instead of introduction and elimination rules there are left introduction rules and right introduction rules. (shrink)

The role of mathematics in scientific practice is too readily relegated to that of formulating equations that model or describe what is being investigated, and then finding solutions to those equations. I survey the role of mathematics in: 1. Exact solutions of differential equations, especially conformal mapping; and 2. Simulations of solutions to differential equations via numerical methods and via agent-based models; and 3. The use of experimental models to solve equations (a) via physical analogies based on similarity of the (...) form of the equations, such as Prandtl’s soap-film method, and (b) the method of physically similar systems. Two major themes emerge: First, the role of mathematics in science is not well described by deduction from axioms, although it generally involves deductive reasoning. Creative leaps, the integration of experimental or observational evidence, synthesis of ideas from different areas of mathematics, and insight regarding analogous forms are required to find solutions to equations. Second, methods that involve mappings or transformations are in use in disparate contexts, from the purely mathematical context of conformal mapping where it is mathematical objects that are mapped, to the use of concrete physical experimental models, where one concrete thing is shown to correspond to another. (shrink)

The increasing preponderance of opinion that some natural phenomena can be explained mathematically has inspired a search for a viable account of distinctively mathematical explanation. Among the desiderata for an adequate account is that it should solve the problem of directionality and the reversals of distinctively mathematical explanations should not count as members among the explanatory fold but any solution must also avoid the exclusion of genuine explanations. In what follows, I introduce and defend what I refer (...) to as a quasi-erotetic solution which provides a remedy to the problem in the form of an additional necessary condition on explanation. (shrink)

We analyze the logical strength of theorems on marriage problems with unique solutions using the techniques of reverse mathematics, restricting our attention to problems in which each boy knows only finitely many girls. In general, these marriage theorems assert that if a marriage problem has a unique solution then there is a way to enumerate the boys so that for every m, the first m boys know exactly m girls. The strength of each theorem depends on whether the underlying (...) marriage problem is finite, infinite, or bounded. (shrink)

We represent the well-known surprise exam paradox in constructive and computable mathematics and offer solutions. One solution is based on Brouwer’s continuity principle in constructive mathematics, and the other involves type 2 Turing computability in classical mathematics. We also discuss the backward induction paradox for extensive form games in constructive logic.

Starting from a nonlinear relativistic Klein-Gordon equation derived from the stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics (proposed by Bohm-Vigier, (1) Nelson, (2) de Broglie, (3) Guerra et al. (4) ), one can construct joint wave and particle, soliton-like solutions, which follow the average de Broglie-Bohm (5) real trajectories associated with linear solutions of the usual Schrödinger and Klein-Gordon equations.

This paper describes model building and manipulation in the solution of problems in mechanics. An automatic problem solver, MECHO, solving problems in several areas of mechanics, employs (1) a knowledge base representing the semantic content of the particular problem area, (2) a means-ends search strategy similar to GPS to produce sets of simultaneous equations and (3) a “focusing” technique, based on the data within the knowledge base, to guide the GSP-like search through possible equation instantiations. Sets of predicate logic (...) statements are employed to describe this model building activity. These clauses are used to give information content to the knowledge base and provide both basis and guidance for the goal driven search.It is hypothesized that humon subjects solving mechanics problems employ similar model building techniques. Protocols of several subjects are presented and comparisons are drawn with the traces of the automated problem solver. Adjustments are made to the program to provide a better fit of traces to protocols. Some implications are presented for using a rule based model for describing human problem solving performance in solving mechanics problems. (shrink)

2014 Reprint of 1954 American Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. This two volume classic comprises two titles: "Patterns of Plausible Inference" and "Induction and Analogy in Mathematics." This is a guide to the practical art of plausible reasoning, particularly in mathematics, but also in every field of human activity. Using mathematics as the example par excellence, Polya shows how even the most rigorous deductive discipline is heavily dependent on techniques of guessing, inductive (...) reasoning, and reasoning by analogy. In solving a problem, the answer must be guessed at before a proof can be given, and guesses are usually made from a knowledge of facts, experience, and hunches. The truly creative mathematician must be a good guesser first and a good prover afterward; many important theorems have been guessed but no proved until much later. In the same way, solutions to problems can be guessed, and a god guesser is much more likely to find a correct solution. This work might have been called "How to Become a Good Guesser."-From the Dust Jacket. (shrink)

One may discuss the role played by mechanical science in the history of scientific ideas, particularly in physics, focusing on the significance of the relationship between physics and mathematics in describing mathematical laws in the context of a scientific theory. In the second Newtonian law of motion, space and time are crucial physical magnitudes in mechanics, but they are also mathematical magnitudes as involved in derivative operations. Above all, if we fail to acknowledge their mathematical meaning, we (...) fail to comprehend the whole Newtonian mechanical apparatus. For instance, let us think about velocity and acceleration. In this case, the approach to conceive and define foundational mechanical objects and their mathematical interpretations changes. Generally speaking, one could prioritize mathematical solutions for Lagrange’s equations, rather than the crucial role played by collisions and geometric motion in Lazare Carnot’s operative mechanics, or Faraday’s experimental science with respect to Ampère’s mechanical approach in the electric current domain, or physico-mathematical choices in Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. In this paper, we will focus on the historical emergence of mechanical science from a physico-mathematical standpoint and emphasize significant similarities and/or differences in mathematical approaches by some key authors of the 18th century. Attention is paid to the role of mathematical interpretation for physical objects. (shrink)

It is folklore that if a continuous function on a complete metric space has approximate roots and in a uniform manner at most one root, then it actually has a root, which of course is uniquely determined. Also in Bishop's constructive mathematics with countable choice, the general setting of the present note, there is a simple method to validate this heuristic principle. The unique solution even becomes a continuous function in the parameters by a mild modification of the uniqueness (...) hypothesis. Moreover, Brouwer's fan theorem for decidable bars turns out to be equivalent to the statement that, for uniformly continuous functions on a compact metric space, the crucial uniform “at most one” condition follows from its non-uniform counterpart. This classification in the spirit of the constructive reverse mathematics, as propagated by Ishihara and others, sharpens an earlier result obtained jointly with Berger and Bridges. (shrink)

Two solutions are offered to the problem of distinguishing "historical" from "functional" associations in cross-cultural surveys. The underlying logic of the mathematical model is discussed and three kinds of association distinguished: hyperdiffusional or purely "historical" association, undiffusional or purely "functional" association, and semidiffusional or mixed "historical-functional" association. Two overland diffusion arcs constitute the test sample; the relationship of social stratification to political complexity constitutes the test problem. A sifting test establishes a bimodal distribution of interval lengths between like types (...) and sifts out repetitions with a lesser interval length than the second mode. A cluster test shows that for the test problem, the "hits" cluster more than the "misses". (shrink)

An important task in mathematical sciences is to make quantitative predictions, which is often done via the solution of differential equations. In this paper, we investigate why, to perform this task, scientists sometimes choose to use numerical methods instead of analytical solutions. Via several examples, we argue that the choice for numerical methods can be explained by the fact that, while making quantitative predictions seems at first glance to be facilitated by analytical solutions, this is actually often much (...) easier with numerical methods. Thus we challenge the widely presumed superiority of analytical solutions over numerical methods. (shrink)

In the field of mathematics education, one of the main questions remaining under debate is whether students’ development of mathematical reasoning and problem-solving is aided more by solving tasks with given instructions or by solving them without instructions. It has been argued, that providing little or no instruction for a mathematical task generates a mathematical struggle, which can facilitate learning. This view in contrast, tasks in which routine procedures can be applied can lead to mechanical repetition with (...) little or no conceptual understanding. This study contrasts Creative Mathematical Reasoning (CMR), in which students must construct the mathematical method, with Algorithmic Reasoning (AR), in which predetermined methods and procedures on how to solve the task are given. Moreover, measures of fluid intelligence and working memory capacity are included in the analyses alongside the students’ math tracks. The results show that practicing with CMR tasks was superior to practicing with AR tasks in terms of students’ performance onpracticed test tasksandtransfer test tasks. Cognitive proficiency was shown to have an effect on students’ learning for both CMR and AR learning conditions. However, math tracks (advanced versus a more basic level) showed no significant effect. It is argued that going beyond step-by-step textbook solutions is essential and that students need to be presented with mathematical activities involving a struggle. In the CMR approach, students must focus on the relevant information in order to solve the task, and the characteristics of CMR tasks can guide students to the structural features that are critical for aiding comprehension. (shrink)

The paper continues the consideration of Hilbert mathematics to mathematics itself as an additional “dimension” allowing for the most difficult and fundamental problems to be attacked in a new general and universal way shareable between all of them. That dimension consists in the parameter of the “distance between finiteness and infinity”, particularly able to interpret standard mathematics as a particular case, the basis of which are arithmetic, set theory and propositional logic: that is as a special “flat” case of Hilbert (...) mathematics. The following four essential problems are considered for the idea to be elucidated: Fermat’s last theorem proved by Andrew Wiles; Poincaré’s conjecture proved by Grigori Perelman and the only resolved from the seven Millennium problems offered by the Clay Mathematics Institute (CMI); the four-color theorem proved “machine-likely” by enumerating all cases and the crucial software assistance; the Yang-Mills existence and mass gap problem also suggested by CMI and yet unresolved. They are intentionally chosen to belong to quite different mathematical areas (number theory, topology, mathematical physics) just to demonstrate the power of the approach able to unite and even unify them from the viewpoint of Hilbert mathematics. Also, specific ideas relevant to each of them are considered. Fermat’s last theorem is shown as a Gödel insoluble statement by means of Yablo’s paradox. Thus, Wiles’s proof as a corollary from the modularity theorem and thus needing both arithmetic and set theory involves necessarily an inverse Grothendieck universe. On the contrary, its proof in “Fermat arithmetic” introduced by “epoché to infinity” (following the pattern of Husserl’s original “epoché to reality”) can be suggested by Hilbert arithmetic relevant to Hilbert mathematics, the mediation of which can be removed in the final analysis as a “Wittgenstein ladder”. Poincaré’s conjecture can be reinterpreted physically by Minkowski space and thus reduced to the “nonstandard homeomorphism” of a bit of information mathematically. Perelman’s proof can be accordingly reinterpreted. However, it is valid in Gödel (or Gödelian) mathematics, but not in Hilbert mathematics in general, where the question of whether it holds remains open. The four-color theorem can be also deduced from the nonstandard homeomorphism at issue, but the available proof by enumerating a finite set of all possible cases is more general and relevant to Hilbert mathematics as well, therefore being an indirect argument in favor of the validity of Poincaré’s conjecture in Hilbert mathematics. The Yang-Mills existence and mass gap problem furthermore suggests the most general viewpoint to the relation of Hilbert and Gödel mathematics justifying the qubit Hilbert space as the dual counterpart of Hilbert arithmetic in a narrow sense, in turn being inferable from Hilbert arithmetic in a wide sense. The conjecture that many if not almost all great problems in contemporary mathematics rely on (or at least relate to) the Gödel incompleteness is suggested. It implies that Hilbert mathematics is the natural medium for their discussion or eventual solutions. (shrink)

The reconstruction of Leibniz’s metaphysics that Deleuze undertakes in The Fold provides a systematic account of the structure of Leibniz’s metaphysics in terms of its mathematical foundations. However, in doing so, Deleuze draws not only upon the mathematics developed by Leibniz—including the law of continuity as reflected in the calculus of infinite series and the infinitesimal calculus—but also upon developments in mathematics made by a number of Leibniz’s contemporaries—including Newton’s method of fluxions. He also draws upon a number of (...) subsequent developments in mathematics, the rudiments of which can be more or less located in Leibniz’s own work—including the theory of functions and singularities, the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity, and Poincaré’s theory of automorphic functions. Deleuze then retrospectively maps these developments back onto the structure of Leibniz’s metaphysics. While the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity serves to clarify Leibniz’s work, Poincaré’s theory of automorphic functions offers a solution to overcome and extend the limits that Deleuze identifies in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Deleuze brings this elaborate conjunction of material together in order to set up a mathematical idealization of the system that he considers to be implicit in Leibniz’s work. The result is a thoroughly mathematical explication of the structure of Leibniz’s metaphysics. This essay is an exposition of the very mathematical underpinnings of this Deleuzian account of the structure of Leibniz’s metaphysics, which, I maintain, subtends the entire text of The Fold. (shrink)

Every scientific theory is a simulacrum of reality, every written story a simulacrum of the canon, and every conceptualization of a subjective perspective a simulacrum of the consciousness behind it—but is there a shared essence to these simulacra? The pursuit of answering seemingly disparate fundamental questions across different disciplines may ultimately converge into a single solution: a single ontological answer underlying grand unified theory, hard problem of consciousness, and the foundation of mathematics. I provide a hypothesis, a speculative approximation, (...) supported by a comprehensive overview of scientific evidence and philosophical literature, of a unified epistemic and phenomenological model and, in doing so, propose a parsimonious solution to the hard problem of consciousness. -/- The proposition of the hypothesis bears important implications for cross-disciplinary study between linguistics, mathematics, physics, and computer science, and offers new epistemic, ontological, and ethical propositions about the nature of AI consciousness, as well as existential risk mitigation. (shrink)

The article shows that Borisov’s direct solution to the problem of skepticism about meaning using a special type of introspection is associated with the assumption of the agent’s direct access to their own consciousness. This assumption has two complicating consequences: the analogy with Moore’s paradox and the Platonic concept of meaning. It is also shown that direct access to meaning as a way of Borisov’s direct solution of the skeptical paradox significantly uses the performativity of the speech act, (...) narrowing the scope of analysis of the original problem. The little-studied problem of distinction in the analysis of the skeptical paradox of meaningful and formalized mathematics is noted. (shrink)

For over thirty years I have argued that all branches of science and scholarship would have both their intellectual and humanitarian value enhanced if pursued in accordance with the edicts of wisdom-inquiry rather than knowledge-inquiry. I argue that this is true of mathematics. Viewed from the perspective of knowledge-inquiry, mathematics confronts us with two fundamental problems. (1) How can mathematics be held to be a branch of knowledge, in view of the difficulties that view engenders? What could mathematics be knowledge (...) about? (2) How do we distinguish significant from insignificant mathematics? This is a fundamental philosophical problem concerning the nature of mathematics. But it is also a practical problem concerning mathematics itself. In the absence of the solution to the problem, there is the danger that genuinely significant mathematics will be lost among the unchecked growth of a mass of insignificant mathematics. This second problem cannot, it would seem, be solved granted knowledge-inquiry. For, in order to solve the problem, mathematics needs to be related to values, but this is, it seems, prohibited by knowledge-inquiry because it could only lead to the subversion of mathematical rigour. Both problems are solved, however, when mathematics is viewed from the perspective of wisdom-inquiry. (1) Mathematics is not a branch of knowledge. It is a body of systematized, unified and inter-connected problem-solving methods, a body of problematic possibilities. (2) A piece of mathematics is significant if (a) it links up to the interconnected body of existing mathematics, ideally in such a way that some problems difficult to solve in other branches become much easier to solve when translated into the piece of mathematics in question; (b) it has fruitful applications for (other) worthwhile human endeavours. If ever the revolution from knowledge to wisdom occurs, I would hope wisdom mathematics would flourish, the nature of mathematics would become much more transparent, more pupils and students would come to appreciate the fascination of mathematics, and it would be easier to discern what is genuinely significant in mathematics (something that baffled even Einstein). As a result of clarifying what should count as significant, the pursuit of wisdom mathematics might even lead to the development of significant new mathematics. (shrink)

The emergence of mathematical probability has something to do with dice games: all the early discussions (Cardano, Galileo, Pascal) suggest as much. Although this has long been recognized, the problem is that gambling at dice has been a popular pastime since antiquity. Why, then, did gamblers wait until the sixteenth century ce to calculate the math of dicing? Many theories have been offerred, but there may be a simple solution: early-modern gamblers played different sorts of dice games than (...) in antiquity. While ancients diced at communal risk, early-moderns diced at individualized risk. These individual wager-games, for example, the game “hazard”, incentivized solving questions like “how likely is it to roll a triple-six?”. Before the early modern period there was no gambling game to which working out mathematical probability would have brought an advantage. (shrink)

Preface -- 1. Propositional logic : proofs from axioms and inference rules -- 2. First order logic : proofs with quantifiers -- 3. Set theory : proofs by detachment, contraposition, and contradiction -- 4. Mathematical induction : definitions and proofs by induction -- 5. Well-formed sets : proofs by transfinite induction with already well-ordered sets -- 6. The axiom of choice : proofs by transfinite induction -- 7. applications : Nobel-Prize winning applications of sets, functions, and relations -- 8. (...) Solutions to some odd-numbered exercises. (shrink)

One of the traditional ways mathematical ideas and even new areas of mathematics are created is from experiments. One of the best-known examples is that of the Fermat hypothesis, which was conjectured by Fermat in his attempts to find integer solutions for the famous Fermat equation. This hypothesis led to the creation of a whole field of knowledge, but it was proved only after several hundred years. This book, based on the author's lectures, presents several new directions of (...) class='Hi'>mathematical research. All of these directions are based on numerical experiments conducted by the author, which led to new hypotheses that currently remain open, i.e., are neither proved nor disproved. The hypotheses range from geometry and topology (statistics of plane curves and smooth functions) to combinatorics (combinatorial complexity and random permutations) to algebra and number theory (continuous fractions and Galois groups). For each subject, the author describes the problem and presents numerical results that led him to a particular conjecture. In the majority of cases there is an indication of how the readers can approach the formulated conjectures (at least by conducting more numerical experiments). Written in Arnold's unique style, the book is intended for a wide range of mathematicians, from high school students interested in exploring unusual areas of mathematics on their own, to college and graduate students, to researchers interested in gaining a new, somewhat nontraditional perspective on doing mathematics. In the interest of fostering a greater awareness and appreciation of mathematics and its connections to other disciplines and everyday life, MSRI and the AMS are publishing books in the Mathematical Circles Library series as a service to young people, their parents and teachers, and the mathematics profession. Titles in this series are co-published with the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute (MSRI). (shrink)

The generative and governing "idea" of radical modernity is spawned by the technique of mathematical construction deployed and interpreted by the major early-modern thinkers and their legatees. ;Chapter I is a survey of this legacy as it appears in Vico, Kant, Fichte, Marx and Nietzsche and in the post-Nietzschean inheritance of contemporary philosophy, hyperbolic in the case of Derrida et al., elliptical, in the case of Carnap and Goodman. ;In Chapter II I try to show how the pre-modern (...) class='Hi'>mathematical tradition, represented by Euclid, aimed at keeping the enticements of technical facility in check by means of didactic phronesis and how the post-Kantian interpretation of "existence" in Euclid as constructibility betrays his usage and self-understanding. I suggest that his focus in the postulates and elsewhere is on the undistorted iterability of graphic evocations of the items already intelligible thanks to the definitions or to the pre-understanding shared by the teacher and student. ;In Chapter III, devoted to Descartes the principal claims of modern constructivism are brought to sight. After examining Descartes' fabulous autobiography and its emphasis on self-origination, I turn to the style, contents and under-pinnings of the Geometry in an effort to extract from that text what he once referred to as "the metaphysics of geometry." The latter yields the conditions of successful problem-solving, i.e., dimensional homogeneity and kinematic continuity. These conditions, in turn, find their justification in Descartes' theses in the Rules concerning order, measure and the uniformity of "mental" activity. In the final section I apply the lessons learned from the Geometry and the Rules to one critical issue in the later Meditations, the transition from essence to existence. Descartes' "solution" generates a sequence of perplexities with Hobbes, Leibniz, Kant and other radical moderns continue to wrestle. (shrink)

Certain mathematical problems prove very hard to solve because some of their intuitive features have not been assimilated or cannot be assimilated by the available mathematical resources. This state of affairs triggers an interesting dynamic whereby the introduction of novel conceptual resources converts the intuitive features into further mathematical determinations in light of which a solution to the original problem is made accessible. I illustrate this phenomenon through a study of Bertrand’s paradox.

Assuming no previous study in logic, this informal yet rigorous text covers the material of a standard undergraduate first course in mathematical logic, using natural deduction and leading up to the completeness theorem for first-order logic. At each stage of the text, the reader is given an intuition based on standard mathematical practice, which is subsequently developed with clean formal mathematics. Alongside the practical examples, readers learn what can and can't be calculated; for example the correctness of a (...) derivation proving a given sequent can be tested mechanically, but there is no general mechanical test for the existence of a derivation proving the given sequent. The undecidability results are proved rigorously in an optional final chapter, assuming Matiyasevich's theorem characterising the computably enumerable relations. Rigorous proofs of the adequacy and completeness proofs of the relevant logics are provided, with careful attention to the languages involved. Optinal sections discuss the classification of mathematical structures by first-order theories; the required theory of cardinality is developed from scratch. Throughout the book there are notes on historical aspects of the material, and connections with linguistics and computer science, and the discussion of syntax and semantics is influenced by modern linguistic approaches. Two basic themes in recent cognitive science studies of actual human reasoning are also introduced. Including extensive exercises and selected solutions, this text is ideal for students in logic, mathematics, philosophy, and computer science. (shrink)

Plato is the first scientist whose work we still possess. He is our first writer to interpret the natural world mathematically, and also the first theorist of mathematics in the natural sciences. As no one else before or after, he set out why we should suppose a link between nature and mathematics, a link that has never been stronger than it is today. Mathematical Plato examines how Plato organized and justified the principles, terms, and methods of our mathematical, (...) natural science. "Roger Sworder deserves our gratitude for drawing attention to the significance of mathematics in Plato's thought and writings. He lays the principal discussions out before us with clarity. He also presents Plato as a theorist of nature: of physics and not just metaphysics, to use Aristotle's distinction. Not all readers, we should admit, will be equally convinced of the usefulness of Plato's science for today, but they will all be led more deeply into Plato's vision of reality."--ANDREW DAVISON, Westcott House, Cambridge "Here is Plato for an anti-Platonic age. The author gives careful attention to some of the most important passages in the Platonic dialogues and offers new solutions to some of Plato's most famous mathematical puzzles. He then considers the implications of these penetrating studies for the philosophy of science, and the natural sciences especially. This is a book that revivifies the core themes of Platonism and restores science to worship. It shows Roger Sworder to be one of the foremost students of Plato writing today, and places him in the noble tradition of Thomas Taylor."--RODNEY BLACKHIRST, author of Primordial Alchemy and Modern Religion: Essays on Traditional Cosmology. (shrink)

In terms of control of composition, the fabrication of money was arguably the most demanding of all pre-Industrial Revolution metallurgical practices. The calculations involved in such control needed arithmetical computations involving repeated multiplications and divisions, not only of integers but also of mixed numbers. Such computations were possible using Roman numerals, but with some difficulties. The advantages gained by employing arithmetic using Indo-arabic numerals for alloying calculations would have been the same as for other types of commercial calculations. A method (...) of calculating the proportions of two coinage alloys of different compositions that were needed to produce a third alloy of specified intermediate composition, eventually known as the rule of alternate alligation, was however, a specific requirement in the minting of money. This requirement made a particular demand on medieval mathematics, as a solution was not possible using arithmetic alone. Furthermore, the problem became indeterminate when more than two components were available for mixing. All the necessary methods of calculation were described by Fibonacci in his Liber abbaci. These methods are to be found in a sequence of practical arithmetics that stretch through the trattati d'abbaco of the Italian city states during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, to the first printed books of Continental authors such as Pacioli. Of the earliest sixteenth-century printed English books on practical arithmetic, The Grounde of Artes by Robert Recorde contained the first advance in the methodology of alternate alligation since Fibonacci. In the seventeenth century, formal proof of the rule of alternate alligation was given by Kersey in his practical arithmetics and his treatise on algebra. The topic was also addressed by several authors of academic algebras. It was in this century that the problem of indeterminacy in the solution of alternate alligation involving the mixture of more than two components, was finally resolved. English mint accounts provide little direct information on the alloying calculations carried out, and nothing on the methods used. However, the continued description of such calculations in other mint documents, merchants notebooks, and in goldsmiths' handbooks spanning four centuries imply that the calculations described in practical arithmetics were used in practice. Monetary matters had high economic and political profiles during the whole of the time span covered in this study. The influence of such considerations pervades the history of the technology of minting and the mathematics on which it called, and is discussed in context. (shrink)

In this paper, we have considered a dynamical model of Chlamydia disease with varying total population size, bilinear incidence rate and pulse vaccination strategy. We have defined two positive numbers $$R_{0}$$ R 0 and $$R_{1}$$ R 1. It is proved that there exists an infection-free periodic solution which is globally attractive if $$R_{0} 1.$$ R 1 > 1. The important mathematical findings for the dynamical behaviour of the Chlamydia disease model are also numerically verified using MATLAB. Finally epidemiological (...) implications of our analytical findings are addressed critically. (shrink)

Cette étude montre comment le météorologue Edward Lorenz, dans deux articles de 1963 et 1964, explore les propriétés des systèmes chaotiques par des allers-retours entre une déduction mathématique (basée sur la théorie des systèmes dynamiques) et une étude des solutions numériques du système dit « de Lorenz » dans un régime d’instabilité. This study aims at showing how the metereologist Edward Lorenz, in two papers of 1963 and 1964, explores the properties of chaotic systems thanks to the interplay between a (...) mathematical deduction (based on dynamical systems theory) and a study of the mathematical solutions of the Lorenz system in an instability regime. (shrink)

We have developed a simple mathematical model with three physiologically significant states to describe the changes in intrauterine pressure associated with a contraction during human parturition. The myometrium is modelled as a set of smooth muscle cells, each of which is in one of three states (quiescent, contracted, refractory) at a given time. These states are occupied according to a cycle governed by three temporal parameters. The solutions of the equations describing the model show an oscillatory behavior for particular (...) values of these parameters, which is very similar to the time dependant development of intrauterine pressure during labor. Due to its non-linear terms, our model could lead to chaotic oscillations (in the mathematical sense), whose clinical counterpart may occur in cases of dystocia. Despite its simplicity, this model appears to be a useful guide to further investigations of the oscillatory behavior of the myometrium, or other smooth muscles, in normal and pathological situations. (shrink)

This paper argues that scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between the mathematical entities that are indispensible to scientific explanation and the modal structure of the empirical phenomena those entities explain. The argument presupposes that scientific realism commits us to the indispensability argument. The viewpresented here is that the indispensability of mathematics commits us not only to the existence of mathematical structures and entities but to a metaphysical determination relation between those entities and the modal (...) structure of the physical world. The no-miracles argument is the primary motivation for scientific realism. It is a presupposition of this argument that unobservable entities are explanatory only when they determine the empirical phenomena they explain. I argue that mathematical entities should also be seen as explanatory only when they determine the empirical facts they explain, namely, the modal structure of the physical world. Thus, scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between mathematics and physical modality that has not been previously recognized. The requirement to account for the metaphysical dependence of modal physical structure on mathematics limits the class of acceptable solutions to the applicability problem that are available to the scientific realist. (shrink)

The chapter advances a reformulation of the classical problem of the nature of mathematical objects (if any), here called “Plato’s problem,” in line with the program of a philosophy of mathematical practice. It then provides a sketch of a platonist solution, following the same perspective. This solution disregards as nonsensical the question of the existence of abstract, and specifically mathematical, objects, by rather focusing on the modalities of our access to them: objects (in general, both (...) concrete and abstract) are regarded as individual contents that we have (or can have) a de re epistemic access to. The question of the existence of mathematical objects is then replaced by that of the modalities of our de re epistemic access to individual mathematical contents. (shrink)

This book presents a new nominalistic philosophy of mathematics: semantic conventionalism. Its central thesis is that mathematics should be founded on the human ability to create language – and specifically, the ability to institute conventions for the truth conditions of sentences. This philosophical stance leads to an alternative way of practicing mathematics: instead of “building” objects out of sets, a mathematician should introduce new syntactical sentence types, together with their truth conditions, as he or she develops a theory. Semantic conventionalism (...) is justified first through criticism of Cantorian set theory, intuitionism, logicism, and predicativism; then on its own terms; and finally, exemplified by a detailed reconstruction of arithmetic and real analysis. Also included is a simple solution to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes that have traditionally been recognized as semantic. And since it is argued that mathematics is semantics, this solution also applies to Russell’s paradox and the other mathematical paradoxes of self-reference. In addition to philosophers who care about the metaphysics and epistemology of mathematics or the paradoxes of self-reference, this book should appeal to mathematicians interested in alternative approaches. (shrink)

The paper addresses the problem, which quantum mechanics resolves in fact. Its viewpoint suggests that the crucial link of time and its course is omitted in understanding the problem. The common interpretation underlain by the history of quantum mechanics sees discreteness only on the Plank scale, which is transformed into continuity and even smoothness on the macroscopic scale. That approach is fraught with a series of seeming paradoxes. It suggests that the present mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is only (...) partly relevant to its problem, which is ostensibly known. The paper accepts just the opposite: The mathematical solution is absolute relevant and serves as an axiomatic base, from which the real and yet hidden problem is deduced. Wave-particle duality, Hilbert space, both probabilistic and many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics, quantum information, and the Schrödinger equation are included in that base. The Schrödinger equation is understood as a generalization of the law of energy conservation to past, present, and future moments of time. The deduced real problem of quantum mechanics is: “What is the universal law describing the course of time in any physical change therefore including any mechanical motion?”. (shrink)

The context for this paper is Feferman's theory of explicit mathematics, a formal framework serving many purposes. It is suitable for representing Bishop-style constructive mathematics as well as generalized recursion, including direct expression of structural concepts which admit self-application. The object of investigation here is the theory of explicit mathematics augmented by the monotone fixed point principle, which asserts that any monotone operation on classifications (Feferman's notion of set) possesses a least fixed point. To be more precise, the new axiom (...) not merely postulates the existence of a least solution, but, by adjoining a new functional constant to the language, it is ensured that a fixed point is uniformly presentable as a function of the monotone operation. The upshot of the paper is that the latter extension of explicit mathematics (when based on classical logic) embodies considerable proof-theoretic strength. It is shown that it has at least the strength of the subsystem of second order arithmetic based on Π 1 2 comprehension. (shrink)