In this paper I argue that Kant’s political and juridical philosophy justifies a type of normative legal positivism that implies specific notions of law and legal freedom which determine and restrict the sphere of action of judges and jurists. Finally, I defend that, according to Kant’s practical philosophy, the normative connection between justice and law is not supposed to be carried out at the juridical level, as a meta-juridical theory, but at the political one, making it a meta-political theory.

A theme of growing importance in both the law and philosophy and socio-legal literature is how regulatory dynamics can be identified and normative expectations met in an age when transnational actors operate on a global plane and in increasingly fragmented and transformative contexts. A reconsideration of established theories and axiomatic findings on regulatory phenomena is an essential part of this discourse. There is indeed an urgent need for discontinuity regarding what we know about, among other things, law, legality, sovereignty and (...) political legitimacy, power relations, institutional design and development, and pluralist dynamics of ordering under processes of globalisation and transnationalism. Making an important contribution to the scholarly debate on the subject, this volume features original and much-needed essays of theoretical and applied legal philosophy as well as socio-legal accounts that reflect on whether legal positivism has anything to offer to this intellectual enterprise. This is done by discussing whether global and transnational cultural, socio-political, economic, and juridical challenges as well as processes of diversification, fragmentation, and transformation reinforce or weaken legal positivists’ assumptions, claims, and methods. The themes covered include, but are not limited to, absolute and limited state sovereignty; the ‘new international legal positivism’; Hartian legal positivism and the ‘normative positivist’ account; the relationship between modern secularisation, social conventionalism, and meta-ontological issues of temporality in postnational jurisprudence; the social positivisation of human rights; the formation and content of jus cogens norms; feminist critique; the global and transnational migration of principles of justice and morality; the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rule of interpretation; and the responsibility of transnational corporations. (shrink)

This paper presents a specific concept of the legal system, bringing a contribution to the Theory of Law, from the line of analysis of the Semiotics of Law. The entire methodological approach of this concept is based on the contributions of the École de Paris, from a theoretical-semiotic perspective derived from the studies of Algirdas Julien Greimas. The analysis seeks to further and qualify previous studies and publications, and focuses on the task of presenting the concept of juridicity, deriving the (...) description of the concept of the legal system from it, understood as a set of connections between legal texts. Consequently, the paper presents a Mesh Model for the description of the legal system, replacing the positivist concept of the Pyramid Model, through restoring the relationship between Law and Moral, between Law and Society and Law and Justice. Throughout the theoretical explanation, the paper tries to trace, develop and qualify the main points with arguments that distinguish the operation of the legal system, such as the concentric movement, micro-universes of meaning, discursive practices, the task of legal actors, dynamic inter-textuality, the role of interpretation, the process of the production of legal meaning and the search for textual justice. (shrink)

My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively speaking, in “the world (...) taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context. (shrink)

Many scholars of Medieval Political Philosophy have suggested that Marisilius of Padua’s Defensor Pacis defends a «positivist» approach to law. In this article we try to show that such claim is wrong. We begin by sketching a brief summary of Marilius’ legal doctrine and then we turn to many scholarly pieces that have found it either in favor of or against «juridical positivism» in the Defensor Pacis. By reviewing the most recent theories on «juridical positivism» we argue that (...) there are no evidences of any coherent «positivist» view of Law in Marsilius’ work and, that if there are, they are irrelevant to Marsilius’ political philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze Carlos Cossio’s theory of law, and how his theory was a reaction to Kelsen’s juridical positivism. The most important aspect I highlight is the logical abstract normativism defended by Kelsen, and how it was overcome by a transcendental and existential theory of law, which Cossio develops in a close relationship to Husserl and Heidegger views.

For more than two centuries the constitutional State and the principle of legality have constructed a rampart against the selfsufficiency of police power, but the events of Summer zoo1 have brutally unveiled the porosity of this limit. Suddenly, an entire history reappeared, preciously instructive, supposedly past and dedicated to erudition since the fateful date, 1789. Like the revolutionaries in the constituent and legislative Assembly , we are once again confronted by a dilemma barely modified by two centuries of juridical (...) class='Hi'>positivism. Is it possible to subject the activities of the police to a system of legal control, or must we rather admit that that institution possesses its own standards and that any blunders are less the sign of a specific violation of the law than the confirmation of a structural specificity proper to the police? (shrink)

The problem of the legal person is a central issue in legal philosophy and the theory of law. In this article I examine the semantic meaning of the concept of the person in Russian philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century, considered to be the "Golden Age" of Russian legal thought. This provides an overview of the conception of the personality in the context of different legal approaches (theory of natural law, legal positivism, the psychological legal doctrine, and (...) the sociological school of law). I indicate a polemic among the theories of the person and attempts to create an integral concept of the legal subject. In addition I present an analysis of the relation between the concepts of the legal subject and the moral person, which personify fundamental features of law and morality. In order to demarcate the notions of individual and the legal subject, I focus on doctrines of the artificial person or the juridical person. (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo es eminentemente didáctico y se centra en un abordaje descriptivo del debate adelantado en filosofía moral y política en torno a los derechos humanos. Se analizan unas siete concepciones acerca de cómo conciben la naturaleza y fundamentación racional de estos derechos, de cuya promulgación contenida en la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos de 1948, se cumplen en este 2008 sesenta años. Como parte de la celebración de esta efeméride por nuestra Facultad de Filosofía y Letras (...) de la Universidad de La Salle, se escribe este artículo con la intención adicional de que sirva a los estudiantes como iniciación a sus estudios y preocupaciones teóricas en materia de derechos humanos. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen and Max Weber are conventionally understood as initiators not only of two distinct and opposing processes of concept formation, but also of two discrete and contrasting theoretical frameworks for the study of law. _The Foundation of the Juridical-Political: Concept Formation in Hans Kelsen and Max Weber _places the conventional understanding of the theoretical relationship between the work of Kelsen and Weber into question. Focusing on the theoretical foundations of Kelsen’s legal positivism and Weber’s sociology of law, and (...) guided by the conceptual frame of the juridico-political, the contributors to this interdisciplinary volume explore convergences and divergences in the approach and stance of Kelsen and Weber to law, the State, political science, modernity, legal rationality, legal theory, sociology of law, authority, legitimacy and legality. The chapters comprising _The Foundation of the Juridical-Political _uncover complexities within as well as between the theoretical and methodological principles of Kelsen and Weber and, thereby, challenge the enduring division between legal positivism and the sociology of law in contemporary discourse. (shrink)

This essay discusses criminal law theories in late Imperial Russia. It argues that, although the political climate of Reform and Counter Reform effectively undermined attempts to implement new legislation premised on the idea of the 'rights-enabled person' (pravovaya lichnosf), paradoxically, it fostered the growth of juridical scholarship. Russian criminal law theorists engaged critically with Western juridical science, which, beginning in the 1870s, witnessed a shift away from absolutist theories inspired by the classics of philosophical idealism towards various strains of (...) class='Hi'>positivism arguing for the restoration of the person as a concrete, physiological being. However, while Russian scholars were drawn to these new trends of criminal anthropology and the sociology of crime, they were also obliged to take stock of an indigenous legal culture that scarcely differentiated between pravo and zakon, together with a long tradition of customary practices that equated crime and punishment with sin and redemption. (shrink)

The arguments put forward in this work are based on certain reflections about doctrinal aspects, theoretical meanings and focuses in some philosophical postures that have been the basis for juridical science. The jus-naturalistic, jus-positivist, formalistic, realistic and materialistic concept..

Deconstruction both by its friends and enemies has come to be associated with a set of cliches that completely misunderstands its ethical aspiration. It is particularly within the field of law that we can see the ethical force of deconstruction, and also illuminate its concrete and practical importance. In The Philosophy of the Limit Drucilla Cornell examines the relationship of deconstruction to questions of ethics, justice and legal interpretation. She argues that renaming deconstruction "the philosophy of the limit" will allow (...) us to be more precise about what deconstruction actually is philosophically and hence to articulate more clearly its significance for law. Cornell explores the ethical and juridical significance of the so-called postmodern rebellion against metaphysics. A shared ethical rebellion links philosophers as different as Theodor Adorno, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Emmanuel Levinas. Together they present a new ethical configuration, new in its difference from both the critical social theory of J$u$urgen Habermas and the analytic jurisprudence of Nagel and Rawls. A key aspect of this newness is the centrality given to the relationship between questions of ethics and sexual difference. Cornell argues that the appeal of Lacan's analysis to feminists is that it helps to explain the profound hold the gender hierarchy has over Western culture, including its theories of political transformation. Under a Lacanian analysis the law of gender identity will be replicated in the laws of an existing legal system. This means that we cannot hope to sustain legal reforms unless the gender hierarchy is challenged. Cornell examines Derrida's position on the significance of the gender hierarchy in philosophy and explores its ethical and political importance. Derrida's intervention against legal positivism has important implications for the legal reforms necessary to protect marginalized groups. His emphasis on the limit, she argues, is crucial to thosewhose well-being and very lives may depend on legal transformation, women and homosexuals, for example. In an important contribution to legal philosophy, Cornell explores the affinities of Derrida's writings with recent liberal analytic jurisprudence. She also explores the differences. Comparing Rawls's and Derrida's accounts of justice, she argues that Derrida gives greater attention to the necessary utopian moment in his insistence on maintaining the divide between law, established norms, and justice. Cornell's focus on the importance of the limit and the centrality of the gender hierarchy allows her to offer a view of jurisprudence different from both critical social theory and analytic jurisprudence. As we watch the long-fought-for civil rights of women systematically overturned, we have reason to think about how the connections she makes shed light on an underlying truth of our social, political, and legal reality. (shrink)

Do our present circumstances allow us to defend a specific connection (that specific connection) between «legal rules», «moral claims» and «democratic principles» which we may say is granted by an unproblematic presupposition of universality or by an «acultural» experience of modernity? In order to discuss this question, this paper invokes the challenge-visée of a plausible reinvention of Law’s autonomous project (a reinvention which may be capable of critically re-thinking and re-experiencing Law’s constitutive cultural-civilizational originarium in a «limit-situation» such as our (...) own). The discussion is developed by recognising that the claim to universality is not only incompatible with a substantive conception of juridicalness as validity but also sustained with difficulty by a procedural representation of discourse and rationality (a representation which, against its own conclusion-claims, could also be said to be culturally and civilizationally bounded). Not forgetting some specific features of contemporary juridical pluralism—namely that which emerges from the counterpoint between semiotic groups or interpretative communities (and their differently assumed claims of intersemioticity concerning the signifier law)—this train of reflection diagnoses briefly a sequence of complementary main difficulties (as «obstacles» to recognising Law’s demand as an unmistakable cultural project), namely those arising from the formalistic normativistic inheritance (confounding legal autonomy with isolationism), from the challenges and seductions of practical holism (justifying a continuum in which Law’s project loses its sense and autonomy), and also from the familiar debate between exclusive and inclusive versions of positivism and non-positivism (a debate which establishes-consecrates an equivocal counterpoint between Law and Morality). (shrink)

Axiological foundations of free speach. Belandria, Margarita y González R., Javier Voluntad, ausencias, y normas: el sustrato histórico del positivismo en el derecho. Will, absences and norms: the historical background of positivism in law. Carpintero Benítez, Francisco Nominalismo jurídico, escolástica española y tradición republicana. Juridical nominalism, spanish scholasticism and republican tradition. Casanova Guerra, Carlos El primer principio de la razón práctica en la teoría de la ley natural de John Finnis. The first principle of practical reason in John Finnis´s (...) natural law theory. Hocevar G., Mayda G. El derecho a una educación integral de calidad, ¿utopía o posibilidad?. The right to an integral education of quality: utopia or possibility?. López de Cordero, Mery La muerte de la imagen. The death of the image. Peña, Edilio Karl Jaspers: autorreflexión y "existenzerhellung". Karl jaspers: self-reflection and "existenzerhellung". Portuondo Pajón, Gladys L. Derechos humanos y positivismo moderado. Human rights and temperated positivism. Ramos Pascua, José Antonio De la libertad y sus apariencias. On liberty and its appearances. Ramis Muscato, Pompeyo Pensamiento y vida: la "guía" zambraniana. Thought and life: zambrano's "guide" Rivara Kamaji, Greta Interdisciplinares Las mujeres en la ciencia de la salud. Women in the health sciences. Alcaraz Ariza, María Ángeles Cultura arquitectónica y crisis de la contemporaneidad. Architectural culture and crisis of the contemporary. Arellano Spinetti, Leonardo Recensiones Homenaje al filósofo venezolano Alberto Rosales. Walton, Roberto Informaciones Índice acumulado. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, from the point of view of a legal positivist conception of law and its associated approach to legal interpretation, that having a ‘democratic Bill of Rights’ as a basis for enacting ‘human rights legislation’ is more legitimate and likely to be more effective with respect to promoting human rights than the contemporary model of using ‘juridical Bills of Rights’ as a basis for modifying or overriding enacted legislation.Resumen:Desde una concepción positivista del derecho y su respectivo (...) enfoque hacia la interpretación jurídica, en este artículo se argumenta que el tener un “Bill of Rights democrático” como base para expedir una “legislación de derechos humanos” resulta ser más legítimo y más efectivo para la promoción de los derechos humanos, que el modelo contemporáneo de “Bill of Rights jurisdiccionales” que sirve para modificar o invalidar la legislación promulgada. (shrink)

Axiological foundations of free speach. Belandria, Margarita y González R., Javier Voluntad, ausencias, y normas: el sustrato histórico del positivismo en el derecho. Will, absences and norms: the historical background of positivism in law. Carpintero Benítez, Francisco Nominalismo jurídico, escolástica española y tradición republicana. Juridical nominalism, spanish scholasticism and republican tradition. Casanova Guerra, Carlos El primer principio de la razón práctica en la teoría de la ley natural de John Finnis. The first principle of practical reason in John Finnis´s (...) natural law theory. Hocevar G., Mayda G. El derecho a una educación integral de calidad, ¿utopía o posibilidad?. The right to an integral education of quality: utopia or possibility?. López de Cordero, Mery La muerte de la imagen. The death of the image. Peña, Edilio Karl Jaspers: autorreflexión y "existenzerhellung". Karl jaspers: self-reflection and "existenzerhellung". Portuondo Pajón, Gladys L. Derechos humanos y positivismo moderado. Human rights and temperated positivism. Ramos Pascua, José Antonio De la libertad y sus apariencias. On liberty and its appearances. Ramis Muscato, Pompeyo Pensamiento y vida: la "guía" zambraniana. Thought and life: zambrano's "guide" Rivara Kamaji, Greta Interdisciplinares Las mujeres en la ciencia de la salud. Women in the health sciences. Alcaraz Ariza, María Ángeles Cultura arquitectónica y crisis de la contemporaneidad. Architectural culture and crisis of the contemporary. Arellano Spinetti, Leonardo Recensiones Homenaje al filósofo venezolano Alberto Rosales. Walton, Roberto Informaciones Índice acumulado. (shrink)

This address at the Hart Centenary Conference in Cambridge in July 2007 reflects on foundational elements in Hart's method in legal philosophy. It argues that his understanding of what it is to adopt an internal point of view was flawed by (a) inattention to the difference between descriptive history (or biography or detection) and descriptive general theory of human affairs, (b) inattention to practical reason as argument from premises, some factual but others normative (evaluative) in their content, and (c) relative (...) inattention to the deliberations of law-makers as distinct from subjects of the law. These flaws contributed to a concept or theory of law that so truncated its account of the juridical, and of the sources of legal reasoning, that it could provide little or no guidance in situations of legal difficulty. The paper suggests that these flaws result, to some significant extent, from the skeptical doubts about morality evident particularly in his later work. All this has implications for the kind of approach to law and legal theory often self-described as positivist. (shrink)

For centuries, natural law was the main philosophical legal paradigm. Now, it is a wonder when a court of law invokes it. Arthur Kaufmann already underlined a modern general "horror iuris naturalis". We also know, with Winfried Hassemer, that the succession of legal paradigms is a matter of fashion. But why did natural law become outdated? Are there any remnants of it still alive today? This book analyses a number of prejudices and myths that have created a general misconception of (...) natural law. As Jean-Marc Trigeaud put it: there is a natural law that positivists invented. Not the real one(s). It seeks to understand not only the usual adversaries of natural law (like legalists, positivists and historicists) but also its further enemies, the inner enemies of natural law, such as internal aporias, political and ideological manipulations, etc. The book puts forward a reasoned and balanced examination of this treasure of western political and juridical though. And, if we look at it another way, natural law is by no means a loser in our times: because it lives in modern human rights. (shrink)

This article pays special attention to the large number of references to political theology by Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, particularly in the interwar period, and seeks to interpret these references in a new way. While Schmitt's analogies between God and state are to be expected considering his strong Catholic roots, such comparisons are much more surprising for a positivist like Hans Kelsen, who always tried to relieve state and law from transcendental elements. The article concludes that, far from being (...) marginal in the doctrinal dispute between Schmitt and Kelsen, references to political theology express and summarize their major controversy about the relation between state and law, as well as about the sources of the state's unity. The heart of the disputatio between the two jurists concerned the ability of the political power to emancipate itself from the juridical order. The ‘legal miracle’—in this context meaning the occasional autonomization of the state from law—was for Schmitt the manifestation of sovereign power. However, for Kelsen it represented the negation of the state's essence, whose actions must be determined only by the legal order. (shrink)

The author maintains in this article that it is possible an approach between the positivistic legal theory, the one that follows the model of the analytical theory developed by Hart, and those others that apply a socio-legal method. Against what some defenders of both perspectives advocate, who view each others with some disdain, the author asserts the need to integrate legal theory with social sciences in the field of juridical ideas. This supposes opening spaces to develop a socio-legal theory of (...) law that lives equally from categories of conceptual analysis and of sociological research. The author rests specially, in order to defend this position, on authors like Roger Coterrell, Denis Galligan, Nicola Lacey and, above all, Brian Tamanaha and William Twinning, whose arguments are here object of special consideration. (shrink)

This essay discusses criminal law theories in late Imperial Russia. It argues that, although the political climate of Reform and Counter Reform effectively undermined attempts to implement new legislation premised on the idea of the 'rights-enabled person', paradoxically, it fostered the growth of juridical scholarship. Russian criminal law theorists engaged critically with Western juridical science, which, beginning in the 1870s, witnessed a shift away from absolutist theories inspired by the classics of philosophical idealism towards various strains of positivism arguing (...) for the restoration of the person as a concrete, physiological being. However, while Russian scholars were drawn to these new trends of criminal anthropology and the sociology of crime, they were also obliged to take stock of an indigenous legal culture that scarcely differentiated between pravo and zakon, together with a long tradition of customary practices that equated crime and punishment with sin and redemption. (shrink)

This paper examines and defends von Wright's view of moral value, put forward in his book The Varieties of Goodness (1963). He holds that moral value is not a primary value like instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, or hedonic value, but a secondary or second-level one which is based on a combination of primary values. Human actions and intentions are the only bearers of moral value, and they are morally valuable because they protect and promote some set of primary values. It (...) is argued that the same account (i) applies also to juridical value, and (ii) can be used to throw some light on the problem of defining the three competing schools of legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism, natural law theory, and legal constructivism. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta profundizar en la doctrina de los derechos fundamentales del jurista italiano Luigi Ferrajoli. Ferrajoli es uno de los principales teóricos del garantismo iusfilosófio. Su teoría sobre los derechos quiere ser una vía de superación de la antinomia positivismo-iusnaturalismo. This paper tries to review the doctrine of fundamental rights of italian jurist Luigi Ferrajoli. Ferrajoli is one of the main theorists of garantism juridical-philosophical. His theory of rights is, in his opinion, an alternative to iusnaturalism and legal (...) positivism. (shrink)

Axiological foundations of free speach. Belandria, Margarita y González R., Javier Voluntad, ausencias, y normas: el sustrato histórico del positivismo en el derecho. Will, absences and norms: the historical background of positivism in law. Carpintero Benítez, Francisco Nominalismo jurídico, escolástica española y tradición republicana. Juridical nominalism, spanish scholasticism and republican tradition. Casanova Guerra, Carlos El primer principio de la razón práctica en la teoría de la ley natural de John Finnis. The first principle of practical reason in John Finnis´s (...) natural law theory. Hocevar G., Mayda G. El derecho a una educación integral de calidad, ¿utopía o posibilidad?. The right to an integral education of quality: utopia or possibility?. López de Cordero, Mery La muerte de la imagen. The death of the image. Peña, Edilio Karl Jaspers: autorreflexión y "existenzerhellung". Karl jaspers: self-reflection and "existenzerhellung". Portuondo Pajón, Gladys L. Derechos humanos y positivismo moderado. Human rights and temperated positivism. Ramos Pascua, José Antonio De la libertad y sus apariencias. On liberty and its appearances. Ramis Muscato, Pompeyo Pensamiento y vida: la "guía" zambraniana. Thought and life: zambrano's "guide" Rivara Kamaji, Greta Interdisciplinares Las mujeres en la ciencia de la salud. Women in the health sciences. Alcaraz Ariza, María Ángeles Cultura arquitectónica y crisis de la contemporaneidad. Architectural culture and crisis of the contemporary. Arellano Spinetti, Leonardo Recensiones Homenaje al filósofo venezolano Alberto Rosales. Walton, Roberto Informaciones Índice acumulado. (shrink)

In, Kant defends a position that cannot be salvaged. The essay is nonetheless important because it helps us understand his philosophy of law and, more specifically, his interpretation of the social contract. Kant considers truthfulness a strict legal duty because it is the necessary condition for the juridical state. As attested by Kants arguments against the death penalty, not even the right to life has such strict unconditional status. Within the juridical state, established by the social contract, the innate right (...) to freedom is transformed into a bundle of merely positive rights, including the right to life. Understanding the reason for the rejection of thus helps us understand the, in a sense, character of Kant’s legal philosophy. In conclusion, some suggestions are made to bring his position closer to our common moral understanding. (shrink)

The postmodernist view, with its emphasis on the nature of discursive practices in constructing subjectivity and reality, has found many applications. This book develops a critically informed psychoanalytic semiotic view derived from Lacan, and applies it to the study of law. It also integrates some of the central concepts of chaos theory in describing how the legal text is constructed and how it may be read. Postmodern feminist analyses focusing on a possible ecriture feminine provide key insights, and the notion (...) of an empowered democracy is offered as a potentially generating milieu for a revolutionary replacement discourse. (shrink)

I outline the theoretical framework of, and three research programs within American speculative philosophy of science during the period 1900-1931. One program applies verificationism to research in psychology, one investigates the methodology of research programs, and one analyses scientific explanation and other scientific concepts. The primary sources for my outline are works by Morris Raphael Cohen, Grace Andrus de Laguna, Theodore de Laguna, Edgar Arthur Singer Jr., Harold Robert Smart, and Marie Collins Swabey. I also use my outline to provide (...) a partial comparison of American speculative philosophy of science and 1930s logical positivism. My comparison suggests that logical positivism was a proposal for substantially narrowing down and winding back American philosophy of science and was based on positions that were already problematized in the American context. -/- . (shrink)

It is generally agreed that R.G.Collingwood's An Essay on Philosophical Method and An Essay on Metaphysics are closely related but are also significantly different. If they do in fact differ in any significant way, one wonders whether there are good reasons to prefer one account over the other at the points where they differ. In this article, I would like to try to answer this query by referring to two passages, where the text in both essays is nearly identical but (...) which nevertheless reveal the differences between the two essays. In these passages Collingwood gives a presentation of Plato's and Kant's philosophical method and compares their methodologies to his own. Precisely the small differences between the two fragments not only show the continuity between both essays, but also make clear how Collingwood's concept of metaphysics after 1936, under the pressure of logical positivism, loses its distinctive sharpness and hence becomes liable to the charge of relativism and historicism. If my analysis has any plausibility, I hope to make it clear that Collingwood's position in EPM is preferable to that of EM or, to put it more mildly, that 'any account of EM must do justice to EPM if we are to allow the rest of Collingwood's philosophy to live and flourish'. (shrink)

As two parts of one overarching legal positivist project, it is likely assumed that the constitutive elements of Joseph Raz’s analysis of the rule of law are compatible with his thinking on the nature of legal authority. The aim of this article is to call this assumption into question by reading Raz in light of the core, if under-recognised, preoccupation of the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller: namely, the latter’s concern to illuminate the relationship between the distinctive form of law and (...) human agency. This not only opens up a new engagement between Raz and Fuller that was far from exhausted within debates about law and morality, but also reveals tensions between Raz’s analysis of the rule of law and his analysis of legal authority that proponents of Raz’s legal positivism need to address. (shrink)

Researchers misunderstand their role in creating ethical problems when they allow dogmas to purportedly divorce scientists and scientific practices from the values that they embody. Cortina, Edwards, and Powell help us clarify and further develop our position by responding to our critique of, and alternatives to, this misleading separation. In this rebuttal, we explore how the desire to achieve the separation of facts and values is unscientific on the very terms endorsed by its advocates—this separation is refuted by empirical observation. (...) We show that positivists like Cortina and Edwards offer no rigorous theoretical or empirical justifications to substantiate their claims, let alone critique ours. Following Powell, we point to how classical pragmatism understands ‘purpose’ in scientific pursuits while also providing an alternative to the dogmas of positivism and related philosophical positions. In place of dogmatic, unscientific cries about an abstract and therefore always-unobservable ‘reality,’ we invite all organizational scholars to join us in shifting the discussion about quantitative research towards empirically grounded scientific inquiry. This makes the ethics of actual people and their practices central to quantitative research, including the thoughts, discourses, and behaviors of researchers who are always in particular places doing particular things. We propose that quantitative researchers can thus start to think about their research practices as a kind of work, rather than having the status of a kind of dogma. We conclude with some implications that this has for future research and education, including the relevance of research and research methods. (shrink)

Sayer argues that Popper defended a logicist philosophy of science. The problem with such logicism is that it creates what is termed here as a `truncated foundationalism', which restricts epistemic certainty to the logical form of scientific theories whilst having nothing to say about their substantive contents. Against this it is argued that critical realism, which Sayer advocates, produces a linguistic version of truncated foundationalism and that Popper's problem-solving philosophy, with its emphasis on developing knowledge through criticism, eschews all forms (...) of foundationalism and is better able to account for the development of substantive knowledge claims. Key Words: critical realism • fallibilism • logicism • post-positivism • truncated foundationalism. (shrink)