. I will argue that the concept of law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual description. Its conceptual function is that of relating certain properties a norm may possess to the conclusion that the norm is legally binding, namely, that it deserves to be endorsed and applied in legal reasoning. Legal validity has to be distinguished from other, more demanding, normative ideas, such as moral bindingness or legal optimality.

I will argue that the concept of (valid) law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual description. Its conceptual function is that of relating certain (alternative sets of) properties a norm may possess to the conclusion that the norm is legally binding, namely, that it deserves to be endorsed and applied in legal reasoning. Legal validity has to be distinguished from other, more demanding, normative ideas, such as moral bindingness or legal optimality.

Abstract. In this paper I shall take an inferential approach to legality (legal validity), and consider how the legality of a norm can be inferred, and what can be inferred from it. In particular, I shall analyse legality policies, namely, conditionals conferring the quality of legality upon norms having certain properties, and I shall examine to what extent such conditionals need to be positivistic, so that legality is only dependant on social facts. Finally, I shall consider how legality is transmitted (...) from norm to norm and whether the ultimate legality policies (the rules of recognition) of a legal system need to be constituted by social facts. (shrink)

En esta contribución intentaré mostrar que el criterio lex superior derogat legi inferiori conduce a una consecuencia que, al menos en lo que conozco, no ha sido todavía advertida. Si las normas de la máxima jerarquía de un sistema jurídico, verbigracia, normas constitucionales constituyen un conjunto consistente, entonces necesariamente el sistema jurídico es consistente. Dicho de otra manera, lex superior preserva necesariamente la consistencia. Si las normas del nivel más alto son miembros de un conjunto consistente, los niveles inferiores de (...) la jerarquía no podrían admitir normas contradictorias con las superiores. Más aún, habida cuenta que de una contradicción se sigue cualquier norma, en virtud del principio lógico ex falso quodlibet, de dos normas contradictorias que pertenecen a algún nivel inferior se derivan algunas normas en contradicción con normas del nivel superior; así normas contradictorias no podrían ser admitidas en los niveles inferiores. In this contribution, I shall intend to show that the criterion lex superior derogat legi inferiori has a consequence which, as far as I know, has not been noted yet: if the higherlevel norms in a legal system, i.e. constitutional norms, configure a consistent set, then necessarily the legal system is consistent. Lex superior preserves necessarily the consistency, as it were. If higher-level norms are members of a consistent set, then the lower-levels could admit no norm in contradiction with the higher-level norms. Moreover, given that from a contradiction follows anything, in virtue of the logical principle ex falso quodlibet, from two contradictory lower-level norms follow some norms in contradiction with norms of the higher-level, thus contradictory norms could never be admit in the lower-levels. (shrink)

Scott Shapiro, a prominent defender of exclusive legal positivism—exclusivism—has intriguingly (re)introduced a logical principle, the endorsement and rejection of which he (I take it) supposes can helpfully distinguish exclusivism from its contrary, inclusive legal positivism—inclusivism. It is an intriguing thought that principles pitched at such a high level of abstraction as this could distinguish between the two versions of positivism. My aim will be to test whether this principle—and associated principles—can do such distinguishing work.

In this paper, I make an attempt to look for a thin and general concept of law that, as far as possible, should be neutral to the more substantial views of legal moralism and legal positivism, so that it is acceptable from both points of view. With this aim in view, I shall begin with a few remarks on concept formation and name a list of necessary requirements on an appropriate concept of law. On this basis, I intend to discuss (...) a number of contemporary legal theories in view to their respective interpretations of the concept of law. Finally, I want to propose a definition of law that not only satisfies the requirements of the concept of law, but is also general enough to be compatible with both camps of legal thinking. (shrink)

Systemic validity has been criticised based on its supposed inability to account for the validity of so-called extra systemic norms and unconstitutional statutes. The article argues that these crit...

. Hindu law represents one of the least known, yet most sophisticated traditions of legal theory and jurisprudence in world history. Hindu jurisprudential texts contain elaborate and careful philosophical reflections on the nature of law and religion. The nature of Hindu law as a tradition has been subject to some debate and some misunderstanding both within and especially outside of specialist circles. The present essay utilizes the familiar framework of legal realism to describe the fundamental concepts of law and legal (...) procedure in Hindu jurisprudence. Questions about the place of natural law theory and legal positivism in relation to Hindu law are also considered. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to provide an accurate grounding-based formulation of positivism in the philosophy of law. I start off by discussing some simple formulations, based on the ideas that social facts are always either full or partial grounds of legal facts. I then raise a number of objections against these definitions: the full grounding proposal rules out possibilities that are compatible with positivism; the partial grounding proposal fails, on its own, to vindicate the distinctive role that is (...) played by social facts within positivist accounts of law. Then, I present a more adequate and insightful formulation capable of solving their problems, which crucially relies on a robust notion of a social enabler. Finally, I model inclusive and exclusive positivism on the resulting template, and set out the advantages of the ground-enablers proposal. (shrink)

En este texto comparo las concepciones de Eugenio Bulygin y Cristina Redondo acerca de aquellos enunciados que dan cuenta de que en una sociedad se aceptan ciertas reglas como pautas de conducta. Me concentro en la pregunta acerca de qué es lo que posibilita al observador “identificar”, “reconocer” normas jurídicas válidas en cuanto tales. Inspirada en el enfoque wittgensteiniano acerca del seguimiento de reglas —retomado a su vez por la crítica de Brandom al “regularismo”—, planteo una respuesta que discrepa de (...) la de Bulygin y coincide con la de Redondo en un punto en el que ambos difieren; mas señalo una sutil —aunque crucial— diferencia con esta última. (shrink)

El presente texto trata de ofrecer una breve semblanza de la figura de Eugenio Bulygin, reconocido académico y teórico del derecho, fallecido el pasado 11 de mayo de 2021.

El profesor Juan Carlos Bayón ha sostenido que el positivismo incluyente resultaría inaceptable por apoyarse en la idea de una convención social de seguir criterios no convencionales: si hubiera acuerdo sobre el contenido de esos criterios, ellos resultarían convencionales, y sin acuerdo, no habría práctica social convergente y, por ende, no habría en realidad una regla convencional. Así, el positivismo incluyente quedaría enfrentado a un dilema: o bien resulta indistinguible del positivismo excluyente, o bien no es una postura convencionalista en (...) absoluto. Este trabajo evaluará la posibilidad de una salida al dilema. Para ello, se efectuará un análisis de las diversas versiones del positivismo incluyente y sus límites a la luz de la objeción planteada. También se intentará demostrar la viabilidad de un contraargumento centrado en los alcances de la tesis de la convencionalidad, que bloquearía la acusación de inconsistencia teórica esgrimida en su contra. Professor Juan Carlos Bayón has argued that Inclusive Legal Positivism should be rejected because its plausibility depends on the idea of a social convention to follow nonconventional criteria of validity. In his view, if there were agreement on the content of these criteria, it would be impossible to sustain its non-conventional character; and without agreement, there would not be a common social practice, and thus no social rule would exist. Therefore, Inclusive Positivism faces a dilemma: being indistinguishable from Exclusive Positivism or not being a genuine form of conventionalism at all. This article evaluates a possible way out of this dilemma. It explores the different versions of Inclusive Legal Positivism and its limits, and tries to build an opposing argument grounded on the scope of the conventionality thesis that would rescue Inclusive Legal Positivism from the accusation of theoretical inconsistency. (shrink)

Este trabajo es una crítica a la distinción entre lagunas de conocimiento y reconocimiento. En Normative Systems, Alchourrón y Bulygin sostienen que estas indeterminaciones en la aplicación del derecho son problemas diferentes. Según AB, las lagunas de conocimiento surgen por nuestro deficiente conocimiento de las circunstancias del caso, pero las lagunas de reconocimiento se producen por la vaguedad del lenguaje. Para resolver las lagunas de conocimiento, los juristas usan presunciones y para resolver las lagunas de reconocimiento es preciso redefinir los (...) conceptos. Sin embargo, AB no ofrecen una reconstrucción específica de la vaguedad y ello afecta al análisis de esos tipos de lagunas. En particular, AB creen que la vaguedad es un problema epistémico y, por ello, un sistema completo puede ofrecer una respuesta correcta para cada caso individual aun cuando no podamos conocer esa solución. Pero, cuando se asume que la vaguedad es un problema epistémico, entonces no existen mayores razones para distinguir entre lagunas de conocimiento y lagunas de reconocimiento. This paper analyzes the distinction between gaps of knowledge and gaps of recognition. In Normative Systems, Alchourrón and Bulygin claim that both indeterminacies are different problems that arise in the application of general norms to individual cases. Where through ignorance of certain properties of the facts, we cannot determine whether an individual case belongs to a generic case, we speak of gap of knowledge. On the contrary, gaps of recognitions are caused by the semantic indeterminacy of the concepts which define a generic case. In order to solve gaps of knowledge, jurists use legal presumptions, but the solution of a gap of knowledge requires the redefinition of a certain concept. However, AB believe that vagueness is only an epistemic problem. For this reason, they conclude that a complete normative system resolves every possible individual case even though we can still find epistemic indeterminacies. However, this paper shows that if vagueness is characterized as an epistemic problem, there will be no relevant reason for stressing the distinction between gaps of recognition and gaps of knowledge. (shrink)