Jeremy Waldron is well known for his disdain of U.S. jurisprudential doc- trine that allows courts to invalidate democratically enacted legislation on the ground it violates certain fundamental constitutional (and quasi-moral) rights. He believes that where disagreement on the relevant substantive is- sues is widespread among citizens and officials alike, it is illegitimate for judges to impose their views on the majority by invalidating a piece of enacted law. Even if we assume, plausibly enough, there are objective moral constraints on (...) what restrictions on behavior may be enacted into law, judges have no privileged access to the objective truth and must, like everyone else, rely on their own subjective intuitions and views. Given that judges are hence no more likely than citizens or legislators to reach the correct decision about what morality requires, these disagreements should be democratically resolved. As he puts it, if disagreement about rights is to be sorted out by counting heads, it should be the heads of citizens who have ultimate sovereignty in a democracy, rather than those of unelected judges, that ought to count.In this essay, I consider Wilfrid Waluchow’s response to Waldron’s argument in his outstanding new book, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Re- view, in which he attempts to provide the practice of judicial review with something akin to the foundation that justifies allowing judges authority over the development of the common law. I will begin with a short explication of Waldron’s argument and then consider Waluchow’s objections to Waldron, as well as Waluchow’s living-tree conception of a common-law constitution with content that evolves through a common law approach to reasoning in constitutional disputes.Resumen:A Jeremy Waldron se le conoce por el desprecio que ha manifestado con relación a la doctrina constitucional estadounidense que permite a los tribunales invalidar legislación que ha sido promulgada de manera democrática, dado que según Waldron lo anterior constituye una violación a ciertos derechos constitucionales (y cuasi-morales). Él piensa que si existe un desacuerdo importante entre los ciudadanos y oficiales del derecho en relación con cierto tema sustantivo, es ilegítimo que los jueces impongan sus puntos de vista sobre los de la mayoría de la población al invalidar una ley promulgada. Incluso si suponemos, de manera lo suficientemente plausible, que existen limitantes morales objetivas sobre las restricciones que el derecho puede contemplar en relación con el comportamiento de los ciudadanos, los jueces no gozan de un privilegio especial con el que puedan acceder a estas verdades objetivas y deben, como todos los demás, basarse en sus propios puntos de vista e intuiciones subjetivas. Entonces, dado que los jueces al igual que los ciudadanos y legisladores no pueden llegar a mejores y correctas decisiones en relación con lo que exige la moralidad, estos desacuerdos se deben decidir de manera democrática. Como sostiene Waldron, si los desacuerdos sobre los derechos se deben decidir con un recuento de manos, deben ser las manos de los ciudadanos, los cuales tienen la soberanía última en una democracia, no así los jueces que no son electos.En este artículo, el autor analiza la respuesta de Wilfrid Waluchow a los argumentos de Waldron, los cuales se encuentran plasmados en el nuevo e interesante libro: A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review, donde Waluchow intenta justificar la práctica del judicial review a través de algo parecido a la justificación que otorga a los jueces autoridad para desarrollar el common law. El autor inicia con una breve explicación del argumento de Waldron y continúa con las objeciones de Waluchow a Waldron, entre las cuales destaca la concepción de Waluchow de la Constitución como árbol viviente. (shrink)

Domain constraint, the requirement that analogues be selected from "the same category," inheres in the popular saying "you can't compare apples and oranges" and the textbook principle "the greater the number of shared properties, the stronger the argument from analogy." I identify roles of domains in biological, linguistic, and legal analogy, supporting the account of law with a computer word search of judicial decisions. I argue that the category treatments within these disciplines cannot be exported to general informal (...) logic, where the relevance of properties, not their number, must be the logically prior criterion for evaluating analogical arguments. (shrink)

This book examines the legal principle of judicial independence in comparative perspective with the goal of advancing a better understanding of the idea of an independent judiciary more generally. From an initial survey of judicial systems in different countries, it is clear that the understanding and practice of judicial independence take a variety of forms. Scholarly literature likewise provides a range of views on what judicial independence means, with scholars often advocating a preferred conception of a (...) model court for achieving 'true judicial independence' as part of a rule of law system. This book seeks to reorient the prevailing approach to the study of judicial independence by better understanding how judicial independence operates within domestic legal systems in its institutional and legal dimensions. It asks how and why different conceptualisations of judicial independence emerge over time by comparing detailed case studies of courts in two legally pluralistic states, which share inheritances of British rule and the common law. By tracing the development of judicial independence in the legal systems of Malaysia and Pakistan from the time of independence to the present, the book offers an insightful comparison of how judicial independence took shape and developed in these countries over time. From this comparison, it suggests a number of contextual factors that can be seen to play a role in the evolution of judicial independence. The study draws upon the significant divergence observed in the case studies to propose a refined understanding of the idea of an independent judiciary, termed the 'pragmatic and context-sensitive theory', which may be seen in contradistinction to a universal approach. While judicial independence responds to the core need of judges to be perceived as an impartial third party by constructing formal and informal constraints on the judge and relationships between judges and others, its meaning in a legal system is inevitably shaped by the judicial role along with other features at the domestic level. The book concludes that the adaptive and pragmatic qualities of judicial independence supply it with relevance and legitimacy within a domestic legal system. (shrink)

The theoretical core of positivism is thought to consist of three theses about the nature of law. The separability thesis denies the existence of necessary moral constraints on the content of law. The pedigree thesis articulates necessary and sufficient conditions for legal validity having to do with how or by whom law is promulgated. The discretion thesis asserts that judges decide hard cases by making new law. While it is often assumed that these theses form a coherent theoretical whole, such (...) an assumption is false. Construed as a claim about all possible legal systems, the discretion thesis is inconsistent with the pedigree thesis. Construed as a claim that is true in some, but not all, possible legal systems, the discretion thesis makes a fundamentally different kind of claim than those made by the pedigree and separability theses and hence should not be thought of as part of positivism's theory of law. (shrink)

Posner's “pragmatic” defense of broad judicial deference to legislative power still reflects the shortcomings noted in my review of his Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. His pragmatism still fails to provide meaningful criteria for decision making that do not collapse into an indeterminate relativism; and his argument that strict constraints on judicial power are required by respect for democracy underestimates the importance of two serious interconnected weaknesses of the modern state: widespread voter ignorance, and interest‐group exploitation of that ignorance.

At present, a series of economic structural changes created by the network economy have brought challenges to the entire economy and society. Traditional social commerce has also suffered severe tests under the background of network economy and global integration, and the rise and development of network commercial activities lack legal constraints. Based on the Big Data technology, in view of the characteristics of data mining services, this paper expands and changes the traditional model and proposes the Big Data alliance data (...) mining service process model. Moreover, this paper uses intelligent decision-making theory and knowledge reasoning methods to construct a fast-responding, service-reusable, and intelligent service model to realize the scalability of data mining services. In addition, this paper constructs system function modules according to the requirements of Internet commercial judicial data mining and verifies the performance of the system constructed in this paper through experimental analysis. The research results show that the system constructed in this paper has certain practical effects. (shrink)

The article considers two different interpretations of the reason model of precedent pioneered by John Horty. On a plausible interpretation of the reason model, past cases provide reasons to prioritize reasons favouring the same outcome as a past case over reasons favouring the opposing outcome. Here I consider the merits of this approach to the role of precedent in legal reasoning in comparison with a closely related view favoured by some legal theorists, according to which past cases provide reasons for (...) undercutting (or ‘excluding’) reasons favouring the opposing outcome. After embedding both accounts within a general default logic, I note some important differences between the two approaches that emerge as a result of plausible distinctions between rebutting and undercutting defeat in formal models of legal reasoning. These differences stem from the ‘preference independence’ of undercutting defeat. Undercutting reasons succeed in defeating opposing reasons irrespective of their relative strength. As a result, the two accounts differ in their account of the way in which precedents constrain judicial reasoning. I conclude by suggesting that the two approaches can be integrated within a single model, in which the distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeat is used to account for the distinction between strict and persuasive forms of precedential constraint. (shrink)

Legal judgment writing mobilises a process of story-telling, drawing on existing judicial discourses, precedents and practices to create a narrative relevant to the specific case that is articulated by the presiding judge. In the Feminist Judgments projects feminist scholars and activists have sought to challenge and reinterpret legal judgments that have disadvantaged, discriminated against or denied women’s experiences. This paper reflects on the process of writing as a feminist judge in the Australian Project, in an intimate homicide case, R (...) v Middendorp. Drawing on the work of Judith Butler on intelligibility, iterability and the communality of violence and vulnerability, this article argues that feminist judgments necessarily require some uncomfortable compromises with unjust gendered institutions. While ‘donning the robes’ may be an uncomfortable process, a feminist re-articulation of the law’s carceral power serves to unsettle and challenge some aspects of gendered oppression, even though it cannot unsettle the operation of the institution. The article concludes that effective feminist interventions by members of the judiciary may require donning robes that are not entirely comfortable in order to persuade and advocate for change. (shrink)

In this article I argue for rule-based, non-monotonic theories of common law judicial reasoning and improve upon one such theory offered by Horty and Bench-Capon. The improvements reveal some of the interconnections between formal theories of judicial reasoning and traditional issues within jurisprudence regarding the notions of the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Though I do not purport to resolve the long-standing jurisprudential issues here, it is beneficial for theorists both of legal philosophy and formalizing legal reasoning to (...) see where the two projects interact. (shrink)

Precedents are judicial decisions that form the bases of further judicial decisions by constraining those decisions. There are two aspects to the constraints exerted by precedent decisions: the scope of the constraint and the strength of the constraint. The scope refers to the range of decisions that are affected by the precedent. The strength refers to the conditions under which a court can escape being bound by the precedent. Models of precedential scope are discussed and evaluated, (...) and the question of strength is analyzed.Resumen:Los precedentes son decisiones judiciales que constituyen la base de decisiones judiciales posteriores, al vincularlas. Hay dos aspectos de la vinculación ejercida por las decisiones de precedente: el alcance de la vinculación y la fuerza de la vinculación. El alcance se refiere al rango de decisiones que se ven afectadas por el precedente. La fuerza se refiere a las condiciones bajo las cuales un tribunal obligado por el precedente puede ignorarlo. En este artículo se discuten y evalúan algunos modelos del alcance del precedente y se analiza la cuestión de su fuerza. (shrink)

Christian theology conceives of ‘sacrificium intellectus’ to account for the message of Saint Paul that he will “take every thought captive to obey Christ”. Human insight gives way to the revealed truths of religion. In modern western cultures to explain the natural world has become the domain of science, and the imposition of collective rules of how we should live was shifted to democratically elected parliaments. In Germany legislation of bioethical issues is often justified with reasons that violate standards of (...) cognitive rationality. Is this another case of sacrificium intellectus? The Federal Constitutional Court refrains from the control of legislative arguments by conceding a broad margin of appreciation for the legislator. People have, however, a right to justification; they must not be subjected to arbitrary legal power. While the practice of democratic rule may seldom comply with the expectations of ‘government by discussion’, it is neither likely to gain acceptance as ‘government without discussion’. To impose legal force on the basis of false arguments and unsound reasoning is not a legitimate sacrificium intellectus, it is an intellectual scandal. (shrink)

It is not easy to find a fair balance between inappropriate speech on the one hand and the appearance of constraint and inaccessibility on the other. Also judges must deal with this difficult task. They must take care not to endanger values that are protected to secure the functionality of justice. This article deals with questions of why and how judges can fulfil this task and what might happen if they fail to do so. The article argues in favour (...) of temperate speech using arguments from the fields of judicial ethics and normative ethics. It also offers examples of intemperate speech that might be dangerous to justice. Last but not least, the article mentions the relevance of judicial temperate speech for the concept of open justice thanks to which the judiciary might seek public confidence. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Weakest Meaning of “Constitutionalism” Constitutionalism as a Theory Particular and General Constitutionalism Explicit and Implicit Constitutions Constitutionalism and Written Constitutions Constitutionalism and Constraint Empowerment and Authority Democracy: Constraint or Empowerment? Constitutionalism versus Democracy Popular Sovereignty Judicial Review of Legislation Concluding Remark Notes.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Scope of Precedential Constraint The Strength of Precedential Constraint References.

Suppositional reasoning can seem spooky. Suppositional reasoners allegedly (e.g.) “extract knowledge from the sheer workings of their own minds” (Rosa), even where the knowledge is synthetic a posteriori. Can literary fiction pull such a rabbit out of its hat? Where P is a work’s fictional ‘premise’, some hold that some works reason declaratively (supposing P, Q), imperatively (supposing P, do Q), or interrogatively (supposing P, Q?), and that this can be a source of knowledge if the reasoning is good. True, (...) I will argue, although only within the context of judicious critical interpretation. Further evident constraints include that the form of the suppositional reasoning needs to be declarative or imperative, and that the fictional ‘premise’ of the work needs to be a metaphysical counterfactual possibility, not merely a temporal counterfactual and not merely an epistemic possibility or probabilistic supposition. (shrink)

The dominant social scientific approach to studying judicial behavior treats judges as strategic actors pursuing their political preferences under institutional constraint. The intellectual roots of this rational choice approach are in American law’s long but sporadic engagement with pragmatist ideas. This article challenges that approach: a fully pragmatist account of judicial action provides a better description of the intellectual and social work of judging, and better explains how judges reach a decision in difficult cases that most affect (...) the development of law and its relationship to society. The article argues that the foundational intellectual problem for appellate judges is how to define the legal questions presented in a case. Definitions of legal questions arise from the interplay of habitual and creative action in the local social context of an appeals court. Professional and local interpretive habits and legal forms ordinarily do a great deal to define the key questions, which are not strictly determined when a case comes before a court. Unscripted small group interactions at oral arguments also figure in question definition; oral arguments are most important in the rare but legally important cases where habitual practices alone are insufficient to delimit the legal question judges must answer. Supported by extensive interviews with federal appeals judges and clerks, the article illustrates judges’ creative, interactional efforts to define an answerable question in a major asylum case decided in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Building from this case, the article describes the factors that shape judicial question definition, and describes the conditions when creative judicial action is likely to be most prominent. (shrink)

Is it lawful for a doctor to give a patient life-shortening pain relief? Can treatment be lawfully provided to a child under 16 on the basis of her consent alone? Is it lawful to remove food and water provided by tube to a patient in a vegetative state? Is a woman's refusal of a caesarean section recommended for the benefit of the fetus legally decisive? These questions were central to the four focal cases revisited in this book. This book revisits (...) nine landmark cases. For each, a new leading judgment is attributed to an imagined judge, Athena, who operates within the constraints of the legal system of England and Wales. Her judgments accord with an innovative legal theory, referred to as 'modified law as integrity', and are linked as a line of precedent. The result is a re-spinning of extant judicial threads into a web of legal principles with a greater claim to coherence and defensibility than those in the original cases. The book will be of great interest to scholars and students of medical law, criminal law, bioethics, legal theory and moral philosophy. (shrink)

This article explores the ideological origins of the American free-speech tradition. It analyzes the two principal categorizations of free speech in classical antiquity: isegoria, the right to voice one’s opinion, and parrhesia, the license to say what one pleases often through provocative discourse, thus grounding modern free-speech epistemology and jurisprudential philosophy in a sociohistorical context. Part 1 reviews the First Amendment corpus juris. A progression of incrementally absolute judicial holdings promotes parrhesia, highlighting democratic utility over individual self-actualization; thus, Americans (...) no longer view freedom of speech as an end ipso facto. While Athenian democracy recognized the need for provocative speech, certain institutional and social constraints, such as dokimasia, established standards of truth and accountability. Part 2 frames the historical developments of isegoria and parrhesia for modern analysis. The author begins by discussing isegoria’s principal aims, namely, promoting individual self-actualization and effective democratic governance. The European free-speech tradition, which views the individual as the locus of power, favors the former. The American tradition, which ‘depersonizes’ civil liberties such that the collective becomes the locus of control, favors the latter. Part 3 identifies the colonial developments in Anglo-American history that account for present-day U.S. free-speech permissiveness. It shows that the American preference for parrhesia-based absolutism was born from British imperialism and censorship. Part 4 suggests a need to reexamine free speech-understandings in the context of new-media proliferation and digital content regulation. The dominance of U.S.-based social media companies injects the American speech tradition into cultures with disparate free-speech philosophies and practices. (shrink)

People with dementia at times exhibit threatening and physically aggressive behavior toward care staff in residential aged care facilities (RACFs). Current clinical guidelines recommend judicious use of antipsychotic (AP) medications when there is an immediate risk of harm to care staff in RACFs and non-pharmacological interventions have failed to avert the threats. This article examines an account of how this recommendation can be ethically defensible: caregivers in RACFs may have a prima facie ethical justification, in certain cases, to use APs (...) as an act of self-defense. The author examines whether such uses of APs meet the three commonly invoked conditions of ethically permissible acts of self-defense—namely, the conditions of liability, proportionality, and necessity—and argues that such conditions obtain only in a restricted range of cases. The liability constraint can be satisfied if residents are the only ones who are causally responsible for the threats they pose. Further, the condition of proportionality obtains if there is sufficient objective ground to demonstrate that the harm of using the medications does not outweigh the good to be secured. Lastly, the necessity condition obtains when the medications are used at their lowest effective dosage and caregivers in RACFs can reasonably assume that, for the purpose of averting threats posed by residents, the use of APs is the only available course of action. Not meeting any of these fairly stringent conditions renders uses of APs as acts of self-defense in RACFs morally impermissible actions. -/- . (shrink)

Liberal concepts of democracy envision courts as key institutions for the promotion and protection of democratic regimes. Yet social science scholarship suggests that courts are fundamentally constrained in ways that undermine their ability to do so. Recognizing these constraints, this book argues that courts can influence regime instability by affecting inter-elite conflict. They do so in three ways: by helping leaders credibly reveal their rationales for policy choices that may appear to violate legal rules; by encouraging leaders to less frequently (...) make decisions that raise concerns about rule violations; and by encouraging the opposition to accept potential rule violations. Courts promote the prudent use of power in each of these approaches. This book evaluates the implications of this argument using a century of global data tracking judicial politics and democratic survival. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:152 BOOK REVIEWS with Weinrih's theory of formalism which Joseph Raz points out in his essay. One of the most serious of these deficiencies in my opinion is the role that is accorded to the judiciary. Weinrih's theory, as Raz shows, requires that when positive law is in conflict with the " form of law," positive law should he disregarded by the courts, and the courts in these cases (...) not only have the legal right to disregard the statutes of law hut even the moral duty to do so. To give such total discretionary power to the courts is certainly to offer an invitation impossible to re· sist, as the recent judicial history of the United States Supreme Court clearly shows, to autocratic and politically motivated judicial activism. The above remarks, inadequate as they are because of the constraints of space, may offer some indication of the rich diversity of natural law theories currently offering themselves for our consideration. Those interested in natural law theory either within the framework of moral theory, or legal theory, or both, will surely find that a careful reading of this volume will amply reward their efforts. St. John's University Jamaica, New York THOMAS A. FAY Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being. By MIECZYSLAW ALBERT KRAPIEC, O.P., translated by Theresa Sandok. New York: Peter Lang, 1991. Pp. 539. $69.95 (cloth). This volume is the second in Lang's Catholic Thought from Lublin series edited by Andrew Woznicki. Krapiec's work is a tour de force of Gilsonian Thomism as it founds metaphyscis upon a judgmental grasp of the act of existence in sensible things. The hook is unrelentingly Krapiec. Though there are abundant historical descriptions, there is a minimum of textual citation. Also, the reader can plainly see that Krapiec is intent upon presenting his understanding of metaphysics ad mentem Thomae. Three main parts comprise the hook. Part One is on the object of metaphysics-being as being (as existing). Part One contains the most crucial pages of the hook, viz., pp. 86-100. There Krapiec explains the attainment of this object. This portion is obviously the heart of the hook, and I will treat it in detail later. Part One also includes a lengthy exposition of the transcendentals. Part Two focuses on the structure of being and elaborates the following : act and potency, substance and accidents, matter and form, essence and existence, and the causes of being. There are two noteworthy points here. First, Krapiec's lengthy inclusion (pp. 313-374) of BOOK REVIEWS 153 matter and form within his metaphysics seems to have metaphysics swallowing up natural philosophy. One's misgivings are not assuaged by Krapiec's presentation of the division of the speculative sciences hack in his General Introduction. There the first degree of abstraction is no longer the home of natural philosophy hut the home of the modern humanistic and natural sciences (p. 28). The second degree harbors mathematics, while the third degree is home not only to metaphysics hut "philosophy" (pp. 28-9). The reader is left wondering what has happened to natural philosophy. I see no exigency' for Krapiec's metaphysics to eclipse natural philosophy. Moreover, for some Thomists, the move will create an unfortunate distraction from the good points of Krapiec's metaphysics. Second, by this reader's count, Krapiec presents no less than nine arguments for the real distinction between essence and existence. These arguments include the following: Aquinas's De Ente et Essentia argument that one can know what a phoenix is without knowing that one exists; the necessary character of existence as an essence vs. contingent realities; the monism of existence as an essence vs. the plurality of beings ; the infinity of existence as an essence vs. finite realities; and the reality of the potency/act distinction applied to essence-as·potency and existence-as-act. I cannot engage this involved topic in the short space of a review. I will say, however, that with Joseph Owens, I fail to see why a conceptual distinction between essence and existence is insufficient to deal with the above facts and problems. Underwriting my skepticism is the understanding that meanings can remain... (shrink)

Chapter 1: An Introduction: The ‘Semantic Sting’ Argument Describes Dworkin’s theory as concerning the conditions of legal validity. “A legal system is a system of norms. Validity is a logical property of norms in a way akin to that in which truth is a logical property of propositions. A statement about the law is true if and only if the norm it purports to describe is a valid legal norm…It follows that there must be certain conditions which render certain norms, (...) but not others, legally valid. Hence it also follows that there can be two types of disagreement over the truth or falsehood of propositions about the law. People can disagree over the question ‘What are the conditions of legal validity?’, in which case their disagreement is a theoretical one. Or they can agree on the conditions of validity, and disagree as to whether or not those conditions actually obtain in a given case or not.” Argues that the best way to interpret Dworkin’s ‘semantic-sting argument’ is as a general argument against conventionalism in legal positivism. Summarizes the outcome of Dworkin’s argument as follows: “[I]f Dworkin is right about the legal reasoning of lawyers and judges, conventionalism would be self-defeating: if lawyers and judges recognize as legally binding not only those norms which are uncontroversially identifiable under the Rule of Recognition, that is, if what they recognize as binding is not only source-based law, then conventionalism turns out to be false on its own terms. In other words, either law is not what lawyers and judges think that it is, in which case law is not a matter of conventions, or – if it is what lawyers and judges think – conventionalism is false, as they do not see the law as purely a matter of conventions.” Dworkin’s theory, then, is a new conception of jurisprudence aiming to present itself as a rival to conventionalism. The book will be concerned with re-examining positivism in light of the interpretative challenge. Chapter 2: Meaning and Interpretation “[R]oughly, interpretation can be defined as an understanding or explanation of the meaning of an object.” Interpretation in this narrow sense is distinct from a less formal and broader use of interpretation that makes it equivalent to explanation. “Hence also, only those objects which are capable of bearing some meaning qualify as objects of interpretation.” [Why shouldn’t we think of interpretation as object-identification? This seems to be closer to what Dworkin has in mind.] Thus, a consideration of the philosophical work on meaning is appropriate. First, a consideration of Davidson on interpretation. The thesis is that Davidson’s “radical interpretation” can only account for sentence meaning and not for linguistic interpretation in general. Davidson cannot account for the non-rule-governed aspects of communication. “Semantics, as opposed to interpretation, concerns those aspects of communication which are rule or convention governed…but such rules are normally unavailable as reasons or justifications for an interpretation. On the contrary, interpretation is usually required because the issue is not determined by rules or conventions.” Interpretation, rather, is parasitic with understanding the meaning of an expression and not equivalent with it. As Dummett notes, any reflection on the meanings of words assumes prior knowledge of ordinary meanings. “This leads to the conclusion that understanding or explaining the meaning of an expression and interpreting it, are two conceptually separate things. It also indicates that seman ics can only be employed, if at all, to elucidate the concept of interpretation by way of contrast: interpretation concerns those aspects of communication which are under-determined by semantic rules or conventions.” Pragmatics, the study of problems posed by discrepancies between utterer’s meaning and sentence meaning, would seem to be closer to inquiry into interpretation. Both are concerned with understanding how meaning is possible where conventional rules leave off. Contemporary pragmatics, moreover, recognizes the logically indeterminate character of communicative inferences beyond conventional meaning and that the contextual conditions that account for the possibility cannot be realized in the semantic structure of the sentence. However, different criteria of success may be at work in pragmatics than interpretation. Pragmatics is concerned with how communication is achieved and thus the criteria of success would be grasping a speaker’s intentions. Many think, however, that communication is unimportant in certain spheres of communication, e.g. artistic interpretation, and that in these cases the aim of interpretation is not to uncover the actual artist’s intentions. What kind of meaning is interpretation aimed at then? It cannot be the meaning the object has for the interpreter. “Interpretation purports to be a statement about the object interpreted, not about the subject who offers the interpretation…it is crucial to remember that not everything we say about a work of art, or any other text, amounts to an interpretation of it. Only those aspects of a text which can shed light on its meaning form part of the text’s interpretation. What the text means for someone rarely entails anything about what the text means.” [This is puzzling to some extent for it remains somewhat ambiguous what it means to talk of subject-independent meaning.] Interpretive meaning attribution is, rather, counterfactual. “In general, I will suggest that the answer to this question consists in the fact that meaning is assigned by a counterfactual statement. Given that x is the meaning attributed to, for instance a text T, and x is not the literal meaning of T, nor is it the meaning of T intended by its author, then the attribution of meaning x to T can only be understood as the contention that on the basis of certain assumptions a certain fictitious or stipulated speaker would have meant x by expressing T.” Thus, on this account, interpretation, when it does not concern an actual speaker, turns out to be a kind of counterfactual intention attribution. Twofold point: “First, that interpretation is essentially a matter of attributing intentions, that is, in the pragmatics sense of ‘meaning’, namely, meaning that such-and-such by an act or expression. At the same time, interpretations need not be based on the intentions of actual authors; the meaning of an act or expression is understandable in terms of counterfactual intentions.” [Are we really restricted to understanding the coherence and integrity of meaning in such a way? Presumably the author is a kind of device for organizing meaning, much like Dworkin’s integrity, but need it take that format?] The logic of interpretation is typically reducible to intention attribution. [What role does the counterfactual author play in structuring meaning?] The criteria of interpretive success will depend upon the object, whether it is the real author or the counterfactual author. If the former, success will depend upon the retrieval of the author’s actual intentions. “Likewise, if the author is characterized in terms of some ideal representative of a certain genre, for instance, the presumptions which are taken to determine this c aracterization would provide the criteria of success for the particular interpretation offered.” [The criteria of success would seem, then, to be the principles, ideals, etc. that we attribute to the counterfactual author. These attributed qualities would be doing all the work – is the attribution of intention to the hypothetical author, then, really necessary at all?] [Does this account presuppose a weird dichotomy between what an object is and what it means? This dichotomy is different, if present at all, in Dworkin.] Chapter 3: Dworkin’s Theory of Interpretation and the Nature of Jurisprudence Three main insights of Dworkin’s theory of interpretation: “First, that interpretation strives to present its object in its best possible light. Second, that interpretation is essentially genre-dependent. And third, that there are certain constraints that determine the limits of possible interpretations of a given object.” Why the best light? Dworkin doesn’t really address this question in depth but claims that otherwise we are left with no way of justifying and choosing an interpretation or we are left with the author’s intention model, which we should reject. [Marmor doesn’t seem clear on what precisely it means to present something in its best light – seems to conflate it with most appealing light which, I take it, is different than what Dworkin has in mind.] “Dworkin is quite right to maintain that without having some views about the values inherent in the genre to which the text is taken to belong, no interpretation can take off the ground. The values we associate with the genre partly, but crucially, determine what would make sense to say about the text, what are the kinds of meaning we could ascribe to it.” There is no necessity for an interpretation to present an object in its best light with regards to the genre it is taken to be part of. Interpretations “could simply strive to present it in a certain light, perhaps better than some, worse than others, but in a way which highlights an aspect of the meaning of the text which may be worth paying attention to for some reason or another.” [What kind of reasons would count in choosing to present it in one light rather than another?] There is simply zero grounds for Dworkin’s assertion that we have no reason to pay attention to an interpretation that does not present it in its best light. Take a psychoanalytic interpretation of Hamlet, for example – not the best light, but a legitimate one. [This seems related to the next criticism – clearly Dworkin would have to loosen his insistence on the best, though not to detriment.] Moreover, especially with regards to art, it doesn’t appear possible to make an all things considered judgment about the best interpretation given the incommensurability of different values that are taken to inhere in a given genre. [Dworkin can respond here that we may have different available interpretations that could be justified with respect to the relevant value. Moreover, a lack of common denominator does not prevent any comparison whatsoever.] Constructive interpretation concerns social practices constituted by norms – it imposes a purpose or value rendering intelligible the normative character of the practice. There is a separate aspect of constructive interpretation that maintains that elements of the practice are sensitive to the point of the practice. It is important to note that different social practices will institutionalize themselves in different ways – thus, different practices will establish varying conditions on how the practice can be altered. The position of the positivists is that evaluative judgments concerning what the law should be are insufficient for determining what the law is given the nature of law’s institutionalization.&nb p; [This would seem to reside on a certain conception of law, i.e. an interpretation about where the value of law lies.] “[T]his being one of the main points of dispute between Dworkin and his positivist opponents, Dworkin cannot at this initial state presume law to be sensitive to its value in the manner that other, non-institutional practices might be, without incurring the charge of having assumed the very point at issue.” The upshot for Dworkin is that any explanation of a social practice such as law requires the same kind of reasoning as participation in that practice. This will be called the hermeneutic thesis. We can try to reconstruct a justification for this view based on the necessity of shared background assumptions – but this will not do since Dworkin’s claim is stronger: it contends that participants’ and theorists’ must “adopt one and the same normative point of view.” [The sense of normative here is unclear. It is true, though, that shared background assumptions do not imply viewing the law as valuable in any particular way, or at least it does not imply this in any strong sense.] Dworkin makes two distinct points with the hermeneutic thesis: “First, that the explanation of a social practice, like law or the arts, is essentially interpretative, and as such, necessarily value laden. Second, that the interpretation of such social practices, which Dworkin calls ‘argumentative’, is unique in the sense that the practice itself is an evaluative enterprise, and that therefore the interpreter of such a practice must form an evaluative judgment of her own about those values which are inherent in the practice that she purports to interpret.” [As stated, the first thesis is terribly ambiguous – for Dworkin, it clear implies a commitment to constructive interpretation. For Marmor, who accepts it, it is totally unclear what commitment he intends to make. He seems to mean simply that we have criteria for success concerning what counts as a successful explanation.] Mamor denies the second thesis. “What Dworkin seems to ignore here is that there is a crucial difference between forming a view about the values which are manifest in a social practice, like law, and actually having evaluative judgments about them.” [The problem, however, it that it is a contentious matter what values are part of the law – a theorist’s account of what values are constitutive of a particular legal system must rely on the kind of arguments which participants rely on. Of course, a theorist might simply note a debate about values and attempt to remain agnostic, but this will fail to be a full theoretical account of what law is!] Dworkin’s thesis seems to depend exclusively on his account of constructive interpretation. [This seems exactly right.] Chapter 4: Coherence, Holism, and Interpretation: The Epistemic Foundation of Dworkin’s Legal Theory Begins with discussion of Rawls’ reflective equilibrium. Sums up dual criticism as follows: “[T]he assumption that intuitions are independently true and the converse one, that their truth depends on fitting a coherent scheme, both seem to yield paradoxical results.” Dworkin, in his article “The Original Position”, claims that Rawls cannot commit himself to ethical realism. “[T]he natural model presupposes some form of ethical realism, while the constructive model does not. One important difficulty arising from an attempt to apply the natural model to Rawls is, that under the natural model, any theory which dopes not account for an intuition, at least for one which is held firmly, cannot be wholly satisfactory, just as scientific theory which does not account for certain observational data it is supposed to cover, would not be satisfactory in a familiar way.” Rawls, rather, is committed to a constructivist view of morality. Moreover, the reason we value coherence epistemically in moral theory is that it itself is a value of political morality – fairness requires consistency and publicity in the application of moral standards. Marmor notes the following problem with such a view: “[I]f coherence is justified, as it is here, with reference to certain moral values, that is, a specific conception of fairness, then we face the following problem: the presupposed values of fairness must themselves be based upon intuitive convictions, in which case the question of their truth cannot be ignored. If they are taken to be true…we are driven back to the perplexities of the natural model.” Discusses, helpfully, the Fish/Dworkin debate. The upshot is that Dworkin’s interpretive model is best off if it commits itself to a Quineian holism. However, this undermines his distinction between internal and external skepticism since holism must deny that moral judgments constitute a closed system. [This analysis seems exactly right.] Endorses Simmonds view that Dworkin’s theory does not meet the requirements of complexity he identifies as necessary to avoid vicious circularity in interpretive judgments of fit and identity. Coherence is doing the work through and through and therefore the interpretive theory of law is circular. [Will require further investigation, though it is unclear how coherence is doing any work in the pre-interpretive stage. At this stage, the judgments, if interpretive, seem to be derived from different sources. In any case, using coherence as a value seems to be highly suspect.] Why doesn’t Dworkin just reject Fish’s assumptions: because of his jurisprudence. “If legal texts can have a meaning that is not entirely dependent on a process of interpretation, then it is at least sometimes the case that the law can simply be understood, and applied, without the mediation of interpretation. And if that is the case, then the argument from interpretation against legal positivism collapses. It is no longer the case that every conclusion about what the law is, depends on evaluative considerations about what it ought to be.” Chapter 5: Semantics, Realism, and Natural Law Assessment of Michael Moore’s legal realism and its implications. [The final criticisms of Moore are not decisive.] Chapter 6: Constructive Identification and Razian Authority A consideration of Dworkin’s denial that the communication model of interpretation is appropriate for legal interpretation. Marmor argues that intentions do play a crucial role in the identification of legal norms in a way that is incompatible with Dworkin’s “coherence thesis”. Marmor takes Dworkin to be committed to the constructive identification thesis: that the identification of something as part of the legal, artistic, etc. genre can be done sufficiently by evaluative considerations. “Here, one must maintain that evaluative considerations are sufficient to determine whether something is a legal norm or a work of art”. [Fit, however, constrains possible evaluative considerations – thus evaluative considerations are not sufficient in themselves.] “Now the crucial point here is this: if you maintain the possibility of constructive identification in art, you must assume that works of art can be identified as such on the basis of certain features they happen to possess, features which contain no reference to any particular intention to create a work of art…unless we take intentions into account, how can we discriminate between the concept of an aesthetic artifact and the con ept of a work of art?” [It is unclear, and I think false, that constructive interpretation of anything requires identifying something irrespective of an artificers intentions. Those intentions may be relevant, dependent upon the genre under which we are trying to classify the object. Nothing, seemingly, about constructive interpretation in general excludes this possibility.] Marmor’s point is that it turns out to be impossible to identify art as art without reference to an artist’s intentions – especially given the state of contemporary art. [It is notable that Marmor’s response to counterexample implicitly depends upon a fully developed theory of aesthetics. His cursory comments on the matter of identifying art seem insufficient to say the least.] The rest of the chapter considers the incompatibility of Raz’s account of authority with constructive interpretation. The incompatibilities mentioned do not move beyond what Raz identifies in his article “Authority, Law and Morality”, but a defense of this notion of authority is defended in several [inconclusive] respects. [Raz and Marmor want to separate identification from content. This is not clearly a defensible separation.] Chapter 7: No Easy Cases? Chapter defends notion that there is a distinction between easy and hard cases in the positivist sense. Takes a Hartian approach and ultimately defends the distinction by associating it Wittgenstein’s conception of rule following. The point is that one need to look the purpose of rule in order to understand what the rule requires. Chapter 8: Legislative Intent and the Authority of Law Examines the following doctrine concerning the role of legislative intent in adjudication: “[F]irst, it would hold that laws, at least in certain cases, are enacted with relatively specific intentions, and that this is a matter of fact which is discernible through an ordinary fact-finding procedure. Second, that in certain cases the presence of such a fact, namely, that the law was enacted with a certain intention, provides judges with a reason to decide the legal dispute in accordance with the relevant legislative intent.” [It is important that for Marmor, interpretive strategies are only appropriate in hard cases. However, we should wonder what grounds positivism can offer for deciding a hard case in any manner which is not the morally best manner according to the judgment of the judge. There are no legal grounds, by definition, in hard cases and so what justificatory strategy would endorse any judicial decision except for the morally best one?] We can ascribe intentions to a legislative body, when this is possible at all, by taking the shared intentions of the majority, rather than some group intention, to be the significant intentions. Moreover, we should expect a good deal of consensus about intentions for otherwise it is hard to explain how legislative bodies are able to produce so much legislation. Discussion of kinds of intentions concludes as follows: “I have distinguished between three main types of intention that are potentially relevant from the legal point of view. Apart from the intentions that are manifest in the language of the law itself, legislators typically have further intentions in enacting a given law, and sometimes they would have certain intentions bearing on its proper application. I have also suggested that some of these further intentions may be essentially non-avowable, in which case they are rendered initially irrelevant. Finally, I have pointed out that considerations of consistency require that the legislator’s application intentions be taken into account only if, and to the extent that, they are in accord with his further intentions.” The manner in which intentionalism is to be justif ed relies on the distinction, Marmor maintains, between expert and mere collective action authority. “The point I wanted to make is strictly conditional: if, and only if, a certain law is justified on the basis of the expertise branch of the normal justification thesis, would it make sense to defer to the legislature’s intentions in the interpretation of the law, that is, to the extent that there is, in fact,; such an intention and it can clarify something that needs clarification.” Insofar as a legislature can be considered an expert on the matter requiring adjudication and interpretation should the body’s intention be taken into account. Chapter 9: Constitutional Interpretation Begins by laying out general necessary features of a constitution. Then Marmor moves on to consider general questions of constitutional legitimacy. First, he considers what grounds might be offered for the legitimacy of a constitution at all. He notes that the central question is what permits a single generation to bind future generations. He then examines four arguments to avoid this problem. The first is based on the moral legitimacy of the constitution; Marmor rejects this solution for the [truly dubious] reason that the constitution would make no practical difference because it would not supply reasons in addition to those provided by morality [but, presumably, the point is that these legally valid rules would be institutionally enshrined]. The second is based on the moral authority of the framers and Marmor rightly rejects this on the basis of the idealization of the framers it requires and less rightly on the basis that there cannot be moral authorities. Third is the “argument from interpretation” which claims that “as long as the particular content of the constitution is determined by its interpretation, and the authoritative interpretation at any time correctly instantiates the values which ought to be upheld in the community, the constitution would be morally legitimate”. The fourth is Raz’s which argues that a constitution is valid so long as its constraints are morally permissible because conventions of this type might aid the continuity of the legal system, i.e. it is important to have a convention of this type and the constitution is a kind of this type. Marmor appears to endorse these two approaches and concludes: “The conditions for the legitimacy of a constitution must comprise the following conditions. First, the values and principles enshrined in it must be morally permissible…Second, when certain choices are made in particular cases, they would be legitimate if they are either morally underdetermined, or else, morally correct…It follows from this that both arguments must assume that at least in those areas in which the constitution would make a moral difference, it can be interpreted to make the difference that it should, that is, according to the true moral principles that should apply to the particular case...the moral legitimacy of constitutions very much dependent on the practices of their interpretation. In other words, a great deal of the burden of moral legitimacy is shifted by these arguments to the application of the constitution, thus assuming that the constitution is legitimate only if the courts are likely to apply the constitution in a morally desirable way.” [This implies that the only significant value constitutions have is in providing a conventional practice where some such practice is required.] Moves on to argue that courts typically rely, and rightly so, on moral considerations when deciding constitutional issues because typically, in cases of the kind that reach the supreme or constitutional court, there is no law on the case. Much of this relies on his earlier discussion about the nature of interpretation in the law – that legal interpretation is always a matter of cha ging the law. (shrink)

In the present paper, I argue against the claim that ex aequo and bono adjudication cannot be epistemically objective. I start with a survey of legal rules allowing the parties to resort to ex aequo et bono adjudication. Next, I argue that decisions taken on ex aequo et bono basis are not subjective for three main reasons. First, they are analogous to decision making in hard cases. Second, theories of practical reasoning and hybrid expressivism provide a precise theoretical account of (...) the mechanisms at stake. Third, the context of adjudication provides substantial constraints on judicial tasks. (shrink)

In the standard analysis of economic institutions--which include social conventions, the working rules of an economy, and entitlement regimes --economists invoke the same theories they use when analyzing individual behavior. In this profoundly innovative book, Daniel Bromley challenges these theories, arguing instead for "volitional pragmatism" as a plausible way of thinking about the evolution of economic institutions. Economies are always in the process of becoming. Here is a theory of how they become. Bromley argues that standard economic accounts see institutions (...) as mere constraints on otherwise autonomous individual action. Some approaches to institutional economics--particularly the "new" institutional economics--suggest that economic institutions emerge spontaneously from the voluntary interaction of economic agents as they go about pursuing their best advantage. He suggests that this approach misses the central fact that economic institutions are the explicit and intended result of authoritative agents--legislators, judges, administrative officers, heads of states, village leaders--who volitionally decide upon working rules and entitlement regimes whose very purpose is to induce behaviors that constitute the sufficient reasons for the institutional arrangements they create. Bromley's approach avoids the prescriptive consequentialism of contemporary economics and asks, instead, that we see these emergent and evolving institutions as the reasons for the individual and aggregate behavior their very adoption anticipates. These hoped-for outcomes comprise sufficient reasons for new laws, judicial decrees, and administrative rulings, which then become instrumental to the realization of desired individual behaviors and thus aggregate outcomes. (shrink)

In the present paper, I argue against the claim that ex aequo and bono adjudication cannot be epistemically objective. I start with a survey of legal rules allowing the parties to resort to ex aequo et bono adjudication. Next, I argue that decisions taken on ex aequo et bono basis are not subjective for three main reasons. First, they are analogous to decision making in hard cases. Second, theories of practical reasoning and hybrid expressivism provide a precise theoretical account of (...) the mechanisms at stake. Third, the context of adjudication provides substantial constraints on judicial tasks. (shrink)

In the late eighteenth century, Adam Smith significantly shaped the modern world by claiming that when people individually pursue their own interests, they are together led towards achieving the common good. But can a population of selfish people achieve the economic common good in the absence of moral constraints on their behavior? If not, then what are the moral conditions of market interaction which lead to economically efficient outcomes of trade? Answers to these questions profoundly affect basic concepts and principles (...) of economic theory, legal theory, moral philosophy, political theory, and even judicial decisions at the appellate level. Walter Schultz illustrates the deficiencies of theories which purport to show that markets alone can provide the basis for efficiency. He demonstrates that efficient outcomes of market interaction cannot be achieved without moral normative constraints and then goes on to specify a set of normative conditions which make these positive outcomes possible. (shrink)

Like many rights theorists, Peter Jones regards rights as lying outside politics and providing constraints upon it. However, he also concedes that rights are matters of reasonable disagreement and that, as a matter of fairness, disputes about them ought to be resolved democratically. In this paper I develop these concessions to argue that rights require democratic justification and that this can only be provided via a real democratic process in which those involved ?hear the other side?. I relate this argument (...) to the republican theory of non-domination, contending that it fits the Lockean project of regarding rights as constraints on arbitrary power better than liberal views that place rights outside the democratic process. I conclude by noting the implications of this argument for rights-based judicial review of legislation. (shrink)

Despite a strong historical record of resettling and providing care for refugee populations, the Australian Federal Government has increasingly implemented harsh and restrictive policies regarding the treatment and management of asylum seekers. Most controversial of these has been the mandatory detention of asylum seekers, a policy applied indiscriminately and without discretion where individual cases have not been subject to judicial review or time constraints. From the outset health professionals have raised concerns about the possible adverse mental health impacts of (...) prolonged detention. In contrast, government representatives have characterized conditions in detention as benign and comfortable, and have consistently contested criticism of detention, often citing a lack of scientific evidence as tacit support for the continuation of the policy. Nevertheless, requests for access to the detention centres to undertake rigorous scientific investigations have gone unheeded. In this context we argue that the Australian Government has failed to uphold its commitment to good governance by allowing transparency, openness and a willingness to have the impact of its policies scrutinized by scientists. The manifest conflict of interest in the government position leads to a breach in the normal social contract between mental health researchers and those responsible for the policy of detention. There is, we argue, a legitimate moral imperative in such situations for clinical researchers to breach the walls of enforced silence and give a voice to those who are afflicted. This imperative, however, must be carefully balanced against the risks that may face detainees agreeing to participate in such research. (shrink)

Perhaps we should change our focus from constitutionalized practices of democracy to democratized practices of constitutionalism. Dworkin and Perry both seek to respond to democratic objections to judicial review by relying on a theory of the legitimacy constraints of democracy itself. According to this view, on some matters, legitimate democracy requires getting the right moral answers. Thus democratic processes must be constitutionalized to ensure such right outcomes on fundamental moral matters. To the extent that judges are better positioned to (...) engage in principled moral reasoning, the arguments continue, we ought to entrust them with ensuring the constitutionalized legitimacy conditions of democracy. I argued that this latter institutional move, however, threatened to simply revive the paternalist worries forcefully articulated by Learned Hand. Waldron’s rights-based objection to rightsbased judicial review, although not dispositive, provided further warning of the moral costs of treating fellow citizens as incapable of reasoning together about the content and proper scope of the legal rights required for democracy. An alternative strategy for justifying judicial review that this chapter investigates is to understand a constitution itself as a product of true democracy, of real popular sovereignty. It is then up to the people, exercising their constituent power at the level of a constitutional assembly, to decide what particular institutional arrangements will best carry forward their collective ideals and decisions. The specific character and structure of those arrangements—whether they are populist or elitist, deliberative or aggregative, sensitive or insulated, electorally accountable or politically independent, and so on—is then a secondary matter. What is central is that the constitutional arrangements the people decide on are, first and foremost, democratically legitimated by the fact that they are the result of authentic popular sovereignty.. (shrink)

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act is a federal law regulating the administration of private employer-sponsored benefits including health benefits . In general, since the federal government has exercised its authority to preempt state regulation of the administration of private employer-sponsored health plans, states are blocked from enforcing laws interfering with ERISA. As many states pursue health care reform experiments, ERISA preemption becomes relevant as a potential limit on the scope and type of reforms states are able to enact. The (...) dominant trend in ERISA litigation has been to preempt state legislation and litigation interfering with the administration of private employer-sponsored health plans, making large-scale state health care reform initiatives difficult. The purpose of this paper is to examine the trajectory of judicial interpretation of ERISA and to discuss what opportunities exist to facilitate health care initiatives given the constraints of ERISA preemption. (shrink)

This chapter considers the key values underlying and explaining important features of international law as a system of law. It uses that value analysis as a way of interpreting international law and of asking whether, within those values, international law can be made to serve certain 'global cosmopolitan' re-distributive aims. The chapter argues that the constraints of international law mean that it is not an appropriate medium for global re-distributive goals commonly associated with theories of societal justice. Because those features (...) and constraints are based in values that international law distinctly serves, those constraints cannot simply be ignored, overridden, or changed judicially. (shrink)

In this article, I critically evaluate the positions of Professors Jeremy Waldron and W.J. Waluchow on the right-based merits of entrenched constitutions and strong judicial review. I support Waluchow in arguing that (i) prohibitions on the constitutional entrenchment of rights and resultant prohibitions of strong judicial review may be only superficially fair or democratic, since fair procedure alone can neither eliminate pre-existing inequalities nor ultimately take the autonomy vital to self-governance seriously (whether individual or collective). Secondly, (ii) if (...) deep dissensus fails to exist on all substantive matters of rights, the constitutional entrenchment of rights combined with strong judicial review can indeed be achieved fairly. I then propose that (iii) the anti-constitutionalist concern about being governed by the ‘dead hand of the past’ is self-refuting, for the alternative is simply another constraint on autonomy. While this is largely consistent with Waluchow's position vis-à-vis Waldron's majoritarianism, I end by expressing serious concerns regarding whether the common law (and the ‘constitutional morality’ that Waluchow claims can be derived from it) can act as a sufficiently robust basis for the protection of liberal and egalitarian rights. (shrink)

This paper discusses the difference between the factual and the legal, both as to terms and as to statements, on the analogy of the methodologists' distinction of the observational and the theoretical. No absolute distinction exists, and pure `brute facts' do not exist in law because of the socialisation of physical world and juridification of the social world.; also, the effect of evidentiary constraints. Law/fact distinction depends on `applicability rules'. The problem of `mixed terms' is partly a matter of (...) class='Hi'>judicial pragmatics, partly to do with the character of applicability rules, and their extensiveness. Semantic realism versus semantic instrumentalism in respect of legal terms -- the latter preferred. Tendency to abstract terms in advanced legal orders. (shrink)

The Framers understood the Constitution to be the fundamental expression of the rule of law over against the arbitrary, intemperate, and unjust “rule of men” that all too frequently existed in the political world, unfortunately both democratic as well as monarchical. Accordingly, the rule of law requires a well functioning political and legal system that includes legislative checks and balances, the separation of power between the President and Congress, an independent judiciary, federalism, etc. What happens when this “Madisonian” constitutional system, (...) designed to express “the deliberate sense of the community,” runs into a Judicial branch that, in effect, claims we live under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what we say it is. Must the Judiciary itself be subject to the rule of law, and the decisions of a constitutional majority, or does their “independence” extend to being independent of the constraints of the rule of law and, thus, decent majority rule? How did the original John Marshall Court answer these questions, and what light do the leading cases and controversies shed on the relationship between the Marshall Court and the Madisonian System? Are we facing a situation of Marshall v. Madison? (shrink)

This paper discusses the difference between the factual and the legal, both as to terms and as to statements, on the analogy of the methodologists' distinction of the observational and the theoretical. No absolute distinction exists, and pure ‘brute facts’ do not exist in law because of the socialisation of physical world and juridification of the social world.; also, the effect of evidentiary constraints. Law/fact distinction depends on ‘applicability rules’. The problem of ‘mixed terms’ is partly a matter of (...) class='Hi'>judicial pragmatics, partly to do with the character of applicability rules, and their extensiveness. Semantic realism versus semantic instrumentalism in respect of legal terms -- the latter preferred. Tendency to abstract terms in advanced legal orders. (shrink)

This article is a jurisprudential analysis of the idea of a ‘living Constitution’, as a common feature of the constitutional practice in democratic countries. The main argument of the article is that constitutional interpretation encompasses, rather than excludes the judicial power to develop and change the content of constitutional guarantees. The metaphor of the ‘living Constitution’ is appropriate to the nature of constitutional adjudication because it suggests gradual, incremental change on a case-by-case basis. While it is stressed that courts (...) can and should be creative, this judicial creativity is subject to significant legal and practical constraints. (shrink)

This article maintains that it is the constitutional responsibility of the courts, here the courts of the State of Michigan, to engage in judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules. The article is written in response to the views expressed by some Justices of the Michigan Supreme Court that separation of powers concerns should impose significant limits on the power of the courts to establish and develop the common law of Michigan. Specifically, the contention is that (...) policymaking is exclusively the province of the legislature, so that the courts cannot properly formulate common law rules that may have significant social and economic effects. The article strongly disagrees with the proposition that there is any kind of constitutional constraint, either prudential or structural, on the power, and indeed, the constitutional responsibility of the Michigan courts (or the courts of any state) to engage in judicial policymaking in the process of formulating common law rules.The judicial power given to the Michigan courts by the Michigan Constitution includes the power to do what courts have always done in the Anglo-American legal system. The judicial power gives the courts the responsibility to adjudicate controversies between private persons and in the process to develop a common law through the workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. In so doing, the courts may properly take into account considerations of social and economic policy just as the legislature does when it engages in the process of enacting legislation. The difference between what the courts do and what the legislature does is a difference in process, not a difference in substance. Judicial policymaking takes place within the judicial process, that is, in the adjudication of controversies between persons in which the courts promulgate common law rules. The common law develops in a line of growth through the workings of binding precedent and stare decisis, and to the extent that there are limitations on the development of the common law, these are limitations that inhere in the judicial process itself. When the courts, for example, consider whether a new claim or a new defense should be recognized by the common law, they must consider whether that new claim or defense properly follows in the line of growth from existing doctrine and precedent. But if the courts conclude that it does, that is, if the claim or defense is consistent with the line of growth of existing doctrine and precedent, the courts are not constrained from recognizing the claim or defense on the ground that the substance of the claim or defense is a matter for the legislature rather than for the courts or that the resulting common law rule may have significant social and economic effects. The legislature, in contrast, enacts legislation through the legislative process. That process is a freewheeling one, often dependent on political compromise and completely unrestrained by the kind of limitations that inhere the judicial process. There is no legislative concept of line of growth, and the legislature can and often does enact legislation that brings about fundamental societal change or reverses the course of public policy. In our constitutional system, the most important questions of public policy are, of course, determined by the Legislature. Where the legislature disagrees with the policy choices reflected in a common law rule, the legislature has the power to enact legislation changing the common law rule. But there are many areas of private law where the legislature has not acted. In our constitutional system, where the matter in issue is not covered or preempted by legislation, the courts may formulate a common law rule to cover that matter, and in so doing may engage in judicial policymaking. Judicial policymaking is a part of the development of the common law, and the courts cannot avoid their responsibility to engage in judicial policymaking to the extent that it is necessary in the process of formulating the common law. As a constitutional matter, there are no separation of powers considerations that prohibit the courts from engaging in judicial policymaking. This part of the article traces judicial policymaking and the common law back to the seminal writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo.The article then discusses at length judicial policymaking and the development of the common law in Michigan. It shows that the clearest history of judicial policymaking in development of the common law is the liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century that were promulgated in the wake of the Industrial Revolution to protect the newly-emerging industries. During that time the courts in Michigan and elsewhere grafted on to the general principles of negligence law liability rules such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine, all of which had the effect of denying recovery to workers and other victims of industrial accidents. Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, however, the Michigan Supreme Court began excising its constitutional power to make changes in the common law, expanding significantly the scope of tort liability in Michigan. Emphasizing that "rules created by the court could be altered by the court," and that the court had a "corrective responsibility when dealing with judge-made law," the Court, in approximately a 30 year period: eliminated the imputed negligence doctrine, under which the driver's negligence was imputed to the passenger in the passenger's suit against a third party; eliminated charitable immunity as a defense to a tort action; held that a wife could maintain at tort action for loss of her husband's consortium; abrogated the defense of assumption of risk, which had been applied outside of the employment area, held that there could be recovery for pre-natal injuries and finally abolished contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in favor of a comparative negligence approach. In these cases the Court discussed the relevant policy considerations influencing their decisions with respect to the common law rule at issue. In the last quarter century, the Court continued to take into account policy considerations in developing the common law, but not infrequently there was disagreement on the Court as to where policy considerations should lead, with some Justices arguing that policy considerations supported the imposition of tort liability, while other Justices argued that they did not.The article concludes that it has been demonstrated that in the development of the common law of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court has at all times engaged in judicial policymaking. From the liability-limiting rules of the late nineteenth century designed to protect the newly-emerging industries in this state, to the Court's exercise of its power to change the common law in Michigan over a 30 year period by expanding significantly the scope of tort liability in Michigan, to its recognition of new claims, such as a child's right to recover for loss of a parent's consortium caused by a negligent injury, to its imposition of limits on tort recovery, such as the open and obvious doctrine, the Court has invoked considerations of policy in support of its decisions. In these cases, the Court's invocation of policy considerations was sometimes accompanied by substantial disagreement among members of the Court over where policy should lead, but at no time did the Court ever suggest that separation of powers considerations should somehow operate as a kind of restraint on the Court's use of policy in the development of the common law. It is the power and responsibility of the Michigan Courts under the Michigan Constitution to make policy choices in formulating the common law. (shrink)

Does Duncan Kennedy successfully cannibalize jurisprudence? He attempts to do it by demonstrating the inexistence of rightness in legal argumentation. If there is no right legal argument, then there is no right answer in adjudication, adjudication is not a rational enterprise and legal doctrine cannot be said to be a science. It can be shown that skepticism is self-defeating. Duncan Kennedy can avoid self defeat only because he actually believes in a lot of legal arguments. His thesis that judges decide (...) questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators does not hold. Judicial reasoning is subject to constraints that do not affect legislators. It must be based on the sources of law and is limited by rules of procedure. Even when the judges have ‘interstitial’ legislative powers they are, unlike the legislator, bound to fit the system and their decisions are considered in procedure from the perspective of the right answer doctrine. The only work that can convincingly refute the skeptic argument against legal science is the reconstruction of jurisprudence as a scientific enterprise. Such work is beyond the scope of any single paper. The article aims to give some inspirations for such a task. (shrink)

In this book I address the widely debated topic of the legitimacy of democratic decisions showing that the traditional concept of the legitimacy of political authority developed by liberal theories involves dilemmatic outcomes. In order to solve this intrinsic tension of the liberal model of legitimacy, I argue that the legitimacy of political decisions must be granted with a two steps strategy that involves both ideal and non-ideal analysis. Starting from the models developed by John Rawls and Gerald Gaus, I (...) build up my own paradigm, claiming that, pace Rawls, it is not possible to do away with an epistemic analysis of the actual circumstances of justification. I look at the epistemology of disagreement literature in order to build up an epistemic and procedural framework in which it could be shown that disagreement is not a practical obstacle that prevents participants from agreeing on virtually correct solutions; rather, it is exactly in virtue of the fact of disagreement that democracy is the best method for collective decisions. The heart of this proposal is that given certain epistemic circumstances (i.e. pervasive disagreement due to an opaque appraisal of evidence), it is possible to argue that participants within a collective decision-making setting should refer to each other as epistemic peers. This normative request inherits its value from a shared understanding of persons as being on an equal footing and capable of reasoning powers. This reading of political equality implies two related features of peerhood. One is the proceduralist tenet that equality is a non-instrumental value that should be expressed by the fact that any voice, in the political arena, should be given equal weight. The second is the idea that, assumed the fact of pluralism, citizens should be ready to share both practical and epistemic authority while publicly debating over evaluative matters. In the second part of the book I argue that democratic procedures of decision-making, in order to actually respect members of society as equal peers, and in the attempt to solve the dilemmatic outcomes of public reason models of legitimacy, should look at political agreements achieved through compromise rather than consensus. In fact, an overly idealized approach to collective-choice procedures may lose track of actual decision-making processes (lack of guidance). Moreover, seeking consensus, through the establishment of deliberative standards that some individuals or groups have less opportunities than others to fulfil may engender exclusion and inequality (lack of inclusion). Accordingly, I suggest that deliberative constraints should be loosened to include partisan and interested claims and to pursue principled compromises rather than consensual agreement. According to the model of legitimacy I defend, a normative account of democracy cannot rely on standards that could be only applied in an ideal context, otherwise this attempt will be doomed to fail in two ways: 1) delegitimizing actual democratic decision-making processes and 2) undermining the actual possibility to implement decisions reached through deliberation in real contexts. (shrink)

Constitutional interpretation in Canada is dominated by the metaphor of the “living tree”. Living tree constitutional interpretation is usually defined in terms of its incompatibility with what is understood in Canada to be the central commitment of originalist interpretation: that the constitution is, in some sense, “frozen” at the moment of adoption. But the tenets of originalism that are used as a definitional contrast are not widely held by originalist constitutional scholars today, and are in fact expressly rejected in the (...) new originalist theories that have been developed principally in the United States over the past 20 years. There has not been a meaningful engagement in Canada with contemporary schools of originalist interpretation. The originalism rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985 , is not the new originalism, and a rejection of this new family of interpretive theories does not necessarily follow from the fact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s rejection of original intent originalism. Unfortunately, the Canadian courts have continued to affirm living tree constitutional doctrine and denounce originalism without providing much of an account of what they are accepting or rejecting. This paper is a prefatory study to an engagement with new originalist scholarship. I attempt a statement of the current commitments in Canadian living constitutional doctrine and, in passing, note the Supreme Court’s attitudes towards originalism. My purpose is to determine what the central commitments of living tree constitutional doctrine are, as a preliminary step towards a later study to determine the extent to which Canadian doctrine is truly incompatible with orginalist interpretation. I explore what I observe to be the four central commitments to living tree constitutionalism in Canada: the doctrine of progressive interpretation; the use of a purposive methodology in progressive interpretation; the absence of any necessary role for the original intent or meaning of framers in interpreting the constitution; and the presence of other constraints on judicial interpretation. (shrink)

The aim is to review the decisions of the Central Elections Committee and of the Supreme Court regarding disqualification of lists in Israel. Two major questions are addressed: When should tolerance have its limits?; and, What constraints on liberty should be introduced in order to safeguard democracy? The judicial analysis focuses attention on the issue of whether the justices acted in accordance with the law. Consideration is given to the written law and to existing normative considerations which allow justices (...) an exegetic latitude. It is argued that theNeiman decision of 1984 was flawed, that the Court was erroneous in ignoring the licensing effect of its decision, and that democracy does not have to allow a violent list propounding the destruction of democracy to act in order to fulfil its aim. It is neither morally obligatory, nor morally coherent, to expect democracy to place the means for its own destruction in the hands of those who either wish to bring about the physical annihilation of the state, or to undermine democracy. These two cases are the only cases in which democracy has to introduce self-defensive measures and to deny representation in parliament to violent lists that convey such ideas, and that act to realize them. (shrink)

On the art of perjury: the “ambiguous oaths” in the first French Novels. Every language possesses the elements intended to assert that what one says the truth, and specifically, formulas to take an oath. But the solemn oath is an act: perjury is punished as a crime. In medieval French, the linguistic formula of the oath is now well described: it is si m'aït Dieux (/se Dieus m'aït), always linked to a second utterance: in this binary structure, the first utterance (...) asserts the truth of the second one. Besides the linguistic constraints, the solemn oath requires a very precise gestural and social ritual: formula uttered aloud, hand laid on relics or on a manuscript of the Gospel, presence of witnesses and guarantors. This ceremonial is known by some juridical treatises (the Coutumes de Beauvaisis of Philippe de Beaumanoir, principally), but above all by some texts of fiction in French, novels or “chansons de geste”, which present juridical oaths.These fictional “solemn oaths” are caracterised by the fact that all of them are “ambiguous oaths”, and that the reader perceives them all, in some respects, as perjuries. Among the oldest texts of French literature, four texts, all written at the end of the XIIth century, show a process with an oath taken by the defendant or his champion: the Roman de Tristan of Béroul, the Chevalier de la charrette of Chrétien de Troyes, the “Branche I” of the Roman de Renart, and Ami et Amile. In the four instances, the process is about a woman's virtue: the oath is necessary to clear of suspicion a woman charged with adultery (queen Yseut, queen Guenièvre, Hersent the wolf) or impurity (Emperor Charlemagne's daughter); in the four instances, the question of truth is linked to the essential question of the purity of the lineage. But above all, in all the instances the oath can take place, with sometimes an ordeal or a judicial fight following it, and the woman charged is declared innocent, therefore chaste: but it is never the case. And yet these oaths are never really false oaths: “ambiguous oaths” rather. The logical and linguistic means by which the ambiguity is built up will be described: it plays, in all the instances, on a double reference.Literary texts do not show real perjuries: the oath scenes appear rather as presentations of the art of lying innocently, or to tell the truth while transfering one of the elements of the proposition. It is the awareness that truth is a linguistic matter, a purely linguistic matter, which is represented. (shrink)

A system effect arises when the properties of an aggregate differ from the properties of its members, taken one by one. The failure to recognize system effects leads to fallacies of division and composition, in which the analyst mistakenly assumes that what is true of the aggregate must also be true of the members, or that what is true of the members must also be true of the aggregate. Examples are (1) the fallacious assumption that if the overall constitutional order (...) is to be democratic, each of its component institutions must be democratic, taken one by one; (2) the fallacious assumption that if judges are politically biased, courts will issue politically biased rulings. In these cases and many others I will discuss, system effects are an indispensable analytic tool for legal theory. A systemic approach implies that the choices of legal actors are strategically interdependent: the best course of action for any given actor will depend upon what other actors do. Judges deciding how to interpret statutes and the constitution, for example, cannot simply assume, idealistically, that it would be best for them to adopt the approach that would be best for all if adopted by all. If others do not adopt that approach, then the nature of the best approach for the given judge may itself change, taking others' actions as nonideal constraints. The implication is a second-best approach to constitutionalism and legal interpretation.The judge who takes system effects into account may change her approach in light of the behavior of her colleagues and the behavior of other institutions. Although such a judge is strategic, it does not follow that she is unprincipled. Rather, under identifiable conditions, the systemically-minded judge will be a strategic legalist who attempts to act, within the constraints that arise from others' behavior, so as to nudge the legal system toward the best possible state, according to her view of the law. Indeed, the systemically-minded judge may even be a legal chameleon who changes her approach as the legal environment, including the behavior of other judges, changes around her, until the court as a whole reaches an equilibrium of optimal diversity. Although such a course of action is psychologically demanding, the systemic benefits that the legal chameleon creates can be attained at the systemic level instead. Wise appointments by Presidents and Senators aiming to diversify the judiciary would mimic, in a second-best way, the diversity that a bench of legal chameleons would produce"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site. (shrink)

Existe-il une corrélation entre le pouvoir d’un organe et le rang hiérarchique de ses normes ? La théorie réaliste de l’interprétation pourrait sembler indiquer le contraire. En effet, si, comme elle l’enseigne, c’est l’interprète d’un énoncé qui en détermine la signification, les agents de l’administration qui mettent en œuvre les politiques publiques devraient exercer un pouvoir plus important que le législateur qui les élabore. L’auteur de l’article soutient toutefois qu’une semblable conclusion serait erronée car les organes qui produisent les énoncés (...) juridiques généraux et abstraits peuvent généralement mobiliser des ressources qui leur permettent de contraindre les organes de concrétisation à prendre leurs préférences en considération. La représentation du droit comme étant constitué d’un ensemble de normes hiérarchisées confère certaines des ressources dont ils disposent. Celles-ci doivent être identifiées et leur efficacité évaluée afin de déterminer dans quels cas il existe.. (shrink)

In this paper I will examine one way of developing Kant's suggestion that one is free just insofar as he acts according to the dictates of norms or principles. and of his distinction between the Realm of Nature, governed by causes, and the Realm of Freedom, governed by norms and principles. Kant's transcendental machinery—the distinction between Understanding and Reason, the free noumenal self expressed somehow as a causally constrained phenomenal self, and so on—can no longer secure this distinction for us. (...) It is just too mysterious to serve as an explanation of freedom. Yet some distinction between the realm of facts and the realm of norms must be established if the notion of freedom as normative rather than causal constraint is to be redeemed. In this paper I will present a version of this distinction which was not envisioned by Kant, and show how a novel response to the dispute between naturalists and non-naturalists concerning the relation of fact to norm can be developed out of that rendering. I will then argue that the account of human freedom which results from this story needs to be supplemented in just the ways which Hegel claimed Kant's account needed to be supplemented, and will recommend an Hegelian self-expressive successor. (shrink)

The so-called "adaptationism" of mainstream evolutionary biology has been criticized from a variety of sources. One, which has received relatively little philosophical attention, is developmental biology. Developmental constraints are said to be neglected by adaptationists. This paper explores the divergent methodological and explanatory interests that separate mainstream evolutionary biology from its embryological and developmental critics. It will focus on the concept of constraint itself; even this central concept is understood differently by the two sides of the dispute.