This licentiate thesis consist of two separate research papers which concern two tangential topics – that of semantic information and that of information security. Both topics are approached by similar methods, i.e. with a concern about conceptual and definitional issues. In Paper I – concerning the concept of information, and a semantic conception thereof – the conceptual, and definitional, issues focus on one property, that of truthfulness. It is argued – against the veridicality thesis – that semantic (...) information need not be truthful. In Paper II – concerning information security – it is argued that the current leading definitions (so-called ‘CIA’ definitions, which define information as secure if, and only if, the properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability are retained) suffer from both actual and possible counter-examples, and lack an appropriate conceptual sense. On the basis of this criticism a new kind of definitions is proposed and argued for. (shrink)

In this commentary, I discuss the effects of the liar paradox on Floridi’s definition on semantic information. In particular, I show that there is at least one sentence that creates a contradictory result for Floridi’s definition of semantic information that does not affect the standard definition.

As was mentioned by Nicolas Lori in his (Found Sci, 2010 ) commentary, the definition of Information in Physics is something about which not all authors agreed. According to physicists like me Information decreases when Entropy increases (so entropy would be a negative measure of information), while many physicists, seemingly the majority of them, are convinced of the contrary (even in the camp of Quantum Information Theoreticians). In this reply I reproduce, and make more precise, (...) some of my arguments, that appeared here and there in my ( 2010 ) paper, in order to clarify the presentation of my personal point of view on the subject. (shrink)

During the refereeing procedure of Anthropomorphic Quantum Darwinism by Thomas Durt, it became apparent in the dialogue between him and me that the definition of information in Physics is something about which not all authors agreed. This text aims at describing the concepts associated to information that are accepted as the standard in the Physics world community.

This doctoral thesis consists of five research papers that address four tangential topics, all of which are relevant for the challenges we are facing in our socio-technical society: information, security, privacy, and anonymity. All topics are approached by similar methods, i.e. with a concern about conceptual and definitional issues. In Paper I—concerning the concept of information and a semantic conception thereof—it is argued that the veridicality thesis is false. In Paper II—concerning information security—it is argued that the (...) current leading definitions suffer from counter-examples, and lack an appropriate conceptual sense. Based on this criticism a new kind of definition is proposed and defended. In Paper III—concerning control definitions of privacy—it is argued that any sensible control-definition of privacy must properly recognize the context as part of the defining criteria. In Paper IV—concerning the concept of privacy—it is argued that privacy is a normative concept and that it is constituted by our social relations. Final, in Paper V—concerning anonymity—it is argued that the threat from deanonymization technology goes beyond harm to anonymity. It is argued that a person who never is deanonymized can still be harmed and what is at stake is an ability to be anonymous. (shrink)

The definition of life is a very important issue in the philosophy of biology, but this issue has unfortunately been neglected by the mainstream philosopher of biology for many years. In this paper, the difficulties with and the reasons for defining life are illustrated, the characteristics of life on Earth are explored, ways of defining life are examined, the main definitions of life are explained and evaluated, and finally, a new information definition of life is proposed.

Discussion of the problems arising in conjunction with the rapid progress of cybernetics demands a philosophical analysis of the basic concepts in the field. This problem cannot yet be considered to have been resolved. As has been emphasized, among others by Academician A. I. Berg , even one of the basic concepts of cybernetics — the concept of information — does not yet have a satisfactory definition. This situation is primarily due to the fact that study of (...) class='Hi'>information problems is, in general, of recent origin. And major effort until now has been centered upon the study of the quantitative relationships associated with informational phenomena. (shrink)

In Figuig Berber, like in many other Berber languages, it is possible to express the indirect object by a lexical expression and by a pronominal clitic in the same sentence. This construction, called “dative doubling” in the literature, is in variation with constructions that do not have a pronominal clitic. In this article, dative doubling is studied in two corpora, one written corpus (Benamara 2011), and one spoken corpus, collected by the author. It is shown that dative doubling is all (...) but absent in the written corpus, while it is quite frequent in the spoken corpus. In the spoken corpus, there is a clear correlation with information structure. Dative doubling is only rarely found with indirect objects that express new information, while it appears more than half of the times when indirect objects express old information. In addition, it is obligatory when expressing old information with the verb ini ‘to say’. (shrink)

A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: we take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. (...) We believe that this equation formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense. We then show how this formal definition is related to the theory of universal optimal learning agents. Finally, we survey the many other tests and definitions of intelligence that have been proposed for machines. (shrink)

This book proposes guidelines for constructing and evaluating definitions of terms, i.e. words or phrases of general application. The guidelines extend to adoption of nomenclature. The book is meant to be a practical guide for people who find themselves in their daily lives or their employment producing or evaluating definitions of terms. It can be consulted rather than being read through. The book’s theoretical framework is a distinction, due to Robert H. Ennis, of three dimensions of definitions: the act of (...) the definer, the content of the definition, and its form. The act of a definer is what the definer does in defining a term; the book distinguishes, following Ennis, three basic acts of defining: reporting, stipulating, and advocating. The content of a definition is in one sense the information that the definition conveys and in another sense the words in its defining part. The form of a definition is the way it is expressed, for example as a definition by genus and differentia. (shrink)

Pragmatic information,understood as the impact of a message upon a receiving system,represents a matured and comprehensive concept of which earlier proposals are special cases.The di .erent kinds of recipients and reactions to incoming message are characterized.In a historical exposition the principal approaches to the definition and operationalization of information are critically reviewed. From a modern point of view,the measurement of pragmatic information is possible but requires novel and specific procedures.As a perspective notion,pragmatic information will be (...) analyzed in its relationships with other perspective notions,particularly 'meaning' and 'interpretation '.Main fields of application include physics, general systems theory and cognitive science.Together with some reflections on information and meaning, these areas of application point forward to connections with the mind-matter problem. (shrink)

The semantic concept of information is one of the most important, and one of the most problematical concepts in biology. I suggest a broad definition of biological information: a source becomes an informational input when an interpreting receiver can react to the form of the source (and variations in this form) in a functional manner. The definition accommodates information stemming from environmental cues as well as from evolved signals, and calls for a comparison between (...) class='Hi'>information‐transmission in different types of inheritance systems—the genetic, the epigenetic, the behavioral, and the cultural‐symbolic. This comparative perspective highlights the different ways in which information is acquired and transmitted, and the role that such information plays in heredity and evolution. Focusing on the special properties of the transfer of information, which are very different from those associated with the transfer of materials or energy, also helps to uncover interesting evolutionary effects and suggests better explanations for some aspects of the evolution of communication. (shrink)

Estonian doesn't have a definite article. Instead, bare singular noun phrases can unambiguously bear either a definite interpretation or an indefinite interpretation. This paper argues that the pragmatic principles governing the felicitous use of three English articles ("a", "the" and "another"), described by A Grønn and KJ Sæbø (2012, 'A, the, another: A game of same and different' Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21, 75-95) can also account for the conditions under which a bare singular noun phrase in (...) Estonian bears a definite or instead an indefinite interpretation. The two languages use the same pragmatic principles to determine the definiteness interpretation of a noun phrase. The difference is just that in English (where definiteness meanings have been lexicalized) these pragmatic principles govern the felicity of article use, whereas in Estonian they govern the interpretation of a bare singular noun phrase. (shrink)

Information processing in neural systems can be described and analysed at multiple spatiotemporal scales. Generally, information at lower levels is more fine-grained but can be coarse-grained at higher levels. However, only information processed at specific scales of coarse-graining appears to be available for conscious awareness. We do not have direct experience of information available at the scale of individual neurons, which is noisy and highly stochastic. Neither do we have experience of more macro-scale interactions, such as (...) interpersonal communications. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that conscious experiences co-vary with information encoded in coarse-grained neural states such as the firing pattern of a population of neurons. In this article, we introduce a new informational theory of consciousness: Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT). We hypothesise that conscious processes are processes which form non-trivial informational closure (NTIC) with respect to the environment at certain coarse-grained scales. This hypothesis implies that conscious experience is confined due to informational closure from conscious processing to other coarse-grained scales. ICT proposes new quantitative definitions of both conscious content and conscious level. With the parsimonious definitions and a hypothesise, ICT provides explanations and predictions of various phenomena associated with consciousness. The implications of ICT naturally reconcile issues in many existing theories of consciousness and provides explanations for many of our intuitions about consciousness. Most importantly, ICT demonstrates that information can be the common language between consciousness and physical reality. (shrink)

In this short paper, we show that a popular view in information science, information-as-thing, fails to account for a common example of information that seems physical. We then demonstrate how the distinction between types and tokens, recently used to analyse Shannon information, can account for this same example by viewing information as abstract, and discuss existing definitions of information that are consistent with this approach. -/- Dans ce court article nous montrons qu'une vision populaire (...) en sciences de l'information, l'information en tant qu’une chose, échoue à rendre compte d'un exemple commun d'information qui semble physique. Nous démontrons ensuite comment la distinction type/token, utilisée récemment pour analyser l'information de Shannon, peut rendre compte de ce même exemple en considérant l'information comme abstraite, et nous discutons des définitions existantes de l’information qui sont compatibles avec cette approche. (shrink)

This book gives an overview for practitioners and students of quantum physics and information science. It provides ready access to essential information on quantum information processing and communication, such as definitions, protocols and algorithms. Quantum information science is rarely found in clear and concise form. This book brings together this information from its various sources. It allows researchers and students in a range of areas including physics, photonics, solid-state electronics, nuclear magnetic resonance and information (...) technology, in their applied and theoretical branches, to have this vital material directly at hand. (shrink)

Mechanistic information is used in the field of risk assessment in order to clarify two controversial methodological issues, the selection of inference guides and the definition of standards of evidence. In this paper we present an analysis of the concept of mechanistic information in risk assessment by recurring to previous philosophical analyses of mechanistic explanation. Our conclusion is that the conceptual analysis of mechanistic explanation facilitates a better characterization of the concept of mechanistic information. However, it (...) also shows that the use of this kind of information in risk assessment is heavily influenced by pragmatic factors, which have not been sufficiently taken into account in philosophical analysis. Mechanistic models are like hypothesis that have to be validated empirically. Due to their dependence on the standards of evidence, they are subject to the same pragmatic factors. Therefore, recurring to mechanistic information does not lead to closure of the methodological controversies in risk assessment. (shrink)

This article proposes a new interpretation of mutual information. We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpretation is consistent with EVI, but it is faced with (...) the problem of measure sensitivity and fails to justify the use of MI in giving definitive answers to questions of information. We propose a fourth interpretation of MI by reduction in expected inaccuracy, where inaccuracy is measured by a strictly proper monotonic scoring rule. It is shown that the answers to questions of information given by MI are definitive whenever this interpretation is appropriate, and that it is appropriate in a wide range of applications with epistemic implications. _1_ Introduction _2_ Formal Analyses of the Three Interpretations _2.1_ Reduction in doubt _2.2_ Reduction in uncertainty _2.3_ Divergence _3_ Inconsistency with Epistemic Value of Information _4_ Problem of Measure Sensitivity _5_ Reduction in Expected Inaccuracy _6_ Resolution of the Problem of Measure Sensitivity _6.1_ Alternative measures of inaccuracy _6.2_ Resolution by strict propriety _6.3_ Range of applications _7_ Global Scoring Rules _8_ Conclusion. (shrink)

This introduction to the role of information structure in grammar discusses a wide range of phenomena on the syntax-information structure interface. It examines theories of information structure and considers their effectiveness in explaining whether and how information structure maps onto syntax in discourse. Professor Erteschik-Shir begins by discussing the basic notions and properties of information structure, such as topic and focus, and considers their properties from different theoretical perspectives. She covers definitions of topic and focus, (...) architectures of grammar, information structure, word order, the interface between lexicon and information structure, and cognitive aspects of information structure.In her balanced and readable account, the author critically compares the effectiveness of different theoretical approaches and assesses the value of insights drawn from work in processing and on language acquisition, variation, and universals. This book will appeal to graduate students of syntax and semantics in departments of linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Scientific writings and policy documents define the terms nanomaterial and nanoparticle in various ways. This variation is considered problematic because the absence of a shared definition is understood as potentially hindering nanomaterial knowledge production and regulation. Another view is that the existence of a shared definition may itself cause problems, as rigid definitions arguably exclude important aspects of the studied phenomena. The aim of this paper is to inform this state of disagreement by providing analytical concepts for a (...) systematic understanding of how, and even whether, nanomaterial and nanoparticle could and should be defined. To do this, we review definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle presented in research articles and policy documents. Definitions were identified by first conducting a Scopus search and then tracing cited definitions back to their sources. In total, 36 definitions were identified. Theories of definition from philosophy and linguistics provide analytical guidance for structuring and categorizing the identified definitions, and the main analytical dimensions of the definitions are then identified and discussed. Finally, we propose a framework for understanding the process of defining nanomaterial and nanoparticle. This framework considers both the generality needed for a shared understanding and the level of precision required for different purposes. (shrink)

Notions like meaning, signal, intentionality, are difficult to relate to a physical word. I study a purely physical definition of "meaningful information", from which these notions can be derived. It is inspired by a model recently illustrated by Kolchinsky and Wolpert, and improves on Dretske classic work on the relation between knowledge and information. I discuss what makes a physical process into a signal.

Information, and information and communication technologies (ICTs) are critical for most developed post-industrial societies. It follows, therefore, that the better the quality of the information exchanged, the more likely such societies and their members may prosper. But what is information quality (IQ) exactly? This paper discusses current definitions, problems and approaches to IQ and the question of how we should, and could, evaluate IQ in the future.

This paper connects information with computation and cognition via concept of agents that appear at variety of levels of organization of physical/chemical/cognitive systems – from elementary particles to atoms, molecules, life-like chemical systems, to cognitive systems starting with living cells, up to organisms and ecologies. In order to obtain this generalized framework, concepts of information, computation and cognition are generalized. In this framework, nature can be seen as informational structure with computational dynamics, where an (info-computational) agent is needed (...) for the potential information of the world to actualize. Starting from the definition of information as the difference in one physical system that makes a difference in another physical system – which combines Bateson and Hewitt’s definitions, the argument is advanced for natural computation as a computational model of the dynamics of the physical world, where information processing is constantly going on, on a variety of levels of organization. This setting helps us to elucidate the relationships between computation, information, agency and cognition, within the common conceptual framework, with special relevance for biology and robotics. (shrink)

This article introduces definitions for direct, means-end, oblique (or indirect) and ulterior intent which can be used to test for intent in an algorithmic actor. These definitions of intent are informed by legal theory from common law jurisdictions. Certain crimes exist where the harm caused is dependent on the reason it was done so. Here the actus reus or performative element of the crime is dependent on the mental state or mens rea of the actor. The ability to prosecute these (...) crimes is dependent on the ability to identify and diagnose intentional states in the accused. A certain class of auto didactic algorithmic actor can be given broad objectives without being told how to meet them. Without a definition of intent, they cannot be told not to engage in certain law breaking behaviour nor can they ever be identified as having done it. This ambiguity is neither positive for the owner of the algorithm or for society. The problem exists over and above more familiar debates concerning the eligibility of algorithms for culpability judgements that mens rea is usually associated with. Aside from inchoate offences, many economic crimes with elements of fraud or deceit fall into this category of crime. Algorithms operate in areas where these crimes could be plausibly undertaken depending on whether the intent existed in the algorithm or not. (shrink)

This paper suggests a way of formalizing the amount of information that can be conveyed to each player along every possible play of an extensive game. The information given to each player i when the play of the game reaches node x is expressed as a subset of the set of terminal nodes. Two definitions are put forward, one expressing the minimum amount of information and the other the maximum amount of information that can be conveyed (...) without violating the constraint represented by the information sets. Our definitions provide intuitive characterizations of such notions as perfect recall, perfect information and simultanetty. (shrink)

In previous publications we have criticized the usual application of information theory to quantal situations and proposed a new version of information-theoretic quantum statistics. This paper is the first in a two-part series in which our new approach is applied to the fundamental problem of thermodynamic equilibrium. Part I deals in particular with informational definitions of equilibrium and the identification of thermodynamic analogs in our modified quantum statistics formalism.

Ontologies are being used increasingly to promote the reusability of scientific information by allowing heterogeneous data to be integrated under a common, normalized representation. Definitions play a central role in the use of ontologies both by humans and by computers. Textual definitions allow ontologists and data curators to understand the intended meaning of ontology terms and to use these terms in a consistent fashion across contexts. Logical definitions allow machines to check the integrity of ontologies and reason over data (...) annotated with ontology terms to make inferences that promote knowledge discovery. Therefore, it is important not only to include in ontologies multiple types of definitions in both formal and in natural languages, but also to ensure that these definitions meet good quality standards so they are useful. While tools such as Protégé can assist in creating well-formed logical definitions, producing good definitions in a natural language is still to a large extent a matter of human ingenuity supported at best by just a small number of general principles. For lack of more precise guidelines, definition authors are often left to their own personal devices. This paper aims to fill this gap by providing the ontology community with a set of principles and conventions to assist in definition writing, editing, and validation, by drawing on existing definition writing principles and guidelines in lexicography, terminology, and logic. (shrink)

In this article I propose an ethical analysis of information warfare, the warfare waged in the cyber domain. The goal is twofold: filling the theoretical vacuum surrounding this phenomenon and providing the conceptual grounding for the definition of new ethical regulations for information warfare. I argue that Just War Theory is a necessary but not sufficient instrument for considering the ethical implications of information warfare and that a suitable ethical analysis of this kind of warfare is (...) developed when Just War Theory is merged with Information Ethics. In the initial part of the article, I describe information warfare and its main features and highlight the problems that arise when Just War Theory is endorsed as a means of addressing ethical problems engendered by this kind of warfare. In the final part, I introduce the main aspects of Information Ethics and define three principles for a just information warfare resulting from the integration of Just War Theory and Information Ethics. (shrink)

Young traces the evolution of the term information from its general linguistic use into the mainstream of modern science, proposing an entirely new definition of information as a mass-energy phenomenon. He demonstrates that: information is in all cases a form phenomenon; both form and information are mass-energy rather than abstract phenomena; mind can be viewed as a mass-energy rather form-manipulating process; form constitutes a mechanism immanent in the physical universe via which mass-energy systems can communicate (...) informationally and control their own energetic activities. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What Is Technology? Explicit Knowledge and Tacit Knowledge References and Further Reading.

Assume this hypothetical situation: an American pharmaceutical company, Maxwell Fisch Pharmaceuticals, Inc., wishes to perform clinical trials involving a new antipsychotic medication, Klezac. Klezac is in its third phase of the clinical stage of the drug research process. Once the testing is complete, Maxwell plans to submit a New Drug Application, the official request to begin marketing Klezac, to the Food and Drug Administration. The new drug is expected to receive FDA approval in 2 or more years. The company decides (...) to shift its research and development activities to Z, a small, developing country. In doing so, Maxwell is following the course taken by numerous other drug companies who wish to take advantage of faster governmental approval in foreign sites and ensuing cheaper research costs. (shrink)

Definition of the problems: The physician-patient-relationship is influenced by economically driven decisions. This study explores the ethical consensus in explaining economical backgrounds of therapeutic and diagnostic interventions to patients, and the clinical practices of patient information.Method: A combination of questionnaire send to members of relevant health care organisations (n=132) and interviews with physicians working in different clinical resorts (n=15).Results and conclusion: In general there is a consensus in truth-telling about the economical background, however this ethical principle in many (...) cases is neglected. Whenever possible physicians try to translate economically driven decisions into medical terms. There is a broad disagreement and a wide range of individual ethical preferences regarding patient information, that can not be controlled by patients in any way. (shrink)

I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular (...) counterpart and upholds reasonable standards of acceptability. The standards I will be discussing come from Humberstone (1997), who claims that definitions cannot be informative as long as they are inferentially circular. (shrink)

John Maynard Smith has defended against philosophical criticism the view that developmental biology is the study of the expression of information encoded in the genes by natural selection. However, like other naturalistic concepts of information, this ‘teleosemantic’ information applies to many non-genetic factors in development. Maynard Smith also fails to show that developmental biology is concerned with teleosemantic information. Some other ways to support Maynard Smith’s conclusion are considered. It is argued that on any definition (...) of information the view that development is the expression of genetic information is misleading. Some reasons for the popularity of that view are suggested. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is suggested that our epistemic access to metaphysical modality generally involves rationalist, a priori elements. However, these a priori elements are much more subtle than ‘traditional’ modal rationalism assumes. In fact, some might even question the ‘apriority’ of these elements, but I should stress that I consider a priori and a posteriori elements especially in our modal inquiry to be so deeply intertwined that it is not easy to tell them apart. Supposed metaphysically necessary identity statements (...) involving natural kind terms are a good example: the fact that empirical input is crucial in establishing their necessity has clouded the role and content of the a priori input, as I have previously argued. For instance, the supposed metaphysically necessary identity statement involving water and its microstructure can only be established with the help of a controversial a priori principle concerning the determination of chemical properties by microstructure. The Kripke-Putnam framework of modal epistemology fails precisely because it is unclear whether the required a priori element is present. My positive proposal builds on E. J. Lowe’s work. Lowe holds that our knowledge of metaphysical modality is based on our knowledge of essence. Lowe’s account strives to offer a uniform picture of modal epistemology: essence is the basis of all our modal knowledge. This is the basis of Lowe’s modal rationalism. I believe that Lowe’s proposal is on the right lines in the case of abstract objects, but I doubt that it can be successfully applied to the case of natural kinds. Accordingly, the case of natural kinds will be my main focus and I will suggest that modal rationalism, at least as it is traditionally understood, falls short of explaining modal knowledge concerning natural kinds. Yet, I think that Lowe has identified something of crucial importance for modal epistemology, namely the essentialist, a priori elements present in our modal inquiry. The upshot is that rather than moving all the way from modal rationalism to modal empiricism, a type of hybrid approach, ‘empirically-informed modal rationalism ’, can be developed. (shrink)

In Posterior Analytics 71b9 12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to (...) this contrast and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the “necessity” condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Information Warfare—the warfare characterised by the use of information and communication technologies. This is a fast growing phenomenon, which poses a number of issues ranging from the military use of such technologies to its political and ethical implications. The paper presents a conceptual analysis of this phenomenon with the goal of investigating its nature. Such an analysis is deemed to be necessary in order to lay the groundwork for future investigations into this topic, addressing (...) the ethical problems engendered by this kind of warfare. The conceptual analysis is developed in three parts. First, it delineates the relation between Information Warfare and the Information revolution. It then focuses attention on the effects that the diffusion of this phenomenon has on the concepts of war. On the basis of this analysis, a definition of Information Warfare is provided as a phenomenon not necessarily sanguinary and violent, and rather transversal concerning the environment in which it is waged, the way it is waged and the ontological and social status of its agents. The paper concludes by taking into consideration the Just War Theory and the problems arising from its application to the case of Information Warfare. (shrink)

The paper investigates the ethics of information transparency (henceforth transparency). It argues that transparency is not an ethical principle in itself but a pro-ethical condition for enabling or impairing other ethical practices or principles. A new definition of transparency is offered in order to take into account the dynamics of information production and the differences between data and information. It is then argued that the proposed definition provides a better understanding of what sort of (...) class='Hi'>information should be disclosed and what sort of information should be used in order to implement and make effective the ethical practices and principles to which an organisation is committed. The concepts of “heterogeneous organisation” and “autonomous computational artefact” are further defined in order to clarify the ethical implications of the technology used in implementing information transparency. It is argued that explicit ethical designs, which describe how ethical principles are embedded into the practice of software design, would represent valuable information that could be disclosed by organisations in order to support their ethical standing. (shrink)

The modern tradition of informal logic has relied heavily on accepting, modifying, or criticizing the patterns of reasoning mentioned in Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations. However, already in 1971, Stachowiak focussed his attention on the muc h neglected Topics and enumerated in his work, Rationalismus im Ursprung some of the Aristotelian rules governing the formation of definitions and principles for correct reasoning. The paper will try to examine how these principles might ap ply to informal arguments today.