Infertility constitutes an essential source of stress in the individual and couple’s life. The Infertility-Related Stress Scale is of clinical interest for exploring infertility-related stress affecting the intrapersonal and interpersonal domains of infertile individuals’ lives. In the present study, the IRSS was translated into Brazilian–Portuguese, and its factor structure, reliability, and relations to sociodemographic and infertility-related characteristics and depression were examined. A sample of 553 Brazilian infertile individuals completed the Brazilian–Portuguese IRSS, and a subsample of 222 participants also completed the (...) BDI-II. A sample of 526 Italian infertile individuals was used to test for the IRSS measurement invariance across Brazil and Italy. Results of exploratory structural equation modeling indicated that a bifactor solution best represented the structure underlying the IRSS-BP. Both the general and the two specific intrapersonal and interpersonal IRSS-BP factors showed satisfactory levels of composite reliability. The bifactor ESEM solution replicated well across countries. As evidence of relations to other variables, female gender, a longer duration of infertility, and higher depression were associated with higher scores in global and domain-specific infertility-related stress. The findings offer initial evidence of validity and reliability of the IRSS-BP, which could be used by fertility clinic staff to rapidly identify patients who need support to deal with the stressful impact of infertility in the intrapersonal and interpersonal life domains, as recommended by international guidelines for routine psychosocial care in infertility settings. (shrink)

Adolescent young carers (AYCs) are a sub-group of young carers who carry out significant or substantial caring tasks and assume a level of responsibility which would usually be associated with an adult. They are a potentially vulnerable group of minors because of the risk factors associated with their caring role. AYCs face a critical transition phase from adolescence to adulthood often with a lack of tailored support from service providers. The recently completed European funded ‘ME-WE’ project, which forms the focus (...) of this paper, aimed to change the ‘status quo’ by advancing the situation of AYCs in Europe, via responsive research and knowledge translation actions. This paper outlines the participatory, co-creation approach employed in the project to optimise AYC’s involvement. It describes the ethical framework adopted by the project consortium to ensure the wellbeing of AYCs within all project activities. Ethical issues that arose in the field study work in all six countries are presented, followed by a discussion of the level of success or otherwise of the consortium to address these issues. The paper concludes with lessons learned regarding ethically responsible research with and for AYCs that are likely transferable to other vulnerable research groups and pan-European projects. (shrink)

El autor, empeñado desde hace algún tiempo en recuperar la enseñanza de la filosofía en Latín, pone frente a frente en este estudio la teoría evolucionista de Darwin y la "quinta vía" tomística. Ello es ocasión para unas disquisiciones sobre la finalidad teleológica del mundo, la admiración aristotélica como principio del filosofar, y la verosimilitud.Palabras llave: Evolucionismo; teleología; verosimilitud.The author, who has made efforts over time to recover the teaching of philosophy in Latin, confronts in this paper Darwin’s Evolutionist Theory (...) and the Tomistic "Fifth Way". This confrontation lends itself to the rendering of some elaborations on the teleological finality of the world, Aristotilian admiration of the beginning of the philosophical task, and verisimilitude.Palabras llave: Evolutionism; teleology; verisimilitude. (shrink)

El autor, empeñado desde hace algún tiempo en recuperar la enseñanza de la filosofía en Latín, pone frente a frente en este estudio la teoría evolucionista de Darwin y la "quinta vía" tomística. Ello es ocasión para unas disquisiciones sobre la finalidad teleológica del mundo, la admiración aristotélica como principio del filosofar, y la verosimilitud.Palabras llave: Evolucionismo; teleología; verosimilitud.The author, who has made efforts over time to recover the teaching of philosophy in Latin, confronts in this paper Darwin’s Evolutionist Theory (...) and the Tomistic "Fifth Way". This confrontation lends itself to the rendering of some elaborations on the teleological finality of the world, Aristotilian admiration of the beginning of the philosophical task, and verisimilitude.Palabras llave: Evolutionism; teleology; verisimilitude. (shrink)

Although De Casu Diaboli is not a traditional locus for a discussion of faith and reason, it is nonetheless subtly permeated by this topic in two ways. The first concerns Anselm’s general strategy for answering the student’s questions regarding the cause of the devil’s first sin. Anselm ends by claiming the devil willed incorrectly for no other cause than that his will so willed. Anselm thus ultimately calls upon the student to have faith in the mysterious, libertarian selfdetermining power of (...) the created will; explanation must cease and the student must accept that God would only have punished the devil if the devil’s will were freely to blame. This implicit, ultimate appeal to faith appears in stark contrast to the content of the entire treatise—a treatise up to that point filled with explanations of how the devil sinned in terms of the structure of the angels’ wills and intellects. In other words, the purpose of the treatise had been to provide a reason for the devil’s sin. It would seem that such reasons-giving discussions which occupy the first part of the work would be unnecessary if Anselm were ultimately to appeal to the student to rest upon his faith. The first part of the paper accordingly explores and attempts to alleviate this seeming tension. Additionally, Anselm explains that the devil had some compelling reasons to choose the way in which he did given his particular epistemic state. Despite this, the devil was to have faith in God’s prohibition and not follow his reasons for doing otherwise. The second part of the paper, therefore, discusses how the relative priority of faith can be inferred from Anselm’s discussion of the devil’s first sin. (shrink)

This paper will explore the evolution of the conceptions of Satan (the devil), and demons throughout the past 3,000 years, in light of an in-depth study of St. Anselm of Canterbury’s medieval text, The Fall of Satan (De Casu Diaboli). Anselm’s brilliant work, De Casu Diaboli, has inspired much reflection into not just the nature of angels and demons but also into our own. It is worth noting that, it is impossible to exhaustively cover a 3,000-year period on such a (...) major topic, but a brief overview of the significant periods will be provided before focusing on De Casu Diaboli. (shrink)

Příspěvek je zaměřen na prezentaci proměn v chápání významu pojmu analogie od starověku, přes krizi analogického pojmu v období středověké scholastiky až k převažujícímu významu, jež tento pojem získal s nástupem novověku a vědeckou revolucí. Na pozadí této proměny je pro stejné období akcentován vývoj lidského vědomí, především jeho sílící intencionalita a schopnost reflexe vlastní kognitivní aktivity a vlastního vědomí. Naznačena je teze, že proměna vývoje chápání analogie přímo souvisí s rozvojem intencionálního vědomí. Charakteristickým rysem plně rozvinutého intencionálního vědomí je (...) však zkušenost vydělenosti, odtržení člověka od světa (jakožto niterného subjektu od externího objektu). V druhé polovině článku je následně předložen syntetizující náhled, umožňující takto vzniklou mezeru ve vztahu člověka ke světu překonat právě tím, že je na tento vztah nahlíženo jako na vztah bytostně analogický. The article is dealing with presentattion of historical changes in the understanding of and the meaning of analogy from antiquity through the crisis of the analogical concept in medieval period to its presently prevalent meaning, which the term gained at the onset of renaissance and scientific revolution. With this as a frame of reference, the change of human consciousness in the same time period is mapped – mainly its growing intentionality and the ability of reflection of one’s own cognitive activity and consciousness. The proposition is outlined, that the change in understanding and meaning of analogy directly corresponds with the development of intentional consciousness. The characteristic features of fully developed intentional consciousness is the experience of separation of man from the world (of the inward subject separated from the outward object). In the second part of the article a synthetic view is presented, in which the arisen gap between the man and the world is bridged by considering their relationship as essentially analogical. (shrink)

The highly ordered neuronal projections from the retina to the tectum mesencephali (optic tectum) in several vertebrate groups have been intensively studied. Several hypotheses so far have been proposed, suggesting mechanisms to explain the topographical and biochemical specificity of the retinotectal projections during ontogeny. In the present paper we compare the main hypotheses of retinotectal development with respect to the nature of specificity envisaged, the activity-dependence versus inheritance criterium and the strategy of argument, in casu the descriptive versus interferential type (...) of argument. Matching of the current developmental hypotheses and mechanisms for elimination or persistance of contralateral, respectively ipsilateral connections, is attempted with respect to the known neuroanatomical connectivity data in the amphibian optic tectum and with respect to the symmetry relations between ipsilateral and contralateral connection patterns described in amphibians and other vertebrate groups. Local mechanisms influencing the survival potential of synaptic contacts between retinal afferents and tectal neurons are probably essential for generating global symmetry patterns. Finally, a global topological approach is discussed with respect to its applicability in the amphibian retinotectal projection system. Basic assumptions of topological modeling appear to rely on anatomical and functional properties of the visual system like left-right symmetry, dichotomy, (absence of) convergence and segregation of fibers and neurons into columnar information units. It is concluded however, that more neuroanatomical, physiological and ultrastructural data are needed to establish a formalized operation model of the amphibian retinotectal system. (shrink)

According to the privation theory of evil, evil is nothing. In De casu diaboli Anselm’s student-interlocutor raises three arguments meant to show that evil is in fact something: the argument from fear (if evil is nothing, there can be no reason to fear it), the argument from signification (if evil is nothing, “evil” has no signification; if “evil” has a signification, evil is not nothing), and the argument from causal efficacy (if evil is nothing, how can it enslave the soul (...) to passion and cause it so much trouble?). I expound the account of language that Anselm uses to answer the argument from signification and the distinctions between justice and advantage and between positive and privative evils that he uses to answer the arguments from fear and from causal efficacy. I conclude that, by the time Anselm gets done with it, there is not much left of the privation theory. (shrink)

Cervantesu antični klasiki niso bili tuji, z njimi se je seznanil v času šolanja in med bivanjem v Italiji. Da mu je bil klasični svet blizu, dokazuje z vpletanjem antičnih elementov, snovi in motivike. Huma­nistična nota v njegovem delu je najbolj opazna v nenehni obrambi svobode in človeškega dostojanstva oziroma vrednosti človeškega bitja samega po sebi v skladu z renesančnim konceptom človeka. Svoboda kot ključni pojem in temelj Cervantesove poetike navezuje njegov opus na renesančno tradicijo. Premiso o človekovi svobodi in (...) njeni temeljni vrednosti Cervantes izrazi na številnih mestih. Cervantesovo izrazito usmerjenost k svobodi in prežetost njegovega dela z njo pa je treba razumeti tudi skozi njegovo osebno izkušnjo in mučno ujetništvo v Alžiru, kjer je preživel pet let. Da bi preživel ter ohranil bistrost duha in razuma, je začel pisati. (shrink)

O Katulu vemo zelo malo zanesljivega in celo večino tega je treba razbrati iz njegovega lastnega literarnega dela. To je vedno tvegan pristop, ki mu kritika danes večinoma nasprotuje (četudi je kritika vedno spremenljiva in znaki teh sprememb so že v zraku). Toda po drugi strani vemo kar precej o zadnjem stoletju rimske republike, o času torej, v katerem je Katul preživel svoje kratko, a intenzivno življenje, in o številnih javnih osebnostih, tako iz sveta književnosti kot politike, ki jih je (...) štel med svoje prijatelje ali sovražnike. Tako kot Byron, ki je bil Katulu v nekaterih pogledih podoben, se je gibal v krogih visoke družbe, imel je radikalna stališča, ne da bi se aktivno politično udejstvoval, ter je pisal poezijo, ki daje vtis, da je nastala kot odziv na družbeno dogajanje, literarne tokove ali zasebne škandale takratne aristokracije. (shrink)

Anselm of Canterbury holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu (...) diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3,... (shrink)

This paper aims to highlight some aspects of the Anselmian thought, that is, those that deal with the problem of the signification of nothingness. Anselm think over this problem in some of his main writings, in particular in the Monologion and in the De casu diaboli: considering the signification interpreted as adaequatio rei et intellectus, i.e. of a correspondentist theory of truth, it is problematic for the early-medieval philosopher to establish in what way there are names (such as "nothing") which, (...) although they have no referent in objective reality, nevertheless seem to perform some function in language. In order to fully understand the theoretical procedure carried out by Anselm, it is also essential to take into account other works, such as the De grammatico and the De veritate, in which, even if there is no real discussion about nothingness, some foundamental assumptions of Anselmian thought are made explicit. They are essentials to fully understand his speculation around these problems. Next, we will try to show how Anselm comes to identify some constitutive characteristics of logical negation, aware of the distinction between the sometimes improper form that language can take in its ordinary use and the "straight" one, that is the logical one, which correctly expresses how things are in reality for him. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a generic format for adaptive vague logics. Logics based on this format are able to (1) identify sentences as vague or non-vague in light of a given set of premises, and to (2) dynamically adjust the possible set of inferences in accordance with these identifications, i.e. sentences that are identified as vague allow only for the application of vague inference rules and sentences that are identified as non-vague also allow for the application of some extra (...) set of classical logic rules. The generic format consists of a set of minimal criteria that must be satisfied by the vague logic in casu in order to be usable as a basis for an adaptive vague logic. The criteria focus on the way in which the logic deals with a special ⊡-operator. Depending on the kind of logic for vagueness that is used as a basis for the adaptive vague logic, this operator can be interpreted as completely true, definitely true, clearly true, etc. It is proven that a wide range of famous logics for vagueness satisfies these criteria when extended with a specific ⊡-operator, e.g. fuzzy basic logic and its well known extensions, cf. [7], super- and subvaluationist logics, cf. [6], [9], and clarity logic, cf. [13]. Also a fuzzy logic is presented that can be used for an adaptive vague logic that can deal with higher-order vagueness. To illustrate the theory, some toy-examples of adaptive vague proofs are provided. (shrink)

Razprava se ukvarja z analizo prvega pisma iz Hieronimove korespondence. Avtor je imel do njega očitno ambivalenten odnos, kar kliče k iskanju večplastne sporočilnosti spisa. Po poskusu datacije, retorični in slogovni analizi ter predstavitvi osnovne zgodbe, ki je vključena vanj, se pokaže, da je pismo kljub navidezni hagiografski šablonskosti vsebinsko bogato. Analiza se zato nadaljuje na dveh področjih. Kraj dogajanja, poznoantično mesto, ne more preživeti brez nove vodilne osebnosti, škofa. Je s pismom Hieronim želel tlakovati pot na vercelski škofovski sedež (...) prijatelju Evagriju iz Antiohije? Ob analizi nejasnih spolnih identitet obeh glavnih oseb iz zgodbe, nemoškega mladeniča in moško neuklonljive ženske, se pokaže, da je Hieronim v novem času iskal nov krščanski ideal, meništvo, ki ga je preko te zgodbe umestil v kontinuiteto z mučeništvom. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a generic format for adaptive vague logics. Logics based on this format are able to (1) identify sentences as vague or non-vague in light of a given set of premises, and to (2) dynamically adjust the possible set of inferences in accordance with these identifications, i.e. sentences that are identified as vague allow only for the application of vague inference rules and sentences that are identified as non-vague also allow for the application of some extra (...) set of classical logic rules. The generic format consists of a set of minimal criteria that must be satisfied by the vague logic in casu in order to be usable as a basis for an adaptive vague logic. The criteria focus on the way in which the logic deals with a special ⊡-operator. Depending on the kind of logic for vagueness that is used as a basis for the adaptive vague logic, this operator can be interpreted as completely true, definitely true, clearly true , etc. It is proven that a wide range of famous logics for vagueness satisfies these criteria when extended with a specific ⊡-operator, e.g. fuzzy basic logic and its well known extensions, cf. [7], super- and subvaluationist logics, cf. [6], [9], and clarity logic, cf. [13]. Also a fuzzy logic is presented that can be used for an adaptive vague logic that can deal with higher-order vagueness. To illustrate the theory, some toy-examples of adaptive vague proofs are provided. (shrink)

The story of the devil’s fall poses at least three separate philosophical puzzles, only two of which Anselm addressed. The first (Puzzle A) wonders how this angel could have committed a sin in the first place since he was created with a good will and good desires. A second puzzle (Puzzle B) consists of trying to explain why the devil cannot ever be forgiven for that first sin. According to Christian teaching, the devil is unable to “repent” (i.e., express sorrow (...) for) that first sin and thereby acquire forgiveness for it. Humans, by contrast, are portrayed as repeatedly sinning, repenting, and being forgiven. It is a mystery why no mechanism similar to that humans use for forgiveness is available to the devil. The final puzzle (Puzzle C) is slightly different. It wonders why the devil was never given a second chance. In daily life, most of us are given (and grant to others) second chances all the time. Given that the consequences of choosing incorrectly were in this case so disastrous and permanent, it seems inconceivable that a good God would permit one of His angels merely one chance to choose and thereby determine his eternal fate. And yet, despite this inconceivability, this is precisely the way the story is presented. Anselm addressed Puzzles A and B but never explicitly raised Puzzle C. I propose he failed to raise it because he conflated it with Puzzle B. In this paper, I first explain how he solved Puzzles A and B. I then go on to argue that Puzzle C does indeed constitute a separate puzzle that should not be conflated with Puzzle B. I then argue that the best (and perhaps only) way in which Anselm could solve Puzzle C is to appeal to a type of free will that conflicts with his solution to Puzzle A. As a result, I argue that there may be a latent contradiction in Anselm’s treatment of the devil’s sin unless an alternate solution to Puzzle C can be found. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a generic format for adaptive vague logics. Logics based on this format are able to (1) identify sentences as vague or non-vague in light of a given set of premises, and to (2) dynamically adjust the possible set of inferences in accordance with these identifications, i.e. sentences that are identified as vague allow only for the application of vague inference rules and sentences that are identified as non-vague also allow for the application of some extra (...) set of classical logic rules. The generic format consists of a set of minimal criteria that must be satisfied by the vague logic in casu in order to be usable as a basis for an adaptive vague logic. The criteria focus on the way in which the logic deals with a special ⊡-operator. Depending on the kind of logic for vagueness that is used as a basis for the adaptive vague logic, this operator can be interpreted as completely true, definitely true, clearly true, etc. It is proven that a wide range of famous logics for vagueness satisfies these criteria when extended with a specific ⊡-operator, e.g. fuzzy basic logic and its well known extensions, cf. [7], super- and subvaluationist logics, cf. [6], [9], and clarity logic, cf. [13]. Also a fuzzy logic is presented that can be used for an adaptive vague logic that can deal with higher-order vagueness. To illustrate the theory, some toy-examples of adaptive vague proofs are provided. (shrink)

Anselm is known for offering a distinctive definition of freedom of choice as “the ability of preserving uprightness of will for its own sake.” When we turn to Anselm’s account of the devil’s fall in De Casu Diaboli, however, this idiosyncratic understanding of freedom is not at the forefront. In that text, Anselm seemingly assumes a traditional understanding of free will defined in terms of alternative possibilities for the angels. These alternative possibilities must be present so the angels can engage (...) in ‘self-determination.’ God, however, does not face alternative possibilities to achieve His self-determination. Anselm thus explicates his notion of free will in terms of three different concepts: his distinctive definition of free choice, self-determination, and the principle of alternative possibilities. Despite attempts (by both scholars and Anselm) to explain how these three concepts are related, I argue that their relationship is problematic. In particular, I argue that Anselm is guilty of conflating and equivocating with regard to these concepts. I further importantly claim that the conflation obscures the fact that his understanding of self-determination calls into question God’s excellence over that of the good angels. (shrink)

In this article, the relationship between philosophy and history of education is delved into. First, it is noted that both disciplines have diverged from each other over the last few decades to become relatively autonomous subsectors within the pedagogical sciences, each with its own discourses, its own expositional characteristics, its own channels of communication, and its own networks. From the perspective of the history of education, it seems as though more affiliation has been sought with the science of history. The (...) history of education, in any event, has in the past few years become more historicizing and less ‘educationalizing’. According to the author, (who is not a philosopher of education) there are signs that indicate that such an analogous line of reasoning, mutatis mutandis, also applies for the philosophy of education. Does this mean that there are no longer any bridges from the one area to the other or that none are possible? Probably not. In the second portion, it is shown that the modern or even postmodern ‘new cultural history of education’, with its often ironical and demythologizing traits uses or can use a considerable amount of ‘grand theory’ (à la Foucault). Indeed, the development of an adequate conceptual apparatus that also has to cope with the problem of ‘presentism’ assumes a constant dialogue with the past and for this a philosophical‐interpretative (casu quo, hermeneutic) approach is still the best situated. Inversely, the Foucauldian perspective shows that philosophy in general and philosophy of education in particular equally hardly do without history. Within the reflection on pedagogical praxis, the historical and the philosophical thus probably will continue to rely on each other—if only as allies against the dominance of short‐winded empirical‐quantitative research. Still, it would be naive to think that, from this possible alliance, the fragmentation of historically developed knowledge systems with their own sociological and institutional foundation of scientific activities can be rectified in a trice. (shrink)

Ob množici del grških in rimskih piscev, ki so bila prevedena v slovenski jezik, je Livijeva Zgodovina doslej ostala nekako ob strani. Razen posameznih odlomkov ni bilo prevedenega nič. Količina ohranjenega besedila, avtorjev slog z dolgimi stavčnimi periodami, izbranim besediščem in različnimi retoričnimi prijemi, vse to pred­stavlja za prevajalca gotovo precejšnjo oviro. Z novo knjigo, ki je pred kratkim izšla pri Slovenski matici in prinaša prvih pet Livijevih knjig v prevodu Primoža Simonitija, se sedaj to spreminja. Knjigo je uredil David (...) Movrin, ki je napisal tudi spremno besedo in pripravil obsežen spremni aparat. Prevod zajema nekje sedmino ohranjenega Livijevega dela, ob predvidenem nadaljevanju s skupino prevajalcev si lahko obetamo izid nadaljnjih zvezkov in v doglednem času tudi prevod vsega, kar se je od Livija ohranilo v rokopisnem izročilu. (shrink)

In his eleventh century dialogue De Casu Diaboli, Anselm seeks to avoid the problem of evil for theodicy and explain the fall of Satan as attributable to Satan’s own self-creating wrongful will. It is something, as such, for which God as Satan’s divine Creator cannot be held causally or morally responsible. The distinctions on which Anselm relies presuppose an interesting metaphysics of nonbeing, and of the nonbeing of evil in particular as a privation of good, worthy of critical philosophical investigation (...) in its own right. Anselm’s concept of nonbeing does not resolve the philosophical problem of evil implied by Satan’s fall from grace, but is shown perhaps more unexpectedly to enable Anselm’s proof for the inconceivable nonexistence of God as the greatest conceivable intended object of thought to avoid Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason objection to the general category of ”ontological’ arguments. (shrink)

Traditional logical reconstruction of arguments aims at assessing the validity of ordinary language arguments. It involves several tasks: extracting argumentations from texts, breaking up complex argumentations into individual arguments, framing arguments in standard form, as well as formalizing arguments and showing their validity with the help of a logical formalism. These tasks are guided by a multitude of partly antagonistic goals, they interact in various feedback loops, and they are intertwined with the development of theories of valid inference and adequate (...) formalization. This paper explores how the method of reflective equilibrium can be used for modelling the complexity of such reconstructions and for justifying the various steps involved. The proposed approach is illustrated and tested in a detailed reconstruction of the beginning of Anselm’s De casu diaboli. (shrink)

The paper discusses Anselm's account of human finitude and freedom through his discussion of what it means to receive what we have from God in De casu diaboli. The essay argues that Anselm is considering the same issue as Jean Paul Sartre in his account of receiving a gift as incompatible with freedom. De casu diaboli takes up this same question, asking about how the finite will can be free, which requires that it have something per se, when there is (...) nothing, as St. Paul asserted in Romans, that we have not received. Anselm's notion that we have two wills, one for benefit or advantage, and one for justice, allows for something to come per se from the individual who wills and also accounts for the willing of the good angels as the acceptance of what they are and have as received and, hence, as finite. The essay concludes with reflection on Sartre and Camus's The Plague taking as the central ethical and existential problem of human life, as Anselm does, the problem of finitude, and comparing their responses. (shrink)

Webrova vznemirljiva teza iz dela Protestanska etika in duh kapitalizma, ki sprva izgleda tako neverjetno, je bila od svoje prve objave deležna številnih kritik, spodbijajo pa jo vse do danes. Ena izmed številnih kritik, pa ostaja še posebej nepopustljiva: če je duh samoodpovedovanja primeren za kapitalistično podjetništvo, pa ekonomije ne poganjajo samo podjetniki; ekonomija potrebuje tudi potrošnike, ki so pripravljeni kupiti več od tega, kar predstavlja njihove dejanske potrebe. Po Benjaminu je kapitalizem religija brez dogme ali teologije in ni nič (...) drugega kot čisti kult. Kot takšen sestoji v nenehnem slavljenju vernika, ki svojo vero udejanja skozi porabo in potrošnjo. V nadaljevanju bi rad izpostavil tezo, da nam vzporejanje dveh momentov krize – krize Druge svetovne vojne in krize 2008 –, omogoča na novo osvetliti Webrovo slavno tezo o asketski naravi kapitalizma, ter podal novo razlago tega, zakaj investicijski kapitalizem in potrošniški kapitalizem sploh nista protislovna, temveč konec koncev popolnoma sovpadata. Med drugo svetovno vojno sta namreč vladi Združenih držav Amerike in Kanade izdali niz propagandnih plakatov, katerih cilj je bil zmanjšati porabo in preusmeriti finančne sile gospodinjstev v prid skupnega vojnega napora. Mnogi od teh plakatov, ki so jih naredili nekateri najbolj zviti oglaševalci tistega časa, so črpali iz najgloblje zakoreninjenih načel puritanizma Nove Anglije: dolžnosti samoomejevanja. Sporočilo je bilo v naslednjem: vaši prihranki bodo odrešljivi ob koncu vojne, to pa le malce premesti Calvinovo perspektivo varčevanja, ki omogočajo odrešitev v času ob koncu sveta. Danes bi bilo dobro, če bi premislili eshatološke implikacije teh prerokov, ki predpisujejo najboljše obnašanje ob dogodku konca krize. (shrink)

Simulacija je nova oblika figuracije, ki je prelomila z reprezentacijskimi in prezentacijskimi načini. Čas, ki ga diktira aktivni simulacijski program, ni več memorični čas fotografije, filma ali televizije, za vedno shranjen in pripravljen za to, da ga uporabimo. Čas sinteze je čas, ki nič več ne pripada realnemu času. To je ahroničen čas. Lahko ga pospešimo, upočasnimo, obračamo, pošiljamo nazaj k izviru, da ga še enkrat preberemo. To je hibridni čas, ki združuje čas stroja/ naprave in subjekta.

Filozofija prvega človeka pred grehom, tj. filozofija v paradižu, je bila malebranchevski okazionalizem. Če bi Adam vztrajal v okazionalistični drži, do greha ne bi prišlo. Prav padec iz okazionalizma je bil potemtakem tisti, ki je povzročil Adamov padec. Okazionalizem je bil očitno možen samo ob božji razveljavitvi določenih naravnih zakonov, z eno besedo, možen je bil samo v paradižu. A dejstvo, daje klonil celo najbolj prepričani okazionalist, Adam, in to v času, ko je - s tem, daje njemu v prid (...) delal izjemo v naravnih zakonih - njegovo okazionalistično prepričanje posredno vzdrževal sam Bog, najbrž govori o tem, da se okazionalizem, kot filozofija, ni mogel obdržati niti z božjo pomočjo. (shrink)

VSEBINAPredgovor k prvi izdajiPredgovor k drugi izdajiUvodI. O razliki med čistim in empiričnim spoznanjemII. V posesti imamo neka apriorna spoznanja, in celo navadni razum ni nikoli brez takšnih spoznanjIII. Filozofija potrebuje neko znanost, ki bi določila možnost, principe in obseg vseh apriornih spoznanjIV. O razliki med analitičnimi in sintetičnimi sodbamiV. V vseh teoretičnih znanostih uma so kot principi vsebovane apriorne sinteticne sodbeVI. Obča naloga čistega umaVII. Ideja in razdelitev posebne znanosti z imenom kritika čistega uma1. Transcendentalni nauk o elementihPrvi del. (...) Transcendentalna estetika§ 1.Prvi odsek. O prostoru§ 2. Metafizična ekspozicija tega pojma§ 3. Transcendentalna ekspozicija pojma prostoraSklepi iz gornjih pojmovDrugi odsek. O času§ 4. Metafizična ekspozicija pojma časa§ 5. Transcendentalna ekspozicija pojma časa§ 6. Sklepi iz teh pojmov§ 7. Pojasnilo§ 8. Obče opombe k transcendentalni estetikiZaključek transcendentalne estetikeDrugi del. Transcendentalna logikaUvod. Ideja transcendentalne logikeI. O logiki nasplohII. O transcendentalni logikiIII. O razdelitvi obče logike na analitiko in dialektikoIV. O razdelitvi transcendentalne logike na transcendentalno analitiko in dialektikoPrvi razdelek. Transcendentalna analitikaPrva knjiga. Analitika pojmovPrvo poglavje. O vodilu za odkrtije vseh čistih razumskih pojmovPrvi odsek. O logični rabi razuma nasplohDrugi odsek§ 9. O logični funkciji razuma v sodbahTretji odsek§ 10. O čistih razumskih pojmih ali kategorijah§ 11.§ 12.Drugo poglavje. O dedukciji čistih razumskih pojmovPrvi odsek§ 13. O principih transcendentalne dedukcije nasploh[§ 14.] Prehod k transcendentalni dedukciji kategorijDrugi odsek. Transcendentalna dedukcija čistih razumskih pojmov [B]§ 15. O možnosti povezave nasploh§ 16. O izvorni sintetični enotnosti apercepcije§ 17. Načelo sintetične enotnosti apercepcije je najvišji princip vse rabe razuma§ 18. Kaj je objektivna enotnost samozavedanja§ 19. Logična forma vseh sodb je v objektivni enotnosti apercepcije v njih vsebovanih pojmov§ 20. Vsi čutni zori so podvrženi kategorijam kot pogojem, pod katerimi se njihovo raznoterje edino lahko združi v eno zavest§ 21. Opomba§ 22. Kategorija nima nobene druge rabe za spoznanje reči, kot je njena aplikacija na predmete izkustva§ 23.§ 24. O aplikaciji kategorij na predmete čutov nasploh§ 25.§ 26. Transcendentalna dedukcija obče možne izkustvene rabe čistih razumskih pojmov§ 27. Rezultat te dedukcije razumskih pojmovDrugi odsek. O apriornih temeljih za možnost izkustva [A]Vnaprejšnje opozorilo1. O sintezi aprehenzije v zoru2. O sintezi reprodukcije v upodobitvi3. O sintezi rekognicije v pojmu4. Preliminarna razlaga možnosti kategorij kot apriornih spoznanjTretji odsek. O razmerju razuma do predmetov nasploh in možnosti, da jih spoznamo apriori [A]Sumarična predstavitev pravilnosti in edine možnosti te dedukcije čistih razumskih pojmov [A]Druga knjiga. Analitika načelUvod. O transcendentalni razsodni moči nasplohPrvo poglavje. O shematizmu čistih razumskih pojmov. (shrink)

Izhodišče prispevka je domneva, da nad precejšnjim delom Salustijevega historiografskega opusa lebdi senca izkušnje dolge državljanske vojne v Rimu v času njegovega življenja. To je razvidno iz zgodovinarjevega prikaza surovega obračuna nobilitete z bratoma Grakh in iz njegove upodobitve Sule in njegove vladavine kot vira moralnega kaosa v desetletju po njegovem zavzetju Rima. Ko razmišlja o vzrokih krize rimske republike v šestdesetih letih pr. Kr. in v času nastanka svojih spisov, se Salustij sicer skuša predstaviti kot nepristranski opazovalec, ki občasno (...) biča napake političnih voditeljev obeh sprtih taborov, aristokracije in ljudstva. Vendar zgodovinar gotovo ne deli Ciceronovega mnenja o slogi med osrednjima skupinama vladajočega sloja kot zadostnem zdravilu za rimske težave. Preveč resno je jemal družbene korenine krize. Pri tem je nedvomno pripisoval odgovornost za krizo vladajočemu sloju. Zato si po Salustijevem mnenju pozornost zaslužijo celo neverodostojni glasniki sprememb, kakršen je bil Katilina. Po eni strani se Salustij ni odmaknil od uničujočega Ciceronovega prikaza voditelja zarote in ga je še dodatno prikazal kot demagoga, ki se, kadar mu to koristi, predstavlja za tipičnega člana nobilitete. Toda po drugi strani slika njegov razmislek o položaju v Rimu kot verodostojen, zlasti ko gre za Katilinov goreč napad na vodilno elito. (shrink)

The essay examines Anselm’s De libertate arbitrii and De casu diaboli, arguing that the points made about the will and free choice are mirrored in the questions and struggles of the student interlocutor in the dialogues. In contrast to Plato and Aristotle, who want to bring us to see that virtue is the path to happiness, Anselm wants to show that we have free choice and are responsible for not choosing rightly (i.e., choosing justice for its own sake), and that (...) human beings are autonomous but also finite and flawed. For this kind of learning, not just reasoning but insight and self-examination are required, a process reflected in the very human will, willfulness, and weakness of the student as he engages with his teacher. (shrink)

stance, Scotus adopts Anselm’s notion of a ‘(pure) perfection’ and elevates it to a fundamental principle of his metaphysics. Again, he distills Anselm’s Ontological Argument into something like its original Monologion components, and then treats each component part of the argument with a rigor and attention to detail far beyond anything Anselm suggested. In the case of Anselm’s so-called ‘two-wills’ theory, however, Scotus’s revisions are so extensive that they amount to a rejection of Anselm’s account, even though Scotus retains some (...) of Anselm’s terminology. I’ll begin by looking at Anselm’s initial presentation of the two-wills theory in his De casu diaboli (§1), and his later refinements of that account in his De concordia (§2). I’ll then look at Scotus’s deployment, revision, and rejection of Anselm’s theory in his three discussions of angelic sin: Lect. 2 d. 6 q. 2 (§3), Ord. 2 d. 6 q. 2 (§4), and Rep. 2 d. 6 q. 2 (§5). This will be followed by a brief look at whether Scotus’s theory of the self-regulating will is an adequate replacement for Anselm’s account (§6). (shrink)

Članek obravnava Leibnizev načrt filozofskega jezika, t. i. »univerzalno karakteristiko«. Najprej izpostavimo dejstvo, da Leibnizev načrt temelji na določenem semiotičnem vidiku matematike, ki v kontekstu novoveške ideje matematizacije vseh znanosti predstavlja novost. Kakorkoli ima Leibnizev drzen načrt resne pomanjkljivosti, ki so nedvomno botrovale temu, da ni nikoli zares začel z njeno izvedbo, pa Leibniz črpa optimizem iz strogo platonistične zasnove svoje epistemologije, v kateri je karakteristika utemeljena. Karakteristika je v sami teoretski zasnovi mogoča le pod pogojem, da se zaveže klasičnemu (...) realizmu in se odpove tisti metodi filozofije zavesti, ki sta jo ustoličila Descartes in Locke. Iz tega, kaj karakteristika obljublja, in iz njene zavezanosti platonizmu pa je videti, da se karakteristika kot jezik narave v ključnih potezah zgleduje po neki tradiciji mišljenja jezika, ki ima svoj začetek v Platonovem Kratilu in ima v Leibnizevem času še vedno svoje zagovornike. (shrink)

Al lettore che nella produzione speculativa di Anselmo si sofferma in modo particolare su De veritate, De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli e De concordia, la volontà si manifesta come un indiscutibile centro di interesse della riflessione anselmiana, tesa a determinare teoreticamente il valore e l'efficacia della iustitia, intesa come rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata, in ambito etico ed ontologico. La voluntas si presenta così quale protagonista del rapporto tra Dio e creatura, tra natura, storia ed eternità, perché è proprio (...) mediante gli atti volontari che la creatura può inserirsi od opporsi attivamente al rectus ordo della creazione, che a sua volta costituisce come una forma di libera oggettivazione del farsi altro da sé, rimanendo se stessa, della summa rectitudo. Attraverso questo movimento la rectitudo e la recta voluntas divina si pongono e si mostrano come l'essenza della realtà. Rivelando voluntas e rectitudo una valenza ad un tempo etica e metafisica, si potenzia il significato della volontà come responsabilità e come agente intrinsecamente libero che Anselmo le attribuisce. La voluntas, che vuole perché vuole, si sottrae al regno della necessità e si impone, in quanto artefice di libertà, come la protagonista aporetica della relazione tra la stabilità dell'ordine della realtà e la novità della storia, inchiodando Anselmo, amante della necessità razionale, alla celebrazione di una forza decisiva e ultimativa, che sembra sfuggire al pieno controllo della ratio. (shrink)

Velej Paterkul je bil rimski ekvit, vojaški poveljnik in senator, ki je svojo politično kariero opravljal pod Avgustom in Tiberijem. Vse, kar vemo o njem, nam je povedal sam v svojem zgodovinskem delu Historia Romana. Popisal je zgodovino vse do Tiberijeve vladavine, zaradi slabe ohranjenosti prve knjige pa je težko reči, kje je začel. Bil je prvi rimski zgodovinar, ki je svoje delo označil za transcursus, v katerem bo popisal samo najpomembnejše dogodke. Slednje na splošno opisuje bolj podrobno, če so (...) bili bližje času, v katerem je pisal. Kljub temu da je Velejevo delo pravzaprav edino ohranjeno prozno delo iz časa Avgustove in Tiberijeve vladavine, je malo antičnih del, ki so jih tako v antiki kot kasneje citirali tako malo. Zanemarjali so ga predvsem zaradi njegovega navdušenja nad Tiberijem in njegovo vladavino. (shrink)

According to the standard reading of Anselm’s De casu diaboli 12 through 14, the angels are morally responsible only if their own wills are in a radical way within their own power. By giving to angels two wills, i.e., two basic inclinations or volitional dispositions, Anselm’s God yields to the angels room for a free choice—indeed imparts on them the necessity of such a choice: in the case where an angel’s own happiness is incommensurable with justice, the angel must choose (...) or “will” which disposition to act in accordance with. The standard reading thus takes Anselm to argue for a form of voluntarism. In this paper I argue that the underlying moral psychology of De casu diaboli is neither voluntarist nor intellectualist. A voluntarist reading renders Anselm’s views on motivation incoherent, whereas his views on the conditions of morally right action run afoul of crucial intellectualist assumptions. (shrink)

This article addresses one of the crucial metaphysical presuppositions of the contemporary problem of evil: the belief that evil is that which a good thing must eliminate, or to be more precise, that evil is that which God must eliminate. The first part analyzes J. L. Mackie’s atheological argument in “Evil and Omnipotence.” The second part analyzes the reasons why Saint Anselm rejected the claim that God must eliminate evil in his De Casu Diaboli. The article’s goal is not just (...) raise crucial questions with respect to contemporary approaches to evil. It is also to reflect with Saint Anselm upon one of the genuine aporiai posed by existing evils: how does one remove them? (shrink)

The article analyzes Anselm of Canterbury’s development of three meanings of “nothing” in the Monologion, and a fourth in three later works: De casu diaboli, one of his letters, and his Incomplete Work. By focusing exclusively on the points where the meaning of nothing is first presented and then successively redefined, we can see that Anselm rejects the idea of creation ex nihilo by arguing that the things created by God had some form of existence before they were created, and (...) that creation refers not to coming into existence but to coming into being. In the three later works Anselm extends the meaning of nothing to show that it has a surprisingly positive content, since it is a term of negation that has meaning only in terms of what it excludes or negates. Anselm’s analysis of nothing seems to presage many modern discussions this subject. (shrink)

Článek analyzuje původní verzi Husserlovy kritiky Brentanova pojetí časového vědomí, která je obsažena v Husserlových Přednáškách k fenomenologii vnitřního časového vědomí, a Husserlovu snahu vyřešit Brentanův argument nekonečně nekonečného regresu v rukopisném textu O primární modifikaci paměti. Z Husserlovy kritiky si všímá jen dvou bodů. Za prvé kritiky Brentanova prezentismu, tj. názoru, že časové vědomí je založeno v bodu přítomnosti, v němž jsou psychické fenomény, které názor času konstituují, dány současně. Za druhé Husserlovy výtky, že Brentano nepoužívá pro výklad vědomí (...) času schéma počitkový obsah – pojetí počitkového obsahu. Za tímto účelem rekonstruuje text Brentanovu teorii v podobě, v které ji znal Husserl, a vykládá jak Brentanovy důvody pro odmítnutí časové povahy vnitřního vnímání, tak nedořešené problémy Brentanova hlediska. Následně se pokouší dokázat, že Husserl Brentanův prezentismus podcenil a že věcné problémy, které s jeho odmítnutím souvisely, musel řešit zavedením absolutně „kvazi-prezentního“ vědomí a odmítnutím schématu obsah – pojetí pro výklad konstituce imanentních časových jednot. Oba zvolené body Husserlovy kritiky Brentana se tak v pozdějších vrstvách přednášek ukazují jako částečně neoprávněné.The article discusses the original version of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s concept of time consciousness, which forms a part of Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Next, it gives an overview of Husserl’s attempt to solve Brentano’s argument from the infinitely infinite regress against the consciousness of internal time. Two points of Husserl’s critique of Brentano are analyzed. The first point concerns Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s presentism. Brentano holds that consciousness of time is contained in the time point of the present now, in which psychical phenomena constituting our time consciousness are given simultaneously. The second point concerns the lack of content – apprehension scheme in Brentano’s explanation of the time consciousness. The article reconstructs Brentano’s position in the form known to Husserl and explains Brentano’s reasons for refusing the internal consciousness of time as well as problems connected with this refusal. An analysis of Husserl’s text proves that Husserl underestimated Brentano’s presentism and that he was forced to introduce a concept of the absolute time consciousness to solve the problems connected with his refusal of Brentano’s position. Since Husserl had to eventually give up the content – apprehension scheme in his explanation of immanent time unities, his original critique of Brentano is shown to be partly unjustified. (shrink)

Následující text vydal v roce 1930 Oskar Kraus pod názvem Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins v časopisu Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, 75, n. 1-2, s. 1-22. Obsahuje výňatky z korespondence Franze Brentana a pražského profesora Karlo-Ferdinandovy univerzity Antona Martyho z roku 1895 a část Martyho přednášky o Brentanově teorii časového vědomí z téhož roku. Tématem textu je zdůvodnění přechodu od modelu časového vědomí, který pracuje s časovou modifikací předmětů představování, k modelu, který pracuje s časovou modifikací intencionálního vztahu k předmětu. (...) Ve verzi, která je zde zachycena, jde o přechod ke kontinuální modifikaci aktů souzení, které předmět „kladou“. Čtenáře, který by se zajímal o popis a hlubší zdůvodnění vývoje a povahy Brentanových teorií časového vědomí, bych odkázal na následující texty: Chisholm, R. (1981): „Brentano’s Analysis of the Consciousness of Time“. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1), 3-16, a Chrudzimski, A. (2005): Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität, Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden, Ontos, Frankfurt. V češtině pak na Janoušek, H. (2017): „Brentanova teorie času a časového vědomí“. Pro-Fil, 18, no. 1, (v tisku), dostupné online na stránkách časopisu Pro-Fil. (shrink)

V následujícím textu nejprve zařadíme Kantovo dílo do kontextu osvícenské filosofie a přiblížíme jeho náhled na některé otázky tehdejší metafyziky a přírodní filosofie. Poté se zaměříme zejména na Kantovu svéráznou koncepci prostoru a času v rámci transcendentální estetiky a transcendentální logiky, kterou Kant systematicky představil v Kritice čistého rozumu. Následně přezkoumáme hlavní námitky, které filosofové i vědci vůči této koncepci vznesli. To nám pak bude odrazovým můstkem k závěrečné debatě o vztahu fyzikálních pojmů a teorií k metafyzice.

In the last few decades, emotion became one of the central topics in many scientific disciplines. Neuroscientific research has developed many tools and approaches for studying emotions in humans and animals. In this regard, the work of Antonio Damasio has been important for uncovering physiological mechanisms of emotions and feelings and their role in homeostatic regulation. In some aspects, his theory has challenged our own everyday intuitions about what emotions are. The aim of this article is to show that Damasio’s (...) account of affects has underlined the importance of the body in generating feelings and subjective conscious experience and that this view of the two-way communication between the body and brain can offer a fresh perspective on the mind-body problem. (shrink)

In the middle and late Ming Dynasty, Lin Chaoen, who was also called the ‘Two heresies of Minzhong’ with Li Zhi, was famous for advocating the thought of ‘Three-in-One Doctrine’ and establishing the Religion of Three-in-One. In the past, the study of Lin Chaoen and the Religion of Three-in-One was basically based on religious study, and his identity as a scholar was ignored. Therefore, this article mainly analyses Lin Chaoen’s thought of ‘Three-in-One Doctrine’ from the field of philosophy and reveals (...) the close relationship between his theory of three religions and the formation of the Religion of Three-in-One. Lin Chaoen’s thought originated from Yangming’s mind philosophy; thus, the emergence of the Religion of Three-in-One also means that the traditional Confucianism has the possibility of becoming a folk religion. Contribution: This article examines Lin Chaoen’s thought of ‘Three-in-One Doctrine’ from the perspective of philosophical theory, and reveals that the essence of his thought of ‘Three-in-One Doctrine’ is Yangming’s mind philosophy. Moreover, this article analyses the transformation process from the thought of ‘Three-in-One Doctrine’ to the Religion of Three-in-One, and reveals that the Religion of Three-in-One is a new type of folk religion developed from an academic group. (shrink)