The combination of genuine ethical concerns and fear of learning to use germ-line therapy for human disease must now be confronted. Until now, no established techniques were available to perform this treatment on a human. Through an integration of several fields of science and medicine, we have developed a nine step protocol at the germ-line level for the curative treatment of a genetic disease. Our purpose in this paper is to provide the first method to apply (...) germ-line therapy to treat those not yet born, who are destined to have a life threatening, or a severely debilitating genetic disease. We hope this proposal will initiate the process of a thorough analysis from both the scientific and ethical communities. As such, this proposal can be useful for official groups studying the advantages and disadvantages of germ-line therapy. (shrink)

Germ-line therapy has long been regarded with great caution both by scientists and by ethicists. Even those who do not reject germ-line therapy in principle have tended to reject it in practice as carrying unacceptable risks in our current state of knowledge. For this reason, a recent paper by Rubenstein, Thomasma, Shon, and Zinaman is unusual in putting forward a serious proposal for the use of germ-line therapy in the foreseeable future.

The rationale for pursuing the development and use of Germ-Line selection and modification techniques is examined in this essay. The argument is put forth that it is the moral obligation of the medical profession to make available to the public any technology that can cure or prevent pathology leading to death and disability, in both the present and future generations. Society should pursue the development of strategies for preventing or correcting, at the Germ-Line level, genetic features (...) that will lead to, or enhance, pathological conditions. Because prenatal screening and even early embryo screening and selection can prevent only a subset of known genetic disorders, direct genetic intervention is the only way in which certain couples can exercise their rights to reproductive health. Finally, the arguments most often raised against the pursuit of and use of methods for Germ-Line intervention shall be discussed. Keywords: Germ-Line therapy, pre-implantation embryo screening gamete modification, risk and uncertainty CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The application of genetic editing techniques for the prevention or cure of disease is a highly promising tool for the future of humanity. However, its implementation contains a number of ethical and legal challenges that should not be underestimated. On this basis, some sectors have already asked for a veto on any intervention that modifies the human germ line, while supporting somatic line editing. In this paper, I will support that this suggestion makes no sense at all, (...) because the somatic/germ line disjunctive has no moral relevance and, therefore, it should not play any role in legal terms. I will provide a number of reasons to hold this assumption, such as the non‐sacred nature of the germ line, the difference between germ line and human genome modification, or the moral importance of the presence of a will to create modified descendants. While doing so, I will provide some examples of the different approaches to germ line editing adopted by different regulations so as to demonstrate that, contrary to what is sometimes stated, a general ban on this practice is not the rule, but the exception. Additionally, I will show how alternative options which currently exist, such as a selective ban based on criteria different to the germ line/somatic line distinction, match better with the need to conciliate research needs and legitimate ethical concerns. Finally, I will introduce some further suggestions to this same purpose. (shrink)

Technical, ethical, and social questions of germ-line gene interventions have been widely discussed in the literature. The majority of these discussions focus on planned interventions executed on the nuclear DNA (nDNA). However, human cells also contain another set of genes that is the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). As the characteristics of the mtDNA grossly differ from those of nDNA, so do the social, ethical, psychological, and safety considerations of possible interventions on this part of the genetic substance.

Technical, ethical, and social questions of germ-line gene interventions have been widely discussed in the literature. The majority of these discussions focus on planned interventions executed on the nuclear DNA (nDNA). However, human cells also contain another set of genes that is the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). As the characteristics of the mtDNA grossly differ from those of nDNA, so do the social, ethical, psychological, and safety considerations of possible interventions on this part of the genetic substance.

This paper discusses the issue of whether we have responsibilities to future generations with respect to genetic screening, including for purposes of selective abortion or discard. Future generations have been discussed at length among scholars. The concept of ‘Guardianfor Future Generations’ is tackled and its main criticisms discussed. Whilst germ-line cures, it is argued, can only affect family trees, genetic screening and testing can have wider implications. If asking how this may affect future generations is a legitimate (...) question and since we indeed make retrospective moral judgements, it would be wise to consider that future generations will make the same retrospective judgements on us. Moreover such technologies affect present embryos to which we indeed can be considered to have an obligation. (shrink)

This essay examines the arguments for and against working towards the objective of human germ line engineering for medical purposes. Germ line changes which result as a secondary consequence of other well designed and ethically acceptable manipulations of somatic cells to cure an otherwise fatal disease can be seen as acceptable. More serious objections apply to intentional germ line interventions because of the unacceptability of using a person solely as a vehicle for creating uncertain (...) genetic change in his descendants. It is also morally unacceptable to use the promise of future benefit to experiment on fetuses or embryos when other more effective technologies exist to help parents have healthy children. Using new genetic technologies to select desirable genotypes among gametes is less problematic and affords a promising new technique for avoiding intergenerational harms. Keywords: embryo research, germ line manipulation, intergenerational ethics, secondary germ line effects CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Genetic interventions raise a host of moral issues and, of its various species, germ-line genetic enhancement is the most morally contentious. This paper surveys various arguments against germ-line enhancement and attempts to demonstrate their inadequacies. A positive argument is advanced in favor of certain forms of germ-line enhancements, which holds that they are morally permissible if and only if they augment Rawlsian primary goods, either directly or by facilitating their acquisition.

: Genetic interventions raise a host of moral issues and, of its various species, germ-line genetic enhancement is the most morally contentious. This paper surveys various arguments against germ-line enhancement and attempts to demonstrate their inadequacies. A positive argument is advanced in favor of certain forms of germ-line enhancements, which holds that they are morally permissible if and only if they augment Rawlsian primary goods, either directly or by facilitating their acquisition.

New technologies in germ–line engineering have raised many questions about obligations to future generations. In this article, I focus on the importance of increasing freedom and the equality of freedom for present and future generations, because these two ideals are necessary for a just society and because they are most threatened by the wide–scale privatisation of GLE technologies. However, there are ambiguities in applying these ideals to the issue of genetic technologies. I argue that Amartya Sen's capability theory (...) can be used as a framework to ensure freedom and equality in the use of GLE technology. Capability theory articulates the goal of equalising real freedom by bringing all people up to a threshold of basic human capabilities. Sen's capability theory can clarify the proper moral goal of GLE insofar as this technology could be used to bring people up to certain basic human capabilities, thereby increasing their real freedom. And by increasing the freedom of those who lack basic human capabilities, GLE can aid in decreasing the inequalities of freedom among classes of people. (shrink)

: The current difference in attitude toward germ-line enhancement in humans and nonhumans is unjustified. Society should be more cautious in modifying the genes of nonhumans and more bold in thinking about modifying our own genome. I identify four classes of arguments pertaining to germ-line enhancement: safety arguments, justice arguments, trust arguments, and naturalness arguments. The first three types are compelling, but do not distinguish between human and nonhuman cases. The final class of argument would justify (...) a distinction between human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement; however, this type of argument fails and, therefore, the discrepancy in attitude toward human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement is unjustified. (shrink)

Somatic cell gene therapy has yielded promising results. If germ cell gene therapy can be developed, the promise is even greater: hundreds of genetic diseases might be virtually eliminated. But some claim the procedure is morally unacceptable. We thoroughly and sympathetically examine several possible reasons for this claim but find them inadequate. There is no moral reason, then, not to develop and employ germ-line gene therapy. Taking the offensive, we argue next that medicine has a prima facie (...) moral obligation to do so. (shrink)

Genetic interventions raise a host of moral issues and, of its various species, germ-line genetic enhancement is the most morally contentious. This paper surveys various arguments against germ-line enhancement and attempts to demonstrate their inadequacies. A positive argument is advanced in favor of certain forms of germ-line enhancements, which holds that they are morally permissible if and only if they augment Rawlsian primary goods, either directly or by facilitating their acquisition.

Genetic interventions raise a host of moral issues and, of its various species, germ-line genetic enhancement is the most morally contentious. This paper surveys various arguments against germ-line enhancement and attempts to demonstrate their inadequacies. A positive argument is advanced in favor of certain forms of germ-line enhancements, which holds that they are morally permissible if and only if they augment Rawlsian primary goods, either directly or by facilitating their acquisition.

We have surveyed various recent European opinions on Germ-Line engineering. The majority express more or less severe reservations about any interventions on the human Germ-Line, including therapeutic ones. However, they are divided over the pragmatic, or categorical-ethical nature of the relevant arguments. This split reflects two competing views of technology. The ‘pessimistic’ one is deeply concerned by the slippery slope leading from bona fide therapeutic applications of genetic engineering to eugenic practices. It insists that, if anything (...) can defend us against these evils, it must be a set of strong, ethically-based prohibitions. The other, ‘optimist’ view is more confident in the discriminating powers of societal regulation. We argue for the latter view and suggest that the pragmatic arguments brought to this debate are less problematic than the ethical ones. (shrink)

In most discussions of the social justice implications of new genetic technologies, enhancements are considered to be highly contentious. This is particularly so when we speak of enhancements that benefit the recipient in positional terms and enhancements that are germ-line and which can be passed on to future generations. I argue that the egalitarian reluctance, as displayed by Max Mehlman (2003:2005), to permitting enhancements is overblown. Recent writings from Buchanan (2008) and Farrelly (2004) highlight a more positive, context-dependent, (...) role for permitting the socio-economically advantaged the freedom to gain access to enhancements, including enhancements of traits associated with positional or competitive advantage. I argue that this reasoning also (necessarily) applies to germ-line enhancements or, at least, to 'effective germ-line enhancements.' In other words, I argue that such enhancements should be more seriously considered in terms of this positive context-dependent role. Nevertheless, this support is not unqualified. I critically re-examine concerns regarding the notion of the genetic underclass and I raise some worries about the possible adverse consequence of such a regulatory framework on sustaining the required egalitarian ethos. Importantly, such worries (and suggestions to address them) will be focused on the adverse effects of inequalities, rather than germ-line enhancements themselves. (shrink)

Germ-line gene therapy, like many other medical technologies, raises questions of special concern to Christians. It not only raises questions about medical effects, actual or possible, of genetic interventions that would be inherited from one generation to another but also, more importantly, raises anthropological questions and so questions about parental attitudes. These are questions about the dignity and value of human life, about inter-human relations and about the God-human relationship.1 For this reason the paper starts with an exploration (...) of the implications of Christian anthropology, viewed from a Roman Catholic perspective. A set of conditions will be specified in the light of which germ-line gene therapy’s compatibility with Christian attitudes, a Christian understanding of the human being, and the meaning of human life can be assessed. (shrink)

Reproductive biotechnologies can separate concepts of parenthood into genetic, gestational and social dimensions, often leading to a fragmentation of heteronormative kinship models and posing a challenge to historical methods of establishing legal and/or moral parenthood. Using fictional cases, this article will demonstrate that the issues surrounding the intersection of current and emerging reproductive biotechnologies with definitions of parenthood are already leading to confusion regarding social and legal family ties for offspring, which is only expected to increase as new technologies develop. (...) Rather than opposing these new technologies to reassert traditional concepts of the family, however, this article will explore the opportunities that these technologies represent for re‐imagining various culturally cherished values of family‐making in a way that is inclusive of diverse genders, sexualities and cultures. It will consider IVF, gametogenesis, mitochondrial donation, surrogacy, artificial gestation, CRISPR‐Cas9 gene editing, foster care and adoption as some of many possible pathways to parenthood, including for members of the LGBTIAUQ+ community. (shrink)

The prospect of germ-line genetic engineering, the ability to engineer genetic changes that can be passed on to subsequent generations, raises a wide range of moral and public policy questions. One of the most provocative questions is, simply put: Are there moral reasons that can be articulated in general secular terms for accepting human nature as we find it? Or, at least in terms of general secular moral restraints, may we reshape human nature better to meet our own (...) interests, as we define them? This question in turn raises the further question of whether human nature as it now exists has a moral standing akin to sacredness that can be understood in nonreligious terms. This essay will take as a given that it is not possible to show in general secular moral terms that human nature has a sanctity or special moral standing that should guide secular health-care policy. In addition, as this essay shows, it is not possible through appeals to considerations of authorizing consent or beneficence toward others to remedy this failure to establish a sanctity or special moral standing for human nature. Absent a religious or culturally normative understanding of human nature and given the availability of germline genetic engineering, there is a plurality of possibilities for refashioning our nature. The unavailability of substantive secular moral constraints on germ-line genetic engineering discloses a secularly licit plurality of possibilities for human nature. The likelihood that we will be able to refashion our human nature reveals how few general secular moral constraints there are to guide us. Paradoxically, the more we are able to reengineer our human nature, the less guidance is available. The plurality of possible conceptions of human well-being that can be pursued through germ-line genetic engineering challenges our self-understanding as humans. Given human freedom, and in the absence of taken-for-granted religious or cultural moral constraints, the likelihood of germ-line genetic engineering opens the possibility of human nature in the plural. (shrink)

The prospect of germ-line genetic engineering, the ability to engineer genetic changes that can be passed on to subsequent generations, raises a wide range of moral and public policy questions. One of the most provocative questions is, simply put: Are there moral reasons that can be articulated in general secular terms for accepting human nature as we find it? Or, at least in terms of general secular moral restraints, may we reshape human nature better to meet our own (...) interests, as we define them? This question in turn raises the further question of whether human nature as it now exists has a moral standing akin to sacredness that can be understood in nonreligious terms. This essay will take as a given that it is not possible to show in general secular moral terms that human nature has a sanctity or special moral standing that should guide secular health-care policy. In addition, as this essay shows, it is not possible through appeals to considerations of authorizing consent or beneficence toward others to remedy this failure to establish a sanctity or special moral standing for human nature. Absent a religious or culturally normative understanding of human nature and given the availability of germline genetic engineering, there is a plurality of possibilities for refashioning our nature. The unavailability of substantive secular moral constraints on germ-line genetic engineering discloses a secularly licit plurality of possibilities for human nature. The likelihood that we will be able to refashion our human nature reveals how few general secular moral constraints there are to guide us. Paradoxically, the more we are able to reengineer our human nature, the less guidance is available. The plurality of possible conceptions of human well-being that can be pursued through germ-line genetic engineering challenges our self-understanding as humans. Given human freedom, and in the absence of taken-for-granted religious or cultural moral constraints, the likelihood of germ-line genetic engineering opens the possibility of human nature in the plural. (shrink)

Although the ability to perform gene therapy in human germ-line cells is still hypothetical, the rate of progress in molecular and cell biology suggests that it will only be a matter of time before reliable clinical techniques will be within reach. Three sets of arguments are commonly advanced against developing those techniques, respectively pointing to the clinical risks, social dangers and better alternatives. In this paper we analyze those arguments from the perspective of the client-centered ethos that traditionally (...) governs practice in medical genetics. This perspective clarifies the merits of these arguments for geneticists, and suggests useful new directions for the professional discussion of germ-line gene therapy. It suggests, for example, that the much discussed prospect of germ-line therapy in human pre-embryos may always be more problematic for medical genetics than adult germ-line interventions, even though the latter faces greater technical difficulties. (shrink)

Enhancements of the human germ-line introduce further inequalities in the competition for scarce goods, such as income and desirable social positions. Social inequalities, in turn, amplify the range of genetic inequalities that access to germ-line enhancements may produce. From an egalitarian point of view, inequalities can be arranged to the benefit of the worst-off group (for instance, through general taxation), but the possibility of an indefinite growth of social and genetic inequality raises legitimate concerns. It is (...) argued that inequalities produced by markets of germ-line enhancements are just if it they are embedded in a framework of social institutions that satisfies two conditions: (i) Rawls’ Difference Principle, which states that inequalities of income and wealth should benefit the worst-off group; (ii) the lexically prior 'principle of rough equality', which states that citizens’ initial life-chances should be similar enough, so that extreme inequalities in income, wealth and power are not produced or accumulated through institutions justified by the Difference Principle. The principle of rough equality replaces the Rawlsian principles of the Fair Value of the Political Liberties and Fair Equality of Opportunity in a post-genomic society and expresses a concern with background political equality, which is argued to be a condition of the freedom and equality of citizens that should not be traded off with material benefits. Extreme inequalities are defined in terms of political equality. (shrink)

In his left-libertarian theory of justice Hillel Steiner introduces the idea of conceiving our germ-line genetic information as a natural resource as a means to achieving luck-egalitarian equality. This idea is very interesting in and of itself. But it also has the potential of turning Steiner’s theory into a particularly powerful version of left-libertarianism, or so I argue in the first part of this paper. In the second part I critically examine this idea. I show why, in contrast (...) to what Steiner claims, this idea requires us to evaluate not only the pieces of GLGI that we have used, but rather all the pieces of GLGI that our bodies deliver throughout our lives. Then I argue that besides the immense technical difficulties involved in meeting this requirement, which we may overcome in the future, there is also a substantive reason why we cannot meet this requirement. The relevant value of any given piece of GLGI depends on the way it would interact with another piece of GLGI of the opposite sex in a reproductive process. But there is no way of determining which pieces of GLGI should be assigned to each other for the purpose of this evaluation. (shrink)

This article is a response to David Jones’s “Germ-line Genetic Engineering: A Critical Look at Magisterial Catholic Teaching.” Here, Jones argues that the Magisterium’s teaching is inadequate in relation to germ-line genetic engineering (GGE) in that it neither settles the question of whether all GGE is illicit nor does it bring theological resources to bear on the issue. Jones himself argues against GGE, stating that it is not a therapy for a specific individual and that using (...) the technique is incompatible with the theology of marriage because children are not accepted as gifts. I argue that there is merit in Jones’s reasoning, as GGE can certainly be used in a manner contrary to the theology of marriage. However, I am less convinced as to whether Jones actually manages to make the case that GGE, in and of itself, may not be morally permissible. I would certainly agree with his ultimate conclusion that further theological reflection is needed. (shrink)

The classification of techniques used in mitochondrial donation, including their role as purported germ-line gene therapies, is far from clear. These techniques exhibit characteristics typical of a variety of classifications that have been used in both scientific and bioethics scholarship. This raises two connected questions, which we address in this paper: how should we classify mitochondrial donation techniques?; and what ethical implications surround such a classification? First, we outline how methods of genetic intervention, such as germ-line (...) gene therapy, are typically defined or classified. We then consider whether techniques of mitochondrial donation fit into these, whether they might do so with some refinement of these categories, or whether they require some other approach to classification. To answer the second question, we discuss the relationship between classification and several key ethical issues arising from mitochondrial donation. We conclude that the properties characteristic of mitochondrial inheritance mean that most mitochondrial donation techniques belong to a new sub-class of genetic modification, which we call ‘conditionally inheritable genomic modification’. (shrink)

This article is written from within the Catholic, and more particularly the Augustinian/Thomist tradition of moral theology. It analyses the response of the Catholic Magisterium to the prospect of germline-genetic engineering (GGE). This is a very new issue and the Church has little definitive teaching on it. The statements of Popes and Vatican congregations or commissions have not settled the key questions. An analysis of theological themes drawn from secular writers points beyond pragmatic safety considerations toward intrinsic ethical limits to (...) GGE. Given the impossibility of identifying would-have-been-created persons who would be “treated” by this intervention, altering the human genome for the sake of future generations cannot be regarded as “therapy.” Further theological considerations suggest that GGE may not be morally permissible, even in the case of identifiable genetic diseases. This is an area where more theological reflection is needed. (shrink)

Technologies for human germ‐line modification may soon enable humanity to create new types of human beings. Decisions about use of this power entail an unprecedented combination of difficulties: the stakes are immense, the unknowns are daunting, and moral principles are called into question. Evolved morality is not a sure basis for these decisions, both because of its inherent imperfections and because genetic engineering could eventually change humans’ innate cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, consensus is needed on moral values relevant to (...) germ‐line modification. These values could be based on characteristics of human beings that would remain constant regardless of revised genomes. (shrink)

Germ-line genetic interventions, like all medicine, can present opportunities to remove suffering, save and prolong human life, and support the conditions for successful human performance. Like all medicine, these interventions also present risks that reflect fallen humans’ age-old egocentric ambition to secure their health and improve their quality of life by relying exclusively on their own power, wisdom, and technical means. Moreover, man has always been tempted to overstep Divine prohibitions and to disregard his own calling to become (...) deified by grace. Wherever man succumbs to such tendencies, this inescapably leads to a disruption of the vital relationship between man and God. The legitimacy of the intervention itself depends on the theological status of the genome. Orthodox theology recognizes that the human genome, just as everything else that is created, must be understood in terms of its relationship to God. This consideration, however, does not mean that it can be idolized or is therefore untouchable. Interventions and alterations can be accepted within the constraints set by God, as formulated in the theology of creative logoi of beings in the teaching of the Fathers of the Church, and thus in view of man’s divine vocation. The Christian acceptability or inacceptability of human germ-line gene therapy depends directly on the extent to which it accords with an Orthodox spiritual life, or else hinders such a life. In this sense, this intervention can be examined in the same way as the application of all medical knowledge. When this is used to relieve pain and is motivated by selfless love for one’s neighbor, then it can be considered God’s gift to humankind. When, however, it becomes an absolute and attempts to usurp the presence of God in human life, then use becomes abuse and modern man faces yet another form of idolatry, even though more refined than earlier forms. (shrink)

This essay presents a hypothesis which contends that the development of organismic complexity in the eukaryotes depended extensively on propagation via flagellated and ciliated gametes. Organisms utilizing flagellate and ciliate gametes to propagate their germ line have contributed most of the organismic complexity found in the higher animals. The genes of the flagellum and the flagellar assembly system (intraflagellar transport) have played a disproportionately important role in the construction of complex tissues and organs. The hypothesis also proposes that (...) competition between large numbers of haploid flagellated male gametes rigorously conserved the functionality of a key set of flagellar genes for more than 700 million years. This in turn has insured that a large set (>600) of highly functional cytoskeletal and signal pathway genes is always present in the lineage of organisms with flagellated or ciliated gametes to act as a dependable resource, or “toolkit,” for organ elaboration. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/lC5nC-WOcm8. (shrink)

In 1982, the President's Commission produced its report on human gene therapy. One of that report's recommendations was to expand the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee to the National Institutes of Health to include a subcommittee on human gene therapy. In 1984, the Human Gene Therapy Subcommittee was established, and in 1989 it produced a document—“Points to Consider for Protocols for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA into Human Subjects”—that stated the RAC's position on what sorts of protocols it would approve.In assessing (...) the impact of the President's Commission report, Alexander Capron wrote,[t]he line [the report] drew between somatic cell and germ-line therapies has shaped subsequent discussions and policy formulation. Its conclusion … that somatic cell therapy resembles medical treatment is the basic premise of the RAC subcommittee's “Points to Consider,” while the Commission's view that ethical as well as technical barriers preclude present attempts to alter germ cells continues to be generally accepted by scientists and nonscientists alike. (shrink)

In 1982, the President's Commission produced its report on human gene therapy. One of that report's recommendations was to expand the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee to the National Institutes of Health to include a subcommittee on human gene therapy. In 1984, the Human Gene Therapy Subcommittee was established, and in 1989 it produced a document—“Points to Consider for Protocols for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA into Human Subjects”—that stated the RAC's position on what sorts of protocols it would approve.In assessing (...) the impact of the President's Commission report, Alexander Capron wrote,[t]he line [the report] drew between somatic cell and germ-line therapies has shaped subsequent discussions and policy formulation. Its conclusion … that somatic cell therapy resembles medical treatment is the basic premise of the RAC subcommittee's “Points to Consider,” while the Commission's view that ethical as well as technical barriers preclude present attempts to alter germ cells continues to be generally accepted by scientists and nonscientists alike. (shrink)

Determinations of the ethical acceptability of genetic therapy have relied on several distinctions in attempts to separate ethically acceptable genetic therapy from those possible therapies that could lead to genetic modifications of future human beings. One distinction that has been proposed is that genetic modifications of human somatic cells is ethically acceptable but that Germ-Line genetics modifications would be ethically objectionable. This paper examines several serious difficulties which call into question the ethical relevance of a somatic/Germ-Line (...) distinction. Keywords: double effect, future generations, Germ-Line modification CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The principal objective of this article is to develop an overtly theological interpretive lens for assessing the ethics of human germ line genetic modification (GGM). In constructing this lens, I draw upon four selected doctrinal or thematic strands: Incarnation, resurrection, procreative mandate, and sin. In turn, I derive four corresponding moral claims: there is no Christian essentialist understanding of the body, the body cannot be perfected, offspring remain a good of marriage, and sin is a universal human disability. (...) In conclusion, I contend that for Christians there are three possible broad options for assessing the ethics of GGM: refusal, endorsement, and ambivalence. In each, I assess the principal strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the respective theological themes, moral claims, and options. In addition, for the sake of this inquiry I assume that the technologies at issue are safe, efficacious, and do not entail the destruction of embryos or fetuses. (shrink)

Contributors to the debate surrounding the ethics of germ line gene manipulation have by and large concentrated their efforts on discussions of the potential risks that are associated with the use of this technology. Many international advisory committees have ruled out the acceptability of germ line gene manipulation at least for the time being. The purpose of this work is to generate much needed discussion on the many other ethical issues concerning the implementation of not only (...) germ line gene manipulation but also other related biotechnologies. In this paper I systematically investigate and analyse the most salient issues put forward by proponents and opponents alike. I argue that if germ line manipulation proves to be a safe and effective procedure, then the principle of beneficence imposes on the medical profession a moral duty to pursue the technology. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 27-29.

In this paper I deal with ethical factors surrounding germline gene therapy. Such implications include intergenerational responsibility, human dignity, moral status of embryos and so on. I will explore the relevance of the above mentioned issues to discuss the ethical implication of human germline gene therapy (HGLT). We will see that most of arguments claimed by bioethicists do not provide valid reason to oppose HGLT. I will propose an alternative view, based on personal identity issues, to discuss the ethics of (...) human inheritable gene modification. (shrink)