In 1982, the President's Commission produced its report on human gene therapy. One of that report's recommendations was to expand the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee to the National Institutes of Health to include a subcommittee on human gene therapy. In 1984, the Human Gene Therapy Subcommittee was established, and in 1989 it produced a document—“Points to Consider for Protocols for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA into Human Subjects”—that stated the RAC's position on what sorts of protocols it would approve.In assessing (...) the impact of the President's Commission report, Alexander Capron wrote,[t]he line [the report] drew between somatic cell and germ-line therapies has shaped subsequent discussions and policy formulation. Its conclusion … that somatic cell therapy resembles medical treatment is the basic premise of the RAC subcommittee's “Points to Consider,” while the Commission's view that ethical as well as technical barriers preclude present attempts to alter germ cells continues to be generally accepted by scientists and nonscientists alike. (shrink)

This paper responds to Elijah Weber’s “Vulnerability, Dependence, and Special Obligations to Domesticated Animals: A Reply to Palmer”. Weber’s paper develops significant objections to the account of special obligations I developed in my book Animal Ethics in Context, in particular concerning our obligations to companion animals. In this book, I made wide-ranging claims about how we may acquire special obligations to animals, including being a beneficiary of an institution that creates vulnerable and dependent animals, and sharing in attitudes that contribute (...) to causing harms or to creating vulnerable animals. Weber finds these claims implausible, and offers an alternative, much narrower, voluntarist account, on which we only have special positive obligations if, in some way, we have agreed to them. In this paper, I defend, against Weber, a non-voluntarist account of at least some special obligations towards animals, and I respond to some of his more specific objections to my account. (shrink)

Contributors to the debate surrounding the ethics of germ line gene manipulation have by and large concentrated their efforts on discussions of the potential risks that are associated with the use of this technology. Many international advisory committees have ruled out the acceptability of germ line gene manipulation at least for the time being. The purpose of this work is to generate much needed discussion on the many other ethical issues concerning the implementation of not only germ line gene manipulation (...) but also other related biotechnologies. In this paper I systematically investigate and analyse the most salient issues put forward by proponents and opponents alike. I argue that if germ line manipulation proves to be a safe and effective procedure, then the principle of beneficence imposes on the medical profession a moral duty to pursue the technology. (shrink)