Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 210 Seiten: 191-207.

The analysis distinguishes two types of standards for defining organic produce; process standards and product standards. Process standards define organic products by the method and means of production. Product standards define organic by the physical quality of the end product. The National Organic Program (NOP) uses process standards as the basis for defining organic. However, the situation is complicated by agricultural production practices, which sometimes result in the migration of NOP prohibited substances from conventional to organic fields. When this interaction (...) alters the value of the product or the costs of production, a production externality is said to exist. Defining organic using process, rather than product standards, influences the burden and character of production externalities. The NOP’s emphasis on process standards reduces the likelihood that production externalities will emerge. (shrink)

We use a new version of the Definability Theorem of Beth in order to unify classical theorems of Yuri Matiyasevich and Jan Denef in one structural statement. We give similar forms for other important definability results from Arithmetic and Number Theory.

The lattices of varieties were studied in many works (see [4], [5], [11], [24], [31]). In this paper we describe the lattice of all subvarieties of the variety $G_{Ex}^n$ defined by so called externally compatible identities of Abelian groups and the identity xⁿ ≈ yxⁿ. The notation in this paper is the same as in [2].

Externality games are studied in Grafe et al. (1998, Math. Methods Op. Res. 48, 71). We define a generalization of this class of games and show, using the methodology in Izquierdo and Rafels (1996, 2001, Working paper, Univ Barcelona; Games Econ. Behav. 36, 174), some properties of the new class of generalized externality games. They include, among others, the algebraic structure of the game, convexity, and their implications for the study of cooperative solutions. Also the proportional rule is characterized for (...) this class of games. (shrink)

The need to understand the systems that support ethical health research has long been recognized, but there are limited descriptions of actual health research ethics (HRE) systems. Using participatory network mapping methods, we empirically defined Malaysia's HRE system. 13 Malaysian stakeholders identified 4 overarching and 25 specific HRE system functions and 35 actors internal and 3 external to the Malaysian HRE system responsible for those functions. Functions requiring the most attention were: advising on legislation related to HRE; optimizing research (...) value to society; and defining standards for HRE oversight. Internal actors with the greatest potential for more influence were: the national network of research ethics committees; non-institution-based research ethics committees; and research participants. The World Health Organization, an external actor, had the largest untapped potential for influence overall. In summary, this stakeholder-driven process identified HRE system functions and actors that could be targeted to increase HRE system capacity. (shrink)

Pigovian policy is developed in economic theory as an efficient resolution to externality problems. The use of this type of policy to resolve real-world externality problems, including climate change in the form of carbon taxes, assumes that the Pigovian policy result derived in theory holds in the real world. By examining the bridging conditions from theory to the real world, I argue that this assumption holds only in an ambiguously defined subset of externalities. It is thus unclear when Pigovian policy (...) could be coherently applied, which is problematic given its widespread use in critical policy contexts. (shrink)

In [4] the lattice of all subvarieties of the variety G n Ex defined by so called externally compatible identities of Abelian groups together with the identity x n ≈ y n , for any n ∈ N and n ≥ 1 was described. In that paper classes of models of the type (2,1) where considered. It appears that diagrams of lattices of subvariaties defined by externally compatible identities satisfied in a given equational theory depend on the language of the (...) considered class of algebras. A question was asked to what extent the diagram of the lattice of subvarieties of the variety defined by externally compatible identities of a given variety will depend on changing the type of algebras. In general case, the answer to this question seems to be very complicated. In this paper we describe the variety of Abelian groups of exponent p·q, where p,q are different primes of type (2,1,0). (shrink)

Pollution, higher traffic noise, or a poisoned river are all examples of externalities---costs which are imposed by an action but which are not built in to the price of that action. One of the problems of economic theory is whether, when analysing the desirability of a new road, for example, the costs that occur as externalities can be fully incorporated into the price of that road. Dr Andreas Papandreou has provided a book which fully explains and analyses the ideas lying (...) behind the theory of externalities. Papandreou has made a survey of the various methodological approaches taken by economists to the issue of eternalities, and the failure of some markets to reconcile individual and social costs and benefits. He tackles the difficult issue of defining or characterizing externalities, surveys the current literature, and investigates the effect that externality theory has had on major economic issues. His major theme is an exploration of institutional inefficiency and the implications of incorporating organizational costs into economic models. Written in a non-technical style, this book is suitable not only for those economists who make a study of externalities, but for those who need to understand the theory for their own fields of research, and for postgraduate students. (shrink)

The point of the present paper is to draw attention to some interesting similarities, as well as differences, between the approaches to the logic of noncontingency of Evgeni Zolin and of Claudio Pizzi. Though neither of them refers to the work of the other, each is concerned with the definability of a (normally behaving, though not in general truth-implying) notion of necessity in terms of noncontingency, standard boolean connectives and additional but non-modal expressive resources. The notion of definability (...) involved is different in the two cases (‘external’ for Zolin, ‘internal’ for Pizzi), as are the additional resources: infinitary conjunction in the case of Zolin, and for Pizzi, first, propositional quantification, and then, later, most ingeniously, the use of a propositional constant. As well as surveying and comparing of the work of these authors, the discussion includes some some novelties, such as the confirmation of a conjecture of Zolin’s (Theorem 2.7). (shrink)

A long series of conversations interweaving mathematical, historical and philosophical aspects of categoricity in model theory took place between the author and Saharon Shelah in 2016 and 2017. In this excerpt of that long conversation, we explore the relationship between explicit and implicit aspects of categoricity. We also discuss the connection with definability issues.

The aim of the article is to provide a clear and thorough conceptual analysis of the main candidates for a definition of climate and climate change. Five desiderata on a definition of climate are presented: it should be empirically applicable; it should correctly classify different climates; it should not depend on our knowledge; it should be applicable to the past, present, and future; and it should be mathematically well-defined. Then five definitions are discussed: climate as distribution over time for constant (...) external conditions; climate as distribution over time when the external conditions vary as in reality; climate as distribution over time relative to regimes of varying external conditions; climate as the ensemble distribution for constant external conditions; and climate as the ensemble distribution when the external conditions vary as in reality. The third definition is novel and is introduced as a response to problems with existing definitions. The conclusion is that most definitions encounter serious problems and that the third definition is most promising. 1 Introduction2 Climate Variables and a Simple Climate Model3 Desiderata on a Definition of Climate4 Climate as Distribution over Time4.1 Definition 1: Distribution over time for constant external conditions4.2 Definition 2: Distribution over time when the external conditions vary as in reality4.3 Definition 3: Distribution over time for regimes of varying external conditions4.4 Infinite versions5 Climate as Ensemble Distribution5.1 Definition 4: Ensemble distribution for constant external conditions5.2 Definition 5: Ensemble distribution when the external conditions vary as in reality5.3 Infinite versions6 ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

Until relatively recently, few democrats had much to say about the constitution of the ‘demos' that ought to rule. A number of recent writers have, however, argued that all those whose interests are affected must be enfranchised if decision-making is to be fully democratic. This article criticizes this approach, arguing that it misunderstands democracy. Democratic procedures are about the agency of the people so only agents can be enfranchised, yet not all bearers of interests are also agents. If we focus (...) on agency, rather than who is affected, then this leads us to focus on the permissible limits of action, rather than who makes the decision. Just as individual sovereignty is ordinarily limited by the requirement not to injure others, we may apply similar restrictions to what a demos can permissibly do. Thus, any collection of individuals may choose to regulate their affairs collectively for mutual benefit, but should be prohibited from imposing negative externalities on outsiders. On this view, the constitution or definition of the demos is arbitrary, from the democratic point of view. Moreover, democracy does not require the expansion of the franchise, unless injuries cannot be avoided. (shrink)

This dissertation attempts to defend the justifiability of our belief that there is an external world. I begin by investigating what such a claim means and how it fits in with a common sense "realism." The idea put forth is that the latter asserts not only that there is an external world but also what there is in it. So, the bare assertion about the existence of the external world is only a part of common sense. However, (...) I claim that even such a 'mitigated realism' can be interesting and indicate how Putnam's internal realism amounts to just this. ;I then discuss "epistemological arguments" against realism so defined. These are arguments that begin with the epistemological theses and conclude the denial of realism--a strategy found even in the classic idealist Bishop Berkeley. The steps from such epistemic premises to a metaphysical conclusion are spelled out and the general conception of the epistemological project that underlies and warrants such an inference is explored. What emerges is that to be relevant for metaphysics, epistemic debates must be both non-question-begging and epistemic justifiability must be defined in terms of truth-conduciveness. A model of how epistemology can incorporate these features is suggested. ;The last part of the discussion aims at rejecting the epistemic premises of such anti-realist arguments. This amounts to claiming that an external world is both believable and justified. The arguments of Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour claiming to establish this are discussed and criticised. A final vindication, however, is given by reformulating Hilary Putnam's brains-in-a-vat argument. What emerges from the discussion is that just as metaphysics cannot be done in isolation from epistemology, epistemology too cannot be done independently of a theory of intentionality and belief. (shrink)

We give a commentary on Newelski's suggestion or conjecture [8] that topological dynamics, in the sense of Ellis [3], applied to the action of a definable group $G(M)$ on its “external type space” $S_{G,\textit{ext}}(M)$, can explain, account for, or give rise to, the quotient $G/G^{00}$, at least for suitable groups in NIP theories. We give a positive answer for measure-stable (or $fsg$) groups in NIP theories. As part of our analysis we show the existence of “externally definable” generics of (...) $G(M)$ for measure-stable groups. We also point out that for $G$ definably amenable (in a NIP theory) $G/G^{00}$ can be recovered, via the Ellis theory, from a natural Ellis semigroup structure on the space of global $f$-generic types. (shrink)

We prove that a necessary and sufficient condition for a countable set L of sets of integers to be equal to the algebra of all sets of integers definable in a nonstandard elementary extension of ω by a formula of the PA language which may include the standardness predicate but does not contain nonstandard parameters, is as follows: L is closed under arithmetical definability and contains 0 (ω) , the set of all (Gödel numbers of) true arithmetical sentences. Some (...) results related to definability of sets of integers in elementary extensions of ω are included. (shrink)

Realism, defined as a justified belief in the existence of the external world, is jeopardized by ‘meaning rationalism,’ the classic theory of meaning that sees the extension of words as a function of the intensions of individual speakers, with no way to ensure that these intensions actually correspond to anything in the external world. To defend realism, Ruth Millikan ( 1984 , 1989a , b , 1993 , 2004 , 2005 ) offers a biological theory of meaning called (...) ‘teleosemantics’ in which words, without requiring any contribution from the speaker’s intensions, are supposedly matched directly with their extensions by external norms. But even if one granted as a theoretical possibility that word meaning might possibly be stabilized through an external process, nonetheless, realists who wish to appeal to teleosemantics for a semantic proof of the external world must be capable of identifying these external norms, something that Millikan describes as highly fallible. Furthermore, because they can be aware of these norms only as these are internally represented, it would also be necessary for realists to verify that these internal representations accurately reflect the norms as they occur in the external world. But given that this is virtually the same stumbling block to realism found in meaning rationalism, it is concluded that teleosemantics is not likely to restore faith in this worldview. (shrink)

K. W. M. Fulford argues that illness can be defined as action failure where someone finds themselves unable to do something which they would normally ‘just get on and do’ though there is no external impediment. Thus a paralysed person intends to raise their arm but finds that they cannot or an alcoholic intends to stop drinking but is unable to. I argue that such people are ill whether or not they have the relevant intentions and that their illness (...) may consist in the fact that even if they had had those intentions they would have been unable to act on them. (shrink)

This paper challenges some of the basic epistemological assumptions that underpin our current conceptions of accountability.Recent legislative developments like Sarbanes-Oxley attempt to enhance accountability in the business environment through the employment of checks and balances and the threat of individual liability. This kind of legalistic strategy still seems to assume the existence of an individual agent who employs moral principles to come to decisions in a deliberate, impartial manner. This paper will emphasize that moral decision-making often does not take place (...) in this manner, but is rather a tacit process of sensing what the appropriate behavior would be. Accountability, both with respect to individuals and organizations, is less a matter of “accounting for” a set of concrete assets, than a question of being accountable to a set of internal and external stakeholders, or in terms of the tacit sense of moral propriety that develops among business associates and colleagues over time. (shrink)

In this article we show how the universe of BST, bounded set theory can be enlarged by definable subclasses of sets so that Separation and Replacement are true in the enlargement for all formulas, including those in which the standardness predicate may occur. Thus BST is strong enough to incorporate external sets in the internal universe in a way sufficient to develop topics in nonstandard analysis inaccessible in the framework of a purely internal approach, such as Loeb measures.

We prove that in IST, Nelson's internal set theory, the Uniqueness and Collection principles, hold for all (including external) formulas. A corollary of the Collection theorem shows that in IST there are no definable mappings of a set X onto a set Y of greater (not equal) cardinality unless both sets are finite and #(Y) ≤ n #(X) for some standard n. Proofs are based on a rather general technique which may be applied to other nonstandard structures. In particular (...) we prove that in a nonstandard model of PA, Peano arithmetic, every hyperinteger uniquely definable by a formula of the PA language extended by the predicate of standardness, can be defined also by a pure PA formula. (shrink)

Despite promising early work into the role of immune cells such as eosinophils in adipose tissue (AT) homeostasis, recent findings revealed that elevating the number of eosinophils in AT alone is insufficient for improving metabolic impairments in obese mice. Eosinophils are primarily recognized for their role in allergic immunity and defence against parasitic worms. They have also been detected in AT and appear to contribute to adipose homeostasis and drive energy expenditure, but the underlying mechanisms remain elusive. It has long (...) been recognized that immune cells such as macrophages respond to external signals to regulate adipose homeostasis and energy balance, however, less is known about the relevance of eosinophil activity in AT. As the authors propose in this review, given recent debate over the relative importance of their tissue‐specific abundance, the stage is now set for exploring the functionality and activation states of AT eosinophils. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Russell's external world: 1912-1921 by Ronald E. Nusenoff IN "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics",lOur Knowledge ofthe External World,2 and "The Ultimate Constituents ofMatter",3 Russell presents a phenomenalistic reduction ofphysical objects. On this theory, the external world becomes a physical space of six dimensions, which must be logically constructed by a three-dimensional ordering of three-dimensional phenomenal spaces. In what follows, we will consider Russell's varying views, (...) from causal realism in The Problems of Philosophy,4 through phenomenalism, to neutral monism in The Analysis ofMind,5 on the nature ofthe external world. We will pay particular attention to the relation between physical and phenomenal space, and the status ofthe causal theory ofperception. 1. Realism (1912) In The Problems ofPhilosophy, Russell distinguishes a single "real" space ofscience from the "apparent" spaces ofperception. He begins with various cases of perceptual relativity, illusion, etc., and from these infers that those object which are immediately known to us are not the physical objects which the layman might take them to be. Rather, what are immediately known are sense-data, these being caused by, and so in some sense "corresponding" to, physical obI "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics", Scientia, 4 (1914), reprinted as Chapter VIII of Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (London, 1918). 2 Our Knowledge ofthe External World as a Fieldfor Scientific Method in Philosophy (London, 1914). 3 "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter", Monist, 25 (1915), reprinted as Chapter VII of Mysticism and Logic. 4 The Problems ofPhilosophy (London, 1946 [lst published, 1912]). 5 The Analysis of Mind (London, 1921). 65 66 Russell, nos. 29-32 (1978) jects. Physical objects are located in "one public all-embracing physical space", while "our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space of sight or the space of touch or such vaguer spaces as other senses may give us".6 Through experience, we are able to correlate these various private sense-data spaces (i.e., in so far as we can correlate experiences in one with experiences in another). What Russell does not go on to do here is define physical space in terms of private spaces. Given that (a) Space is relational rather than absolute, and (b) All that we can know about physical objects is that both they and their relations "correspond" to our sense-data and their relations, then (c) "we may assume that there is a physical space in which physical objects have spatial relations corresponding to those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces".7 Our knowledge of physical space is then merely knowledge of relative position, and other features, e.g., shape, are "only supposed to correspond to the physical space so far as is required for the preservation of the order".8 On this view, the existence ofa physical space is necessitated solely by, and so is no more plausible than, the need for physcial objects. Russell's argument for accepting our "instinctive" belief that physical objects exist is less than compelling. Since this belief does not lead to any difficulties, but on the contrary tends to simplify and systemize our account of our experiences, there seems no good reason for rejecting it.9 In what follows, ~e shall see that Russell's phenomenalism is not explainable as differing from the realism found in The Problems of Philosophy merely in the rejection of this "instinctive" belief. II. Phenomenalism (1914-?) In his "Reply to Criticisms" in the Schilpp collection,IO Russell seems to deny that he ever really accepted phenomenalism. 6 The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 30-1 7 Ibid., p. 31. 8 Ibid., p. 33. 9Ibid., p. 24. 10"Reply to Criticisms", in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy ofBertrand Russell (Evanston and Chicago, 1944), pp. 679-741. Russell's external world 67 Mr. Boodin quotes a passage from me according to which it appears that at a certain time I thought only percepts were real. This was a technical hypothesis which I was trying to make logically adequate. II However, only a few pages earlier he had remarked: There are some who would deny that physics need say anything about what cannot... (shrink)

Cross-cultural comparisons often investigate values that are assumed to have long-lasting influence on human conduct and thought. To capture and compare cultural values across cultures, Geert Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions Theory has offered an influential framework. Hofstede also provided a survey instrument, the Values Survey Module (VSM), for measuring cultural values as outlined in his Cultural Dimensions Theory. The VSM has since been subject to a series of revisions. Yet, data on countries have been derived from the original VSM — and (...) not on one of the revised versions of VSM. We tested three scales (indulgence, power distance, and individualism) from the latest version, the VSM 2013, as part of a larger survey across 57 countries. Two main findings emerged. For one thing, country scores based on the VSM 2013 scales correlated only weakly with country scores of the same cultural dimensions obtained in a large previous study. Thus, the validity of the VSM 2013 is in doubt. For another thing, the internal consistency of the VSM 2013 scales was overall poor, indicating that the scales did not reliably measure well-defined constructs. We discuss implications for cross-cultural research. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that only a subset of the reason statementsWilliams defines as external must be rejected as false. `A has areason to '' is necessarily false when the ends and aimsconstitutive of A''s good close off the deliberative route from her S to the conclusion she has reason to . But when less important ends are at stake, it seems that a person''s needs generally provide reasons for action, contrary to Williams''s internalist account. I suspect, however, (...) that there may remain inexorable disagreementover these claims because people value things in two distinct ways. Tosupport my suspicion, I explain how people''s valuation can take either an agency-prioritizing or an end-prioritizing form. I then argue thatresolving the disagreement over Williams''s internalist account ofreasons depends on whether it can be established that the agency-prioritizingform is the rationally superior form of valuation. (shrink)

Intra-theoretical logical pluralism is a form of meaning-invariant pluralism about logic, articulated recently by Hjortland :355–373, 2013). This version of pluralism relies on it being possible to define several distinct notions of provability relative to the same logical calculus. The present paper picks up and explores this theme: How can a single logical calculus express several different consequence relations? The main hypothesis articulated here is that the divide between the internal and external consequence relations in Gentzen systems generates a (...) form of intra-theoretical logical pluralism. (shrink)

Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical (...) commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a “conscious process” is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of “consciousness” is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time.". (shrink)

Michael Nair-Collins and Franklin Miller are right to emphasise that, in order to deliberate responsibly about ethical and legal questions related to brain death and organ donation, it is crucial to answer the question of whether or not ‘brain death’i does indeed mark the biological death of the organism. Nonetheless, I disagree with the authors’ conclusion that brain death does not indicate the death of the human organism. Death can never be defined in merely biological terms, because any biological conception (...) of death relies on metaphysical presuppositions regarding what it means to be an ‘organism as a whole’, rather than an aggregate of cells and tissues. Death is a change in substance —that is, a change from one type of entity to another — not the cessation of all biological life. Organismal death occurs well before all of the organism’s parts irreversibly cease vital activity and decompose into inorganic matter. Biological life in some form can and usually does continue after organismal death at least for a time, with recent evidence indicating that animal cell networks continue to perform complex functions like stress response, immune response and inflammation response up to several days postmortem.1 With external support, many cells and tissues can continue to perform their functions ex vivo for long periods of time or even indefinitely.2 Henrietta Lax died in 1951, but cells derived from her cancerous cervical cells …. (shrink)

In the present paper we give syntactical and semantical characterization of the class of algebras defined by P-compatible identities of modular ortholattices. We also describe the lattice of some subvarieties of the variety MOL Ex defined by so called externally compatible identities of modular ortholattices.

Using the Theil index to measure income inequality, we define a specific firm’s contribution to overall income inequality and propose a simple model to find theequilibrium price for a given target of income inequality reduction. We first establish income inequality reduction targets for a population of firms. We then model a marginal income inequality reduction cost curve and match demand and supply to derive the equilibrium price. Using a small sample of fifteen firms, we simulate a market for income inequality (...) reduction and calculate the equilibrium price. (shrink)

In QED, an external electromagnetic field can be accounted for non-perturbatively by replacing the causal propagators used in Feynman diagram calculations with Green’s functions for the Dirac equation under the external field. If the external field destabilises the vacuum, then it is a difficult problem to determine which Green’s function is appropriate, and multiple approaches have been developed in the literature whose equivalence, in many cases, is not clear. In this paper, we demonstrate for a broad class (...) of external fields that includes all that act for a finite time, that four Green’s functions used in the literature are equivalent: Schwinger’s “proper-time” propagator; the “causal propagator” used in the “Bogoliubov transformation” method based on the canonical quantization of the field operator; and two defined using analytic continuation from complexified parameters. To do so, we formulate Schwinger’s “proper-time quantum mechanics" as a Schrödinger wave mechanics, and use this to re-derive Schwinger’s expression for the propagator as a statement relating solutions of the inhomogeneous Dirac equation to those of the inhomogeneous “proper-time Dirac equation”. This is done by constructing direct integral spectral decompositions of the Hamiltonians of both equations, and deriving a form for solutions of the inhomogeneous Dirac equation in terms of these decompositions. We then show that all four propagators return solutions of the inhomogeneous Dirac equation that satisfy the same boundary condition, which under a physically reasonable assumption is sufficient to specify the solution uniquely. (shrink)

Defining moral competence using a virtue approach, this longitudinal study examined the prospective relationships between moral competence and externalizing behavior indexed by delinquency and intention to engage in problem behavior in a large and representative sample of Hong Kong Chinese adolescents. Starting from the 2009–2010 academic year, Grade 7 students in 28 randomly selected secondary schools in Hong Kong were invited to join a longitudinal study, which surveyed participating students annually during the high school years. The current study used data (...) collected in the first three years (Wave 1 to Wave 3) across junior secondary school stage (Grade 7 to Grade 9) with a sample of 3,328 students (Age = 12.59 ±.74 years and 52.1% boys at Wave 1). Cross-lagged panel path analyses were conducted to compare four models involving different hypothesized patterns of relationships between moral competence and externalizing behavior. Results revealed that the reciprocal effects model best fit the data, supporting reciprocal causal relationships between moral competence and externalizing behavior measures. Specifically, a higher level of moral competence significantly predicted a lower level of delinquency and problem behavioral intention over time. At the same time, a higher level of externalizing behavior also significantly predicted a lower level of moral competence one year later. As the magnitudes of the significant findings were not high, replications in different Chinese communities are needed. Nevertheless, the present findings provide important theoretical insights on how moral competence and externalizing behavior in adolescents are associated with each other. Practically speaking, the findings suggest that it is promising to reduce adolescent externalizing behavior by promoting their virtues through moral education programs, and guiding adolescents to behave in a good manner would help promote the development of their virtues. (shrink)

Observers call for companies to establish codes of corporate social responsibility, but few have studied how companies become aware of and codify standards. This study of the practitioner's role in developing standards suggests that practitioners often are left out of ethical decision making, and that persons who prepare codes of ethical performance typically view external publics as less important than internal publics. Social science methods are widely recognized as helpful in identifying and establishing standards, although they are not actually (...) used very much. (shrink)

In the present paper we give syntactical and semantical characterization of the class of algebras defined by P-compatible identities of modular ortholattices. We also describe the lattice of some subvarieties of the variety MOLEx defined by so called externally compatible identities of modular ortholattices.

Baxter (Australas J Philos 79: 449-464, 2001) proposes an ingenious solution to the problem of instantiation based on his theory of cross-count identity. His idea is that where a particular instantiates a universal it shares an aspect with that universal. Both the particular and the universal are numerically identical with the shared aspect in different counts. Although Baxter does not say exactly what a count is, it appears that he takes ways of counting as mysterious primitives against which different numerical (...) identities are defined. In contrast, I defend the idea— suggested, though not quite endorsed, by Baxter himself—that counts are independent dimensions of numerical identity. Different ways of counting are explained by the existence of these different sorts of identity (i.e., counts). For the instantiation of a universal by a particular, I propose one dimension concerned with the individuation of particulars (the p-count) and another dimension concerned with the individuation of universals (the u-count). On that basis, I give a clear definition of cross-count identity that explains its asymmetrical nature (i.e., the fact that particulars instantiate universais, but not vice versa). I extend the theory to a third dimension—that of time, or the t-count—and thereby defend Baxter's ideas on change, and the contingency of instantiation. Baxter (Mind 97(388): 575-582, 1988; Australas J Philos 79: 449-464, 2001) proposes the related idea of composition as (cross-count) identity. Parts are individually cross-count identical with the wholes that they constitute, and they collectively share all aspects across counts with those wholes. I propose an innovation by which totality is shared distinctness across counts. The theory applies to both the totality of particulars that instantiate any given universal, and the totality of parts that constitute any given whole. I argue that this has several advantages over Armstrong's view, which is based on a dubious external totalling relation. I also argue that Armstrong's theory of numbers (or quantities) as internal relations ought to be rejected in favour of an account based on identity and distinctness. The paper concludes with a careful analysis of external relations in Baxter's framework. I argue that we must recognise one further dimension of identity in order to differentiate between, e.g., the aspects of Abelard insofar as he loves Heloise and Abelard insofar as he loves Isobel. Each of these aspects is identical with Abelard and identical with loving-by, yet they must be in some way distinct. I therefore propose the r-count, in which multiple distinct relational properties are the very same relation (-part). The existence of these four independent dimensions explains the fact that particulars, universals, relations, and times are fundamentally different sorts of things in the ontology. Each is individuated with respect to a different dimension of identity. (shrink)

An algebraic block-diagonalization of the Dirac Hamiltonian in a time-independent external field reveals a charge-index conservation law which forbids the physical phenomena of the Klein paradox type and guarantees a single-particle nature of the Dirac equation in strong external fields. Simultaneously, the method defines simpler quantum-mechanical objects—paulions and antipaulions, whose 2-component wave functions determine the Dirac electron states through exact operator relations. Based on algebraic symmetry, the presented theory leads to a new understanding of the Dirac equation physics, (...) including new insight into the Dirac measurements and a consistent scheme of relativistic quantum mechanics of electron in the paulion representation. Along with analysis of the mathematical anatomy of the Klein paradox falsity, a complete set of paradox-free eigenfunctions for the Klein problem is obtained and investigated via stationary solutions of the Pauli-like equations with respective paulion Hamiltonians. It is shown that the physically correct Dirac states in the Klein zone are characterized by the total particle reflection from the potential step and satisfy the fundamental charge-index conservation law. (shrink)

The presented enhanced version of Eriksen’s theorem defines an universal transform of the Foldy–Wouthuysen type and in any external static electromagnetic field reveals a discrete symmetry of Dirac’s equation, responsible for existence of a highly influential conserved quantum number—the charge index distinguishing two branches of DE spectrum. It launches the charge-index formalism obeying the charge-index conservation law. Via its unique ability to manipulate each spectrum branch independently, the CIF creates a perfect charge-symmetric architecture of Dirac’s quantum mechanics, which resolves (...) all the riddles of the standard DE theory. Besides the abstract CIF algebra, the paper discusses: the novel accurate charge-symmetric definition of the electric-current density; DE in the true-particle representation, where electrons and positrons coexist on equal footing; flawless “natural” scheme of second quantization; and new physical grounds for the Fermi–Dirac statistics. As a fundamental quantum law, the CICL originates from the kinetic-energy sign conservation and leads to a novel single-particle physics in strong-field situations. Prohibiting Klein’s tunneling in Klein’s zone via the CICL, the precise CIF algebra defines a new class of weakly singular DE solutions, strictly confined in the coordinate space and experiencing the total reflection from the potential barrier. (shrink)

I propose that the ‘post-truth condition’, i.e., the vulnerability of our institutions for establishing and negotiating what is true and worth knowing, is not primarily a pathology, a susceptibility to external manipulation or coercion, as tends to be stressed in the literature, but has first and foremost to do with the unraveling of certain epistemic assumptions. In analogy with T.S. Eliot’s modernist notion that the attempt to capture and concretize an experience or a state of mind requires ‘objective correlatives’ (...) which it conveys, I argue that the trope of post-truth to express the embattled status of expertise can be understood in terms of failed symbolization. In the second section, I spell out what this means in terms of Donald Davidson’s discussion of the problem of defining truth. In the last section, I propose a ‘poetics of political theory’ for understanding the post-truth condition. (shrink)

Let K be an NIP field and let v be a Henselian valuation on K. We ask whether [Formula: see text] is NIP as a valued field. By a result of Shelah, we know that if v is externally definable, then [Formula: see text] is NIP. Using the definability of the canonical p-Henselian valuation, we show that whenever the residue field of v is not separably closed, then v is externally definable. In the case of separably closed residue field, (...) we show that [Formula: see text] is NIP as a pure valued field. (shrink)

Analysing the debate in the press concerning the most crucial and sensible point of Public Service Broadcasting in Belgium, i.e. an objective and nationwide representative news service, shows clearly that this critizing of the news has primarily a political function because its aim is not to demonstrate how subjectivc or so the news is supposed to be.Accepting and demonstrating the point that a public service organization of broadcasting is no worse for objective newsreporting than a commercial or a Dutch one; (...) it follows from this that these critics must 'hide' other interests.Strong correlations are found between this press debate and the political debate on the nature of this system and the wish to change it. Thus the press, being part of the party system in Belgium, reveals itself as an agenda-setter of political action.These results do not suggest that the press bas an ultimate influence in political matters but it certainly demonstrates that the press indicates how the debate wilt develop.Showing up the agenda-setting concept in the dynamics of politics could be a more fruitfull way to define the political functions of the mass media. (shrink)

Using testosterone alone as a measure of dominance presents problems, especially when dominance is loosely defined to include a range of behaviors that may arise from multiple causes. Testosterone should be examined in relation to other hormonal and neurotransmitter factors, such as serotonin. Various hypotheses about the relationship between high and low levels of testosterone with serotonin and with impulse control are suggested for future study.

First of all I would like to describe inductive and abductive reasoning in the light of the agent–based framework to the aim of clarifying their fallacious character and the role of the so-called ideal systems (logical and computational). Then I will analyze some inductive and abductive types of reasoning that in the perspective of classical and informal logic are defined fallacies. I will describe how in an agent-based reasoning this kind of fallacious reasoning can in some cases be redefined and (...) considered as a good way of reasoning. Finally, I will illustrate how what I call manipulative abduction can be interpreted as a form of practical reasoning a better understanding of which can furnish a description of human beings as hybrid reasoners in so far they are users of ideal and computational agents. (shrink)

The Group Calibration Index (GCI) provides a means of assessing the quality of forecasters’ predictions in situations that lack external feedback or outcome data. The GCI replaces the missing outcome data with aggregated ratings of a well-defined reference group. A simulation study and two experiments show how the GCI classifies forecaster performance and distinguishes between forecasters with restricted information and those with complete information. The results also show that under certain circumstances, where members of the reference group have high-quality (...) information, the new GCI will outperform expert classification that is based on traditional calibration indices. (shrink)

Amartya Sen argues that sectarian discord and violence are fueled by confusion about the nature of identity, including the pervasive tendency to see ourselves as members of singular social groups standing in opposition to other groups (e.g. Democrat vs. Republican, Muslim vs. Christian, etc.). Sen defends an alternative model of identity, according to which we all inevitably belong to a plurality of discrete identity groups (including ethnicities, classes, genders, races, religions, careers, hobbies, etc.) and are obligated to choose, in any (...) given context, which among our multiple affiliations to prioritize. While Sen’s model of discrete identity prioritization is a clear advance over single-factor accounts, it overlooks significant lessons about identity from over 150 years of scholarship by feminists of color. In ignoring the experiences of women of color, Sen’s model falsely assumes that identities are in-principle separable for the purposes of practical deliberation; and, in obligating individuals to make such identity-based “reasoned choices,” Sen’s model forces those with multiply marginalized identities to choose from a set of externally defined identity options, none of which sufficiently captures their experiences. (shrink)