In this paper, I argue for a novel reading of Spinoza’s position in his exchangewith Boyle about Boyle’s experiment with nitre. Boyle claimed to have shownthrough experiments that nitre ceased to be nitre after heating. Spinozadisagreed and proposed the alternative hypothesis that nitre has changed itsstate and not its nature. Spinoza’s position was construed in the literature asrational scepticism denying that experiments can yield knowledge ofessences because all sensory experience is underdetermined and open tomultiple interpretations. I argue for an alternative (...) reading of Spinoza’sposition which focuses on Bacon’s notion of crucial instance. According tothis reading, Spinoza did not deny the possibility of knowing byexperimentation whether nitre has changed its nature, he asked for a crucialinstance, i.e. an experiment that would refute the hypothesis that nitre haschanged merely its state. Spinoza’s argumentative strategy shows that,contrary to the mainstream reading, the representational content of sensoryideas can be determined even if it does not represent the essence of theobject: we can know with absolute, rather than merely moral, certaintywhether nitre ceased to be nitre without knowing what nitre is. (shrink)

Analyse dans la perspective phénoménologique de l'essence comme expression de "l'être" différent de l'"étant". Substitution, dans la subjectivité, de soi à autrui.

I discuss what Aristotle means when he say that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises. Scientific demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum. This explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each demonstration requires the (...) principle that is the necessary one for the fully appropriate explanation of its explanandum. This picture also provides a key to understand Aristotle's thesis that scientific explanation depends on essences: it is the essence of the attribute to be explained that should be stated as the fully appropriate explanatory factor. (shrink)

Vaidya has recently argued that while Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essence through use of our imagination is subject to a vicious epistemic circle, we can still use the method to successfully attain objectual understanding of essence. In this paper, I argue that the Husserlian objectual understanding-based epistemology envisaged by Vaidya suffers from a similar epistemic circularity as its knowledge-based foil. I argue that there is a straight-forward solution to this problem, but then raise three serious problems (...) for an amended version of Vaidya’s proposal and any similar Husserlian epistemology of essence. The paper closes with some general reflections on applying the Husserlian method to the contemporary notion of essence and on the idea of refocusing the epistemology of essence on understanding instead of knowledge. (shrink)

There has been much debate recently on the question whether essence can explain modality. Here, I examine two routes to an essentialist account of modality. The first is Hale's argument for the necessity of essence, which I will argue is — notwithstanding recent attempted defences of it — invalid by its very structure. The second is the proposal that it is essential to essential truth that it is necessary. After offering three possible versions of the view, I will (...) argue that each fails to provide a metaphysical explanation of necessity in terms of essence. (shrink)

In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual (...) and logical necessity in the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine's view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accounted for, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit. (shrink)

La référence à Fichte traverse de manière discrète mais non moins fondamentale L’essence de la manifestation, où de nombreuses pages sont consacrées à l’Anweisung — texte avec lequel la pensée henryenne partage explicitement le schéma « dualiste », mais également de manière implicite une même définition de l’être. Ce schéma, qui s’exprime dans la dualité de l’être et de l’existence, de l’immédiat et du médiat, de l’absolu et du moi, de l’infini et du fini, ne manque pas de nous (...) conduire à une difficulté de principe, reconnue en tant que telle dans la philosophie postkantienne : comment l’être se rapporte-t-il à l’existence? Posant la question de l’être pour parvenir au sens de l’être même, Henry s’inscrit, consciemment ou non, dans une telle problématique, en considérant le chemin vers l’être comme une sortie de la finitude. Si tel est le cas et si l’être se définit comme immanence et vie, comment affronte-t-il la question de la relation entre l’immanence et la transcendance? (shrink)

Cet article examine le rapport entre l’Idée platonicienne du Bien et l’au-delà de l’essence de Levinas.

This chapter examines Edmund Husserl’s notion of idea in the Kantian sense with the aim of clarifying the distinction between ideas and essences. In particular, the chapter focuses on the occurrences of the notion of idea in the Kantian sense in Ideas I, identifies its core features, and explains why the notion of idea should not to be conflated with the phenomenologically relevant notion of essence. The chapter then points to doubts about the givenness of ideas in the Kantian (...) sense and argues that, once the notions of essence and of idea are disentangled, those doubts have no bearing on whether essences merit a place within phenomenology. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new system of logic for existence and essence, in which the traditional distinctions between essential and accidental properties, abstract and concrete objects, and actually existent and possibly existent objects are described and related in a suitable way. In order to accomplish this task, a primitive relation of essential identity between different objects is introduced and connected to a first order existence property and a first order abstractness property. The basic idea (...) is that possibly existent objects are completely determinate and that essentially identical objects are just different individuations of the same individual essence. Accordingly, essential properties are defined as properties that are invariant with respect to this kind of identity, while abstract objects are determined by being characterized by essential properties only. Once such ideas are implemented, a number of classical intuitions about objects, their essence, and their way of existence can be consistently interpreted. (shrink)

riety of necessity that binds moral and natural his conception of mental properties has no metaphysical consequences. Descartes is properties because the necessity is neither..

We introduce combinatorial principles that characterize strong compactness and supercompactness for inaccessible cardinals but also make sense for successor cardinals. Their consistency is established from what is supposedly optimal. Utilizing the failure of a weak version of a square, we show that the best currently known lower bounds for the consistency strength of these principles can be applied.

Unified, all-purpose, philosophical models of reduction in science lack resources for capturing varieties of cross-scientific relations that have proven critical to understanding some scientific achievements. Not only do those models obscure the distinction between successional and cross-scientific relations, their preoccupations with the structures of both theories and things provide no means for accommodating the contributions to various sciences of theories and research about long-term diachronic processes involving large-scale, distributed systems. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is the parade case. (...) Explanatory pluralism accommodates a wider range of connections between theories and inquiries in science than all-purpose models of reduction do. Consequently, it provides analytical tools for understanding the roles of the theoretical proposals about the evolution of the human mind/brain that have proliferated over the last two decades. Those proposals have testable implications pertaining to both structure and processing in the modern human mind/brain. An example of such research illustrates how those proposals and investigative tools and experiments cut across both explanatory levels and modes of analysis within the cognitive sciences and how those studies can yield evidence that bears on the assessment of competing theories and models. (shrink)

‘Water is H2O’ is one of the most frequently cited sentences in analytic philosophy, thanks to the seminal work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam in the 1970s on the semantics of natural kind terms. Both of these philosophers owe an intellectual debt to the empiricist metaphysics of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, while disagreeing profoundly with Locke about the reality of natural kinds. Locke employs an intriguing example involving water to support his view that kinds (or ‘species’), such (...) as water and gold, are the workmanship of the human mind. This is the point of his story about a winter visitor to England from Jamaica, who is astonished to find that the water in his basin has turned solid overnight, and proceeds to call it ‘hardened water’. Locke criticizes this judgement, maintaining that it is more consonant with common sense to regard water and ice as different kinds of substance. Putnam, by implication, disagrees. Deploying his imaginary example of Twin Earth—a distant planet where a watery-looking substance, XYZ, rather than H2O, fills the oceans and rivers—he maintains that common sense supports the judgement that XYZ and H2O, despite their superficial similarity, are not the same kind of substance, precisely because their molecular compositions are different. Here it will be argued that both views are mistaken, but that, in this dispute, Locke has more right on his side than his modern opponents do. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 2, Page 403-405, April 2022.

Fear and concerns regarding AI and robots have existed for a long time, and the emergence of strong artificial intelligence, on par with human intelligence, is likely just a few decades away. The primary purpose of this article is to establish a theoretical framework for navigating the relationship between humans and this advanced form of artificial intelligence. This article first points out that the most fundamental characteristic of life is its continuous process of evolution and iteration. By analyzing the developmental (...) history of intelligence in different species, it can be observed that intelligence also exhibits a similar evolutionary phenomenon. Therefore, from this perspective, intelligence can be defined as a new form of information life. Under this premise, similarities and differences between information life forms and conventional biological life become apparent. The most significant distinction lies in the fact that the survival of biological life is based on non-replicable matter and energy, leading to extensive competition and food chain phenomena within ecosystems. In contrast, the survival of information life relies more on replicable information, fostering tendencies towards peace and communication. Based on this theoretical premise, there is a potential for a harmonious coexistence between humans and AI. This theory also provides guidance for the positive development of human society. (shrink)

Argues for two claims about human essential properties that together constitute an “Aristotelian” theory of human nature. The first is that humans essentially have a physical nature involving circulatory, digestive, and other physiological systems; their functioning to a high degree constitutes good health and, beyond that, athletic excellence. The second is that humans are essentially rational, both theoretically and practically. This last claim yields the two main “Aristotelian” values of theoretical and practical perfection, which develop theoretical and practical rationality. The (...) claim is defended both intuitively, in thought‐experiments, and by the analysis of psychological explanation, in which rationality plays a central role. (shrink)

Abstract:In the transformation from classical to modern aesthetics, the proposition and exploration of aesthetic experience constitutes one of the major dimensions of various aesthetic problems. Pragmatic aesthetics, phenomenological aesthetics, hermeneutic aesthetics, analytical aesthetics, and new pragmatic aesthetics have comprehensively analyzed and discussed aesthetic experience. Through the construction and deconstruction of aesthetic experience in aesthetic history, the study of the key concept seems to have come to a certain predicament. This is mainly reflected in the fact that the subjective and objective (...) attribute of experience remains unclear, and the material base of aesthetics is not solid enough. In this regard, cognitive neuroscience and anthropology provide new ways to understand aesthetic experience. From the perspective of aesthetic anthropology, the study on aesthetic experience is rooted in a broad field and serves as a solid material basis for its objectification. Cognitive neuroaesthetics explains the psychological mechanism of aesthetic experience. Together, they provide an opportunity for the study on aesthetic experience to enter a new realm. Moreover, the new interpretation of the essence of aesthetic experience will help to improve the theory and practice of aesthetic education. (shrink)

J. L. Mackie's famous claim that Locke ‘anticipates’ Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference (CTR) rests, I suggest, upon a pair of important misunderstandings. Contra Mackie, as well as the more recent accounts of Paul Guyer and Michael Ayers, Lockean Real Essences consist of those features of an entity from which all of its experienceable properties can be logically deduced; thus a substantival Real Essence consists of features of a Real Constitution plus logically necessary objective connections between them and features (...) of some particular Nominal Essence. Furthermore, what Locke actually anticipates is the most significant contemporary challenge to the CTR: the qua‐problem. (shrink)

To reconcile true claims of de re necessity with the supposedly contingent existence of the concrete objects those claims are typically about, Kripkean essentialists invoke weak necessity. The claim that a is necessarily F is held to be equivalent to the claim that necessarily, if a exists then a is F. This strategy faces a barrage of serious objections a proper subset of which shows that the strategy fails to achieve its intended purpose. Relief can be provided via recourse to (...) a markedly non-Kripkean version of essentialism.1. (shrink)

Considered a classic in the philosophy of language movement known variously as the New Theory of Reference or the Direct-Reference Theory, as well as in the metaphysics of modal essentialism that is related to this philosophy of language. This award-winning book is based on the author’s doctoral dissertation.

_This important early Heidegger text sheds new light on his later focus on language._.

In this paper, I intend to make a case for Buddhist phenomenology. By Buddhist phenomenology, I mean a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra’s doctrine of consciousness. Yet, this interpretation will be vulnerable if I do not justify the way in which the anti-essentialistic Buddhist philosophy can countenance the Husserlian essence. I dub this problem of compatibility between Buddhist and phenomenology the ‘problem of essence’. Nevertheless, I argue that this problem will not jeopardize Buddhist phenomenology because: 1) Yogācārins, especially late (...) Yogācārins represented by Xuanzang do not articulate emptiness as a negation but as an affirmation of the existent; 2) Husserl’s phenomenological essence is not a substance that Yogācārins reject but the ideal sense that Yogācārins also stress. After resolving the problem of essence, I formulate Buddhist phenomenology as follows: on the epistemological level, it describes intentional acts of consciousness; on the meta-epistemological level, it entails transcendental idealism. (shrink)

All theories of world creation, whether scientific, philosophical, or religious, can readily acknowledge the fact that humans have primarily evolved to engage with nature, the individual self, fellow human beings, society, and other naturalistic aspect of existence. Nevertheless, several novel challenges ascend when the human mind engages with technology, media, machines, and related concepts such as—ChatGPT, artificial intelligence, and to name a few. For that reason, we need philosophy and critical assessment of the uncovered essence of advanced technologies, media (...) and machines and our way of life concerning them. In other words, protectively assessing their impact requires a thorough examination of ethical and existential concerns, including technology’s implications for freedom, AI’s evolving role, the essence of human being, and the unexamined transformative societal changes that follow. Building upon the premise that these phenomena share a common thread despite their apparent disparities, our interdisciplinary pursuit draws inspiration from philosophical luminaries such as Luciano Floridi, Karamjit S. Gill, David Kaplan, Aldous Huxley, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and Gandhi. Through philosophical insights, we explore the essence of technology and its broad effects, with a focus on its impact on human freedom and essence in both public and private domains. (shrink)

This article critically re-reads György Márkus’s seminal Marxism and Anthropology in light of its recent reissue with an introduction by Hans Joas and Axel Honneth. Joas and Honneth problematically identify the normative source of Márkus’s position as an a-historical and extra-natural account of the human. In fact, when the human essence is thought as natural while also historical, developing new powers and needs through changing strategies of socially organized work, Marx’s materialist conception of history can be used to generate (...) a critique of social organizations, relations, and structures that constrain rather than promote such development. Such constraint on developing powers can be read as ‘alienation’ from the human essence. Márkus’s work develops this reading of Marx in a textually sensitive way, but his analysis of alienation in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 focuses on the individual when such analysis could in fact be profitably extended to apply to groups and the species as whole. (shrink)

Phenomenology can be roughly described as the theory of the pure essences of phenomena. Yet the meaning of essence and of concepts traditionally tied to it are far from settled. This is especially true given the impact modern science has had on established philosophical views and the need for revisiting certain core notions of philosophy. In this paper I intend to review Husserl’s view on thingness-essence and his conception of the essence of individuals, based mainly in his (...) writings from the time of Logical Investigations, Ideas, and later of Experience and Judgment. Taking account of the work of Lothar Eley in Die Krise des Apriori, among others, I will inquire into the ways in which phenomenology may undermine the view of essences as non-factual, as well as undermine their ontological priority. Doing so may help to shape a conception of material or formal individual essences and generally of essences as concrete objects of experience in virtue of well-defined epistemic ones. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to set out some of the main views about essence which Aristotle puts forward in Book Z of theMetaphysics.A central feature of Aristotle's account, as we shall see, is his distinction between primary and secondary cases of essence, and a similiar distinction in connection with the related notions of substance and definition. This division between primary and secondary cases means that Aristotle may well have two very different sorts of remark to make about (...) essence, or definition, or substance, according to which of the two kinds of case he has in mind. There is no reason to suppose the same logical properties apply to both the primary and the secondary cases. And when we come to define the various notions, we shall see that if our definitions are right, the logical properties in the two kinds of case are in fact quite different. (shrink)

PEUT-ON penser et rendre effective l'exigence de la justice et de la démocratie en faisant l'hypothèse que nous sommes tous essentiellement des calculateurs impénitents, avant tout soucieux de leur seul intérêt personnel? Oui, répond le libéralisme politique contemporain qui, de John Rawls à John Harsanyi ou David Gauthier, s'efforce de dessiner les traits d'une juste démocratie réduite à des règles de coexistence pacifique entre ces sujets " mutuellement indifférents ", si caractéristiques de l'actuelle société de marché. Non, objectent les " (...) communautariens " et les républicains, qui en appellent à la nécessité d'une conception du bien commun partageable par tous, au risque de sembler vouloir ressusciter le fantôme de la société close d'antan. Tout en soumettant la théorie politique contemporaine à un examen aussi pédagogique qu'exigeant, Philippe Chanial montre comment nombre des débats actuels les plus cruciaux et des écueils sur lesquels ils achoppent, trouvent leur solution dans une tradition de pensée trop oubliée mais si près de renaître aujourd'hui : l'associationnisme civique qui a constitué l'une des matrices principales de la pensée politique et des sciences sociales du XIXe siècle et du premier tiers du XXe siècle (au moins en France et aux États-Unis). Sous cet éclairage inédit, Tocqueville, Saint-Simon et Pierre Leroux, Jaurès, Durkheim ou John Dewey apparaissent unis par une commune intelligence de ce que Marcel Mauss appelait la " délicate essence " de la cité. Cet associationnisme civique, constellation assurément hétéroclite, vient nous rappeler qu'il existe une forme de bonheur dont la raison libérale et utilitaire est incapable de rendre compte, ce bonheur public que nous éprouvons dans l'engagement civique et associatif. Ce livre qui marque sa redécouverte devrait parler en profondeur tant aux philosophes, aux politistes ou aux sociologues qu'aux militants associatifs. (shrink)

To comprehend the world around us, we first have to decipher how our brains work. This book outlines a new approach to knowledge and understanding based on the elucidation of several basic neuronal mechanisms. This book explores the crucial fact that unconscious processes and conscious experiences form a continuum, which introduces the concept of 'rerepresentations'. Examples of rerepresentations can be seen in language, mathematics, technology and the arts. This fundamental notion captures the essence of being human, namely what separates (...) us from our evolutionary predecessors. For this reason, an effort has been made to present all notions from first principles, without assuming any background specialized knowledge. Although this volume will be more easily accessible to individuals with a background in sciences and medicine, Ways of Comprehending presents, in an accessible manner, important information which should be common knowledge, but is lacking among the vast majority of scientists, technocrats, and humanities scholars. The interdisciplinary, integrative approach presented in this book implies that different disciplines and notions which appear disconnected, are actually closely related. This approach elucidates how we think about topics such as mathematics, physics, painting, music, and philosophy. More importantly, it helps us understand the origin of our thoughts, feelings and actions. This finally brings deep insight and fulfilment or, more precisely, eudemonia. (shrink)

China's Philosophical Studies: Rediscovery of Chinese Spiritual Essence collects essential research findings of China's philosophical studies conducted by the academics at East China Normal University (ECNU) in recent years. The book covers topics including thoughts in China's Spring and Autumn Period, Chinese virtue of trust, establishing morals, historical studies of Chinese philosophy, etc. This book is the fifth volume of the WSPC-ECNU Series on China. This Series showcases the significant contributions to scholarship in social sciences and humanities studies about (...) China. It is jointly launched by World Scientific Publishing, the most reputable English academic publisher in Asia, and ECNU, a top University in China with a long history of exchanges with the international academic community. (shrink)

« Logik als Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache », tel est le titre que Heidegger donne à son cours du semestre d’été 1934, cours qui a été traduit en 2008 sous le titre « La logique comme question en quête de la pleine essence du langage », « pleine essence » se voulant ici la traduction du nouveau sens que Heidegger donne à partir du milieu des années 1930 au terme Wesen, qu’il ne s’agit plus d’entendre en (...) un sens nominal comme l’essence ou la quiddité ni comme l’expression de la permanence ou... (shrink)

Ubuntu/Unhu societies were characterised by the thrust on freedom for responsibility where the elders were the bearers of authority which was conducive for the development of the freedom. The authority of the elders had a bearing on the freedom of the non-elderly people. Authority and freedom are connected by responsibility. Without responsibility as the nodal point between authority and freedom, authority lapses into power and freedom lapses into licence. This study sought to find out how elders in Ubuntu/Unhu societies socialised (...) the youngsters to become responsible citizens. In exploring the thrust and procedures of civic education in Ubuntu/Unhu societies, a study of ten elderly informants of ages between sixty-five and ninety-five were purposively selected from a district in Zimbabwe. The research findings are that the advent of colonialism has begotten misconstruction of the nature of freedom in Ubuntu/Unhus societies. The thrust has of late been on negative freedom which is freedom ‘from’ social vices. Many of these social vices are attributable to cultural invasion by the Euroethnocentric tendencies of the colonialists and the effects of global citizenry. Ubuntu/Unh societies were essentially focusing on the philosophy of freedom for responsibility in their pedagogy and andragogy. The contemporary institutions could get some insights from Ubuntu socialization strategies on how to develop responsibility in children and youths in this era of modernity. (shrink)

This article examines the pragmatic conception of self. It describes the views of classical pragmatists Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead on the concept of self. It explains the pragmatic concept of self reinforces the agentive idea that what we do makes us who we are. It suggests that there is no pre-established certainty in the self and that it is marked by fallibility. It outlines the pragmatist assault on the Cartesian picture of the self (...) and contrasts it with the fallible self of pragmatism. (shrink)

Preface The status of sovereignty as a highly ambiguous concept is well established. Pointing out or deploring, the ambiguity of the idea has itself become a recurring motif in the literature on sovereignty. As the legal theorist and international lawyer Alf Ross put it, “there is hardly any domain in which the obscurity and confusion is as great as here.” 1 The concept of sovereignty is often seen as a downright obstacle to fruitful conceptual analysis, carried over from its proper (...) setting in history to “plague and befog contemporary thought.” 2 . . . So contested is the concept that, rather than pursuing the contestation, many political theorists think we should give up so protean a notion. Granting that the debate on the relevance of sovereignty frustratingly oscillates between claims that it will either continue to exist or that it is about to disappear, forgetting it altogether, and thereby escaping this seemingly endless argument, can easily appear as the most urgent task for political theory . The following argument makes a case that the “urgent task” is not the abandonment of the concept of sovereignty, but an understanding of its essential philosophical nature as an integrated and evolving expression of practical reason. Sovereignty is neither ambiguous nor obscure once its fundamental presuppositions are laid bare and its many philosophical and historical manifestations shown to be the product, in actuality, of a single, dialectally dynamic but integrated set of metaphysical elements. This is the first of three arguments describing the evolution of international law as a manifestation of practical reason through an application of philosophical method to the source , locus , and scope of the concept of sovereignty. It moves from a dialectic balance favoring utility to a balance dominated by legal right to a dialectic of duty to humanity and nature. All three arguments are meant to be a contribution to the new field of International Legal Philosophy as defined by Phillip Allott. 4 This field combines a sensitivity to legal practice with an effort to understand the underlying philosophical determinants of empirical choice and behavior. One purpose of international legal philosophy is to “remove” from the minds of those who study the law what Diderot defined as “the sophism of the ephemeral,” and what Allott calls “the disempowering idea that what xii Preface happens to exist now is inevitable and permanent.” 5 A core imperative is to “reunderstand what it is to be a thinking being” 6 and to rediscover the dialectic between the private and the public as it determines, and is redetermined by, legal practice. This requires a “revolution in the human mind” 7 so that we may transcend the current dependence on positivist methods and empirical fact as an end-in-itself, and try to understand the underlying and more constant and essential ideas and inherent dialectics that constitute the substructure or “metaphysics” of international law. I will approach this “revolution” with the use of R. G. Collingwood’s philosophical method 8 and the philosophy of David Hume, applied to international law as an expression of practical reason. The goal of philosophical method is the construction of a comprehensive policy argument (CPA) for a public policy or legal issue. In addition to the conventional use of empirical models and their logic of investigation in the study of policy and law, CPA requires that an underlying philosophical logic of concepts be deciphered to identify the ideas within the issue, and their definition, overlap, and systematic interdependence. Philosophical method is a means with which to interpret and understand competing systematic and complete conceptual logics, existing at the core of an issue and pertinent to policy change. Philosophical method is therefore not meant to be a replacement for the empirical investigation of a policy or legal issue, or the use of scientific method in social studies. Rather, it is a complimentary and prerequisite method that seeks to transcend the limitations of positivism and present a more complete understanding of the philosophical presuppositions of positivist ideas like power, interest, or strategic rationality. Philosophical method is meant to be used with the facts of the policy or legal issue to match an illuminating logic of concepts with a pertinent logic of investigation . Within the CPA, the use of philosophical method and the metaphysics of a policy or legal issue is assumed to be critical to the full understanding of the overlapping concepts, dialectics, and scale of forms that determine, and are determined by, the empirical context of the policy or legal topic. Specifically, instead of utilizing bits and pieces of various theoretical arguments to address narrowly focused empirical questions, as positivism prescribes, I will address the evolution of international law as practical reason in three phases. Each will be approached through a single integrated logic of philosophical concepts from a particular philosopher (i.e., David Hume, G. W. F. Hegel, Immanuel Kant). This philosophically holistic approach to the law is based on the assumption that only through the use of a single integrated argument in legal analysis can sovereignty, or any concept, be understood as a truly systematic and logical whole. A complete philosophical paradigm has a dialectic integrity and systematic logic that can more adequately describe the evolving essence of a concept like sovereignty. This approach also has the advantage of generating a number of distinct holistic descriptions of the law through the application of different philosophical systems, one at a time, to its factual structure. 9 Positivism does not seek Preface xiii holism, and rejects the idea that “theory” has such a characteristic. The essential or comprehensive substructure of any idea is therefore ignored in a method that recommends the observation of empirical problems through the use of whatever hodgepodge of theoretical elements is seen fit to frame its superstructure. This failure to deal with metaphysics has retarded both an essential understanding of international law as a species of legal system, and any holistic and dialectical conceptualization of its inherent concepts, like sovereignty. A second positivist convention expects modern theorists to create new theory rather than to refine and apply that of existing philosophy. This predisposition is driven by the positivist goal of discovery that ignores refinement as a possible purpose of philosophical analysis. Collingwood argues that philosophy must take that set of ideas already known and utilize existing systematic philosophical arguments to refine them so that they evolve closer to their essence as concepts. Considering this imperative, the idea of sovereignty can be assumed to have had valid usage for hundreds of years, over which time, the concept has evolved to mean different things, each a refinement of the definition that preceded it. Transcending positivism means that the scholar’s search is not for “new” material, but to decipher the metaphysical essence of a concept as it has been made manifest over time and context. These manifestations are rooted, and refined from, the known terms of that concept’s inherent idea(s). Rather than depending exclusively on positivism and its conventions, my work utilizes, in addition to Collingwood, the intact philosophical systems of Hume, Hegel, and Kant to trace the refinement of international law as a product of human practical reason. These paradigms, or integrated systems of logical concepts, will be applied to legal practice individually, so that each CPA can be deciphered separately. This provides a set of integrated and logically intact paradigms for the evolutionary stages of practical reason in international law. Because each argument is applied systematically, a deeper understanding of the source, locus, and scope in the development of law in general, and international law in particular, is possible where it is not with the application of various disconnected components of many theories. Each CPA based on Hume, Hegel, or Kant can then be used to describe a distinct context that its logic of concepts best illuminates; specifically, the (1) genesis, (2) contemporary dilemmas, and (3) future of the international legal system. By widening the perspective of international lawyers and policymakers, they can more easily perceive the dialectic of ideas that has created, and is refined by, the legal practice in which they participate. We also move toward Allott’s goal of “human self-perfecting.” 10 And, in addition, by providing a more complete knowledge of the origins of legal practice and its evolution, we illuminate the practical possibilities for what we might “choose to be” 11 in the future. To achieve this, the essential metaphysical elements of state sovereignty and its inherent evolutionary scale of forms will be deciphered and described. This will transform what appears to be a multitude of definitions and xiv Preface practical realizations of the concept of sovereignty into a set of interdependent manifestations of a single substructure, made of a single set of dialectic elements. The interpretation of international law through practical reason sorts and integrates a diverse and discordant literature and defines state sovereignty as a single concept evolving on a scale of forms that allows it to exhibit diverse character traits, all arising from different combinations of common and essential metaphysical elements. This approach, compared to positivist methods and legal realism, allows one to transcend current agreement that sovereignty is, at best, a narrowly focused set of empirical characteristics or, at worst, “organized hypocrisy.” 12 This method also encourages the scholar and practitioner to understand the predispositions and pitfalls of the concept of sovereignty, as well as its potential future paths, more effectively. The use of philosophical method to create policy paradigms out of preexisting philosophical systems and apply these to international law will be called Philosophical-Policy & Legal Design . This approach allows the use of preexisting and complete philosophical arguments that provide an adequate logic of concepts to chart the evolution of the idea of sovereignty along its scale of forms. An examination of the source of practical reason in human social convention with the employment of a philosophical-policy drawn from Hume’s logic of concepts about human nature will demonstrate this new approach. Why Hume? Because, up to now, without an adequate substructure we have arguments, like Brunne é’ s and Troope’s, 13 that may correctly identify international law as an “interactional” system, but cannot present any argument as to why it is, where this empirical reality comes from, or what its implications are for the future. Comparatively, Hume provides a logic of philosophical concepts that answers these concerns. First, he fulfills the requirements for a fuller understanding of the origin and evolution of law from social convention and the dependence of social convention on the human imperative for society. Second, he offers a more adequate delineation of the overlapping concepts of the law in terms of the ideas and institutions that deal with norms and justice (e.g., principle, process, practice, rule, power, interest). Third, he provides a fundamental understanding of the essential dialectics at the core of a conceptualization of the law with both unconscious and conscious human participation (i.e., passion. (shrink)