This article investigates the prospect of giving de dicto- and de re-necessity a uniform treatment. The historical starting point is a puzzle raised by Aristotle's claim, advanced in one of the modal chapters of his Prior Analytics, that universally privative apodeictic premises simply convert. As regards the Prior and the Posterior Analytics, the data suggest a representation of propositions of the type in question by doubly modally qualified formulae of modal predicate logic that display a necessity operator (...) in two distinct positions. Can the N-operator occurring in these positions be given a unified semantical treatment (which would justify dispensing with a notational differentiation)? A positive answer, based on a suitably shaped truth condition for N-formulae, is given, and is supported in the final section with an alternative proof theoretically based conception of a property's essential belonging to an individual. (shrink)

Necessity can be ascribed not only to propositions, but also to feelings. In the Critique of Judgment (KdU), Immanuel Kant argues that a feeling of beauty is the necessary satisfaction instantiated by the ‘free play’ of the cognitive faculties, which provides the grounds for a judgment of taste (KdU 5:196, 217-19). In contradistinction to the theoretical necessity of the Critique of Pure Reason and the moral necessity of the Critique of Practical Reason, the necessity assigned to (...) a judgment of taste is exemplary necessity (KdU 5:237). Necessity can also be assigned by employing the de re/de dicto distinction, namely, by ascribing entailments of what must necessarily hold to either a thing (de re) or to a proposition (de dicto). Although Kant does not use the distinction in any of the three Critiques, this omission has not prevented Kant scholars from applying the distinction in their analyses of the first two Critiques. In this paper, I examine the role that modality plays in Kant’s third Critique and I attempt to bring the de re/de dicto distinction to bear on Kant’s famous aesthetic theory. Ultimately, I perform a retrospective classification of the modality of taste by arguing that because a judgment of taste is not a statement about an objective fact, a judgment of ‘x is beautiful’ can only be read as de dicto necessary. (shrink)

Is the macro grounded in the micro? That is, is every truth about a macroscopic object fully grounded in a truth wholly about its microscopic parts? In a recent interesting paper, Martin Glazier argued for a negative answer. Following him, call the position that the macro is grounded in the micro ‘priority micro pluralism’ (‘pluralism’ for short). In this discussion note, I propose a way out for the pluralist. In brief, it consists in the recognition that some metaphysical positions, including (...) pluralism, are best expressed by fundamentally de dicto grounding claims. In that these claims have a distinctive modal force, this recognition has far-reaching consequences that go beyond a defence of pluralism. (shrink)

If religion once seemed to have played out its role in the intellectual and political history of Western secular modernity, it has now returned with a vengeance. In this engaging study, Hent de Vries argues that a turn to religion discernible in recent philosophy anticipates and accompanies this development in the contemporary world. Though the book reaches back to Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and earlier, it takes its inspiration from the tradition of French phenomenology, notably Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, and, (...) especially, Jacques Derrida. Tracing how Derrida probes the discourse on religion, its metaphysical presuppositions, and its transformations, de Vries shows how this author consistently foregrounds the unexpected alliances between a radical interrogation of the history of Western philosophy and the religious inheritance from which that philosophy has increasingly sought to set itself apart. De Vries goes beyond formal analogies between the textual practices of deconstruction and so-called negative theology to address the necessity for a philosophical thinking that situates itself at once close to and at the farthest remove from traditional manifestations of the religious and the theological. This paradox is captured in the phrase adieu ( à dieu ), borrowed from Levinas, which signals at once a turn toward and a leave-taking from God -- and which also gestures toward and departs from the other of this divine other, the possibility of radical evil. Only by confronting such uncanny and difficult figures, de Vries claims, can one begin to think and act upon the ethical and political imperatives of our day. (shrink)

Drawing from extensions of existing ideas in the logic of ground, a novel account of the grounds of necessity is presented, the core of which states that necessary truths are necessary because they stand in specific grounding connections.

In this thesis I argue that we should break with the dominant Kripkean tradition concerning natural kind terms and theoretical identity. I claim that there is just no interesting connection between the metaphysics and semantics of natural kind terms, and demonstrate this by constructing a version of descriptivism that is combined with the same metaphysics – that is, a nontrivial version of essentialism – found in Kripke, but which effectively avoids all of the standard criticisms. With my version of descriptivism (...) in place, I present what I take to be the most reasonable version of metaphysical essentialism, positing only what I call 'thin' essences. I claim that thin essences are perfectly adequate to underpin scientific realism, and moreover that they are sufficient to support the version of descriptivism developed here. In effect, what I offer here is an error theory of the Kripkean tradition: Kripke is right to think that there are interesting things to say about meaning and essence, but just wrong about what those things are. Thus whilst Kripke thinks that it is possible to make discoveries about the meanings of natural kind terms, I think, rather, that we make empirical discoveries that lead to revisions in meaning. Furthermore, whilst Kripke thinks there is a dichotomy between de re and de dicto necessity, and that theoretical identities are necessary de re, I think this distinction is both misleading and inaccurate, and that the necessity of theoretical identities is neither entirely de re nor entirely de dicto. By separating and insulating questions concerning meaning from questions concerning essence I show that whilst scientific discoveries are contingent and a posteriori, the definition of scientific terms are both necessary and a priori. (shrink)

This chapter focuses mainly on how possible worlds relate to the truth and falsity of modal claims (or propositions), and therefore to whether claims are necessarily true, necessarily false, possibly true, possibly false, and so on. This issue is that of modality de dicto, modality concerning propositions. But there is another type of modality, namely modality de re. This has to do with the modal status of relations between things and their properties, with whether things possess properties necessarily, contingently (...) or not even possibly. This chapter introduces the distinction between de dicto and de re necessity, and then explores different ways of making sense of de re necessity‐necessities involving particular individuals. It talks about Strong Transworld Identity, and explores how Abstractionists respond to the Leibniz's Law argument. Some metaphysicians go farther and identify what is possible with what is conceivable, or perhaps with what we are justified in believing to be possible. (shrink)

While distinguishing between the actions and physical boundaries of self and other (non-self) is usually straightforward there are contexts in which such differentiation is challenging. For example, self-other ambiguity may occur when actions of others are similar or complementary to those of the self. Even in the absence of such situational challenges, individuals experiencing hallucinations have difficulties with this distinction, often experiencing thoughts or actions of self as belonging to other agents. This paper explores the role of ambiguity in self-other (...) differentiation, drawing from developmental, psychodynamic and neurocognitive perspectives. A key proposal is that engagement in contexts that make distinctions between self and other challenging yet necessary allow reality-testing skills related to agency to develop. Attunement in typical caregiver-infant interactions is framed as a safe but inherently ambiguous environment that provides optimal condition for the infant to develop a coherent self-other sense. Vulnerability to psychosis may be related to limited access to such an environment in early development. However, the perceptual, cognitive and social skills that contribution to attribution are likely to be malleable following infancy and improve though opportunities for boundary play in similarly ambiguous settings. Using music-making to illustrate, we postulate that engagement in intricate joint-actions that blurs agentic boundaries can contribute to the continued development of an adaptive sense of self and other essential to healthy social functioning. Increased insight into the self-other ambiguity may enhance our understanding of mechanisms underlying ‘self-disorders’ such as schizophrenia and eventually extend the range of social and arts-based therapeutic possibilities. (shrink)

I provide a case-by-case definition of essential truths based on the notions of metaphysical necessity and ontological dependence. Relying on suggestions in the literature, I adopt a definition of the latter notion in terms of the notion of ground. The resulting account is adequate in the sense that it is not subject to Kit Fine’s famous counterexamples to the purely modal account of essence. In addition, it provides us with a novel conception of truths pertaining to the essence of (...) objects, which might help to dispel doubts on the legitimacy of the notion of essence itself. (shrink)

At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are (...) knowable a posteriori, a world order according to certain metaphysical principles and natures that god crafts within the constraints of matter. Finally, what is providentially necessary is what occurs according to the chain of fate, but only once it is in process or past. -/- The method of the paper is a close reading of Diogenes Laertius 7.75, adducing broad textual evidence along the way, to show that the Stoic theory of modality embraces Philonian possibility, both that which is capable of being true as a matter of logical consistency, and that which is possible according to the bare fitness of the entity. What differentiates the Stoics from Philo is their additional commitment to possibility as opportunity, resisting the collapse of determinism into necessity. (shrink)

The science of the soul exceeds all other parts of philosophy not only in “dignity and exactness”, but also in “usefulness, necessity, charm, and, above all, in difficulty”.1 As the body is the subject of health and disease, so too the soul is the subject of virtue and vice; and just as the physician must devote great effort to knowing the body, anyone who treats morals “must take care to have a clear understanding of things pertaining to the scientia (...) de anima”.2 To be mistaken about the soul, in the way of materialists or the impious Averroes, is to leave “the good without reward, and evil without punishment”, and thus to “uproot all good morals, all laws and Republics”.3 The study of the soul is inescapably a prolegomenon to moral philosophy and to theology. But because it studies what is common to all living things, the science of the soul also prepares the way for the study of particular plants and animals, just as physics precedes the study of elements and mixtures.4 The natural philosopher deals with six kinds of bodies: the simple incorruptible bodies of the heavens, the simple but corruptible terrestrial elements, imperfect mixtures (ice, comets), perfect inanimate mixtures (metals and pre-. (shrink)

Three themes in the work of Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897–1966) have especial relevance for current development ethics: first, the importance of counterbalancing a disciplinary philosophical or theological orientation with strong bases in empirical life-experience, practical learning and social sciences; second, the necessity to study capitalism not only ‘development’, and concrete life-needs not only a generalised notion of ‘freedom’; and third, the imperative to employ global and cosmopolitan frames besides national and ‘community’ ones. These themes came to distinguish Lebret as a (...) development ethicist. He began with the first and second from the 1930s, under his banner of ‘Économie et Humanisme’. The third emerged later in consequence of his studies across an interconnected world. The paper elucidates and discusses the three themes in turn. The subsequent sections then briefly consider Lebret’s legacies, influence and continuing relevance: directly, within the Catholic Church’s perspectives since the 1960s on human and global development; and indirectly, for secular work on ‘human development’ and in Anglophone development ethics. (shrink)

L’actualité du kantisme en philosophie morale et politique est illustrée par l’importance en son sein des approches formelles, notamment l’éthique de la discussion et le libéralisme politique. Ces approches estiment que le formalisme pratique implique une réduction de la sphère de la rationalité pratique à la seule réflexion morale sur l’impartialité des normes, au détriment du questionnement éthique sur la vie bonne renvoyé à la particularité subjective. Dans le présent article, nous contestons la nécessité d’une telle implication et nous voulons (...) montrer la possibilité de penser une éthique formelle : un jugement éthique a priori peut être fondé sur la seule nécessité de donner sens à la forme de la finitude.The actuality of Kantism in moral and political philosophy is mirrored in the importance of formal approaches, i.e. deliberative ethics and political liberalism. These approaches underline that practical formalism implies a reduction of the sphere of practical rationality to a moral reflection on impartiality of norms. This reflection is carried out at the expense of the ethical questioning on the « good life », which is reduced to the subjective particularity. In the present article, I contest the necessity of such an implication. Also, I want to show the possibility to conceive a formal ethic, namely an a priori ethical judgement can be founded on the necessity alone to give sense to the form of finitude. (shrink)

In the context of the increasingly transnational organization of society, culture, and communication, this article develops a conceptualization of the global common as a basic condition of interrelation and shared experience, and describes contemporary political efforts to fully democratize this condition. The article demonstrates the implications for curriculum and teaching of this project, describing in particular the importance of fundamentally challenging the interpellation of students as subjects of the nation, and the necessity for new and radically collaborative forms of (...) political and pedagogical authority that can more powerfully realize the imaginative potential of educators and students alike as global democratic actors. In this effort, familiar progressive educational ideas (e.g. the importance of the continuity of the curriculum, and the meaning and purpose of experimentalism) are interrogated and rearticulated. The article concludes with a discussion of the unique ways in which education can contribute to constructing a democratic society in the global era, and how the central aspects of such a pedagogy in common can also suggest essential principles for the organization of social movements in this context. (shrink)

La phénoménologie réaliste de Reinach ne se limite pas à une doctrine originale des états de choses et des relations d'essences. Elle procède également, en contrepoint, à une analyse de la relation de causalité dont la phénoménologie transcendantale ne fournit aucun équivalent. Cette analyse, qui met en avant la notion de nécessité matérielle, se déploie à partir d'une relecture critique de Hume, le plus grand représentant moderne de la crise de la causalité. Reinach's realistic phenomenology doesn't limit itself to being (...) an original theory of states of affair and relations of essences. On the counterpart, it is leading an analysis of the relation of causality, of which transcendantal phenomenology doesn't provide any comparable instance. This analysis highlights the notion of material necessity, which is producted upon a critical reading of Humes Treatise, modernity's biggest representant of causality crisis. (shrink)

The number of available legal documents has presented an enormous growth in recent years, and the digital processing of such materials is prompting the necessity of systems that support the automatic relevant information extraction. This work presents a system for ontology-based information extraction from natural language texts, able to identify a set of legal events. The system is based on an innovative methodology based on domain ontology of legal events and a set of linguistic rules, integrated through inference mechanism, (...) resulting in a flexible approach and scalable approach. A case study with the use of documents from the Superior Court in Brazil is related, with satisfactory results in precision and recall. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to analyze the current situation of epistemology, and those critics, such as those presented by Rorty and Taylor, that indicate the necessity of overcoming. It is intended to show that the foundational project and ideas of exact representation, elementary experience and incorrigibility, which from modernity conditioned epistemology, are untenable. However, a new form of philosophical reflection that considers the plot knowledge / language / action, can be thought. This new perspective implicates to attend (...) to the multiples games of language in which knowledge can be taken configurating the epistemological field from other interrogations. (shrink)

In the chapter on ‘Plato and Aristotle’ of theLectures on the History of PhilosophyHegel praises Aristotle's work for displaying a principle of ‘pure subjectivity’ in a manner that he considers to be largely absent from the Platoniccorpus:In general, Platonic thinking [das Platonische] represents objectivity, but it lacks a principle of life, a principle of subjectivity; and this principle […], not in the sense of a contingent, merely particular subjectivity, but in the sense of pure subjectivity, is proper to Aristotle. Elsewhere, (...) Hegel refers to Aristotelian conceptions of organic life and of thinking as to the earliest speculative insights of Western philosophy. In § 378 of theEncyclopaedia he calls theDe Anima‘the best or even only work of speculative interest ever written on the philosophy of spirit’. In yet other places, however, Hegel attributes at least ‘intuitive’ forms of speculation to Plato as well.In a preliminary way, a 'speculative relation’ in Hegel's acceptation is instantiated by a subject's theoretical and practical relation to itself — that is, theoretical self-knowing and practical self-will. ‘Speculative’ is any concept which grasps as a unity what other kinds of cognition keep asunder: for example, the subjective and objective dimensions of a phenomenon or state of affairs. But even independently of a detailed analysis of what ‘the speculative’ entails, one is struck by the apparent inconsistency of these claims regarding Plato or Aristotle with Hegel's overall view of the logical necessity of philosophy's historical development. This view is synthetically expressed in the 1820 Introduction to these sameLectures. (shrink)

Should we use human germline genome modification only when serious diseases are involved? This belief is the underlying factor in the article written by Kleiderman, Ravitsky and Knoppers to which I now respond. In my opinion, the answer to this question should be negative. In this paper, I attempt to show that there are no good reasons to think that this technology should be limited to serious diseases once it is sufficiently proven to be safe and efficient. In fact, opting (...) otherwise would negatively harm human beings’ right to the highest standard of health that unmodified embryos could promote. Therefore, the issue should not be so much to define adequately what a serious disease is, but rather to elucidate whether this concept should play any role beyond the context of preimplantation genetic testing. This paper argues that we should not accept the similarity between technologies such as PGT and HGGM because they face different challenges and offer totally different possibilities. Therefore, we are in urgent need to build a completely new ethical architecture that covers the application of germline editing in human embryos. As a part of that process, a much deeper debate on the necessity of distinguishing different disease types is required. (shrink)

Contemporary advances in the fields of globalization and technologies raise the question of the relationship between international business and the global common good. Half of the hundred biggest economies in the world are now corporations. Nation-states were tradi- tionally viewed as the guarantors of the common good; however, the current historical stage is marked by the waning of the role of government, and reveals an emerging situation characterized by a co-responsibility of multiple agents in this respect. Three major evolu- tions (...) are likely to induce multinational corporations (MNCs) to take the global common good into account: the imperative of the preservation of our biosphere, the rise of an anti-globalization sentiment with all its potential consequences, and the necessity to design a global social contract. Besides, these three phenomena are interconnected, which adds to the pressure on MNCs to change their policies. ba. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo, estabelece-se uma relação entre o conceito de autoria trabalhado por Bakhtin e Possenti e o de responsabilidade enunciativa, proposto por Adam. Para aqueles, a inserção de vozes alheias e o distanciamento em relação à linguagem são aspectos característicos de um texto autoral; para este, a responsabilidade enunciativa é uma dimensão constitutiva do enunciado e se relaciona ao agenciamento de vozes e ao uso de marcadores de pontos de vista. Partindo dessa discussão, analisam-se diários de leitura de estudantes (...) de Ensino Médio, observando como eles agenciam outras vozes e utilizam recursos de modalidades para constituir um discurso autoral. Os resultados apontam para a inserção de vozes alheias e utilização de lexemas afetivos, avaliativos e axiológicos nos diários, ora de forma mais elaborada e consciente, ora de forma mais simplória e carente de criticidade, do que se depreende a necessidade de atividades de retextualização para configuração de uma escrita autoral.ABSTRACT In this article, we established a relationship between the concept of authorship studied by Bakthin and Possenti and that of enunciative responsibility, as proposed by Adam. For the first, the insertion of the voice of others and the outsideness in relation to language are characteristic features of an authorial text; for the latter, enunciative responsibility is a constitutive dimension of the utterance and is related to managing voices and utilizing markers of points of view. From that discussion, we analyzed reading journals of high school students, observing how they manage the voices of others and use modality resources to attain authorial speech. The results point to the insertion of the voices of others and the use of affective, evaluative and axiological lexemes in the journals in more elaborate and conscious ways, and in simpler, less critical ones, from which one can surmise the necessity of retextualization activities in order to achieve authorial writing. (shrink)

Several scholars have argued that Wittgenstein held the view that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation, and that therefore Hume's principle is not a sound basis for a definition of number. I offer a new interpretation of the relevant fragments on philosophy of mathematics from Wittgenstein's Nachlass, showing that if different uses of ‘presupposition’ are understood in terms of de re and de dicto knowledge, Wittgenstein's argument against the Frege-Russell definition of number turns (...) out to be valid on its own terms, even though it depends on two epistemological principles logicist philosophers of mathematics may find too ‘constructivist’. (shrink)

According to sparse modalism, the notion of essence can be analysed in terms of necessity and naturalness. In this paper, I develop and defend a version of sparse modalism that is equipped with a non-standard, relativized conception of naturalness. According to this conception, properties and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different kinds of things, and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different slots. I argue that this relativized version of sparse modalism can (...) accommodate various cases that the standard, non-relativized version can’t. The alternative version can accommodate cases where a relation is essential to a relatum but merely necessary to another, cases where a property is essential to an object but merely necessary to another, and cases where a less-than-perfectly natural property is essential to an object. (shrink)

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume’s radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume’s perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume‘s (...) radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume’s naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume’s two “definitions” of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation---Norman Kemp Smith’s and Annette Baier’s, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin’s, on the other---that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume. (shrink)

The article addresses the psychological experience of the "We" developed in Being and Nothingness (BN), and how it resonates within the social dynamics of Critique of Dialectical Reason (CDR). It is problematized about which "We" is spoken in the condition of Being-with. In BN, Sartre demonstrates that the foundation of human relationships is conflict, as being-with-others is rooted in being-for-others. This, therefore, reflects on the impossibility of psychological experiences of the Us-object and We-subject to support alienation and engagement. We start (...) from the conjuncture of serial collectivity to address the experience of the Us-object, and the necessity of individual choice for engagement with others, which may or not occur when the experience of Us-object takes place. In this way, when individuals recognize themselves as part of a structure organized by a third party and aim for a common goal, the community subject happens. We noticed that Sartre, in Being and Nothingness and its developments, helps us to think about being-with-another, even in a virtual world of the 21st century. Sartre, throughout his life and although without success, strove to materialize the Being that he idealized for people: mutually committed to the responsible construction of a socio-material field “desirable for a community”, including conflict resolutions. (shrink)

In his book The Philosophy of Nature, Ellis presents "the new essentialism" as resting on the notions of a property, an intrinsic property, an essential property, natural necessity and possibility, a natural kind, a fixed natural kind, and a natural law. The present paper argues that the central notions in this group are susceptible of a logical analysis, Ellis's notion of natural possibility has a historical precedent in the work of Abéelard, the notion of natural possibility contains both de (...) re and de dicto elements, and Ellis's essentialist claims, when joined to any plausible definition of natural possibility, lead to inconsistency. (shrink)

I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity . The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm? My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. (...) The results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general argument of this thesis is sound, then, on this ground, the realist conception of metaphysical essentialism is rejected. The positive thesis of this study is the articulation of certain ways to frame the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori which avoid the problems of realistic essentialism and which suggest a certain transcendental reading of modality. According to the Kripke Paradigm, any de dicto modal status derives ultimately from the de re modality inherent in the object designated, as the object is characterised by contingent and necessary properties on the ontological level. Thus, the Kripke Paradigm is primarily a thesis in de re realist essentialism. The final verdict in this study is that the Kripke Paradigm cannot sustain the realistic conception of de re metaphysical essentialism. If we should adopt a transcendental reading of modality, then certain portions of the Kripke Paradigm are valid. I do not delineate or possess the details of a comprehensive doctrine of transcendental metaphysic. Nevertheless, the observations I make should suffice to bring about the rough orientation of how I conceive the notion of transcendental modality. (shrink)

This profound metaphysical treatise is carefully and subtly argued. It merits the author recognition as one of the major contemporary philosophers in the United States. Plantinga begins by distinguishing logical necessity from causal necessity, what we will not give up, what is self-evident, and what we can know a priori. In the first chapter he also reviews why classical and contemporary philosophers have distinguished between saying that it is necessary that a proposition is true and saying of an (...) object that it is necessarily such and such. The second and third chapters are primarily a defense of the distinction between de dicto and de re necessity, despite the fact that he shows, to those who claim only to understand de dicto necessity, how assertions of de re necessity can be read as assertions of de dicto necessity. Plantinga mischievously observes in passing that assertions of de dicto necessity can be interpreted as de re assertions of a proposition that it is necessarily true. He defends the legitimacy of asserting necessity de re so that he can say of objects that they have properties essentially. (shrink)

In this work we attempt to confront the orthodox widespread claim, present in the philosophical and foundational debates about Quantum Mechanics (QM), that ‘superpositions are never actually observed in the lab’. In order to do so, we begin by providing a critical analysis of the famous measurement problem which, we will argue, was originated as a consequence of the strict application of the empirical-positivist requirements to subsume the quantum formalism under their specific understanding of a physical ‘theory’. In particular, the (...) ad hoc introduction of the projection postulate (or measurement rule) can be understood as the necessity of imposing a naive empiricist standpoint which presupposes that observations are self evident givens of “common sense” experience independent of metaphysical (or conceptual) presuppositions yet necessarily represented in binary terms. We then turn our attention to two “non-collapse” interpretations of QM—namely, modal and many worlds—which even though deny that the “collapse” is a real physical process retain anyhow the projection rule as a necessary axiom of the theory itself. In contraposition, following Einstein’s claim that “it is only the theory which decides what can be observed”, we propose a return to the realist representational understanding of physical theories in which ‘observation’ is not a “self evident” given of experience but something that can be only understood in the context of a theoretical (formal-conceptual) scheme. It is from this standpoint that we discuss a new non-classical conceptual representation which allows us to understand quantum phenomena in an intuitive (anschaulicht) manner. Leaving behind the projection postulate, we discuss the general physical conditions for measuring and observing quantum superpositions in the lab. (shrink)

The student of Spinoza is faced by a peculiar difficulty. On opening the Ethics —Spinoza's chief work, completed for publication shortly before his death in 1674—he finds a system of metaphysics set forth in geometrical form, starting from definitions, axioms, and postulates, and advancing synthetically from first principles to a detailed interpretation of the universe. The difficulty lies not in the language— Spinoza's Latin is easy to construe, and there are translations—nor in the lack of literary graces; his style indeed (...) is singularly impressive in its austere dignity. It lies rather in this, that the method of exposition conveys a misleading suggestion of dogmatism and finality, and conceals almost all traces of the patient inquiries that issued in the finished structure. If once the principles of the system are admitted, the rest appears to follow by logical necessity. But by what processes of thought was Spinoza led to those principles? This is the problem that besets the reader: in order to understand the Ethics, he must penetrate behind the text of the propositions to their significance as answers to the questions that were stirring in Spinoza's mind. (shrink)

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis about transcendental geology in the final phase of his work, this article examines the debate about the Anthropocene from the perspective of philosophy of history. Firstly, we follow the author through the preliminary materials for The Visible and The Invisible by situating transcendental geology within the book’s complex theoretical architecture, and by foregrounding the necessity of rethinking the notion of Earth through the reading that the French philosopher offers of Husserl’s phenomenology. We will thus focus (...) on the theme of the overturning of the Copernican doctrine in an ethico-practical perspective, showing that Merleau-Ponty’s ecology can be considered a philosophical ecology ante litteram. Finally, drawing on the hypothesis proposed by historians Bonneuil and Fressoz, the essay will attempt to highlight the relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s practical thought for the debate about the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Brillouin sees order as generated by tapping negentropy sources existing upstream, while Prigogine sees it as generated by dumping entropy downstream. Joining both ideas yields a picture of the computer closely paralleling that of Carnot's heat engine. The difference is that the one delivers information and the other, work. In either case the irretrievable (that is, by definition) loss occurs at the last step. Bennett and Landauer very rightly emphasize this, but their fixation on the condenser blinds them to the (...) necessity of the furnace; thus they are led to believe in the possibility of “perpetual duplication of the second kind,” which Brillouin explicitly denies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 34.2 (2006) 3-13 [Access article in PDF] Biographical Illusion and Methodological Reality Leland De La Durantaye Pierre Bourdieu. Esquisse Pour Une Auto-Analyse. Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2004. 1 Like his student and friend Nietzsche, Jacob Burckhardt often stressed the necessity for a scholar to work in solitude. Like Nietzsche, he also possessed a gift for acidic analogy and likened the world of academia to a group of dogs (...) sniffing one another.Few observers of the academic interactions of his time had such sharp senses as Pierre Bourdieu, and few have been as torn between solitary reflection and communal exchange. Trained by France's most elite academic institutions (such as the celebrated Parisian lycée Louis-le-Grand and the even more celebrated École Normale Supérieure), Bourdieu was grateful for the opportunities that this training afforded him. And he felt that this gratitude could best be repaid by submitting those elite academic institutions and their insular world to an unsparing critique, to unveiling the distance that separated their stated ideals from their real effects.Like Bergson and Jaurès, like Sartre and Aron, like Foucault and Derrida, Bourdieu studied that which was most difficult and most prestigious where it was most difficult and prestigious: philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure. Like those famous fellow alumni, he was a brilliant student, and like them, he longed to distinguish his personal vision from those around him. This led him to do something surprising, something that, despite their separate and significant dissatisfactions with the philosophy of their day, neither Bergson nor Sartre, neither Foucault nor Derrida ever did: he abandoned philosophy. He left what he saw as the intellectual royal road for the most pedestrian of paths—that of sociology.As he often reminded his readers, sociology was in a sorry state when he entered it. Both in academic appraisal and the popular imagination, it was considered dry and provincial. It was thought to have no true intellectual adventure in it—nothing of the ethnologist tramping through the rain forests of the Amazon, nothing of the lone philosopher working through the night on an opus to end metaphysics. It was laborious and abstract; it dealt in statistical generalities. Bourdieu repeatedly described sociology as "the pariah of disciplines."1 He had, however, a special mission for it in mind. [End Page 3]In Bourdieu's posthumous memoir Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, published in February 2004—two years after his death—by the small publishing house he helped found, Raisons d'Agir, he notes how, "a bit as a joke," he had often defined himself as "the leader of a liberation movement aiming to free the social sciences from philosophy's imperialism" [94].2 From early on in his career, he had wished to revolt against the "empire of the total philosopher"—an empire reigned over by, more than any other, Jean-Paul Sartre [cf. 25].3 Looking back upon this decisive period of his development, Bourdieu goes so far as to state that the shaping of his identity was done "against everything which the Sartrian enterprise represented for me" [37]. In historical accounts, Sartre is often given as counterfigure his friend and fellow normalien Raymond Aron. In his Esquisse, Bourdieu proposes a different, and less conventional, counterfigure for the imperial philosopher: the brilliant Austrian satirist and cultural critic Karl Kraus. Bourdieu notes the particular affection he had always felt for Kraus and attributes it to the latter's singular capacity for "critical reflectivenesss" [37]. Subtly, and appropriately, Bourdieu follows this remark with something that occurs nowhere else in his memoir: an epigram (the composing of which Kraus excelled in). Bourdieu writes: "there are a great many intellectuals who question the world, but there are very few intellectuals who question the intellectual world" [37]. The remark could not more compactly and precisely reflect what Bourdieu had aspired all his life to do: to excel in the art and science of questioning the intellectual world. 2 Leo Spitzer liked to cite Friedrich Gundolf's dictum "Methode ist Erlebnis" (method is lived experience). Nearing the end of his career... (shrink)

In the Social Contract, the model for the structural description of textuality derives from the incompatibility between the formulation and the application of the law, reiterating the estrangement that exists between the sovereign as an active, and the State as a static, principle. The distinction, which is not a polarity, can therefore also be phrased in terms of the difference between political action and political prescription. The tension between figural and grammatical language is duplicated in the differentiation between the State (...) as a defined entity and the State as a principle of action or, in linguistic terms, between the constative and the performative function of language. A text is defined by the necessity of considering a statement, at the same time, as performative and constative, and the logical tension between figure and grammar is repeated in the impossibility of distinguishing between two linguistic functions which are not necessarily compatible. It seems that as soon as a text knows what it states, it can only act deceptively, like the thieving lawmaker in the Social Contract, and if a text does not act, it cannot state what it knows. The distinction between a text as narrative and a text as theory also belongs to this field of tension. Paul de Man, Tripp Professor in the humanities and chairman of the French department of Yale University, is the author of Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. His forthcoming study of the theory of figural language, of which this essay will be a part, centers on Rousseau and involves as well Rilke, Proust, and Nietzsche. He has also contributed "The Epistemology of Metaphor" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

Just as he puts to the test, in his private correspondence, the philosophical theses that he will then defend in more elaborate treatises, Fenelon has thus put to the test, in his letters, polemic anti-Jansenist arguments that he has then developed in his Pastoral Instruction in the form of dialogues subscribed on January 1, 1714 to defend the doctrinal legitimacy of the condemnation of Quesnel’s errors by the Bull Vnigenitus. In the years before the publication of the Clementine Constitution, Fénelon’s (...) correspondence developed an obsession with the necessity of condemning Jansenism by the Roman proscription of the system of the two delectations. (shrink)

How should autonomous vehicles be programmed to behave in the event of an unavoidable accident in which the only choice open is one between causing different damages or losses to different objects or persons? This paper addresses this ethical question starting from the normative principles elaborated in the law to regulate difficult choices in other emergency scenarios. In particular, the paper offers a rational reconstruction of some major principles and norms embedded in the Anglo-American jurisprudence and case law on the (...) “doctrine of necessity”; and assesses which, if any, of these principles and norms can be utilized to find reasonable guidelines for solving the ethical issue of the regulation of the programming of autonomous vehicles in emergency situations. The paper covers the following topics: the distinction between “justification” and “excuse”, the legal prohibition of intentional killing outside self-defence, the incommensurability of goods, and the legal constrains to the use of lethal force set by normative positions: obligations, responsibility, rights, and authority. For each of these principles and constrains the possible application to the programming of autonomous vehicles is discussed. Based on the analysis, some practical suggestions are offered. (shrink)

The question of the dimensionality of space has informed the development of physics since the beginning of the twentieth century in the quest for a unified picture of quantum processes and gravitation. Scientists have worked within various approaches to explain why the universe appears to have a certain number of spatial dimensions. The question of why space has three dimensions has a genuinely philosophical nature that can be shaped as a problem of justifying a contingent necessity of the world. (...) In contrast to explanations of three-dimensionality based on anthropic arguments, we support the search for a theory that provides a justification for the dimensionality of space based on a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning applied to science. In doing so, we argue that Kant correctly approached the question in “Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces” by connecting space dimensionality and the inverse square law. In expounding the strategy of Kant’s argument, we describe the main features of a general Kantian explanation of the dimensionality of space and discuss them with respect to current accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science, such as inference to the best explanation and the deductive-nomological model. (shrink)

We were led, at the close of the last paper, to the conclusion that the moral judgment lays claim to a knowledge of what is unknowable. It is not merely that our volition is imperfect, that the act of necessity falls short of what we know to be right. This seems bad enough; but the plight in which we actually find ourselves is even worse. The paradox is that we never know, and never can know, in any particular situation, (...) what it is really right to do. We know indeed that it is always right, really and absolutely right, to do what we believe to be right. For a man to act “against his conscience,” after all possible thought has been taken for its enlightenment, we know to be morally wrong. But this knowledge is purely formal and gives no clue to the matter of moral obligation. It tells us what is common alike to any and every case of moral duty; it does not tell us what we ought to do. For the right that we will cannot be merely the rightness of willing it. What I ought to do cannot be merely that I ought to do it. Now our beliefs and judgments as to material rightness, i.e. as to what it is right to do in a concrete situation, are notoriously liable to error. So we seek for a criterion by which to test our variable and fallible judgments, a criterion of what is really right. But the search is doomed to failure; we can only test beliefs by beliefs, our former beliefs by our later, the beliefs of one man or society or age by those of others. (shrink)

As a contribution to the commemorations of Spinoza's death, this article describes in a few pages the significance of Spinoza in the evolution of Western political thought. Especially in his Political Treatise, Spinoza attempted to elaborate a «scientific» theory of political life, i.e. a closing deductive theory based upon a «true knowledge of the causes and natural bases» of human actions and passions. In his view it can be proved with a rational necessity that democracy - defined as Spinoza (...) defines it - is the best political regime. He strongly emphasizes that democracy and, consequently, a well organized and efficiently functioning life in common, is impossible without real freedom of opinion and speech and a political «neutralization» of religion. (shrink)

A long-debated question in the philosophy of health, and contingent disciplines, is the extent to which wise clinical practice (“clinical wisdom”) is, or could be, compatible with empirically validated medicine (“evidence-based medicine”—EBM). Here we respond to Baum-Baicker and Sisti, who not only suggest that these two types of knowledge are divided due to their differing sources, but also that EBM can sometimes even hurt wise clinical practice. We argue that the distinction between EBM and clinical wisdom is poorly defined, unsupported (...) by the methodology employed, and ultimately incorrect; crucial differences exist, we argue, not in the source of a particular piece of clinical knowledge, but in its dependability. In light of this subtle but fundamental revision, we explain how clinical wisdom and EBM are—by necessity—complementary, rather than in conflict. We elaborate on how recognizing this relationship can have far-reaching implications for the domains of clinical practice, medical education, and health policy. (shrink)

How may human agents come to trust artificial agents? At present, since the trust involved is non-normative, this would seem to be a slow process, depending on the outcomes of the transactions. Some more options may soon become available though. As debated in the literature, humans may meet bots as they are embedded in an institution. If they happen to trust the institution, they will also trust them to have tried out and tested the machines in their back corridors; as (...) a consequence, they approach the robots involved as being trustworthy. Properly speaking, users rely on the overall accountability of the institution. Besides this option we explore some novel ways for trust development: trust becomes normatively laden and thereby the mechanism of exclusive reliance on the normative force of trust may come into play - the efficacy of which has already been proven for persons meeting face-to-face or over the Internet. For one thing, machines may evolve into moral machines, or machines skilled in the art of deception. While both developments might seem to facilitate proper trust and turn as-if trust into a feasible option, they are hardly to be taken seriously. For another, the new trend in robotics is towards coactivity between human and machine operators in a team. Inside the team trust is a necessity for smooth operations. In support of this, humans in particular need to be able to develop and maintain accurate mental models of their machine counterparts. Nevertheless, the trust involved is bound to remain non-normative. It is argued, though, that excellent opportunities exist to build relations of trust toward outside users who are pondering their reliance on the coactive team. The task of managing this trust has to be allotted to human operators of the team, who operate as linking pin between the outside world and the team. Since the robotic team has now been turned into an anthropomorphic team, users may well develop normative trust towards them; correspondingly, trusting the team in as-if fashion becomes feasible. (shrink)

The axiomatic approaches of quantum mechanics and relativity theory are compared with approaches in which the theories are thought to describe readings of certain measurement operations. The usual axioms are shown to correspond with classes of ideal measurements. The necessity is discussed of generalizing the formalisms of both quantum mechanics and relativity theory so as to encompass more realistic nonideal measurements. It is argued that this generalization favours an empiricist interpretation of the mathematical formalisms over a realist one.

We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency, as originally proposed in van Benthem :36–41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of “obligation as weakest permission” from Anglberger et al. :807–827, 2015).

With his doctrine of the “complete irresponsibility of man,” Nietzsche in different ways complicates the opposition between responsibility and irresponsibility. This article traces the different and conflicting senses of irresponsibility throughout Nietzsche’s development. First, the doctrine is shown to build on Nietzsche’s early study of Heraclitus (section I), whom Nietzsche admired for expounding and embodying a radical “innocence” that was both responsible and irresponsible in different senses. When presented as “philosophical conviction” in Human, All too Human, Nietzsche paradoxically speculates about (...) the doctrine’s incorporation out of a sense of responsibility for the future of mankind (section II). Section III shows how Nietzsche’s later writings evince an increasing awareness of this paradox by explicitly positing complete irresponsibility as his own redemptive doctrine in Twilight of the Idols. After 1881, he has come to affirm a new notion of responsibility and criticizes a weak sense of irresponsibility as the abdication of one’s task. I end by discussing the relation of these different senses of irresponsibility, and argue that the fact that Nietzsche’s texts often deliberately complicate rather than clarify such distinctions is an important reflection of how he textually takes responsibility for “complete irresponsibility” (section IV). (shrink)

In recent years largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine and that of Jonathan Lowe there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of essence and the project of explaining de re necessity in terms of it. Of course, Quine rejected what he called Aristotelian essentialism in his battle against quantified modal logic. But what he and Kripke debated was a notion of essence defined in terms of de re necessity. The new Aristotelian essentialists (...) regard essence as entailing but prior in the order of explanation to de re necessity. In what follows I argue that the concept of essence so understood has not been adequately explained and that any attempt to explain it, at least along the lines most familiar from the literature, must be flagrantly circular or make use of de re modal notions. (shrink)