The book's significance is two-fold: it argues for a new stage in the development of contemporary Confucian philosophy, and it demonstrates the value to Western ...

An empirically based version of the good life as proposed by positive psychology is a donut with something missing at the core--the moral map. This paper addresses ramifications of this lacuna, and suggests ways to narrow the gap between science and life. By applying an extended version of the self-regulation theory of Higgins to a cross cultural analysis of the good life as envisioned by Seligman and Confucius, respectively, this paper sheds light on the culturally encapsulated value judgments behind positive (...) psychology, examines issues at stake in an empirically based version of the good life, and suggests, for future research, alternative approaches that may better fulfill the promises of positive psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

UNTIL RECENT YEARS moral traditions have not been an important topic for moral philosophy. With few exceptions, attention has been directed to the problem of moral justification, to the search for universal criteria for the assessment of moral beliefs or judgments regardless of their traditional provenance. Generally, philosophers aspire to formulate "the view from nowhere." Since the publication of Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue there has been a revival of interest in the concept of a living, moral tradition, especially among moral (...) philosophers concerned with the possibility of an ethics of virtue or character as a viable alternative to the ethics of principle or, say, to deontological, utilitarian, or contractarian ethics. We must observe here that in the three decades prior to 1981, some moral philosophers displayed similar concern with tradition, although terms other than "tradition" were used, for example, "forms of life," "ways of life," "moral practices," and "moral community." Rawls's conception of reflective equilibrium is also developed with an eye on the notion of tradition. Indeed, Rawls has been quite explicit about his tradition-oriented approach to moral theory: "What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine.". (shrink)

The unique discourse of Confucian ritual practice encompasses a powerful and sophisticated way of talking about individual fulfillment within the context of more substantive or universal conceptions of the good life. To make this case, I will consider both the text of the "Analects" and the influential readings of the "Analects" offered by Fingarette in "Confucius: The Secular as Sacred" and by Hall and Ames in "Thinking through Confucius". Though the two interpretive works are helpful in articulating the classical (...) Confucian contribution to the problem of balancing conformity and individuality, I will argue that an alternative reading is required to appreciate fully how values thought to embody and express the fullest humanity might be inculcated in ethical agents without undoing their individuality. Such an alternative is developed here. (shrink)

_The Horizon of Modernity_ provides a historicized account of New Confucian philosophy in relation to the contemporary revival of Confucianism and explores the nexus between subjectivity and social structure in the works of Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xiong Shili.

This article introduces the Chinese conception of wisdom by a focus mainly on the famous discussion in Mencius. It emphasizes that everything is a change, that changes toward wisdom are natural (or in the case of Xunzi, humane), and that people are always changing toward or away from what is wise. In contrast to much Western thought, wisdom is a response to external things, not to an internal marker. Moreover, it is nearly always a commentary on conjoint actions as in (...) a game, or ritual. The essay continues some strands of Chinese thinking about wisdom through Xunzi and up to Zhu Xi. My position as a Westerner is commented on at the end. (shrink)

Fifteen essays addressing conceptions of individualism and holism as they emerged in Chinese literature and philosophy from the time of Confucius and Chuang-tzu to the present.

Those who bear the burdens of injustice and oppression are entitled to act in ways contrary to existing laws and institutions to secure their own entitlements and those of others. This article aims to articulate a Confucian perspective on resistance against injustice. There are reasons for thinking that the notion of resistance is fundamentally at odds with Confucian political thought. In this article, I move beyond this simple conflict/compatibility model and explore the complex relationships between resistance and Confucianism. (...) On one hand, some of Confucianism’s core commitments can be better attained in contemporary societies by allowing resistance; on the other, a Confucian perspective can offer insights into current discussions on the ethics of resistance. (shrink)

Against a backdrop of an international trend to shift from a teacher-centred to a learner-centred education, this article explores a Confucian conception of education. Focusing on an ancient Chinese text Xueji, the essay examines its educational ideals and practices based on the principles of ‘choice’, ‘doing’ and ‘power relationship’. It is argued that the educational model in the Xueji does not fit the description of a learner-centred education as commonly understood in the Western literature. Rather, the Xueji advocates a (...) ‘teacher-directed and learner-engaged’ approach by giving the teacher control over the curriculum and authority over the learners while encouraging the learners to participate actively in the learning process. In proposing a conception that is not exactly learner-centred, the Xueji challenges the assumption that ‘good’ education must necessarily be learner-centred. (shrink)

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, EarlyView.

The assumption that a system described as ‘Confucianism’ formulated by Dong Zhongshu became accepted as the norm during the Western Han dynasty (202 BCE – 9 CE) is challenged and his supposed authorship of the Chunqiu fanlu examined.

Inspired by early Confucian texts such as the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi, defenders of Confucian role ethics argue that persons are constituted by their social roles and relationships. However, this has the puzzling implication that persons cannot survive changes in social roles and relationships. This paper proposes ways to understand this claim by appealing to the notions of essence, material constitution, and four-dimensionalism. In particular, it will be suggested that role ethicists should distinguish biological humans from persons and (...) should say either that (i) persons are materially constituted by biological humans, or that (ii) persons are four-dimensional objects that merely overlap with biological humans. There has thus far not been much contact between early Chinese philosophy and contemporary metaphysics in this vein. A secondary goal of this paper is to demonstrate that views in early Chinese philosophy can be examined within frameworks from contemporary metaphysics, and furthermore, that the results include novel theses not yet recognized in contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

There is an inner thoroughness spirit in traditional Chinese learning of classics—the so-called "Guoxue" in Chinese. Only on this foundation of "thoroughness" spirit can academics show its vigorous culture life and spiritual life, which makes traditional Chinese learning of classics pursue the transcendence of heaven and man and can’t be divided into a religion. Our traditional Chinese values and its original significance exist in our traditional academic system and the enlightenment of propriety and music. As for the self—identification, because of (...) the lost of the "thoroughness" spirit and original significance foundation, the traditional Chinese learning of classics concealed their academic specialties that make the reconstruction of modern Chinese culture lack a solid foundation. Currently, various colleges, institutes and centers of traditional Chinese learning have been set up in many universities, but “Guoxue” should not be taken as one special subject far from the other disciplines, and we should make efforts to reconstruct the traditional Chinese learning of classics ("Guoxue") as a primitive significance-adding foundation or “academic home”. (shrink)

In the current crisis of liberal democracy, Confucianism has been cited as offering superior alternative models of government. With the resources from Dewey’s Pragmatism, this paper defends democracy, which should not be equated to de facto liberal democracies, as desirable for Confucian societies. It examines the affinities between Confucian and Dewey’s conception of the person and community and argues for an understanding of democratic values that brings together Dewey’s democratic values and Confucian ideals of personal cultivation and (...) virtuous governance. (shrink)

This article discusses the application of artificially intelligent robots within eldercare and explores a series of ethical considerations, including the challenges that AI (Artificial Intelligence) technology poses to traditional Chinese Confucian filial piety. From the perspective of Confucian ethics, the paper argues that robots cannot adequately fulfill duties of care. Due to their detachment from personal relationships and interactions, the “emotions” of AI robots are merely performative reactions in different situations, rather than actual emotional abilities. No matter how (...) “humanized” robots become, it is difficult to establish genuine empathy and a meaningful relationship with them for this reason. Even so, we acknowledge that AI robots are a significant tool in managing the demands of elder care and the growth of care poverty, and as such, we attempt to outline some parameters within which care robotics could be acceptable within a Confucian ethical system. Finally, the paper discusses the social impact and ethical considerations brought on by the interaction between humans and machines. It is observed that the relationship between humans and technology has always had both utopian and dystopian aspects, and robotic elder care is no exception. AI caregiver robots will likely become a part of elder care, and the transformation of these robots from “service providers” to “companions” seems inevitable. In light of this, the application of AI-augmented robotic elder care will also eventually change our understanding of interpersonal relationships and traditional requirements of filial piety. (shrink)

Various interpretations of the role that ming ("fate") plays in early Confucian thought are examined. An interpretation is advanced which argues that early Confucians saw reality as being bifurcated into two distinct realms--"inner" and "outer"--and that ming refers to unpredictable forces in the outside realm, which are beyond the bounds of proper human endeavor. The vagaries of ming are not the concern of the gentleman, whose efforts and worries are to be focused on the cultivation of the self: the (...) inner realm where "seeking helps one to get it." It is argued that a sense of "interiority" is present in early Confucianism, and an attempt is made to distinguish the world-view of Confucius and Mencius from that of later Neo-Confucian interpreters. (shrink)

Offers three Neo-Confucian understandings of broadening the Way as broadening oneself, through an ongoing process of removing self-boundaries.

Drawing on the Confucian political philosophy of China, Roger Ames presents “family feeling” (xiao) as a candidate for a universal minimalist morality. Challenging certain conventional views in political philosophy that see family feeling as a threat to achieving an egalitarian level playing field, Ames underscores the ethical and political significance of family, advocating for the integration of familial sentiments into the political sphere. He addresses modern challenges, showing how diverse cultural expressions are allowed for within this philosophy’s pluralistic and (...) locally focused framework. This dynamic ethical perspective rooted in the shared sentiment of family feeling challenges us to critically reexamine Confucianism, China, and our entire geopolitical situation. (shrink)

With the rapid proliferation of New Confucian studies since the mid 1980s, it has become an unquestioned dogma that one particular event at the beginning of 1958 marks a watershed in the movement’s development. This event is the publication of the Manifesto that Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, and Zhang Junmai 张君劢 co-signed and published almost simultaneously in the two journals Minzhu pinglun 民評論 (Democratic Tribune) and Zaisheng 再生(National Renaissance) with the title 为中国文化敬告世界人士宣言─我们对中国学术研究及中国文化与世界文前途之共同认识 (Wei Zhongguo (...) wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan –women dui Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji Zhongguo wenhua yu shijiewen qiantu zhi gongtong renshi; translated in English as A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture – our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study relating to World Cultural Outlook). Scholars have interpreted the document as an emblematic expression of cultural conservatism, in reaction to the intellectual trend of 1920s best represented by the so-called Scienticist School (kexuejia 科学家). Concepts such as cultural identity and cultural conservatism, however, do not account for the philosophical richness articulated in the Manifesto, whose main purpose is to benefit Western intellectuals in ‘aiding them to appreciate Chinese culture’. In order to do so, the authors employ a strategic terminology, which allows them to build a consistent cross-cultural dialogue between Western and Chinese philosophy by means of an unprecedented discourse on Chinese Rationalism (Zhongguo xinxing zhi xue 中国心性之学). Interestingly, the latter is described by the authors as «the essence of Chinese Culture» and, beside its comparative value, it represents the most comprehensive configuration of Confucianism in the context of 20th century. Academic interest in Chinese Studies and Chinese Philosophy should take into account the articulation of Chinese Rationalism in the Manifesto of 1958 as representing a paradigm of post-comparative dialogue that exemplifies the underlying philosophical continuity beyond consistently different traditions of thought. (shrink)

This paper examines the content of the Japanese Samurai spirit, which is comparable to the Korean Seonbi spirit, focusing on its relationship with Confucian thought. Specifically, the paper discusses the distinctive nature of Nitobe Inazo's ‘Bushido’, which spoke of Samurai morality based on universal Confucianism, Tsuda Sokichi's Bushido theory which totally rejected the influence of such Confucianism, and the spread of Confucianism which began in earnest with the end of warfare in the Edo period through Nakae Tojyu and Yamaga (...) Soko. First, I argue that Nitobe's Bushido developed Bushido based on Confucianism, which refers to universal morality, but that it also encompassed values specific to Japan due to the historical circumstances of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. Next, I pointed out that Tsuda's Bushido theory, which he criticized, was an argument based on historical grounds that put the actual lives of warriors in the foreground, but was limited in that it unilaterally emphasized only the historical particularities of Japan and downplayed the role of Confucianism as a universal ideology. Next, the creation of a new Samurai spirit through Confucianism in the Edo period, or the content of the Confucian Shido theory, through Tojyu's viewpoint of Bunbu Ittoku and Soko's emphasis on external dignity, revealed that although the Sonbi spirit and the Samurai spirit are based on the same Confucianism, the two are as dissimilar as the conflicting images represented by Bun and Bu. (shrink)

This essay elucidates special features of I Eonjeok’s Jungyong gugyeong yeonui and Yeonui byeoljip, mainly in comparison with Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the Zhongyong. It also explores the significance of these two works in I Eonjeok’s entire thoughts on Confucian classics. I Eonjeok understands the Daxue in accordance with Neo-Confucianism, especially when he regards the investigation of the principle [窮理] as the precondition for correcting the mind [正心]. In addition, he interprets ‘one’ [一] as the sincerity [誠] of the (...) way of Heaven and discusses it in the context of the theory of the heavenly principle and human desire [天理人欲論]. I Eonjeok understands that reverence [敬], one of the core concepts of Neo-Confucian moral cultivation, is in line with sincerity and the sagely mind. In the Jungyong gugyeong yeonui, I Eonjeok emphasizes the Nine Rules [九經] of the Zhongyong as the key principles on which one governs the world. He believes that one can fulfil this task through sincerity, and as a way of cultivation, he recommends the investigation of things, expansion of knowledge, sincerity, and correcting the mind [格致誠正] instructed in the Daxue. According to him, sincerity is construed as the way of Heaven and the King can observe the Nine Rules by getting a firm grasp of the way of Heaven. The Jungyong gugyeong yeonui was intended to be presented to the King; therefore, it exhibits strong characteristics as the disciplines of kingship [帝王學]. The Jungyong gugyeong yeonui and Yeonui byeoljip, both of which explain the Nine Rules, provide complementary explanations to each other. I Eonjeok interprets Confucius’ saying that the King should appoint a person who has the virtue of cherishing people's lives as emphasizing that the King is able to benefit the people with pity only when he is assisted by the subject with this virtue. He stresses the significance of appointing the prime minister and other ministers from the perspective of the disciplines of kingship. In addition, he believes that fortune or misfortune from Heaven depends on whether the King has consistent virtue or not. I Eonjeok is under the influence of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism in that he contrasts the heavenly principle and human desire when discussing the virtue of the King. Besides, his interpretation of the Nine Rules is deemed as the disciplines of kingship in that he underlines the pure mind of the King. (shrink)

: The doctrines on human nature and moral development maintained in ancient China by Gaozi, Mencius, and Xunzi, respectively, have been interpreted mostly as a contradiction within the Confucian school. It is argued here that they represent distinct, yet possible and congruous, modes of interpreting and re-elaborating Confucius' teachings, two opposing yet largely complementary currents that have developed within the Confucian school.

It is always a delight to see contemporary engagement with the rich insights of Mencius and Xunzi. In the case of Sungmoon Kim’s thoughtful and ambitious book, this delight is further accompanied by a feeling of confidence about future possibilities. Indeed, the analytic style and the conceptual devices Kim adopts in his discussion and reconstruction of these two thinkers’ ideas provide us with a more focused and structured way to notice and appreciate their commonalities and differences. Moreover, he attends to (...) the differences in the social and political contexts these two thinkers were embedded in, as well as their different views regarding human nature and moral psychology. This attention is then followed by his... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:An Exegetic Study of the So-Called Proposition of Confucian AestheticsWang Yi (bio) and Xiaowei FuSince Wang Guowei and Cai Yuanpei introduced the concepts of aesthetics and aesthetic education, respectively, to China in the early twentieth century, there has been a strong tendency in many of the aesthetic discussions to examine ancient texts and materials using modern concepts of aesthetics. In particular, sentences with the character-word mei1 are often (...) sought in classical works and interpreted as speeches on or about beauty, which has led to frequent misunderstandings of the classical texts and of the ancient Confucian aesthetic theory.The most typical among these misunderstandings, we think, is the misinterpretation of one of Mencius's remarks on the goodness of human nature-"To possess these qualities of goodness fully is beautiful" (Chongshi zhiwei mei)2-as a representative statement of the Confucian aesthetic theory of "the union of the beautiful and good." Although it is not clear who was the first to put this interpretation forward, it is now widely accepted and almost unquestioned that the statement "Chongshi zhiwei mei" is the classical proposition of the Confucian aesthetic theory after countless repetitions by aestheticians and educationalists. And extended from this is the claim that "the union of the beautiful and good," or the union of the moral and beauty, is the traditional theory of Confucian aesthetic education.3 Finding it coincidentally in accordance with the idea of "the union of the beautiful and good" in both the Soviet and Greek philosophies, aesthetic educators are apt to admit that aesthetic education is included in moral education or aesthetic education is but one of the means of moral education; thus, aesthetic education cannot be an independent subject. [End Page 80]It is rather surprising that in spite of the wide interest in quoting this sentence, very little in the textual research and criticism has offered convincing proof that it is really Mencius's opinion about beauty or aesthetic theory and therefore-since he is the most influential Confucian educator and philosopher after Confucius-representative of the aesthetic theory of Confucianism.Actually, the proper analysis of the meaning of the word mei in this statement by Mencius has long been a controversial issue in Chinese history. There have been two main approaches: mei as an equivalent of shan (good/ goodness) and mei as a synonym with its modern Chinese counterpart. The former is taken by Zhao Qi,4 according to whom mei in this statement is a term used to explain a level of shan. This analysis is further developed by Sun Shi,5 who argues that mei is the third level of the six shan. Likewise, Yang Bojun,6 among other modern scholars, also considers mei an equivalent of shan. The latter approach, on the other hand, is pursued by Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi, Jiao Xun,7 and many modern aestheticians, who all interpret mei as "beauty" or "beautiful" in the aesthetic sense.The main interest of the present analysis is an attempt to decode the genuine meaning of the statement. With references to ancient dictionaries like Origin of Chinese Characters8 and exegetic works (from 206 bc to the modern times) of Mencius, this article attempts to contextualize mei in the original text and historical context in order to interpret the meaning of the sentence and the real intention of Mencius. In this way we hope to determine whether it can be regarded as the proposition of Mencius or the Confucian aesthetic theory of "the union of the beautiful and good."IIn the first part of this article we shall offer a contextual study of the sentence with reference to two of the ancient interpretations of the theme of the passage and the meaning of the character mei. By investigating the context of the sentence "Chongshi zhiwei mei" we argue that the theme of the passage is a discussion of the six levels of shan (goodness).The context of the sentence comes from a passage in Mencius (Jinxin part 2), which begins with Mencius talking with Haosheng Buhai about one of his disciples, Yue Zhengzi, who was reported to embark in a political career in the State... (shrink)