Block makes a case for the existence of conscious experience without access. His case would have been much stronger, however, if he had woven fully unconscious processing into the and considered arguments that are intrinsic to neuroscience.

THIS PAPER IS A DISCUSSION OF MACKIE’S HUMEAN ARGUMENT THAT MIRACLES CANNOT PLAY A ROLE IN A CASE FOR THEISM. I ARGUE THAT MACKIE IS MISTAKEN IN CONTENDING THAT MIRACLES CANNOT FORM PART OF A CASE FOR THEISM. IF THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT CERTAIN EVENTS DEVIATE FROM THE ORDINARY COURSE OF NATURE, AND IF AFFIRMING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD WOULD RENDER THAT EVIDENCE MORE COMPREHENSIBLE THAN OTHERWISE, THEN IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT EVIDENCE THAT THESE EVENTS HAVE OCCURRED IS EVIDENCE (...) THAT GOD EXISTS. (shrink)

Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue?the primary focus (...) of this paper?he argues that consciousness is both intrinsic and higher-order, due to its reflexive nature. This, in turn, has consequences for the second issue, where again Aristotle seeks out the middle ground. He is committed against qualia in any strong sense of the term. Yet he also holds that the phenomenal quality of experience is not exhausted by its representational content. (shrink)

This paper provides a definitive answer, based on considerations derived from first-order logic, to the question regarding the status of elementary geometry, whether elementary geometry can be reduced to algebra. The answer we arrive at is negative, and is based on a series of structural questions that can be asked only inside the geometric formal theory, as well as the consideration of reverse geometry, which is the art of finding minimal axiom systems strong enough to prove certain geometrical theorems, given (...) that there are no algebraic structures that one could associate with those minimal axiom systems. (shrink)

In "The Existence of God," Richard Swinburne offers several arguments for the claim that death is not a surprising phenomenon on the assumption that God exists. I try to show that his arguments fail individually and when taken collectively. Further, I claim that the kinds of assumptions involved in his arguments can plausibly be used to argue that death would be surprising if God exists and therefore that death counts as evidence against God's existence. Finally, I argue that Swinburne's claims (...) create problems for theists who believe in eternal life after death since his arguments seem to entail that God would have good reason for denying us eternal life beyond the grave. (shrink)

Arguments attempting to debunk moral beliefs, by showing they are unjustified, have tended to be global, targeting all moral beliefs or a large set of them. Popular debunking arguments point to various factors purportedly influencing moral beliefs, from evolutionary pressures, to automatic and emotionally-driven processes, to framing effects. We show that these sweeping arguments face a debunker’s dilemma: either the relevant factor is not a main basis for belief or it does not render the relevant beliefs unjustified. Empirical debunking arguments (...) in ethics can avoid this predicament, but only if they are refocused on highly selective classes of moral belief. Experimental data can combine with familiar consistency reasoning to reveal that like cases are not being treated alike. Selective debunking arguments are unlikely to yield sweeping sceptical conclusions, but they can lead to rational moral change. (shrink)

Experimental research in moral psychology can be used to generate debunking arguments in ethics. Specifically, research can indicate that we draw a moral distinction on the basis of a morally irrelevant difference. We develop this naturalistic approach by examining a recent debate between Joshua Greene and Selim Berker. We argue that Greene's research, if accurate, undermines attempts to reconcile opposing judgments about trolley cases, but that his attempt to debunk deontology fails. We then draw some general lessons about the (...) possibility of empirical debunking arguments in ethics. (shrink)

Many scholars are ready to accept that first person thought involves a special way w such that, for any thinker x, only x can access the first person way w of thinking about x. Standard articulations of this Frege-inspired view involve a rejection of the strict shareability of first person thought. I argue that this rejection eventually forces us to renounce an intuitively plausible characterisation of communication, and specifically, disagreement. This result invites us to explore alternative articulations which, still within (...) an overall Fregean framework, may better explain how first person thoughts reach out into a public, shareable dimension. Here I shape this possibility in terms of perspectives, i.e. ways of thinking that do not individuate concepts or thoughts. Perspectives, I submit, can serve to unproblematically accommodate basic disagreement in indexical cases and to outline the dynamic character of first person thought. (shrink)

Although there has been significant attention in clinical ethics to when physicians should follow a parent’s wishes, there has been much less discussion of the obligation to solicit viewpoints and decisions from all caregivers who have equal moral and legal standing in relation to a pediatric patient. How should healthcare professionals respond when one caregiver dominates decision making? We present a case that highlights how these problems played out in an ethical bargain. Ethical bargaining occurs when the parties involved choose (...) not to pursue a morally preferable option for the sake of coming to a resolution. This case is not one of parental disagreement; rather, the medical team agreed to exclude the patient’s mother from decision making if the patient’s father promised to bring their son back to the hospital for necessary medical tests. We argue that there is an obligation to notice and acknowledge power asymmetries in the family unit, which, in this case, was manifested as the marginalization of the female decision maker by the male decision maker. In these scenarios, clinicians should be careful to avoid treating parents as one homogenous unit, and they should take action to enable caregivers’ autonomy and voice. While there are moral and practical limits to how and when physicians should intervene in family dynamics, we discuss the steps that the medical team should have taken in this case to avoid undermining the parental authority of the mother. We conclude by offering recommendations to address and enable caregivers’ autonomy at an institutional level, and we discuss the importance of tracking and responding to damaging family dynamics to prevent ethically impermissible bargaining. (shrink)

The distinction between the body schema and the body image has become the stock in trade of much recent work in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy. Yet little is known about the interactions between these two types of body representations. We need to account not only for their dissociations in rare cases, but also for their convergence most of the time. Indeed in our everyday life the body we perceive does not conflict with the body we act with. Are the (...) body image and the body schema then somehow reshaping each other or are they relatively independent and do they only happen to be congruent? On the basis of the study of bodily hallucinations, we consider which model can best account for the body schema/body image interactions. (shrink)

In resultant moral luck, blame and punishment seem intuitively to depend on downstream effects of a person’s action that are beyond his or her control. Some skeptics argue that we should override our intuitions about moral luck and reform our practices. Other skeptics attempt to explain away apparent cases of moral luck as epistemic artifacts. I argue, to the contrary, that moral luck is real—that people are genuinely responsible for some things beyond their control. A partially consequentialist theory of (...) responsibility justifies moral luck. But this justification is no mere rationalization of the status quo. Recent experimental and evolutionary work on punishment and learning suggests that the very same reasons that justify moral luck have also shaped the evolution of our luck-sensitive moral practices. (shrink)

In this article I give a unified account of three phenomena: bullshit, pseudoscience and pseudophilosophy. My aims are partly conceptual, partly evaluative. Drawing on Harry Frankfurt's seminal analysis of bullshit, I give an account of the three phenomena and of how they are related, and I use this account to explain what is bad about all three. More specifically, I argue that what is defective about pseudoscience and pseudophilosophy is precisely that they are special cases of bullshit. Apart from (...) raising interesting philosophical issues, gaining a clearer understanding of these phenomena is also of practical importance, in that it bears on how best to tackle the threat that they pose. (shrink)

This paper assesses two different approaches to inner speech that can be found in the literature. One of them regards inner speech as a vehicle of conscious thought. The other holds that inner speech is better characterised as an activity derived from social uses of its outer counterpart. In this paper I focus on the explanatory power of each approach to account for the control of attention and behaviour in the context of executive tasks. I will argue that the vehicle (...) view cannot capture some central cases of inner speech in executive tasks because they cannot be described as cases of bringing thought into consciousness. Then I will offer a revised version of the activity view and I will apply it to some examples so as to show that it is better posited to account for them. I end by considering two objections to the activity view and a possible way to address them. (shrink)

This paper examines Derk Pereboom’s argument against punishment on deterrent grounds in his recent book Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. It suggests that Pereboom’s argument against basic desert has not been shown to extend to the view that those who act wrongly lose rights against punishment for deterrent reasons. It further supports the view that those who act wrongly, if they fulfil compatibilist conditions of responsibility, do lose rights to avert threats they pose. And this, it is argued, (...) supports punishment on deterrent grounds, at least in some limited cases. (shrink)

In this short conversation, I will engage Jonathan Chimakonam’s essay entitled “The knowledge Question in African Philosophy: A Case for Cogno-Normative Epistemology” published as the chapter four of [Atuolu Omalu: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy]. I will identify the major submissions of the essay and engage them critically with the aim of opening new vistas of thought. My method will be conversationalim. Keywords : Conversational philosophy, Jonathan Chimakonam, African philosophy, epistemology, cogno-normative.

ABSTRACTPopular music life is permeated by a quantitative form of male dominance, and has been for several decades. Based on a recent study this article engages with the reproduction of said male dominance by attempting to understand boys’ approaches to popular music and musicians. In particular, by making use of an interdisciplinary explanatory feminist theory the article seeks to show that interacting mechanisms at different levels make the adoption of a so-called ‘identificatory’ approach attainable for boys. The potential effect of (...) their adoption of this approach is that male dominance within popular music life is reproduced. In addition to this, however, a more general aim of this article is to illustrate the ways in which critical realism can inform empirical gender research, especially in terms of the postulation of explanatory mechanisms. (shrink)

Scanlonian contractualism rejects the consequentialist assumptions about morality, value, and rationality in virtue of which deontological constraints appear paradoxical. And yet, Jeffrey Brand-Ballard and Robert Shaver have claimed that it cannot succeed in defending the said restrictions. That is because they see Scanlon’s tie-breaking argument as threatening to justify aggregation in paradox of deontology cases. I argue that this claim rests upon a failure to appreciate contractualism’s relational character. Once we take this feature of the view into account, it (...) becomes clear that the tie-breaking argument is ruled out in cases where the only way for us to prevent several killings would be to commit one ourselves. To show this, I provide a contractualist explanation of why our duty not to harm persons is stricter than our duty to help them when they are threatened with harm. I conclude by distinguishing two ways in which this defense of deontological restrictions might bring contractualism objectionably close to absolutism. (shrink)

Attempts to extend the classical Hausdorff difference hierarchy to the case of partitions of a space to k > 2 subsets lead to non‐equivalent notions. In a hope to identify the “right” extension we consider the extensions appeared in the literature so far: the limit‐, level‐, Boolean and Wadge hierarchies of k ‐partitions. The advantages and disadvantages of the four hierarchies are discussed. The main technical contribution of this paper is a complete characterization of the Wadge degrees of Δ02‐measurable k (...) ‐partitions of the Baire space. (© 2007 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

In this lucid and insightful study, Stephen Makin investigates a form of argument widespread in ancient Greek philosophy, where the absence of a reason for one alternative to be the case rather than another is used to establish substantive conclusions—where the alternatives are “indifferent”. Examples abound: Anaximander engages in such reasoning to show that the Earth does not move; Zeno of Elea to show that what is cannot be divided; Democritus to argue for finite divisibility, on the one hand, and (...) the infinite variety of atoms and worlds, on the other; not to mention the extensive use of such arguments in ancient skepticism. (shrink)

Excerpt from Les Sceptiques Grecs Enfin le doute lui-meme n'est pas le scepticisme. C'est du doute seulement qu'on pourrait dire qu'il est a peu pres contem porain de la pensee humaine; car, pour un esprit qui reflechit, la decouverte de la premiere erreur suffit a inspirer une certaine defiance de soi; et combien de temps a-t-il fallu a des esprits un peu attentifs pour s'apercevoir qu'ils s'etaient plus d'une fois trompee? About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of (...) rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Psychologists and neuroscientists have recently been unearthing the unconscious processes that give rise to moral intuitions and emotions. According to skeptics like Joshua Greene, what has been found casts doubt on many of our moral beliefs. However, a new approach in moral psychology develops a learning-theoretic framework that has been successfully applied in a number of other domains. This framework suggests that model-based learning shapes intuitions and emotions. Model-based learning explains how moral thought and feeling are attuned to local material (...) and social conditions. Philosophers can draw on these explanations, in some cases, in order to vindicate episodes of moral change. Explanations can support justifications by showing that they are not mere rationalizations. In addition, philosophical justifications are a fertile source for empirical hypotheses about the rational learning mechanisms that shape moral intuitions and emotions. (shrink)

Research on collective emotion spans social sciences, psychology and philosophy. There are detailed case studies and diverse theories of collective emotion. However, experimental evidence regarding the universal characteristics, antecedents and consequences of collective emotion remains sparse. Moreover, current research mainly relies on emotion self-reports, accounting for the subjective experience of collective emotion and ignoring their cognitive and physiological bases. In response to these challenges, we argue for experimental research on collective emotion. We start with an overview of theoretical frameworks to (...) identify a set of three characteristics of collective emotion. Based on research in cognitive and affective sciences, we then examine the corresponding candidate mechanisms. Finally, we highlight outstanding questions, review experimental evidence, and suggest ideas for future experimental research. (shrink)

This paper attempts three things. It invites you to engage critically with me in the adjudication of a particular controversy. It attempts to argue for and exemplify important procedures which distinguish good and bad thinking in a critical mode. And it argues the case for the separate teaching of critical thinking (henceforth CT).

The case of clinical trials for convalescent plasma during COVID-19 illustrates important lessons for realizing public sector approaches to biomedical research and development. These lessons, centering on mission, transparency, and spillover effects, can be translated to wider efforts to develop a “public option” for clinical trials.

The article deals with the problem of representation and considers such points as its necessity in science, contemporary crisis of representation and its possible outcome. The paper also scrutinizes the case of representation of scientific researches by means of scientometrics methods. The need of the representations in science is determined by three points: absence of the direct access to the fact, certainty of the fact which exceeds the certainty of the immediate experience and consolidation of the scientific community by any (...) stable representation. The sense of crisis concerns the confusion of the representation with the reality and the fact that it hides the reality as well. The scientific research is necessarily represented by means of scientometrics methods, which is connected with the unintelligibility of the idea of the scientific researches to the outsiders. The idea of quantitatively estimated scientific outcome replaces the essential, qualitative intentions and impedes to achieve them. This fact evokes the criti­cism against scientometrics methods from the side of scientific community. The authors suggest the ways to overcome this crisis. One of the steps against it implies the attention to the genesis of such type of representation. This means keeping in mind the fact that scientometrics appeared on the basis of the scientific com­munity’s necessity to search for the information about already existing researches and to disseminate the ideas. (shrink)

Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the (...) self-concept in self-ascriptions of action can be fundamentally third-personal and concern a body that is not presented as one’s own, but as an object among others. (shrink)

As a final project for a business and society course, students presented analyses of ethical dilemmas in business settings; each dilemma was different, chosen either from the student’s personal business experience or from a recent business news event. Students identified multiple decision criteria (financial, ethical, etc.) relevant to the dilemma and then recommended a decision, reflecting a prioritizing of the multiple decision criteria. The goal of this research was to learn whether personal experience led to different decision priorities. Analyses from (...) 121 students taken from six semesters of the course were sorted by choice of topic, as well as by which decision criterion was given top priority. Results showed significant differences (Chi-square value of 38.50562, significance level of 5.45963E-10) between the personal examples and the news examples. Students typically put ethical concerns first when analyzing news events. However, whenit came to personal events, more self-serving concerns often took priority. These disparate results suggest that even when knowledge is gained from study of theory and cases, it may not be applied to dilemmas that arise in students’ own experiences. (shrink)

Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when (...) considering the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson. (shrink)

In the global economy, linguistic diversity influences economic and political development as well as public policies in positive and negative ways. It leads to financial costs, communication barriers, divisions in national unity, and, in some extreme cases, conflicts and war--but it also produces benefits related to group and individual identity. What are the specific advantages and disadvantages of linguistic diversity and how does it influence social and economic progress? This book examines linguistic diversity as a global social phenomenon and (...) considers what degree of linguistic variety might result in the greatest economic good.Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber look at linguistic proximity between groups and between languages. They describe and use simple economic, linguistic, and statistical tools to measure diversity's impact on growth, development, trade, the quality of institutions, translation issues, voting patterns in multinational competitions, and the likelihood and intensity of civil conflicts. They address the choosing of core languages in a multilingual community, such as the European Union, and argue that although too many official languages might harm cohesiveness, efficiency, and communication, reducing their number brings about alienation and disenfranchisement of groups.Demonstrating that the value and drawbacks of linguistic diversity are universal, How Many Languages Do We Need? suggests ways for designing appropriate linguistic policies for today's multilingual world. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anscombe’s classic paper Causality and Determination claims that causation can be perceived. It also defends causal singularism, the idea that the causal relation is fundamentally between the particular cause and effect, and does not depend on regularities holding elsewhere in the universe. But does the former furnish an argument for the latter? The present paper analyses a special type of causal experience involving emotional reactions to present stimuli; for instance, being frightened by a spider. It argues that such experiences (...) are strongly local, in the sense that they justify belief in a local causal relation independently of our knowledge about events elsewhere in the universe. If this analysis is correct, Humean regularity theories of causation are false; and all other non-singularist theories of causation face a difficult explanatory challenge. This means that the case for causal singularism comes out considerably strengthened. (shrink)

According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principles for coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider (...) several objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected. (shrink)

La experiencia hermenéutica, para Gadamer, posee tres momentos fundamentales en los que se reúnen el componente empírico, histórico y el lingüístico. El objetivo general de este escrito es ver cómo se da este fenómeno en el caso de la experiencia estética. Para ello, en una primera parte, desarrollaremos el modelo del encuentro con otro que se comporta como un tú, es decir, que interpela e interroga, con lo que expondremos un aspecto esencial del carácter lingüístico de toda experiencia. En una (...) segunda parte nos preguntaremos si este modelo del ‘tú’ es extensible a la experiencia estética. En función de esto veremos los llamados tres momentos de la experiencia según Gadamer en el modo en que se dan tanto en el caso del encuentro con otro, que se comporta como un tú, y en el caso de la experiencia estética; destacando tangencialmente, en ambos casos, las vertientes kantianas de la exposición de Gadamer. Understanding and beauty: parallels between hermeneutic and aesthetic experience, according to Hans-Georg Gadamer According to Hans-Georg Gadamer the hermeneutical experience has three fundamental moments in which the empirical, historical and linguistic components meet. The overall objective of this paper is to see how this phenomenon occurs in the case of aesthetic experience. For this purpose, in the first part we will develop the model wherein one experiences an encounter with another who behaves like oneself, that is to say, who challenges and questions. This will expose an essential aspect of all linguistic experience. In the second part, we will inquiry if this model of the other being “you” can be extended to the aesthetic experience. On this basis we see the so-called three moments of the experience according to Gadamer, in the way they are displayed both for the encounter with another who behaves as a “ you” , and in the case of the aesthetic experience. For both cases, we will tangentially highlight the Kantian aspects of Gadamer’s explanation. (shrink)

Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of (...) our pre-theoretical conceptions, I propose, instead, a strategy to circumvent this rather unexpected result: to reject subject-specific de se contents in favour of subject-specific ways of thinking that do not enter into the content of one's attitudes. (shrink)

My response to Shelly Kagan’s book, The Geometry of Desert, is to raise both general and more specific issues. I criticise Kagan’s way of setting up his project. I will suggest many factors other than desert better explain Kagan’s cases. I then examine more particular aspects of the project. I investigate Kagan’s discussion of what he calls the V-shaped skyline. According to Kagan, the V-shaped skyline represents the idea that it is more important that the very vicious and the (...) very virtuous get what they deserve than that the morally neutral get what they deserve. He finds this view attractive. I will suggest that the V-shaped skyline does not represent Kagan’s idea, and that there are independent reasons to reject the V-shaped skyline. Finally, I explore the possibility that Kagan’s account of desert implies that we have reasons not only to alter people’s levels of well-being to fit their levels of virtue, but also reasons to alter people’s levels of virtue to fit their levels of well-being. Kagan’s way of representing desert suggests that we have such reasons. However, I argue that it is implausible that we do. This casts doubt on Kagan’s way of understanding desert. (shrink)

In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept‐individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

The paper uses insights from the so-called rape in disguise case study to describe forensic DNA practices in the Netherlands in late 1980s. It describes how "reliabilities" of forensic DNA practices were achieved. One such reliability - convincing evidence - proliferates body parts through time and space. Then, attention shifts to the individual who was suspected of having committed the rape. He was asked to deliver tissue for DNA typing, but refused to do so. Hence DNA typing could not be (...) used to connect the suspect to a cervical smear collected from the body of the victim. His refusal and the legal impossibility to use force to obtain his biological material led first to questions in the Dutch parliament and then to the Dutch forensic DNA law. Other legal measures enacted after this are also described. I argue that, by means of the various Dutch forensic DNA laws and new forensic genetic techniques, the application of forensic DNA practices have shifted from identification and evidence to a tool for criminal investigation and prevention of future crimes. In the final part of the paper, the right to inviolability of the body and its synonym bodily integrity are emphasised. I argue that despite the various forensic DNA laws, bodily integrity of obtained tissue for DNA typing is still at stake as the result of convincing evidence. (shrink)

After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and radically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must face a version of the old systematicity challenge: either it does not explain systematicity, or else, it is just an implementation of representational theories. To show this, I present a purely behavioral and representation-free account of systematicity. I then (...) consider a case of insect sensorimotor systematic behavior: communicating behavior in honey bees. I conclude that anti-representational dynamicism fails to capture the fundamental trait of systematic behaviors qua systematic, i.e., their involving exercises of the same behavioral capacities. I suggest, finally, a collaborative strategy in pursuit of a rich and powerful account of this central phenomenon of high cognition at all levels of explanation, including the representational level. (shrink)

According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principlesfor coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider several (...) objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected. (shrink)

It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such (...) as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Forms of Life and Cultural EndowmentsVictor Peterson IIYou know, honey, us colored folk is branches without roots and that makes things come round in queer ways.—Zora Neale Hurston (Their Eyes Were Watching God 15)what does it mean when we speak of a form of life? When speaking of a form of life, we consider one different from others by way of its mode of expression, that is, by its (...) means of construction. This interpretation lends itself to a functional analysis of the material put to use and whose operations jointly express the concept we are after. Modes of expression can be plotted between a rhetorical and semantic axis (Gates 48). As such, "[t]he level of connotation of the visual sign, of its contextual reference and positioning in different discursive fields of meaning and association, is the point where already coded signs intersect with the deep semantic codes of a culture and take on additional more active ideological dimensions" (Hall 56). Coordinates within this domain encode signifying practices, revitalizing the traditional concept of signification as a function of what's signified with respect to a signifier. The content of a syntagm in this coordinate system, a point in this plane, indexes its function with respect to others. As such, we will conceive of the content of modes of expression functionally.A function is defined by pairing an element from a domain and another from a sub/co-domain whereby that pair is an element of that function. In this way, we can treat functions as abstract objects. If we treat a domain as what determines the availability of an expression, and a sub/co-domain as representative of its range of application, then the function of applying some proposition maps a movement from a domain of selection to one of composition, that is, its use with respect to others. The function of an expression, then, represents an operation over the possible worlds of its appropriate application (Taylor 201–02, 269, 276). This becomes more interesting when considering assertions whereby one subject is known to be the case for another, a concept that's modeled when a proposition from one is appearing in the object position of another (Fara 65–73). Resultingly, a proposal for an [End Page 26] ontology constituted by modes of interaction rather than identity stipulations to physical entities arises. It follows that if a form of life is understood by way of its mode of expression, then its content is expressed as an ensemble of the functions of its operations. Let this ensemble of functions be called an endowment.There is a pervasive debate in cultural studies that obsesses over proprietary notions as well as the ability to locate an origin. With that in mind, let us consider a coordinate system where there are two perpendicular axes, and we define positions within the space provided at the intersection of lines drawn from each. Each axis is represented by an ordered series of markers. A line drawn from each axis indicates that the coordinates indexed at their intersection is a function of these two markers. This locates an individual at a point in that domain, indexing a relation between the axes framing that space. Therefore, that coordinate-wise space, here a domain of possible expression, is not "empty" as pessimists would claim, but is filled with functional-content, albeit functions yet applied and marked by a point in that plane.Although we are currently speaking of two-dimensional space, the same follows for as many dimensions as we want. A point's location is a function of three values in three dimensions, four in four dimensions, and so on. Forms of life, then, will be comprised of four dimensions. This allows for a space-time conception, wherein joint expressions bend space-time and that space dictates those individuals' possible movements. From this, we construct a geometrical model of space-time represented as a cube composed of two-dimensional slices with these slices extending in a particular direction like cards stacked one on top of the other to model time.We want our conception of a form of life to be spatial. After all, it... (shrink)

This essay discusses a core tenet of pessimism, Afropessimism, in particular. Pessimism claims to be a metatheory analyzing the assumptive logics of the system it critiques. Afropessimists hold that a logical treatment of pessimism is unwarranted because pessimism does not employ a logical treatment of its object. We’ll discuss Afropessimism and, by extension, pessimism, in general, on their own terms as metatheory. We’ll see that a metatheory indirectly follows the logic its object follows directly. From this, a metatheory must hold (...) an assumptive logic of its own, even if superficially disavowed. Consequently, we’ll arrive at a puzzling result when, in this particular case, the metatheory’s claims empty its object of its content, hence the pessimism. (shrink)

I defend an alternative theory of conversational implicatures that does without Grice's notion of making‐as‐if‐to‐say. This theory characterises conversationally implicating that p as a way to mean that p by saying that q or by saying nothing. Cases that Grice's theory cannot capture are captured, and cases that Grice's theory misdescribes are correctly described. A distinction between conversational implicatures and pragmatic inferences from what speakers express is required, as well as a non‐implicature treatment of figurative speech.

This response deals with seven of the major challenges the commentators have raised to the target article. First, I show that the historical-anecdotal method I have followed has its roots in sociology, and that there is a strong case for the development of a “psychology of history.” Next, the observational data suggesting that intentional cruelty cannot be restricted to humans is rebutted on the grounds that cruelty requires not only an intention to inflict pain, but to do so because that (...) pain would cause the victim to suffer – which requires a theory of mind. Third, in the light of the commentaries, I recognise that not only predation but also intraspecific aggression contributes to the development of cruelty. Fourth, I contrast nativists and environmentalists, the former regarding cruelty as a universal human capacity and the latter holding the view that cruelty is acquired through social learning, and argue that there is an otherworldly quality to the environmentalist view. I then show (the fifth challenge) that the target article does generate testable hypotheses. Sixth is a consideration of the implications of the target article for the re-admission of the concept of evil to the psychological lexicon; and seventh, a consideration of the commentaries which note that the cultivation of compassion is a tool for the prevention of cruelty. The last section of the response replies to questions of detail and rebuts some misrepresentations of my argument. Correspondence:c1 Correspondence to: West Hill House, 6 Swains Lane, Highgate, London N6 6QS, United Kingdom. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze how the concept of African Christian diaspora religion and/or spirituality, as a missionary-based model, is currently being used and defined within African transnational research and diaspora religion. I conducted a review using a citation search strategy to retrieve peer-reviewed articles that explore the extent to which the seminal paper of Steven Vertovec on “Diaspora Religion” has informed the conceptualization and analysis of the concept of African Christian diaspora religion and/or spirituality. The search (...) generated empirical articles which met the inclusion criteria and were included for concept analysis. This concept analysis identified five emerging attributes of ACDRS as a network of support, a transnational dynamic, a platform for civic engagement and activism, the basis for developing place bonds and diaspora identity, and as an experiential religion. These defining attributes position ACDRS as a multidimensional concept encompassing noninstitutionalized religious expressions and activities, albeit with limited empirical data. I also discussed some study limitations and conceptual issues related to the attributes, antecedents, consequences, and cases of ACDRS. (shrink)

Steven Heine’s latest book on the history of kōans, Like Cats and Dogs: Contesting the Mu Kōan in Zen Buddhism, is his second monograph dedicated to a single kōan case record. The author’s first such offering, Shifting Shape, Shaping Text: Philosophy and Folklore in the Fox Kōan, focused on the second case record of the thirteenth-century Gateless Gate collection. Published at the end of the 1990s the text was a response, in many ways, to the two authors who dominated the (...) field of Zen studies during that decade, Bernard Faure and William Bodiford, particularly in regard to the historical relation between monastic Chan/Zen and popular forms of supernatural belief and practice... (shrink)