Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Thinking Disagreement.Víctor M. Verdejo & Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez - 2021 - Theoria 87 (6):1562-1584.
    In this paper, we bring into focus the level of thought or content in the elucidation of disagreement. We set out the view that disagreement at this level involves a specific form of noncotenability, namely, noncotenability as captured by sense or intension as opposed to reference. We present the challenge that nourishes the alternative referential view and suggest, through examples, that (i) only intensional disagreement is apt to adequately accommodate basic rationality constraints on disagreement, and (ii) it can meet the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.
    I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations