This article is in two parts, with part II to appear in the next issue of JAE (Spring 2013). Part I (with six sections), in this issue, has two related objectives. The first objective is to examine a number of key substantive, methodological, and science-practice issues related to the field designated here as empirical psycho-aesthetics. The second objective is to present an outline of its origin and discuss certain important features of several related fields—experimental philosophy, cognitive-science-and-art, (cognitive) neuroscience of art, (...) and neuroaesthetics. To a certain extent, the comparative goal is approached through the analysis of several recent significant controversies. Throughout the discussion, the .. (shrink)

Résumé L’auteur entend synthétiser le contenu et les principaux résultats de quatre étapes décisives du développement des études concernant les frontières. Il redéfinit les concepts, les méthodes et les domaines d’application de ces secteurs de la recherche. Il met surtout l’accent sur la période contemporaine, insistant sur la discussion des approches post-modernes. Le premier ensemble de ces approches insiste sur l’évolution des identités territoriales et sur les relations entre centre et périphérie, facteurs principaux d’établissement des frontières et de leurs fonctions. (...) Le deuxième ensemble souligne l’importance des facteurs géopolitiques, y compris les différences culturelles entre territoires voisins. Les considérations de sécurité interpellent massivement ce groupe qui cherche à expliquer les changements relatifs aux régimes frontaliers. Le troisième ensemble s’attache à l’influence des perceptions de la diversité du monde contemporain pour les élites politiques et pour les opinions publiques. D’autres approches, enfin, analysent les frontières à partir de la combinaison des facteurs politiques et institutionnels ainsi que des perceptions des réseaux transfrontaliers à plusieurs niveaux du territoire. (shrink)

This article analyzes the philosophical views of the Russian philosopher Andrey V. Smirnov. Smirnov has advanced and substantiated the idea that there exist at least two distinct ways of linking th...

Several key substantive, methodological, and science-practice issues that concern the field designated as empirical psycho-aesthetics were examined in part I (in the Winter 2012 issue of JAE) of this two-part article. Also presented was an outline of the discipline's origin and its relationship with elder and younger "sisters"—philosophical aesthetics, experimental philosophy, cognitive-science-and-art, (cognitive) neuroscience of art, and neuroaesthetics. The comparative goal was in part approached through the analysis of several recent significant controversies and debates.Here, in the six sections of part (...) II of the article, empirical work on various problems that are relevant to the discussion initiated in part .. (shrink)

The article is a study into the advent of the ‘systems approach’ in Soviet psychology in the 1970s. This arose mainly through the theoretical publications of B. F. Lomov, written after he had been appointed director of the newly established Institute of Psychology. These publications are examined as reflections of those interests related to the sociopolitical role of the director of this leading psychology institution, which was officially charged with building a common theoretical and methodological framework for all Soviet psychology. (...) The main goal of these texts, predetermined by the role of their author, was to advance a theoretical scheme that made possible a formal unification of the schools of psychology, and which at the same time promoted an image of psychology as a research field that was both capable of achieving practically applicable results and compatible with the new ‘big science’ trend. (shrink)

An increase in the level of strength endurance can be carried out during the period of a special preparatory stage in the annual cycle of training athletes. The present research proposes a periodization of shooters' sports training with the substantiation of the measures taken to develop such a motor quality as strength endurance. The aim of the research is to organize the training process in a way that the development of the motor quality, strength endurance, enhanced performance in shooting. Young (...) men of 13-15 years old engaged in educational training groups of children's and youth sports school on bullet shooting were selected to participate in the experiment. (shrink)

The doctrine of the “absence of the self” ( anātman ), which is the basis of the ontology of Buddhist schools of all possible orientations, in its application to practical activity implies the existence of such an organizing structure of cognition, which in its essence differs both from the orthodox systems of Indian thought ( āstika ) and from the correlationist ideas of modern transcendental epistemology. The research presents the abhidharma as a genre of Buddhist literature and a discipline of (...) Buddhist system of knowledge (Abhidharma) serves as a cognitive model producing such an image of the world from which the problem of “Self” ( ātman ) is eliminated. Such “elimination” does not mean the destruction of the “I” (ego, personality) at all, but proposes to consider it as an “assemblage”, a composition or autonomous wholeness composed of heterogeneous elements of different natures, each of which in turn is an “assemblage”, the relations between and within the individual “assemblages” being external relations. At the center of the research is the question: is it possible (or how is it possible) to have a strategy of cognition that would not assume as its basis the dichotomy “cognizing subject - cognizable world”, but would have as its goal the transcendence of phenomenal existence. It is argued that Abhidharma/abhidharma is a description of elements shaping the structure of which could be regarded just as such a cognitive strategy. The paper is based on the author’s experience of translating Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (4th century) and a large commentary on it, the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, attributed to Sthiramāti (6th century). (shrink)

We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

This paper refines the received analysis of deceptive lies. This is done by assessing some cases of lies that are supposedly not intended to deceive and by arguing that they actually involve sophisticated strategies of intentional deception. These lies, that is, merely seem not to be intended to deceive and this is because our received analysis of deceptive lies is insufficiently sophisticated. We need to add these strategies to our analysis of deceptive lying. The argument ends by presenting this refined (...) analysis. (shrink)

Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e. knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies but I now see that they are more problematic than what (...) I initially thought. Therefore, I will discuss these lies in more detail, refine the existing cases, and resolve some anticipated objections. I conclude that tell-tale sign bald-faced lies are genuine lies not intended to deceive. (shrink)

In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are (...) either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions. (shrink)

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are not capable of forming intentions. Accordingly, (...) certain human behavior is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead. This solves our problem because if the function of A's behavior was to mislead, B's ending up misled was not an accident or a mere mistake even if A did not intend to deceive B. (shrink)

This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confidently believe is true. Thus, self-deceivers need not replace one belief (...) with another; rather, they may just increase existing credence in a proposition they already believe is true. (shrink)

This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3; Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be given preference. (...) And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

Self-deception makes best sense as a self-defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self-deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self-deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal benefit at the cost of inflicting short-term harm, which is (...) a basis for a unified account of the phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that this view is narrow. Cases of altruistic, benevolent, and even self-punishing self-deception also exist. There, the function is not the self-deceiver's benefit. In fact, self-deception may have no function at all. Therefore, I put forward a novel account that analyses the function of self-deception on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

In his article, Grossmann argues that, in the context of human cooperative caregiving, heightened fearfulness in children and human sensitivity to fear in others are adaptive traits. I offer and briefly defend a rival hypothesis: Heightened fearfulness among infants and young children is a maladaptive trait that did not get deselected in the process of evolution because human sensitivity to fear in others mitigates its disadvantageous effects to a sufficient extent.

This text is a classic of Lenin - his essay explores materialism and its relation to capitalism and how Communism can get over this psychological wish for material and empirical ownership.

This paper rejects an argument defending the view that the boundary between deception and manipulation is such that some manipulations intended to cause false beliefs count as non-deceptive. On the strongest version of this argument, if a specific behaviour involves compromising the victim’s reasoning, then the behaviour is manipulative but not deceptive, and if it involves exposing the victim to misleading evidence that justifies her false belief, then it is deceptive but not manipulative. This argument has been consistently used as (...) a reason to reject the traditional analysis of human deception, according to which intentionally causing someone to acquire a false belief is sufficient for deception. And because the traditional analysis is also consistent with our most basic intuitions about deception, it does matter whether this argument succeeds. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue (1) that the contents of some delusions are believed with sufficient confidence; (2) that a delusional subject could have a conscious belief in the content of his delusion (p), and concurrently judge a contradictory content (not-p) – his delusion could be transparent (Krstić 2020), and (3) that the existence of even one such case reveals a problem with pretty much all existing accounts of lying, since it suggests that one can lie by asserting what one (...) consciously and confidently believes is true, and (4) sincerity, since it suggests that asserting a proposition you believe is true is neither sufficient nor necessary for sincerity. If I am right about (1) and (2), then (3) and (4) follow easily. Therefore, the paper is mainly devoted to an analysis of transparent delusion and defending (1) and (2). (shrink)

Deceptionism about lying is the view that all lies are intended to deceive. This view sits uneasily with some cases that seem to involve lies not intended to deceive. We call these lies bald-faced because the liar lies while believing that the hearer knows that they are lying. The most recent deceptionist argument put forward by Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (this journal) defends the view that all genuine bald-faced lies are intended to deceive some of their hearers. I argue that this (...) argument is interesting but problematic: its premises do not support the view that all bald-faced lies are intended to deceive but rather only that some people who bald-faced lie to institutions or large audiences intend to deceive someone. Also, genuine bald-faced lies addressed at institutions are intended to (non-deceptively) manipulate institutions rather than deceive anyone. (shrink)

Answer set programming (ASP) is a form of declarative programming oriented towards difficult search problems. As an outgrowth of research on the use of nonmonotonic reasoning in knowledge representation, it is particularly useful in knowledge-intensive applications. ASP programs consist of rules that look like Prolog rules, but the computational mechanisms used in ASP are different: they are based on the ideas that have led to the creation of fast satisfiability solvers for propositional logic.

Physical theories are complex and necessary tools for gaining new knowledge about their areas of application. A distinction is made between abstract and practical theories. The last are constantly being improved in the cognitive activity of professional physicists and studied by future physicists. A variant of the philosophy of physics based on a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical theories is proposed. Readers should decide whether this option is useful for their understanding of the philosophy of physics, as well as other (...) philosophies of particular sciences. (shrink)

The paper has two objectives: to introduce the fundamentals of a triplet model of a concept, and to show that the main concept models may be structurally treated as its partial cases. The triplet model considers a concept as a mental representation and characterizes it from three interrelated perspectives. The first deals with objects (and their attributes of various orders) subsumed under a concept. The second focuses on representing structures that depict objects and their attributes in some intelligent system. The (...) third concentrates on the ways of establishing correspondences between objects with their attributes and appropriate representing structures. (shrink)

The scheme for classifications of concepts is introduced. It has founded on the triplet model of concepts. In this model a concept is depicted by means of three kinds of knowledge: a concept base, a concept representing part and the linkage between them. The idea of triplet classifications of concepts is connected with a usage of various specifications of these knowledge kinds as classification criteria.

This is an expository article about the solution to the frame problem proposed in 1980 by Raymond Reiter. For years, his “frame default” remained untested and suspect. But developments in some seemingly unrelated areas of computer science—logic programming and satisfiability solvers—eventually exonerated the frame default and turned it into a basis for important applications.

This is a review of some of the definitions of the concept of a stable model that have been proposed in the literature. These definitions are equivalent to each other, at least when applied to traditional Prologstyle programs, but there are reasons why each of them is valuable and interesting. A new characterization of stable models can suggest an alternative picture of the intuitive meaning of logic programs; or it can lead to new algorithms for generating stable models; or it (...) can work better than others when we turn to generalizations of the traditional syntax that are important from the perspective of answer set programming; or it can be more convenient for use in proofs; or it can be interesting simply because it demonstrates a relationship between seemingly unrelated ideas. (shrink)

The triplet model treats a concept as complex structure that expresses three kinds of information. The first is about entities subsumed under a concept,their properties and relations. The second is about means and ways of representing the first information in intelligent systems. The third is about linkage between the first and second ones and methods of its constructing. The application of triplet models to generalization and development of concept models in philosophy, logic, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, linguistics, artificial intelligence has (...) been demonstrated. The componential structure of the triplet model and extended concept classification have been given. Theoretical considerations are combined with historical case-studies of concept history. For scientists and students with an interest in problems of knowledge structure and representation. Abstract and Extended Summary in English. (shrink)

This paper examines Gadamer's and Davidson's dialogical models of interpretation. It shows them to be comparable, but importantly dissimilar with respect to the kind of agreement they require for communication to be possible. It is argued that this difference entails different concepts of alterity: they model not only how we talk, but implicitly who we can intelligibly talk to. Another important contribution of this paper is to uncover a distinction in Gadamer between two kinds of agreement missed so far by (...) all commentators. The final section of this paper defends a second thesis, namely that the degree of agreement required by the models is proportional to the conceptual difference it can make intelligible. Hence, the extent of graspable cultural difference is not only an empirical matter, but is entailed by our choice of model. (shrink)

This volume offers a wide range of both reconstructions of Nikolai Vasiliev’s original logical ideas and their implementations in the modern logic and philosophy. A collection of works put together through the international workshop "Nikolai Vasiliev’s Logical Legacy and the Modern Logic," this book also covers foundations of logic in the light of Vasiliev’s contradictory ontology. Chapters range from a look at the Heuristic and Conceptual Background of Vasiliev's Imaginary Logic to Generalized Vasiliev-style Propositions. It includes works which cover Imaginary (...) and Non-Aristotelian Logics, Inconsistent Set Theory and the Expansion of Mathematical Thinking, Plurivalent Logic, and the Impact of Vasiliev's Imaginary Logic on Epistemic Logic. The Russian logician, Vasiliev, was widely recognized as one of the forerunners of modern non-classical logic. His "imaginary logic" developed in some of his work at the beginning of 20th century is often considered to be one of the first systems of paraconsistent and multi-valued logic. The novelty of his logical project has opened up prospects for modern logic as well as for non-classical science in general. This volume contains a selection of papers written by modern specialists in the field and deals with various aspects of Vasiliev's logical ideas. The logical legacy of Nikolai Vasiliev can serve as a promising source for developing an impressive range of philosophical interpretations, as it marries promising technical innovations with challenging philosophical insights. (shrink)

It is proposed to analyze fuzzy concepts and relations between them in the frame of triplet concept modeling. Fuzzy concepts are introduced by means of the so-called fuzzification of dichotomous concepts. The cognitive and psychological aspects of concept possession are separated and studied.

We extend Gurevich-Harrington's Restricted Memory Determinacy Theorem), which served in their paper as a tool to give their celebrated “short proof” of Robin's decision method for S2S. We generalize the determinacy problem by attaching to the game two opposing strategies called restraints, and by asking “which player has a strategy which is a refinement of the restraint for the player and such that it wins the game against the restraint of the opponent?” We give a solution for the Determinacy with (...) Restraints Problem in the class of strategies with restricted memory for the GH games. The solution includes a criterion for the winning player and an explicit class of winning strategies. A determinacy result which includes similar information was first discovered by Büchi and Landweber and extended by Büchi . However, these pioneering works do not consider the determinacy with restraints. Also, the explicit presentation of winning strategies in these insightful papers does not emphasize their modular construction as do GH's and our proofs. In our view, this is a source of a difficulty in understanding these papers. Games with restraints and modular construction of winning strategies have applications to the semantics, development and verification of concurrent programs. A concurrent program can be viewed as a strategy in a certain game and a program specification can be regarded as a combination of a winning condition and restraints for the game , A. Yakhnis and V. Yakhnis ). The modularity of a winning strategyfor the game helps to generate a concurrent program from the strategy that satisfies the specification ). It turns out that such program specification requirements as mutual exclusion and an absence of a lockout or a deadlock are naturally represented as Büchi's or Gurevich-Harrington's winning conditions. The present paper can be read independently of the paper by Gurevich and Harrington. (shrink)

It is proposed to analyze the unity of scientific knowledge in terms of its structure-nominative reconstruction. -/- .

Tato stať se zabývá implicitním vztahem pojmu nutnosti a náhodnosti (bytí jsoucího) a pojmu zákona (bytí jsoucího) v Marxově filosofii spjaté (svázané) s explicitním vztahem pojmu nutnosti a náhodnosti (bytí lidsky jsoucího v ekonomicko-společenské bytné sféře) a pojmu zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího v ekonomicko-společenské bytné sféře) v Marxově politické ekonomii a ukazuje její ontologicko-nomologické přednosti, poukazujíc však na její antropologicko-ontologické nedostatky, spjaté zvláště s jejím historicismem (s "bídou historicismu").

Felicitous models were defined by Kit Fine in 1987 for the purpose of describing the semantics of negation in the programming language Prolog. They are often referred to as stable models, or answer sets. Years later, sophisticated software systems for generating answer sets were designed, and they became the basis of a new programming paradigm, called answer set programming. That programming method is used now for solving computational problems in many areas of science and technology. This chapter traces the early (...) history of felicitous models and the ways in which that idea contributed to computer science. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is only one proof for God’s existence in Avicenna, and only one way for establishing the proof within his metaphysical system. This metaphysical proof is essentially derived from a priori notions, among which the notion of existence has the central role. Avicenna’s proof is structured in such a way that all its concepts are either derived from the meaning of ‘existence’ or are connected with this meaning. In this sense Avicenna’s proof sets out a scenario (...) of discursive a priori knowledge established purely on considerations of fundamental ontological meanings such as ‘existence’, ‘existent’, ‘thing’, ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, ‘impossible’, ‘one’ and ‘cause’. (shrink)