This book constitutes the proceedings of the 17th International Conference, TAP 2023, as part of STAF 2023, a federation of conferences on Software Technologies, Applications and Foundations, which includes two more conferences besides TAP: ICGT (International Conference on Graph Transformations), and ECMFA (European Conference on Modelling Foundations and Applications) in Leicester, UK, in July 2023. The 8 full papers together with 2 short papers included in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 14 submissions. They were organized in topical (...) sections on Low-level Code Verification, Formal Models, Model-based test generation, and Abstraction and Refinement. (shrink)

In the past half century, the theory of the firm has become a specific and prolific research field. However, the social ontology of this central institution of capitalism has never truly been the subject of investigation. I consider this negligence harmful for organizational economics and management and, more broadly, for the social sciences, notably because the first and central question raised by the theory of the firm relates to its nature: What is a firm? For this reason, I propose some (...) novel considerations for a social ontology of the firm by focusing on social emergence, reconstitution, the two-level institutional logic of the firm, complex organizational dynamics and interacting mechanisms, and power. (shrink)

In his 1995 book Colour vision (New York: Routledge), Evan Thompson proposes a new approach to the ontology of color according to which it is tied to the ecological dispositions-affordances described by J.J. Gibson and his followers. Thompson claims that a relational account of color is necessary in order to avoid the problems that go along with the dispute between subjectivists and objectivists about color, but he claims that the received view of perception does not allow a satisfactory relational account (...) of color. Hence to avoid the problems of the subjectivist/objectivist dispute one must abandon the received view of perception. I describe an account which is similar to Thompson's, but which invokes instead the physical dispositional properties described by the received view. All of the distinguishing characteristics that Thompson claims separate his ecological dispositions from physical dispositions are in fact found in the physical dispositions appealed to by my proposed theory. Because my proposed theory is similar to subjectivism, Thompson's departure from the received view is not as radical as he claims. In a final section I describe the a posteriori manner in which a substantive departure from the received view must be carried out by describing an example of ecological experimentation. (shrink)

Although Schütz’s relationship with the Austrian school of economics was an intimate one, Lavoie and other Austrian scholars have challenged (a) Schütz’s characterization of praxeology as an objective science of subjective phenomena and (b) the ability of Schütz’s phenomenology, which emphasizes the subjective meanings of actors, to really make sense of spontaneous social orders. It is my contention, however, that Schütz can be adequately defended against both these charges. First, for Schütz, the claim that social science is an objective science (...) of subjective phenomena need not imply apodictic apriorism nor solipsism. Second, in spite of his emphasis on subjective meanings, the study of spontaneous social orders need not be difficult to justify. (shrink)

Première partie. De la question des mondes possibles aux présuppositions de la méta-éthique -- Deuxième partie. Différenciation logique et connaissance morale -- Troisième partie. Un paradigme pour penser les droits.

The evolution of the record producer from organizer to auteur, from Phil Spector and George Martin to the rise of hip-hop and remixing.

Practical and conceptual, the Responsible Research and Innovation set of books contributes to the clarification of this new requirement for all sciences and technological innovation. It covers the multiple and international responsibilities, by using various philosophical resources, mostly discussing the following topics: ethics, contingency, normative economy, freedom, corporate social responsibility (CSR), participative technological evaluation, sustainable development, geoengineering, the precautionary principle, standards, interdisciplinarity, and climate management. The ethics of efficiency must be considered with regard to the logic of action or to (...) economic, political, legal or scientific systems. This book presents a question on the central theme of responsible research and innovation (RRI), which has an ethical influence on effective logics. The issue is to question the opportunity and modularities of an ethical effective influence on the logics of efficiency of research and innovation. From the distinction of efficiency and effectiveness, lies the problem of efficacy, the ethical accord between the two. Thus appears the possibility of taking effective responsibility with respect to systematic injustices potentially linked to this efficiency. This book proposes categories to understand the ethical implications of research and innovation processes, under the aspect of their efficacy. (shrink)

Since Protagoras' classic “man is the measure of all things,” claims of relativism and counter-claims have been tendered. The nineteenth century saw Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Westermarck, Pareto, Marx, and others, suggesting that institutions, customs, moral codes, and the like, are “relative” both to the culture and to the time. At the crest of this wave of “relativism” surged a vicious claim: that truth and knowledge itself were merely functions of particular conditions. The “validity” of knowledge was said to be at the (...) whim of historic, social factors. Not only is no theory really true; no particular statement is ever so. Not only is no theory or statement really true; no theory of knowledge has thus far ever been free from the bias of its genesis. There have been no absolute insights for epistemology. Or so, at least, it was claimed. (shrink)

The supreme Roman epic and the greatest poem in Latin, the Aeneid has inspired many of the great European poets including Dante and Milton. The Trojan hero Aeneas, after surviving the sack of Troy, makes his way to the West, urged on by benevolent deities and following a destiny laid down by Jupiter, but harassed and impeded by the goddess Juno. He wins his way to Italy despite many trials, of which the greatest is the tragic outcome of his love (...) affair with Dido, Queen of Carthage. In Italy Aeneas visits the world of the dead, and is forced to wage a fearful war with the indigenous Italian tribes before he can found his city and open the history of Rome. The Aeneid survives as a poem not only of Roman imperialism but also of the whole world of human passion, duty and suffering. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

Prompted by Alfred Landé's appraisal of individual indeterminacy in both ordinary and quantum games of chance, this paper suggests an alternative assessment in terms of the model-structure of physical theory. Whereas Landé explains such indeterminacy by appeal to "the Leibnitzian principle" of causal continuity, the author sees no need for such a special explanation. Instead, he indicates how the partial interpretation of the kinetic and quantum models limits us to statistical generalities--to limited "areas of relative chance." The alleged indeterminism of (...) physics thus resides in the model and its partial interpretation in the sense that the statistical nature of statements about "the next throw" or about individual particles is built into the model that enables the scientist to talk at all about such outcomes or entities. (shrink)

Can history be objective? Is history a science or humanistic discipline? What is its subject-matter? These three questions are variations on a single theme—the objectivity of history—which I want to explore. Faced with the welter of claims and counter-claims regarding objectivity in history, there is need to be explicit about one's approach to these claims. My prime endeavor in this paper is to reformulate these questions from my scheme of reference. I want to consider the objectivity of historical knowledge from (...) a framework that does justice both to philosophic and methological issues and to historical knowledge-claims themselves. How this philosophic framework be labeled is immaterial. What is alone important is that it does distinguish philosophy proper from both science and its methodological analysis. Confusion between the three, I believe, frequently generates problems out of whole cloth. The result is that obfuscation of issues present in much recent literature concerning history. (shrink)

La science économique a toujours été réticente à l’égard du concept de pouvoir, qui ne saurait être opérationnalisé dans les modèles microéconomiques et qui justifierait des rationalisations ex post. Pourtant, le pouvoir est un vecteur d’institutionnalisation sociale que les économistes se doivent d’intégrer pour faire de la firme un objet de recherche de l’économie politique et réaliser de nouveaux progrès explicatifs. Partant, l’article ambitionne de proposer une analyse méthodologique renouvelée du pouvoir, lequel implique une structure collective tout en reposant sur (...) des individus acteurs. Fort de cette clarification conceptuelle, un essai de définition du pouvoir dans la firme est proposé : le pouvoir est la capacité latente (qui sera ou non exercée) d’une entité A à contraindre et à dessiner les choix d’une entité B de telle sorte que le comportement et les actions de B soient orientés dans un sens favorable à A, et ce par des mécanismes intrinsèques à la relation socioéconomique qui peuvent être formels ou informels. Une telle définition du pouvoir permet de reconsidérer l’agir transformatif dans la firme et de lier le pouvoir aux dispositifs relationnels des organisations du capitalisme. (shrink)

La science économique a toujours été réticente à l’égard du concept de pouvoir, qui ne saurait être opérationnalisé dans les modèles microéconomiques et qui justifierait des rationalisations ex post. Pourtant, le pouvoir est un vecteur d’institutionnalisation sociale que les économistes se doivent d’intégrer pour faire de la firme un objet de recherche de l’économie politique et réaliser de nouveaux progrès explicatifs. Partant, l’article ambitionne de proposer une analyse méthodologique renouvelée du pouvoir, lequel implique une structure collective tout en reposant sur (...) des individus acteurs. Fort de cette clarification conceptuelle, un essai de définition du pouvoir dans la firme est proposé : le pouvoir est la capacité latente (qui sera ou non exercée) d’une entité A à contraindre et à dessiner les choix d’une entité B de telle sorte que le comportement et les actions de B soient orientés dans un sens favorable à A, et ce par des mécanismes intrinsèques à la relation socioéconomique qui peuvent être formels ou informels. Une telle définition du pouvoir permet de reconsidérer l’agir transformatif dans la firme et de lier le pouvoir aux dispositifs relationnels des organisations du capitalisme. (shrink)

How can the medium be addressed when it is always already saturated in religious over-determinations and ever marked by theological concerns (such as revelation and incarnation) while, at the same time, religion would not be practiced and theology not be done without using some such medium? We encourage methodological and conceptual shifts, first, from medium to mediality; second, from religion to its partial negation (or, perhaps, partial permeation); third, from theology to doing the theological differently. With these shifts we desire (...) to initiate, continue, and intensify debates, specifically between theologians and scholars of religious studies and media theory. (shrink)

Vladimir Soloviev should probably not be described as a philosopher or theologian of the highest rank. However his importance in the intellectual history of Russia and of Eastern Orthodoxy in general is peerless. This fact is now slowly beginning to seep into Western scholarship. He was and remains relevant and interesting as a formidable animator, a man of enormously diverse interests, and a genuine ecumenicist. Without him the Russian theological school in twentieth century France would not have been possible. Moreover, (...) the curious debate about his repeated conversions and reconversions and his strongly pro-Jewish essays contribute to this interest. (shrink)

We already have a distinction between the intension and extension of terms. This is not simply the distinction that is operative in philosophy of mind, body, and action. There, the concern is with things, and with a physicalistic or a mentalistic account of them. The physicalist says he supports an ‘extensional’ analysis of things, the mentalist an ‘intensional’. So, the physicalist says that, in the end, only ‘the extensional language of physical science’ will do in ontology. But, associating this physical-mental (...) dichotomy with the intension-extension distinction as applied to terms is misleading. The ontological issue is obscured by the association. An ontologist wants, like Spinoza or Berkeley, to know whetherthingsare extended or not, and in what respects. This question makes central the concept of space, or more generally of ‘field’, ‘domain’. Unfortunately, the same word ‘extension’ is used also for the spread or location of athingin space. To dissociate the extension of a term, a logical notion, from the ontological notion of the spatial status of a thing, I introduce the new word ‘extention’. This coinage correlates, not with the ‘intension’ of terms—the logical correlate of ‘extension’—but with ‘intention’, a word that fortunately already has common currency, and reeks with connotations that have logical ties with ‘consciousness’. So, from here on, we have two dichotomies: intension-extension applying to terms, and intention-extention applying to things. Since terms are things, both sorts of considerations are relevant to them, the logical one and the ontological. Only the latter applies to, say, stones or persons, since these are not linguistic terms. (shrink)

In a recent paper I criticized the pragmatist theory of truth from the frame of reference of modern logical positivism. By showing the similarity between Karl Mannheim's claims of epistemological relevance for sociology of knowledge and certain pragmatist notions concerning truth I made criticism of the latter with the former. The aim of this present paper is to extend and elaborate upon those critical remarks regarding pragmatism both in order to answer objections raised since and to clarify what was said (...) there. Moreover, the evaluation of the pragmatist theory of truth may have been surprising to some since so much lately has been made of the points of agreement between pragmatism and modern positivism. It is thus also my intent to delimit agreements and disagreements and compare the respective emphases in pragmatist and positivist thought concerning the nature of truth. (shrink)

Although Schütz’s relationship with the Austrian school of economics was an intimate one, Lavoie and other Austrian scholars have challenged (a) Schütz’s characterization of praxeology as an objective science of subjective phenomena and (b) the ability of Schütz’s phenomenology, which emphasizes the subjective meanings of actors, to really make sense of spontaneous social orders. It is my contention, however, that Schütz can be adequately defended against both these charges. First, for Schütz, the claim that social science is an objective science (...) of subjective phenomena need not imply apodictic apriorism nor solipsism. Second, in spite of his emphasis on subjective meanings, the study of spontaneous social orders need not be difficult to justify. (shrink)

This paper argues that in order to understand West Indian economic underdevelopment, the saliency of the informal institutions that emerged during its colonial period and the effect these institutions have had on the emergence of a local entrepreneurial class can not be discounted. British colonial occupation, I contend, gave rise to two persistent informal institutions that have affected development: a belief in the ability and responsibility of government to direct the economy and pessimism regarding the possibility of entrepreneurial success. Relying (...) on Schumpeter’s discussion of the importance of entrepreneurs to economic development and North’s work on informal institutions, I examine how the poverty of entrepreneurs in the region and the cultures of corruption, privilege and intervention that evolved as a result of the region’s colonial experiences have hampered past efforts at development.Cet article soutient qu’afin de comprendre le sous-développement économique des Caraïbes, il est important de ne pas négliger la prédominance des institutions informelles qui ont émergé durant la période coloniale et l’influence que ces institutions ont eue sur l’émergence d’une classe entrepreneuriale locale. L’occupation coloniale britannique, selon l’auteur, a donné naissance à deux institutions informelles persistantes qui ont affecté le développement : une conviction dans la capacité et la responsabilité du gouvernement à diriger l’économie et un pessimisme vis-à-vis de la possibilité de succès entrepreneuriaux. En se fondant sur la théorie Schumpeterienne sur le rôle de l’entrepreneur dans le développement économique et sur les travaux de North concernant les institutions informelles, l’auteur examine comment la rareté des entrepreneurs dans la région et la corruption, les privilèges et les interventions qui ont évolué en résultat des expériences coloniales de la région, ont entravé les efforts de développement dans le passé. (shrink)